The Guyana-Venezuela Territorial Controversy: the International Approaches of the Government of Guyana, 1966-1992 by Clyde, Keane A
The Guyana-Venezuela Territorial Controversy: the




A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Queen Mary and
Westfield College, University of London, 2002.
1
Abstract
This thesis presents a case study of small state diplomacy. It investigates the
international approaches of Guyana from 1966 to 1992, to the territorial controversy
with Venezuela.
The Anglo-Venezuelan dispute over the boundary with British Guiana was
settled by arbitration in 1899, but was reopened in 1962. British Guiana gained its
independence in May 1966, after an agreement was signed in Geneva, which
designated the once settled dispute a "controversy". The foreign policy strategies
deployed by Guyana demonstrate the extent to which a small state can effectively
utilize diplomacy. The thesis challenges those interpretations which have viewed
Guyana's foreign policy mainly in terms of a mechanism used by the government to
secure legitimacy. Such arguments fail to consider the multifaceted characteristic of
foreign policy and the threat to Guyana's territorial integrity from the more powerful
Venezuela. It is contended that it would be more accurate to state that during periods
of tensions with Venezuela, preservation of the Guyanese state was the principal goal
of foreign policy. When relations improved, this goal was of continued importance,
but other goals became prominent.
The thesis analyses Guyanese-Venezuelan relations as Caracas pursued its
claim. It evaluates Guyana's international response as its main defence strategy,
given that state's military and economic weaknesses vis-a-vis Venezuela. It assesses
the effectiveness of Burnham's vitriolic diplomacy 1966-1985 and the more subtle
form during the Hoyte administration, 1985-1992. An examination of the foreign
ministries' archives in London, Washington, Caracas and Port-of-Spain was
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conducted to gain insights into the interaction of the of the dispute's re-emergence and
cold war concerns over Guyana. The measures taken by the USA, Britain, Brazil and
Trinidad and Tobago to ensure that Venezuelan action did not affect Burnham's rule
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Chapter 1:




This thesis presents a case study of small state diplomacy through an analysis of
the international approaches of the government of Guyana, 1966-1992, to the territorial
controversy with Venezuela. I argue that the foreign policy strategies deployed
demonstrate the extent to which a small state can effectively utilize multilateral
diplomacy to mobilize international support in the face of threats. As such, the thesis
challenges those interpretations of Guyana's foreign policy that have viewed it purely in
terms of being a mechanism to perpetuate rule or secure legitimacy by a government
which was lacking in this latter respect. It is the contention here that such arguments are,
at best, simplistic, since they fail to take into account the multifaceted characteristic of
foreign policy goals and specifically, the threat to Guyana's territorial integrity from its
larger and more powerful western neighbour.
The use of foreign policy as a defence mechanism emerged in the immediate post-
independence period as the key strategy in the government of Guyana's approach to
dealing with Venezuela's claims to a substantial portion of its territory. This strategy in
response to threats, real or perceived, has centred on publicising the problems on the
international stage with a view to winning support and in so doing, provide what it is
hoped would be a deterrent to the Venezuelan occupation of Essequibo county, the
largest and western-most of Guyana's three counties. The international approaches
emerged because of: (a) Guyana's military and economic weakness vis-a-vis Venezuela
made engaging the support of third parties a necessity for the former; (b) the failure of the
Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham government in Guyana to secure a defence agreement
with the departing colonial and/or regional power at independence in 1966; and (c)
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Burnham's confidence of winning the support of the Afro-Asian bloc on the international
stage.
Any understanding of the international approaches of the government of Guyana
to its territorial controversy with Venezuela must seek firstly to locate it in the context of
British Guiana's independence struggles. This is because: (a) the nineteenth century
dispute was re-opened at this time; (b) it became embroiled in the cold war concerns of a
Marxist government possibly leading the country to independence in the US's backyard;
and (c) the signing of the Geneva Agreement, which accorded the settled dispute the
status of a "controversy", became the price which Burnham was willing to pay to lead
British Guiana to independence. I have unearthed instances of Washington and London
intervening on behalf of the Burnham government in the late 1960s to get Caracas to
reduce tensions in order to ensure that Marxist leader Cheddi Jagan did not form the
government in Guyana In this regard, London was also instrumental in forging ties
between Brasilia and Georgetown.
Central to the arguments advanced in this thesis is cognisance that foreign policy
is multifaceted in terms of aims and outcomes. As such, there is recognition that in
pursuing international action in relation to the controversy, the government may have
gained a level of prestige which enhanced its status on the domestic stage. The rise of the
third world movement, which was facilitated by the detente of the 1970s, presented the
government of Guyana with enhanced opportunities for international approaches to the
territorial controversy. In the process, this increased its prestige amongst its peers on the
international stage and at home. The thesis argues that to simply dismiss the foreign
policy as being a tactic or "Machiavellian" diversion away from internal problems, as
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some writers have done, is to escape meaningful academic enquiry into a small state's
effective use of multilateral diplomacy.
I argue that during periods of heightened tensions with Venezuela, preservation of
the Guyanese state's territorial integrity was the principal goal of foreign policy. At times
of improved relations, this goal continued to be of importance in Georgetown, but other
foreign policy goals assumed prominence: prestige enhancement for the regime and
economic prosperity.
The thesis argues that the government of Guyana was particularly careful not to
solicit the support of the Eastern Bloc and Cuba on a bilateral basis in the controversy
despite growing links with these areas during the Burnham government in the 1970s and
1980s. This factor, I argue, is a direct result of the government's cognisance of the
strategic importance of the US in the controversy and hence the need not to take action
that may push Washington into openly supporting Venezuela, given the effect this may
have in emboldening Venezuelan actions against Guyana
The administration of Hugh Desmond Hoyte from 1985 to 1992, offers an
interesting contrast to the Burnham era 1964-1985, in spite of both governments
belonging to the same PNC party. This is because international lobbying against
Venezuela's claim continued, but in a more subtle form, It is posited that America's
endorsement of the Hoyte administration would, at least, have influenced Caracas' cordial
engagement with Georgetown, if not being, in part, the result of direct intervention by
Washington. Personal, as well as secret diplomacy, between Hoyte and his Venezuelan
counterparts were important in advancing ties between Guyana and Venezuela.
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I examine the bilateral and, in particular, secret diplomacy, between Caracas and
Georgetown as productive channels in advancing towards a solution of the territorial
controversy. This is especially in relation to The Protocol to the Geneva Agreement in
1970 and the Hoyte-Lusinchi/Hoyte-Andres Perez meetings between 1987 and 1992
which furthered talks and cooperation, resulting in the UN Good Offices process in 1990.
New insights are provided into these topics through a study of recently-released
Department of State documents and interviews conducted with those involved in the
areas concerned.
The internationalising of the Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy as the
prime facet of the government of Guyana's approach to this issue has not been without its
difficulties, especially during the Burnham era. Evidence of this can be found in the
problems encountered with CARICOM - a key source of support in the Guyanese
government's strategy - in the early 1980s.
The thesis offers fresh insights into the development of relations between Guyana
and Venezuela in the early 1960s and 1970s based on an analysis of recently released
documents from foreign ministries in London, Washington, Georgetown, Caracas and
Port-of-Spain. An attempt is made to fill the existing gaps in the literature on Guyana's
relations with Venezuela, both in relation to the controversy and more generally, through
an examination of published primary and second material. 'This has been supplemented
extensively by interviews with key personnel, namely ministers and policy officials,
directly involved in the area under study.
In view of the ongoing controversy over the Essequibo, this thesis concludes by
arguing that though south-south institutions, such as the NAM, have lost influence, the
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most effective approach for the government of Guyana is the continued involvement of
third parties, especially international bodies.
Organization of the Thesis
The literature on small states and/or developing countries has emphasised the
importance of personality or the charismatic leader in the politics of such entities. 1
Searwar, in particular, states, "The ruling group, in the case of the Caribbean, nearly
always reflects the perceptions and views of a dominant leader. ,,2 This fits the typology
of the "predominant leader" developed by Hermann, where decision-making is vested in a
single individual.3 It is not the intention here to contribute to this debate, but I have
found it useful for analytical purposes to divide the period under study in accordance with
the leadership changes in Guyana. This is because there are variations in the
international approaches to the Guyana-Venezuela controversy, 1966-1992, as a result of:
(a) the restraining influences of a right-wing coalition partner in the early stages of
government; (b) differences in leadership styles; and (c) differences in the international
environment. Hence, the substantive analysis has been categorized into the three periods:
"The Burnham-D'Aguiar Years 1964-1968", which comprise the PNCIUF coalition
government led by Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham as prime minister and Peter
D'Aguiar as fmance minister; "The Burnham Years 1969-1985" when the PNC became
the sole party in government led by Burnham as prime minister and later executive
president; and "The Hoyte Years, 1985-1992" that followed Burnham's death, but which
continued with the PNC in power, led by the former economic development minister,
1 See, as examples, Hill in Clapham (1977), pp.6-7 and Ince in Ince et al. (1986).
2 Searwar in Bryan et al. (2000), p.5.
3 Hermann et al. in Hermann et. al. (1987).
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Hugh Desmond Hoyte. The Burnham period, has been examined across two chapters,
"The Burnham Years 1969-1980" and "The Burnham Years 1981-1985" in order to aid
analysis of this lengthy period of office.
Chapter 1 explores the issues of small states and diplomacy. It also provides an
historical background to the post-world war two political developments in Guyana and
offers a critique of the existing literature on Guyana's foreign policy and the Guyana-
Venezuela territorial controversy.
Chapter 2, "The Guyana-Venezuela Territorial Controversy", provides an
historical background on the nineteenth century Anglo-Venezuela dispute before
examining the period surrounding the reopening of the dispute in 1962 and up to the
signing of the Geneva Agreement in 1966.
Chapter 3, "The Bumham-D'Aguiar Years, 1964-1968", focuses on the period
immediately after independence (26 May 1966) when the Guyanese leadership assumed
responsibility for foreign affairs and developed its own international strategies in
response to a tense period of relations with Venezuela over Essequibo.
Chapters 4 and 5, "The Burnham Years 1969-1980" and "The Burnham Years
1981-1985", analyse the international approaches to the controversy during the lengthy
tenure of the Burnham government. Both chapters are divided into two parts to facilitate
analysis, each part reflecting a particular period in Guyana-Venezuela relations and the
government's international approaches.
Chapter 6, "The Hoyte Years 1985-1992", examines the altered course of
international approaches to the Guyana-Venezuela controversy during the administration
of Hugh Desmond Hoyte.
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Terms and Definitions
The nineteenth century Anglo-Venezuelan dispute-cum-twentieth century
controversy over Essequibo county, represents a significant claim to five-eights of
Guyana's 216 000 square kilometres of territory. Child defmes territorial conflicts as
those stemming" ... from disputes over the possession and sovereign rights of portions of
the earth's surface, be they land or water." He distinguishes border conflicts as those
which" ... flow from the strains and tensions that seem to emerge almost inevitably when
two sovereignties meet at a frontier. ,,4 Given the size of the Venezuelan claim to part of
the state of Guyana and using Child's typology, I have opted for the designation in this
thesis of the Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy.i The controversy has been
categorized as the biggest territorial dispute in Latin America," October 3, 1999, marked
the one-hundredth anniversary of the arbitration award that was made in Paris to settle the
Anglo-Venezuelan territorial dispute. This date has also served as a reminder to the
government in Georgetown that the nineteenth century dispute continues in the form of a
controversy since Venezuela renounces the validity of the 1899 award. The Guyanese
government from independence to 1992 used its foreign policy, principally relying on
lobbying international institutions and individual states, as its main weapon to counter
Venezuela's territorial claims to Essequibo.
4 Child (1985), pp.13-14. Child's typology of conflict in Latin America, of which territorial and border
conflicts are two types, is a modified version of that developed for the Stockholm lnternaticnal Peace
Research Institute.
S Elsewhere Venezuela's claim has been described as the "Venezuela-Guyana Boundary Dispute" (e.g.
Braveboy-Wagner (1984a and 1984b) and '''Guyana-Venezuela Border Dispute" (e.g. Narine Singh, 1982).
Whether the terms "boundary", "border" or "territorial" are chosen, it is accurate to refer to Venezuela's
claim to Essequibo post-1966 as "a controversy" since this is the official definition given in the 1966
Geneva Agreement which will be discussed in chapter 2.
6 Braveboy-Wagner in Hopkins (1984b), p.229.
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Let us examine the question of what a "small state" is.7 A number of variables
have been used to construct the elements of size in state-types, including land and
population sizes, as well as economic resources. In this regard, for example, Taylor used
three criteria by which micro-states can be measured: population, GNP and area. As
Taylor admits, however, the use of any measurement to designate states as either macro
or micro ultimately depends on the criteria used by the researcher.i The Commonwealth
Consultative Group's 1985 report notes that the only common denominator to the tools of
measurement for small states, amongst the many interpretations, is population. 9 And
even this factor has been subjected to different calculations in the attempts at definition.
Hein's compilation on the policy-directed interpretations of what constitutes such
entities is indicative of the discord that has hindered an exact defmition. He identifies as
a "high cut-off point" figures ranging between 5 and 15 million 10. Vital's study, which
uses population and economic differentials to classify state types, varies the population
range of small states from 10115 million to 20/30 million for developed and developing
countries, respectively. He readily admits that what he terms "micro-states" (states with
even smaller population figures than those he classified as small states), " ... constitutes
yet another class of states with reasonably distinct and characteristic problems of their
own".'! A similar conclusion was reached by Barston who used the 10-15 million mark
to designate small states and singled out for special mention, the existence of states with
less than a million people. He recognized that even within that category there were
7 Wood in Benedict (1967), p.29, notes that the 1962-1964 seminars of the Institute of Commonwealth
Studies, from where his chapter was originally presented, found it "impossible" to decide on the meaning of
"smallness'".
8 Taylor in Rapaport et aI. (1971), p.199.
9 Commonwealth Consultative Group (1985), p.8.
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differences in material wealth and resources, for instance, between Luxembourg and
Mauritius.'? Such yardsticks of high population measurement predate the proliferation of
a number of miniscule states from the late 1960s as decolonization advanced.P Hein
provides a list of studies which have used the one million upper population mark to
defme small states, drawing attention to those which have dropped the upper limitations
to just a few hundred thousand. 14
Further potential for confusion exists between the names given to the smaller
states, even when there is consensus on the population size limit. Plischke's study on
microstates, for instance, uses the upper cut off point of 300, 000 people to delineate such
states, but implements a further division of "submicrostates" identified as those states
with less than 100, ooo." Hein, using the terminology of "microstates", classifies them
as those countries within the one million population limit. 16 The Conunonwealth
Consultative Group, which used the same numerical value, has opted instead for the title
of "small states"Y Clarke and Payne have observed in their 1987 publication that
"... something of a consensus has recently emerged about taking a population of one
million or less as the critical threshold" in defining small states; they adopt this emerging
standard for their own work." In the 1990s the UN singled out for special consideration
small island developing states which, in its view, faced particular ecological, economic
10 Hein in Dommen and Hein (1985), pp.24-25.
11 Vital (1967), pp.8-9.
12 Barston in Schou and Bnmdtland (1971), pp.41, 45.
13 Hein, op.cit., pp.23-25.
14 Ibid., pp.24-25.
15 Plischke (1977), Preface.
16 Hein, op.cit., p.16. See also Harden (1985), p.viii, who uses the same terminology.
17 Commonwealth Ccnsultative Group (1985), p.9.
18 Clarke and Payne in Clarke and Payne (1987), p.xviii.
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and other vulnerabilities. 19 More recently, the 1997 report by the Connnonwealth
Advisory Group set a population limit of 1.5 million or less to defme small states. The
increase of half a million from the 1985 Connnonwealth Consultative Group report is
said to be reflective of general population increases in small states. It follows that the
designation of Guyana as a small state, given its population of less than one million
people, is apt, irrespective of whether the 1 or 1.5million mark is used.
We may go one step further in classifying Guyana not only as small, but also as a
weak state. According to Handel, lithepower of a state is... best measured not against all
other countries, but in relation to its neighbors, and by the degree to which the strength at
its disposal matches its national goals and ambitions. ,,20 The designation of Guyana as a
weak state vis-a-vis Venezuela becomes evident when the economic, military and other
capacities of the two states are examined. As Tables 1 indicates, by all variables -
population, territory, economy and military - Guyana is weaker than Venezuela. The
latter is powerful not just in relation to its eastern neighbour, but as Myers argues,
Venezuela had emerged as one of three new regional powers in the 1980s.21 It was in
recognition of its weaknesses vis-a-vis Venezuela that the government of Guyana in 1966
decided to opt for diplomacy as the only mechanism by which it could adequately seek to
secure the state's territorial integrity.
19 UN (1992 and 1994). See also Briguglio inWorld Development (1995).
20 Handel (1990), p.52. See also pp.52-53 for further details on the economic, military and internaticnal
sr,temic factors which are used to designate states as weak.
2 Myers (1985), p.l l l. The other two emergent regional powers are said to be Cuba and Mexico.
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Total Armed Forces 2,200 33,500
Estimated GNP US$ 254 million 11.3 billion
Estimated Defence not available 267 million
Expenditure US$
Army Personnel 2,200 20,000
Navy Personnel nil manpower and 7, 500 (equipment includes
equipment 2 submarines, 3 destroyers
and 10 submarine chasers)
Air Force Personnel nil manpower and 6, 000 (equipment includes
equipment 111 combat aircraft)
Paramilitary Personnel 2,250 10,000
1983-1984
Population 890,000 15,200,000
Total Armed Forces 7, 000 (all services part of 40,500
army)
Estimated GNP US$ 511. 6 million 69.489 billion
Estimated Defence 25 million 1.142 billion
Expenditure US$
Army Personnel 6,500 27,500
Navy Personnel 300 (equipment includes 10 8, 500 (equipment includes
patrol boats) 3 submarines)
Air Force Personnel 200 (8 planes, 6 helicopters) 4, 500 (equipment includes
18 F-16A fighter jets)
Paramilitary Personnel 5,000 20,000
2000 (unless otherwise indicated)
AreakJn2 216,000 912,050
Population (estimate) 847,000 24.3 million
Population of the capital 254,000 3.01 million
(1995 estimate)
Urban Population (1997) 36.4% 86.5%
Life Expectancy (years) 61.1 (men), 67.9 (women) 70 (men), 75.7 (women)
Infant Mortality per 1000 59 21
live births (1997)
GDPUS$ 827 million 120.5 billion
GDP per head US$ 1,071 4,964
Key Export Agriculture = 50% approx. Oil = 84.2% of export
of export earnings earnings
Sources: EIU (2001a, 2001b); IISS (1972, 1984); and Turner (2000).
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Diplomacy as a Defence Mechanism for Small States
The 1983 US invasion of Grenada led to a number of studies on the security of
small states, heralding in a thematic synergy between academic studies and policy
reports. This marked a shift from earlier concerns about the viability and international
participation of such states as they have become independent entities from the 1960s. In
a critique of "the notion of viability of very small states", Enunanuel asserts the concept
is not without merit, but that it requires conceptualisation, less the implicit prejudices that
had marked the earlier debate.22 Blair, in what she terms "the ministate dilemma'"
considered the issue of whether such states, defined as having under 300, 000 people,
should be given full membership at the UN upon independence.f The Connnonwealth
Consultative Group report considered the economy of small states as part of the issue of
vulnerability rather than viability. It moved away from the earlier implicit questioning of
whether small states should be granted independence to one of accepting their
independent status, but recognizing threats specifically faced by such states." The report
by the Connnonwealth Advisory Group (1997) has gone one step further in looking at
ways of overcoming the vulnerabilities identified in the 1985 report.
Immediately after the invasion of Grenada, the literature stressed the importance
of diplomatic action by small states to ensure security and survival. It is unlikely that
22 See Emmanuel in Lewis (1976), pp.I-15.
23 Blair (1967). See also UNITAR (1971), pp.II-15, which noted the views in previous studies and the
reservations expressed by even the UN secretary-general in 1967 against small states being admitted as full
members of the UN or other international organizatioos. This debate mirrored the earlier discussions
concerning the admittance of the then independent small states, such as Liechtenstein, to the UN's
£[edecessor, the League of Natioos in the 1920s, UNITAR (1971), pp.II4-118, 122.
Commonwealth Consultative Group (1985), pp.14-22. Other areas of vulnerability considered in this
report include external aggression and threats to territorial and political security.
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such action on the part of Grenada would have changed the course of events surrounding
the US invasion. However, it will be argued here that the international approaches of the
Guyanese government from 1966 to 1992 illustrate the importance of diplomatic action
for the security of small states. The issue of protection, security and territorial integrity
of small states continued into the 1990s as a policy initiative, led by the UN General
Assembly, which has called for respect of the principles of the UN Charter: non-
interference in the international affairs of states and peaceful settlement of disputes. 25
The Connrnnwealth has also continued to examine the issue, looking at the new threats
to small states' security and how their vulnerability can be overcome." Earlier, Barston's
study in the late 1980s had identified four types, old and new, of security threats faced by
small states: territorial, political, economic and technological. 27
The Connnonwealth Consultative Group's report of 1985 stresses the importance
of diplomacy for small states' security. The report argues:
"In many respects a skilful use of diplomacy within the framework of a prudent
and well thought out foreign policy is a small state's first line of defence. Since
these states have no military or economic power to wield they are forced to rely
on diplomatic means in order to convey to other countries the nature of their
national interests in the different areas of international relations that are vital not
just to the security but to their very survival. And it is only through effective
diplomacy that they can hope to persuade wealthy and powerful nations to enter
into relationships with them which can work to their material advantage without
necessarily entailing unacceptable constraints on their sovereignty and genuine
independence. ,,28
25 See UN (1989 and 1991a) when the issue was brought onto the UN's agenda following threats to small
states from the actions of mercenaries. See also UN (1991 b) which notes that security concerns include the
traditional areas such as threats to territorial security and new areas such as drug-trafficking.
26 Commonwealth Advisory Group (1997) which notes a shift from the geo-political threat of the mid-
1980s to the emergent economic and environmental threats to small states in the 1990s. Its findings
contrast with the arguments of Easterly and Kraay (2000) of the World Bank, who argue that small states
are not a special category requiring special economic measures and that in some cases, their position is
better than other states.
27 Barston in Hafiz and Khan (1987), pp.231-232.
28 Commonwealth Consultative Group (1985), p.68.
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Linton asserts the validity of these same points ill his study which reviews the
Commonwealth Consultative Group's report:
"The truism that diplomacy is a state's first line of defence is particularly relevant
in the case of small states. Since very small states have no capacity for economic
or military leverage, diplomacy for them has a special creative and persuasive
function as a means towards securing desired ends which advance the national
interest. ,,29
It may be argued, that for small states diplomacy is the only, rather than first line of
defence. This is especially where, as in the case of Guyana, there is no access to the
military protection of a more powerful state. Espfndola emphasises the signiftcance of
diplomacy to small states even stronger than the Commonwealth Study Group when he
argues, "For small states ... diplomatic contacts are a matter of survival. ,,30 Reid addresses
this point when he argues, "... the need to depend on the external environment for support
can impose on microstates a necessity to participate in international affairs to a much
greater extent than larger states. ,,31 The centrality of diplomacy for such states, not only
in terms of security but also resources, has been advanced by Searwar: "For the small
state, whether it be in the Caribbean or elsewhere, but particularly in the Caribbean,
diplomacy must be the chief instrument in advancing its security and in securing
resources. ,,32 But what type of diplomacy are we referring to here? The answer to this
question is two-fold: in terms of conceptualisation and form.
In the traditional literature on international relations where the concern is with
militarily powerful states, diplomacy is depicted as carrying with it an element of threat.
29 Linton in Bryan et al. (1990), p.268.
30 Espfndola in Clarke and Payne (1987), p.70.
31 Reid (1974), p.39.
32 Searwar in CaribbeanAJjairs (1988), p.82.
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Morgenthau asserts, "It is the final task of an intelligent diplomacy, intent upon
preserving peace, to choose the appropriate means for pursuing its objectives. The means
at the disposal of diplomacy are three: persuasion, compromise, and threat of force. ,,33
Given that small states do not have the third aspect of diplomacy - military might - to fall
back on, it is clear that Morgenthau's framework was not designed with them in mind.
Yet, we can find elements within it that are applicable to small states, that is, in terms of
utilizing national resources on international issues of direct relevance to the state.
Morgenthau notes:
"The conduct of a nation's foreign affairs by its diplomats is for national power in
peace what military strategy and tactics by its military leaders are for national
power in war. It is the art of bringing the different elements of the national power
to bear with maximum effect upon those points in the international situation
which concern the national interest most directly.,,34
In the case of small states, the deployment of national power on international
issues also relies on a diplomacy that encompasses the techniques of persuasion and
compromise, but with the capacity to mobilise international support being in place of the
threat of military might. In this regard, Linton makes a salient point concerning the
diplomatic capabilities of small states: "Size is no limitation in respect of diplomatic
ability, even if a small population and limited resources mean that the size of the
diplomatic establishment and its geographical range are limited. ,,35 While skill is
important, these diplomatic limitations do impose impediments on small states'
functioning in the international arena; factors that clearly put them at disadvantage vis-a-
vis larger states. "The cumulative effect of the impact of very small size on microstate
33 Morgenthau (1985), p.565.
34 Ibid., p.159.
35 Linton in Clarke and Payne (1987), p.219.
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foreign policy decision-making is to reduce the resources which can be brought to bear
on the formulation and execution of programmes of action. 1136
Strategies have been identified for small states to overcome the deficiencies in
diplomatic manoeuvrability caused by meagre economic, population and military
resources. These techniques invariably centre on utilizing multilateral diplomacy as a
means of gaining access to and visibility on the world's stage in order to overcome size
limitations. As Searwar argues:
"... despite certain short-term gains that might accrue from secrecy and
competition, effective diplomacy must be founded in solidarity, as it is only the
group approach which can provide a mechanism for dealing effectively with the
unequal power relations in which small states are involved." 37
It is often argued that the most effective diplomatic forum for small states to carry out
multilateral diplomacy is the United Nations. Linton, for instance, asserts:
IISmall states need to maintain few overseas missions, but should seek to
maximise their representation in international agencies. Clearly selected major
powers and majoring states have priority, but a United Nations presence continues
to be of great advantage to small states, giving, as it does unrivalled access to the
world community and to technical assistance agencies. 1138
The salience of the United Nations for small states is a repeated theme in the literature on
these entities. Harden's study, coming in the wake of the Grenada crisis, asserts the
diplomatic economies of scale to be gained from participation in this world body:
"... representation in the United Nations offers small states a much more cost-
effective method of maintaining extensive relations with the outside word, than
bilateral diplomacy, which is often too costly both in fmancial and human terms
for micro-states to contemplate. The United Nations location in New York is also
helpful since it enables the Permanent Representative of a micro-state to the
United Nations to be jointly accredited as Ambassador to Washington. 1139
36 Reid (1974), p.23.
37 Searwar in Caribbean Affairs (1988), p.82.
38 Linton, op.cit., p.219. See also Blair (1967), p.11, who makes a similar point.
39 Harden (1985), pp.15-16. See also Hong in International Social Science Journal (1995), p.28 1.
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With a membership body of 189 states in 2000, the UN is the world's major diplomatic
centre. 40 The Commonwealth Consultative Group's report notes the key diplomatic
access offered at that organization:
"... the opening three weeks of each annual General Assembly, when most of the
world's Foreign Ministers are in attendance, affords small states a unique
opportunity to cultivate such relationships at the requisite high level; overtures
made at that time can then be followed up through contacts at the various national
United Nations missions. 1141
This unique feature of the United Nations offers small states the opportunity to mobilize
support on issues of importance at the relevant ministerial level of government from
states around the world. The opportunity to gain such access in one venue can reduce
small states' diplomatic costs; hence, the opening period of the General Assembly is of
significance for such entities.
Some of the studies cited above have identified Guyana as being amongst the
small states which have used international lobbying at the UN to gain support in the
territorial controversy with Venezuela.f Guyana's first foreign minister emphasised the
pertinence of this international body to his country when he stated:
"Our Permanent Mission to the United Nations established in New York is one to
which we attach very great importance - more particularly since we cannot afford
the establishment of Missions in the very large number of countries with whom
we have friendly relations and would wish to keep in contact. 1143
40 See Willetts (1978), p.84, who made a similar argument at a time when UN member states numbered
151. The point is emphasised further if we compare the UN to another major diplomatic centre,
Washington, which in 2001 had 164 embassies or other diplomatic representation accredited to it, but with
some operating from the respective missions to the UN in New York,
http://www.state.govlslcprlrlsldpllwint2001.
41 Commonwealth Consultative Group (1985), p.69.
42 Ibid., pp.70-71; Linton, op.cit., p.219. See also Griffith (1993), p.283; Braveboy-Wagner in Caribbean
Altairs (1988), pp.82-83; and Braveboy-Wagner (1989), pp.43-44.
4 Ramphal (1967), p.25.
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The Guyanese government's international strategies did not only focus on the United
Nations. Brundtland notes, international organizations in general can be used by small
states "... to mobilize support for their policies by widening the arena of debate and
cnticism ?" In concurrence with Brundtland's and more specifically, Linton's
prescription, the administration in Georgetown, 1966-1992, also lobbied major and
"majoring states", a regional organization and other multilateral fora.
Post- World War Two Political Developments in British Guiana
British Guiana gained its independence in May 1966 as Guyana and the period
before this event is one of the most turbulent in the state's history. It may be argued that
any understanding of the approaches of the government of Guyana to its territorial
controversy with Venezuela must seek to locate it in the context of British Guiana's
independence struggles. This is because: (a) the nineteenth century dispute was re-
opened at this time; (b) it became embroiled in the cold war concerns of a Marxist
government possibly leading the country to independence in the US's backyard; and (c)
the signing of the Geneva Agreement, which accorded the settled dispute the status of a
"controversy", became the price paid for Burnham to lead British Guiana to
independence.
Described as "the first mass-based multi-racial party in Guyana", 45 the People's
Progressive Party was formed in January 1950 on the eve of a new constitutiou"
44 Barston in Schou and Brundtland (1971), p.46.
4S Title of Premdas' article in Caribbean Quarterly (1974).
46 Ibid., p.13.
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According to Premdas, the choice of an African (Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham) and
an East Indian (Cheddi Jagan) at the helm of the new party was a deliberate attempt to
avoid the communal appeal of candidates in the 1947 election and thus to ensure an
appeal to the masses. The new constitution in 1951, named after its chairman John
Waddington, introduced universal adult suffrage at age 21, a bicameral legislature
comprising the lower house, known as the House of Assembly, and an upper house,
known as the State Council. The Waddington constitution placed reserved powers in the
govemor.f" a factor that was to be a source of friction between the elected party and the
British government. Elections took place on April 27, 1953, with the PPP emerging the
winner by securing 18 out of the 24 seats in the House of Assembly and with 60% of the
votes cast." The PPP's success in the elections demonstrated that the party had managed
to cut across communal or ethnic boundaries.49
The PPP had only been in government for 133 days when Britain announced the
suspension of the Waddington constitution on 9 October 1953. This event was to leave
an indelible mark in the political history of British Guiana with the disintegration of the
nationalist movement, the practice of politics along ethnic lines and ultimately racial
violence. In the view of the British government, the actions and alleged conununist links
ofPPP ministers were defmite evidence of a conununist plot.5o
The US has been implicated in the decision to suspend the constitution. Jagan
asserted that" ... the main cause, I believe, for the suspension of our constitution was
47 Smith (1964), p.164.
48 Nath (1975b), p.168.
49 See Spinner Jr. (1984), pp.36-37, on voting patterns in the elections.
50 Command Paper 8980, p.4.
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pressure from the government of the United States of America, ,,51 citing American
involvement at the labour movement level, if not at the governmental level. He
implicates Serafmo Romualdi of the International Confederation of Trade Unions and the
Inter-American Regional Organisation of Workers in fomenting anti-PPP sentiment by
being instrumental in the dissolution of the old Trade Union Council which pursued an
anti-imperialist policy. Jagan's allegations were confirmed directly by Romuladi in his
book highlighting the role of the American labour movement in anti-communist
activities:
"I never tried to deny Dr Jagan's charges. As a matter of fact I publicly
acknowledged the fact that, having become convinced of Dr Jagan's subservience
to the Communist movement since my first visit to British Guiana in 1951, I did
everything in my power to strengthen the democratic trade union forces opposed
to him and to expose Jagan's pro-communist activities from the day he was
elected Prime Minister, following the general elections of April 27, 1953. ,,52
American labour and the CIA therefore played its part in whipping up anti-PPP
sentiment.
Following the ousting of the PPP, the British government appointed an interim
administration. 53 Some PPP ministers were detained and others were jailed (including
Mrs Jagan for six months) for breaking restrictions placed on their movements and other
charges. 54 A commission, chaired by Sir James Robertson, was appointed to consider
and recorrnnend changes required to the Waddington constitution. Spinner Jr. states, "Far
more devastating than its justification of British intervention, the Robertson Commission
51 Jagan (1966), p.158.
52 Romuladi (1967), p.346. It is worth noting that Agee (1963) names Romualdi as the principal CIA agent
in Latin America. See also Rose (1992) whose PhD thesis, especially chapter 4, "The Failure of the British
Policy in British Guiana, 1953-1957", analyses the State Department and Foreign Office records relating to
this period.
53 See Burrowes (1984), pp.67-69, for mere details.
54 Ibid., pp.70-73.
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exacerbated racial discord between Africans and East Indians, as well as promoted a split
between corrnnunists and democratic socialists in the PPP. ,,55 Amongst the six prominent
members labelled "communists" were Dr and Mrs Jagan - leader of the legislative group
and general secretary, respectively. Mr Burnham, chairman of the party, was amongst
those labelled as "socialists". In the case of Burnham, the report does note that he is
"ambiguous'v" Furedi cites the Colonial Office correspondence which indicates that
HMG did not expect the PPP to unite across ethnic lines, but once that happened, London
was determined to move against it. He states, "The hopes of the Colonial Office
eventually rested with Forbes Burnham... Government policy was to encourage
Burnham to split from Jagan in order to undermine the capacity of the PPP to win multi-
ethnic support. ,,57 Colonial Office tactics aside, the split between Jagan and Burnham as
a result of rivalries for power is believed by some to have been a possibility. 58
Elections took place in August 1957 under a revised constitution which Smith
describes as an .,... extremely flexible constitution in which the form of government
depended a good deal upon the discretion of the Govemor . .,S9 Jagan's party won despite
boundary changes, which Nath alleges were to the advantage of Burnham's party.60 The
disintegration of the nationalist movement was completed with the 1957 elections.
Despres notes that while prior to the 1953 elections an appeal could be made to the
SS Spinner Jr. (1984), p.57. Others espousing a similar view of the Robertson Commission, particularly on
the split of the PPP, include Burrowes (1984), p.78; Nath (1976), p.29; and not surprisingly Jagan (1966),
Pf·199-200.
Command Paper 9274, p.38.
57 Furedi in Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics (1990), p.77.
58 Burrowes (1984), p.78. See also Nath (1976), pp.31-35 and Spinner Jr. (1984), pp.61-64, on how
Burnham engineered the split.
59 Smith, op.cit., p.180.
60 Nath (1976), p.45.
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Guianese masses based on their sufferings under colonialism, at the 1957 poll, politics
had moved down the path of etlmic appeal."
Jagan has asserted that the 1957-61 administration was "in office, but not in
power. ,,62 It was during this time that independence was sought from Britain. Full
internal self-government was granted at a conference in March 1960, with defence and
external affairs remaining under the British government. 63 The 1961 elections, under a
new constitution, were the first to be contested by a newly formed party, the United
Force, which emerged in 1960.64 This party, led by an ethnic Portuguese businessman,
Peter D' Aguiar, appealed mainly to middle class business interests in Georgetown.f The
PPP once again triumphed in the elections held on August 21, 1961, winning 20 of the 35
seats, followed by the PNC and UF with 11 and 4 seats, respectively." The victory
ended in stalemate once again; this time, with violence.
Jagan notes that the secretary of state for the colonies refused to set a date for
independence.67 The Guianese premier took the issue of British Guiana's independence
to the UN on 18 December 1961.68 Subsequently, the British government agreed to hold
an independence conference in 1962, in response, officially, to the resolution calling for
independence in the British Guiana legislature in November 1961. The conference,
61 Despres (1967). He also provides an analysis of British Guiana as a plural society including the unifying
and disintegrating factors of that society and specifically on the collapse of the nationalist movement.
62 Jagan (1966), pp.224-243.
63 Command Paper 988, p.5. Pull internal self-government was to take effect with the introduction of a new
constitution in August 1961 and the ensuing elections under a first-past-the-post system.
64 Command Paper 998, pp.6-7.
65 Newman (1964), pp.87-88.
66 Figures from Irving (1972), p.1o.
67 Jagan (1956), pp.250-251.
68 See Inee (1974) for a thorough analysis of how the decolonization of British Guiana was played out at
the United Nations. A Colonial Office file (CO 936 633) released sinee Inee's publication provide an
insight into the British government's position.
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which convened in October 1962, ended in deadlock. On the one hand, the PPP
government favoured the first-past-the-post system, the voting age lowered to 18 and no
elections before independence. 69 While on the other, the PNC and UF favoured
proportional representation, the maintenance of the voting age at 21 and new elections
before independence. It should be observed that it was during these discussions on
independence that the Venezuelan government, in November 1962, reopened the dispute
over Essequibo which had been settled in an 1899 tribunal award. This has raised
questions about the timing and whether there was any link with the US's actions against
Jagan. 70 The failure of the British Guiana parties to agree on their dividing issues before
the convening of a third independence constitution conference in October 1963, resulted
in the colonial secretary, Duncan Sandys, having to resolve the deadlock. Proportional
representation was introduced, the voting age remained at 21 and fresh elections were to
be held once independence was granted." In effect, all of the demands of Burnham's
PNC and the UP were met and none of Jagan's PPP.
Arthur 1. Schlesinger, a former aide to John F. Kennedy, reveals in his book that
the US president was determined to prevent another Cuba Kennedy's fears about Jagan
were aroused following a visit by the latter to Washington in search of aid in October
1961, during which time he met Kennedy." Burnham, as Schlesinger reveals, was the
preferred leader since he was not only the favoured leader of the AFL-CIO, but he had
also impressed Washington:
69 Command Paper 1870.
70 These issues will be discussed in detail in chapter 2.
71 Command Paper 1870.
72 Schlesinger (1965), pp.710-712.
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"Burnham's visit left the feeling as I reported to the President, that 'an independent
British Guiana under Burnham (if Burnham will commit himself to a multi-racial
policy) would cause us many fewer problems than an independent British Guiana
under Jagan,.,,73
The official reason given by the colonial secretary that proportional representation was
implemented to "... prevent the development of party politics along racial lines", was
influenced by Washington DC.74 Schlesinger reveals that proportional representation
was thought by Washington to be the best way of ensuring Burnham's success at the
polls, since "Jagan's parliamentary strength was larger than his popular strength ... ,,75 The
granting of independence had been preceded by a series of disturbances, which appeared
to be about labour-related issues, but which were part of a concerted effort by both
internal and external elements to remove Jagan from power.
The introduction by the PPP government of the Kaldor Budget, named after the
Cambridge economist who designed it in 1962, served as the catalyst for a spate of
violence that culminated in what became known as "Black Friday" on 16 February. The
budget drew protests because of the introduction of a compulsory savings scheme. Five
people lost their lives and scores more were injured, and millions of dollars in damage
was caused to business properties in Georgetown." With the local police unable to
control the rioting mobs, British troops were called into British Guiana once again; this
time, unlike 1953, to be confronted with civil disturbance."?
73 Ibid., p.713.
74 Command Paper 2203, p.4. The release of US State Department Records in the 19908 has confirmed
Schlesinger's memoires on the Kennedy administration's determinatim to prevent Jagan from leading
British Guiana to independence and the subsequent electoral manipulation. See Joseph (1998), especially
fp·30-33.
Schlesinger (1965), p.713. See Also Henfrey in de Kadt (1972), pp.70-71, on a New York Times' report
alleging Washington's involvement in the introduction of proportional representation.
76 See Colonial Office No. 354 on the various groups against the budget.
77 Newman (1964), p.95; and Colonial Office No.354.
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Premdas asserts that the real reason for the 1962 disturbances was to overthrow
the PPP government. He argues, "One way to do this would be to create enough
disturbances in Guyana to prove that the PPP could not govern the country and that an
independent Guyana under Jagan would be highly unstable. ,,78 Indeed, Premdas notes
that the UF had already launched an anti-corrnnunist campaign against the Jagan
government during the 1961 elections. Ample evidence exists that the 1962 disturbances
were propelled by more than the political rivalries of the opposition and had the intention
of toppling the Jagan government. 79 Philip Agee, a former CIA agent, points to the
involvement of that organization in supporting the anti-Jagan unions: "The Georgetown
station operations for several years have concentrated on building up the local anti-Jagan
trade union movement, mainly through the Public Service International ... -so Moreover,
as Agee states, "Last year through the PSI the Georgetown station financed an anti-Jagan
campaign over the Budget that included riots and a general strike and precipitated British
intervention to restore order. ,,81 The involvement of American forces, both official and
unofficial, in pre-independence British Guiana becomes even more evident in 1963 and
1964.
The PPP government attempted to re-introduce the Labour Relations bill in March
1963, the same bill which had precipitated the 1953 constitutional crisis. It was
confronted by a general strike lasting eighty days. Once again, the indications are that
78 Premdas in Caribbean Quarterly (1979), p.29. See also Jagan (1966), pp.282-249, who asserts the same
claim
79 See Singh (1988), p.38, who provides a list of sources on CIA involvement in attempts to overthrow
Jagan from 1962.
80 Agee (1963), p.293. The PSI is described by Agee, p.618, as "the international trade secretariat for
government employees used by the CIA for labour operatirns".
81 Ibid., pp.293-294. See also Singh (1988), p.38.
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the disruptions were intended to topple Jagan's government. Nath notes that the Labour
Relations bill had actually lapsed since 22 May, but the general strike continued until 6
July 1963. Jagan also concluded that the various forces involved in the anti-bill
campaign, including the ruc, opposition parties, CIA, businesses and the press "... soon
felt, after publication of the bill that the time had come to bring down my government. ,,82
While lagan's allegations may have been dismissed at the time, subsequent evidence
supports his claims. Agee states that the CIA fmanced the 1963 general strike. Moreover,
in his diary-styled memoirs, he notes, "Visitors here [Quito] who have also been to the
Georgetown station say eventually the Agency hopes to move the leader of the Black
connnunity into power even though blacks are outnumbered by lagan and the Indians. ,,83
Serafmo Romualdi, the former US Labour ambassador, states in his book that he played a
"minor" role in the general strike. He notes, "His [Burnham's victory] was cause for
widespread rejoicing, especially in trade union circles in the United States where
Burnham had won friendship and respect. ,,84
While British Guiana was caught up as a pawn in the cold war during 1963 the
cost in terms of the state's etlmic relations was high. Milne (1981) notes that the violence
unleashed during the general strike was overtly racialist. Further disturbances came in
1964 when an inter-union dispute in the sugar industry served to ignite the troubles.f
Most writers on the outbreak of violence agree that the underlying cause was not the
82 Jagan (1966), p.272.
83 Agee (1963), p.294. See also Henfrey in de Kadt, (1972), on CIA involvement.
84 Romualdi (1967), p.352.
85 Burrowes (1984), pp.190-192.
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union strike per se, but rather PPP opposition to the introduction of proportional
representation for elections due in 1964.86
Elections under the new proportional representation system were held in
December 1964. The PPP emerged with a majority of the votes, but it was not enough to
secure an overall majority." The formation of a coalition after the elections by the PNC
and the UF gave the opposition the majority needed to form the government that would
lead British Guiana to independence. With the PNCIUF coalition in government, a final
independence constitution conference was held in November 1965, the key issue being to
fix the date upon which independence would be granted. It was boycotted by the PPP on
the grounds that the introduction of proportional representation in 1963 was
unacceptable, a state of emergency existed in British Guiana and people were still being
held in detention." Independence was granted on 26 May 1966. Burnham later ditched
his coalition UF partner, just prior to elections in December 1968. He continued in
power until his death in 1985. The PNC party remained in office under Desmond Hoyte
until 1992, when it was replaced in government by Cheddi Jagan and his PPP party.
Despite Burnham's links with the US, once in full control, he declared Guyana the
world's first cooperative republic on 23 February 1970 and turned increasingly to radical
third world and socialist leanings on the international stage. As US Senator Bartlow
Martin has argued, "Although Burnham in power has gone further left and become far
more anti-American in his speeches than we had expected when we chose him over
86 See, for instance, ibid., p. 188; Lutchman (1974), pp.229-230; and Milne (1981), pp.23-24.
87 The results of the 1964 election were PPP 45.8% of votes winning 20 seats; PNC 40.5% winning 22
seats; and the UP 12.4% winning 7 seats, Command Paper 2849, p.6.
88 Ibid.
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Jagan, we are stuck with him. No real alternative is in sight. ,,89 In effect, this meant
Burnham had some degree of manoeuvrability vis-a-vis Washington.
Interpretations of Guyana's Foreign Policy from 1966-1992
The foreign policy of Guyana, 1966-1992, has received little academic attention
and there is no major study at all of the foreign policy of Desmond Hoyte's
administration, 1985-1992. This thesis aims to fill a gap in the literature on Guyana's
foreign policy by analysing the international approaches of the government to the
Guyana-Venezuela controversy.
The foreign policy of the coalition government, from independence to 1969
approximately, has been described as being pro-western: that is, in terms of the
orientation of diplomatic, trade and aid links established.90 A noted exception is
Ferguson (1999) who does not view this period as being pro-western, but argues instead
that it represented the "Transition Years" as the government sought to build up its foreign
policy immediately after independence. From 1970 to 1978, the Burnham government
89 Bartlow Martin (1978), p.138. See also Gill in Manigat (1977b) who advances a similar argument.
Bartlow Martin, op.cit., p.200, notes that the US did punish the Burnham government, for instance, by
cutting development aid, when Guyana voted to equate Zionism with racism at the UN. See also Mars in
Transition (1983) m claims that the US was destabilizing the Burnham government in the mid-1970s
because of its socialist overtures.
90 See Braveboy- Wagner in Ferris and Lincoln (1981); Brotherson Jr. in Journal of Interamerican Studies
and World Affairs (1989); Danns (1988); Premdas in World Affairs (1982); and Garavini di Turno (1988).
Danns (1988) describes the period 1965-1970 as the "Phase of Neo-Colonial Accommodation", and Ally
(1993) designates 1966-1971 as the "Phase of Accommodation to the United States".
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adopted a leftist and radical third world stance on the international stage." As the state
became gripped in economic problems, the Burnham administration's foreign policy has
been perceived as turning back to the west and pro-capitalist.i" Fauriol's early study
based on his PhD, forsakes thorough analyses of the foreign policies of Guyana, Haiti and
Jamaica, for meticulous observation of encoding and classifying foreign policy "events
data" according to the CREON formula.? Although recognizing the Guyana-Venezuela
controversy as the prime security concern for the government of Guyana from 1966-
1970, Fauriol made the erroneous forecast that the controversy was no longer an issue
following the signing of the Protocol of Port-of-Spain in 1970. Indeed, shortly after his
work was published, the controversy once again assumed centre-stage in Guyana's
foreign policy. In providing an analysis of the management of Guyana's political
economy, Ferguson includes substantial chapters on the state's foreign policy between
1966 and 1985.94 His work is rich in information on Guyana's pursuit of relations with
the socialist world, the Caribbean, the USA, African liberation struggles, as well as
pointing to the salience of the Guyana-Venezuela controversy in foreign policy
emanating from Georgetown. His declared attempt to correct "the mantra of 'twenty-
eight wasted years"', a slogan adopted by the PPP in reference to the dire state of Guyana
91 The exact years and labels have slight variations amongst the writers, but essentially the key point for all
is that there was a swing to the left in the foreign policy orientation. Garavini di Turno has labelled the
period, 1970-1978 as the "Giro a la Izquierda" or turn to the left; Premdas, 1969-1971 as "Burnham Turns
Socialist Again". For Ally, 1970-1976 represents the "Phase of Non-Alignment and Socialist Orientation",
while Ferguson (1999) categorizes the period, 1970-1978, as "The Radicalization of Foreign Policy".
92 Garavini di Turno labels the period, 1977-1983 as "No Alineamiento Pragmatico" and Ferguson labels
the period 1979-1985, "Foreign Policy in Context of Persistent Crisis", as the state battled with domestic
and international problems.
93 Fauriol (1981). CREON is the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations.
94 Fergusrn (1999), pp.95-132, 242-289, 369-415.
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following the PNC government, is replaced by the implication that everything Burnham
did was correct while everything the opposition leader, Cheddi Jagan, did was wrong.
What could have been an informative analysis of part of Guyana's foreign policy, reads
like a justification for Burnham's policies.
Garavini di Turno's study, based on his PhD, is perhaps the most comprehensive
publication, covering the period 1966-1983. He also includes a brief postscript on the
foreign policy of the last two years of the Burnham government and that of Hugh
Desmond Hoyte. Garavini di Turno identifies two significant influences on the foreign
policy of the 1966-1985 period: the leftist orientation of Burnham and Venezuela's claim
to Essequibo. He argues that the interaction between these two facets accounts
significantly for the "peculiar oscillations" and changes between left and right in
Guyana's foreign policy under Burnham." Garavini di Turno acknowledges that for the
government in Guyana diplomacy represented its principal means of defence." As his
study is concerned with the overall shifts in foreign policy, he does not focus fully on the
international strategies employed by the Burnham administration with regard to the
controversy, recognising only that relations with the USA and Brazil in particular were
altered according to the level of pressure exerted by Venezuela in relation to its claim on
Essequibo.
A number of minor studies have looked at particular aspects or themes in
Guyana's foreign policy, especially relating to the Burnham era, but none have focussed
on the Guyanese government's use of its foreign policy as a defence mechanism in
95 Garavini di Turno (1988), p.21-23.
96 Ibid., p.22.
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response to Venezuela's claims to Essequibo. Enloe (1976b) examines Guyana's decision
in the early 1970s to develop relations with China. She argues that the issue of trade, aid
and identity were important in the government's decision as well as the manoeuvrability
facilitated by the US's rapprochement with China. Gill (1977), mimeo., explored the
factors behind Guyana's decision in 1972, along with three other Commonwealth
Caribbean states, to give diplomatic recognition to Cuba in defiance of Havana's
hemispheric ostracization. The same writer also explored the impact of domestic left-
wing political competition on the opening up of relations with the Communist world."
The salience of the Commonwealth Caribbean in Guyana's foreign policy has been
explored in Luard's master's degree thesis" Some aspects of the domestic and external
linkages of foreign policy have been analysed. For example, the relationship between the
change in Guyana's domestic ideology (as the government declared the state a
cooperative republic in 1970) and the impact on foreign policy, has been examined by
Premdas." Danns looks at the domestic and international factors shaping Guyana's
foreign policy. He concludes that Guyana does not have the resources to support its
ideology and non-aligned foreign policy.i'" The foreign policies of Guyana and Trinidad
and Tobago have been compared by Ince, who also analyses the issues of lack of
information and non-consultation in the foreign policy-making of both states.'?' The role
of race in foreign policy, particularly regarding the East Indian population, which during
the Burnham era was largely allied with the opposition PPP, has been explored by Ince
97 Gill inManigat (1977b).
98 Luard (1979), mimeo.
99 Premdas in World Affairs (1982).
100 Danns (1988), mimeo., p.42.
101 Inee in Bryan (1979c) and Inee in International Journal (1979), respectively.
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who notes that while race was of influence in the government's foreign policy, third
worldist ideology was of more importance.102 Searwar's paper (1989) develops this
theme of the role of race in Guyana's foreign policy by linking it with that state's
international lobbying on the Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy. He argues that
the presence of an East Indian population allowed the government to foster an Afro-
Asian identity on the international stage, thereby mobilising Afro-Asian support for
Guyana's territorial integrity. In this regard, Searwar argues that the development of
diplomatic links with India, which occupied a major leadership position in the Third
World, was important.
The foreign policy of the Burnham years, especially from 1970 to 1985, has been
the subject of significant debate. This period witnessed the expansion of Guyana's
diplomatic relations to include Havana and other parts of the socialist world. There was
also a very active approach to Third World issues, such as calls for a New International
Economic Order at the UN and support for African liberation struggles.103 The
government also became actively engaged in the NAM and South-South co-operation
issues. Some writers have interpreted Burnham's foreign policy as being the means by
which his government sought to consolidate andlor legitimise power. A senior PPP
figure, Moses Nagamootoo, has stated, "... the Venezuelan threat, whether by design or
accident, was a blessing. 11104 This is because in Nagamootoo's view, the renewed tensions
with Venezuela in the 198111982period allowed the PNC government to divert attention
from its domestic problems, while improving the government's image as it lobbied
102 Inee in Bryan (l979b).
103 See Burnham (1975a), (1980a) and (1981b).
104 Thunder, July-Sept. (1982), p.32.
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internationally for support. On the domestic stage, Spinner Jr. argues that the Burnham
government utilized the tensions with Venezuela in 1981/1982 to divert attention from
domestic problems by calling on the populace to unite against Caracas. lOS Prerndas in
examining Burnham's ideological positioning for a period of more than thirty years,
starting in 1950, notes the shifts in Burnham's ideology. He suggests that, "The cause
that best explains the back-and-forth ideological changes in President Burnham's policy
orientations over the last thirty years .. .is the need to acquire, consolidate, and perpetuate
power." 106 That is to say, Burnham adjusted his ideology and foreign policy as domestic
and international changes dictated in order to achieve and maintain power. Premdas
touches briefly on what he describes as the "Machiavellian impulse" of Burnham in his
desire to consolidate his power position.i'" Brotherson Jr. expands on this theme, arguing
that foreign policy from 1970-1985 was a "Machiavellian" search for legitimacy:
"This image of Guyana as a well-intentioned, principled loyalist of the NAM
cause, made to suffer for its loyalty, is a flawed one. The country's foreign policy
was not crafted over the years to serve objective national interests. Rather, the
overriding objective of Guyana's authoritarian leadership was to do abroad what it
had failed to do at home, i.e. to establish legitimacy. With this approach, the late
President Burnham sought to follow the strategy outlined by Niccol6 Machiavelli,
namely, to legitimise one's regime by means of glorious foreign adventure or
diplomatic fervour on the one hand and stifle domestic opposition on the other,
wringing grudging support from the latter in the process. "l08
Brotherson Jr. advanced his contention even more starkly in a newspaper article: "... the
single most important determinant of the Burnham foreign policy was the compulsion to
lOS Spinner Jr. in Caribbean Review (1982), p.30.
106 Those changes are described as follows: "1950-63 socialist; 1964-68, capitalist/mixed economy; 1969-
77, socialist; 1978-present, capitalist/mixed economy", Premdas inWorldAffairs, p.178.
107 Ibid.
108 Brotherson Jr., op.cit., pp.9-10.
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win abroad what the government could not win at home - legitimacy."109 De Caires
makes a similar point by arguing that the incidences of electoral manipulation drew the
government to the international stage as a legitimising forum He notes:
"It cannot have been other than extremely unpleasant for the more sensitive PNC
leaders to live with the electoral situation since 1968 despite the realpolitik.
justification. It is this single fact that has tended to make the party as a whole but
particularly its leaders politically sensitive and aggressive and prone to foreign
policy initiative and with grandstanding. ,,110
De Caires characterizes the Burnham government as being sensitive to its domestic
illegitimacy, and so desirous of legitimacy on the world state, whereas Brotherson Jr.
suggests a more cold-blooded calculation on the part of that government. Nevertheless,
the equation of lack of domestic legitimacy leading to a search for authentication on the
international stage is found in the arguments advanced by both writers. Other
interpretations about the Burnham government's use of foreign policy have been
advanced. Gill, for instance, argues that it was used to enhance power, while Ally
concludes that it was used to boost the party's image.III Irrespective of whether the use
of foreign policy is tenned "Machiavellian" or image enhancing, the underlying argument
remains the same: foreign policy became a vehicle through which the Burnham
government could gain credibility.
The word "Machiavellian" has entered English as a term depicting political abuse
and cunningness. It is defmed in the Collins English Dictionary as follows: "1. of or
relating to the alleged political principles of Machiavelli; cunning, amoral and
109 Brotherson Jr. in Caribbean Contact, June 1989, p.6.
110 De Caires in Caribbean Affairs (1988), p.197.
111 Gill inManigat (1977b), pp.349-351; and Ally, op.cit., p.159.
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opportunist. 2. a cunning, amoral and opportunist person especially a politician. ,,112 The
term is based on Niccolo Machiavelli's sixteenth century study, "The Prince", in which he
advises the Medici dynasty on consolidating power by uniting the various states
comprising the Italian peninsula. Machiavelli uses the imagery of the fox and the lion to
portray the realist prince as one who uses both cunning and strength while being
concerned solely with maintaining his position rather than being restrained by moral
judgments.J':' He argues, "Hence it is necessary for a prince who wishes to maintain his
position to learn how not to be good, and to use his knowledge or not to use it according
to necessity. ,,114 Suggesting that the acquisition and consolidation of power is more
important than the means by which it is achieved, Machiavelli states:
" ... in the actions of all men, and especially princes, where there is no impartial
arbiter, one must consider the final result. Let a prince therefore act to conquer
and to maintain the state; his methods will be always be judged honourable and
will be praised by all; for ordinarr people are always deceived by appearances
and by the outcome of a thing ... ,,11
In recorrnnending how a prince should act to acquire esteem, Machiavelli points to the
importance of major foreign campaigns: "Nothing makes a prince more esteemed than
great undertakings and examples of his unusual talents. ,,116 He cites, the king of Spain,
Ferdinand of Aragon, who kept his subjects in awe with his successful overseas
campaigns while using the opportunity provided by such diversions to consolidate power
on the domestic stage without being noticed_U7 From this it may be deduced that







Rather, as Premdas implies more accurately, Machiavelli's focus is on the acquisition of
power and the use of foreign military adventure in a two-fold way: to keep the domestic
populace in amazement while at the same time using the opportunity this presents to
consolidate domestic power.
It remains to be questioned whether the Burnham government used international
adventure to consolidate power and divert attention from domestic problems. Brotherson
Jr. has contended that the principal international vehicle within which the Burnham
government pursued the goal of legitimacy was the NAM: "The tenets and principles of
non-alignment seemed tailor-made for Burnham. The movement was a stage set which
gave ear, voice, access and potential leadership prominence to leaders of poor states,
allowing them to speak to the world stage."IIS A similar argument has been expressed by
Manley, who states that the southern environment, namely the NAM, was a source of
legitimacy for the Burnham government.l'" Burnham's involvement in that international
body is well-documented, and Searwar has suggested that Burnham's activities in the
NAM, especially in the formulation of cooperative arrangements amongst member states,
makes him an architect of the movement.V" This is questionable but the PNC
government under Burnham was very active in its membership of international fora.
Ifwe consider the allegations and documented cases of electoral fraud in Guyana
during elections between 1968 and 1985 under the PNC government, it is apparent that
the legitimacy of the government was in question. Bartlow Martin argues that Burnham
117 Ibid., p.73-74.
118 Brotherson Ir. in Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (1989), p.22.
119 Manley (1975), p.l. See also Manley's thesis (1975), p.112.
120 Searwar in Dolphin (1985), p.57.
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was turning Guyana" ... into a repressive one-party state".121 Brotherson Jr. bases his
argument on the authoritarian nature of Burnham's government and his retention of
power as a result of rigged elections since 1968.122 In this regard, it should be noted that
Jagan's PPP party maintained that the US had brought the PNC to power through
electoral manipulation and continued its support of the Burnham government despite
continued electoral malpractices in order to prevent a PPP govemment.V"
A number of other factors about the Burnham leadership support the arguments
about the relationship between Guyana's foreign policy and the Burnham administration's
consolidation of power. The "parmountcy of the party" doctrine placed the party above
the government, thereby ensuring the PNC's pre-eminence in the state.124 According to
Burnham, "It was ... decided that the Party should assume unapologetically its
paramountcy over the Government which is merely one of its executive arms" .125 Not
surprisingly, this policy has been equated with a dictatorship of the PNc.126 Labour was
controlled by the administration as the corrnnanding heights of the economy were
nationalized: the foreign-owned sugar and bauxite industries, namely Alcan Bauxite
Company (1971); Reynolds Aluminum and Jessel (1975); and Booker (1976).127 Danns'
121 Bartlow Martin (1978), p.136. A number of other publications describe the repeated electoral fraud of
the Burnham government. These include: "Virtual Army Coup Keeps PNC in power" in Thunder, January-
March 1981 and Jagan (1973) on the use of the military and other electoral malpractices in the 1973
elections; and Avebury in Caribbean Review (1981) on electoral fraud in 1980.
122 Brotherson Jr., op.cit., p.lO.
123 Jagan (1984), p.227-228. His arguments are consistent with those of Bartlow Martin (1978), and Gill in
Manigat (1977b) discussed earlier.
124 Latin America Bureau (1984), pp.53-58.
125 Burnham (1974), p.1l. See also Burnham (1975b).
126 Thomas in Payne and Sutton (1984a), p.92 and Thomas in Ambursely and Cohen (1983), p.32.
127 Ince in Millett and Will (1979), p.169. Thomas in Payne and Sutton (1984a), pp.91-93, argues that the
nationalizations amounted to 'mortgage fmance' since the Burnham government paid commercial rates for
the companies nationalized as opposed to expropriating them. Meanwhile, Payne (1984), p.12, argues that
it was not the Burnham government's intention to nationalize the bauxite industry, but that it was forced
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study on domination and power during the Burnham era notes that the civil service
bureaucracy was controlled by the government through sackings, promotions, patronage
and by making it accountable to the PNC party executive. The impartiality of the
bureaucracy was also eroded as the separation between party and state became blurred
with a mandatory requirement for public servants to attend political rallies. The Burnham
government limited dissent in the society through its ownership and control of the radio
and national newspapers. While editorial authority could not be exercised on the
opposition and other press, these were controlled by means of other tactics, e.g.
restricting import licences for newsprint. 128
Burnham took on the role of executive president with extensive powers in 1980,
following a constitutional change instigated by his government. 129 The background to
this is mired in controversy, with the government accused of using electoral manipulation
to secure the requisite votes in the 1978 referendum on constitutional changes.P"
Electoral fraud is also documented in the December 1980 elections. The human rights
record of this administration was repeatedly in question by both domestic and overseas
groups. The regime lost any residual international credibility with the killing in June
1980 of the historian and politician Water Rodney, in which it was implicated.'!' Two
years earlier, the government had attracted negative publicity for its support of Jim Jones
into that corner after the foreign-owned companies refused to enter into the partnership called for by the
~overnment.
28 Danns (1982), pp.75-80.
129 Lutchman in Transition (1982) and Danns (1982), pp.179-180, provide details of the powers conferred
in the 1980 constitution which placed Burnham effectively above the law and unaccountable to parliament.
Spinner Jr. in Caribbean Review (1980) labels Burnham "Emperor" in view of the powers conferred by the
1980 constitution.
130 See Avebury in Caribbean Review (1981) based on the report, "Something to Remember", submitted by
a team of international observers; and Thunder, April-June 1978, pp.I-16.
131 Spinner Jr., op.cit., p.8.
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who had been allowed to establish the "People's Temple" cult in the Guyanese interior.
The cult ended in the mass suicide and killings in November 1978 that has become
known as "Jonestown". 132 The Burnham regime's close association with another cult, the
"Jewish" "House of Israel", led by a fugitive American, David Hill, was also a cause for
concern domestically and internationally.P'' The cult was implicated in the killing of a
Jesuit priest who worked as a photographer for the Catholic Standard, and other acts of
politically motivated aggression on behalf of the Burnham regime. 134 Further, as Griffith
sunnnarises:
"... the reality in Guyana during most of the early post-independence years was
one in which government dominance of the media, currency controls, restriction
on press imports, and judicial decisions combined to create an environment in
which these freedoms were curtailed rather than permitted or encouraged. Not
only did this suppress political debate, but it also affected the exercise of several
contingent freedoms - the rights of association and assembly and the right to
demonstrate for redress of grievance, among other things. ,,135
Such a repressive atmosphere had emerged after the Burnham government ousted its
right-wing coalition partner in 1968. Shortly afterwards, on 23 February 1970, the state
was declared the world's first cooperative republic, thereby allowing Burnham to develop
his own brand of socialism 136
Thomas has argued that Burnham established an authoritarian state which was the
antithesis of socialism 137 Ferguson, in what seems to be an apology for the Burnham
regime, argues that the move towards authoritarian politics was a response to radical
132 ibid., pp.7-8; and Latin America Bureau (1984), pp.77-78, 96-98.
133 Latin America Bureau (1984), pp.98-100.
134 S' J . 8pmner r., op.cit., p. .
135 Griffith in Griffith and Sedoc-Dahlberg (1997), p.164. Bartlow Martin (1978), p.136, advances a
similar argument. See also Catholic Standard, 21 February 1982, pp.l, 4, which documents the police
shootings, arbitrary arrests and restrictions en the press and freedom of assembly in Guyana.
136 See Lutchman in Caribbean Studies (1970) on Guyana's transformation into a cooperative republic.
137 Thomas (1984b), pp.88 and Thomas in Fitzroy and Ambursley (1983), p.46.
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polarisation and that Burnham's authoritarianism had the support of a range of interest
groups until the late 1970s. He contends that it was only when those interest groups
began to be threatened that there were calls for democracy. 138 A number of studies have
pointed to the process of militarization - increases in military and paramilitary forces - in
Guyana from the mid-1970s. Danns provides details of the PNC regime's effective
control of three military and paramilitary groups, and the police, largely staffed by the
African-descended segments of the population, which had two aims: preventing a coup
d'etat and dissent in civil society against the government.F" Griffith has argued that
militarization was one of the means by which power was maintained,"? while the Latin
America Bureau argues that the Burnham government used the existence of the territorial
controversy as the excuse for militarization. 141 It is interesting to observe that support for
the Burnham regime in particular was also maintained on the basis of racial ties with the
African population. A patron-client relationship, established by the regime, co-opted the
East Indian pro-capitalist leaders, amongst others.142 If note is taken of the severe
economic problems confronting Guyana from the mid-1970s with the resulting shortages
138 Ferguson (1999), p.418.
139 Danns (1982), pp.143-170.
140 Griffith (1993), p.62. See also the following writers on the phenomenon of militarization and civilian
control of the military in Guyana and the Caribbean: Danns in Transition (1978) and (1982); Hintzen and
Premdas in Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (1982); Paget and Stone (1983); Phillips
and Young in Young and Phillips (1986). Note however, that in 1981, at least, Burnham explained the
need to strengthen the military and paramilitary forces as a response to the Venezuelan threat, Burnham
(1981a), p.32.
141 Latin America Bureau, op.cit., p.95. See also Danns in Young and Phillips (1986).
142 Hintzen in Comparative Political Studies.
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of essential foods and a decline in living standards, the argument that the Burnham
government may have required an external diversion becomes more pertinent. 143
Foreign Policy as a Multifaceted Field
It is the contention in this thesis that the arguments about foreign policy in
Guyana during the Burnham era being aimed solely at securing legitimacy or
consolidating domestic power represent a simplistic interpretation for two reasons and
despite the apparent causal link between the domestic difficulties confronting the
government and its unambiguous love of the international stage. Firstly, such premises
fail to take into serious consideration the real threat to Guyana's national security as a
result of the claim to more than five-eighths of its territory by the more powerful western
neighbour, Venezuela. Secondly, at certain times the Venezuelan government pursued its
claim in practical and active form, thereby requiring genuine defensive action from its
Guyanese counterpart.
Since foreign policy was the only means by which the government of Guyana
could effectively defend the threats to the state's territorial integrity and its national
security from the more powerful Venezuela, this use of foreign policy is worthy of
academic enquiry. The use of foreign policy as a defence mechanism emerged in the
innnediate post-independence period as the key strategy in the government of Guyana's
approach to dealing with Venezuela's claims to a substantial portion of its territory. This
143 See Thomas in Payne and Sutton (1984a) on Guyana's economic problems and an analysis of the causes.
See also Caribbean Contact (especially August 1979, August 1982, October 1982, February 1983 and June
1984) 00 the political, economic and societal deterioration which was accompanied by Burnham's firm grip
on the reins of power, with the resulting domestic and international calls for the restoration of democracy
and human rights.
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strategy in response to the threats, real or perceived, has centred on publicising the
problems on the international stage with a view to winning support from that conununity
and in so doing, provide what it is hoped would be a deterrent to Venezuelan occupation
of Essequibo. The international approaches emerged because: (a) Guyana is militarily
and economically weaker than Venezuela, which made engaging the support of third
parties a necessity for the former; (b) the failure of the Burnham government to secure a
defence agreement with the departing colonial andlor regional power; (c) Burnham's
confidence of winning the support of the Afro-Asian bloc, in particular, in international
bodies.
Foreign policy is a multifaceted field.144 As Rothstein argues: "Foreign policy
rarely serves a single purpose. Goals tend to mingle together ... sharp lines between the
quest for security or aid, or trade, or status and prestige are frequently difficult to
discern".145 Puchala, who identifies five separate goals which any state would pursue in
its foreign policy, cautions against seeking out single goals in any aspect of a state's
foreign policy:
"Isolating goals and tracing their pursuits as discrete patterns of international
behaviour were useful measures for general understandings. But they again were
a substantial step away from international political reality, in which states
simultaneously pursue multiple goals, and in which simple acts may have
manifold ends. ,,146
This point is registered if we examine the goals which Puchala has identified - self
preservation [of the state], security [creation of a threat free environment], prosperity,
prestige and peace - and relate them to a state's foreign economic policy. The principle
144 Kent in Kent and Nielsson (1980) uses this term in a different sense to indicate the fact that foreign
p,0licy is influenced by both domestic and systemic factors.
4S Rothstein (1977), p.105.
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goal here may be prosperity, but it is also possible to see how security, prestige, peace
and self-preservation may be derived from successful execution of such a policy.
Weinstein's study of foreign policy in a developing country demonstrates the
multiple uses to which foreign policy may be deployed: to isolate the opposition from
their international allies; to lend legitimacy to internal political demands; to maximise the
leadership's political skills and tools; to create symbols of nationalism and patriotism,
buttressing calls for national unity under the leader; and to generate pride and self-
respect. 147 From both Puchala and Weinstein's studies, it may be argued that foreign
policy can have two sets of goals: those aimed at the state and those for political uses i.e.
serving the government rather than the state. Either way, the core point is that foreign
policy is a multifaceted field which renders single goal or use identification simplistic. In
pursuing international action in relation to the controversy, the Guyanese government
may, indeed, have gained a level of prestige which enhanced its status on the domestic
stage. However, I shall argue that during times of heightened tensions with Venezuela,
the principal goal of foreign policy was preservation of the state's territorial integrity. At
other times, while this goal continued to be important, further features were brought to
the fore in foreign policy: prestige enhancement for the regime and economic prosperity.
The rise of the third world movement, which was facilitated by the detente of the 1970s,
presented the government of Guyana with enhanced opportunities for its international
approaches to the territorial controversy than existed in the earliest period of government.
In the process, an increase in prestige at home and amongst its peers on the international
stage was facilitated.
146 Puchala (1981), pp.90-91.
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The Guyanese administration's effective use of international fora on the Guyana-
Venezuela territorial controversy has been recognized in academia and elsewhere. The
use of international action by the government of Guyana to mobilise support is
acknowledged by Braveboy-Wagner, but as her emphasis is on providing an overview of
Commonwealth Caribbean foreign policy, the precise topic receives little analysis.v" As
we have noted, Ferguson also provides only a brief analysis of this aspect of Guyana's
foreign policy. 149
I do not propose to advance an argument about Guyana's foreign policy being
primarily about either territorial preservation or regime enhancing. In keeping with the
conception of foreign policy as a multifaceted field, I argue that it would be more
accurate to perceive that during periods of heightened tensions with Venezuela,
preservation of Guyana's territorial integrity was the principal goal of foreign policy. At
times of improved relations, this goal continued to be of importance to Georgetown, but
other foreign policy goals became prominent: examples are prestige enhancement during
parts of the Burnham era and economic prosperity under Hoyte. Here, it is in interesting
to note Searwar's argument: "Securing legitimacy was a factor, undoubtedly the case; but
the security motivation especially isolating Venezuela internationally was the most
significant factor.,,150 On the one hundredth anniversary of the 1899 arbitration award
which settled the nineteenth-century dispute, 3 October 1999, the Venezuelan president,
Hugh Chavez Frfas, declared: "'No vamos a dejar donnir esa reivindicaci6n. Seguiremos
147 Weinstein in World Politics (1971-1972), pp.371-372.
148 Braveboy-Wagner (1989); and in Caribbean Affairs (1988), pp.82-83.
149 Ferguson (1999), pp.113, 260-266, 380-393. See also Latin America Bureau (1984), pp.94-96, for a
brief discussion of Guyana's international action.
150 Interview with Lloyd Searwar, 8 December 1999.
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reclamando y exigiendo nuestros derechos, como se 10 he dicho a las autoridades de
Guyana cada vez que he podido y ahora reiteramos'. ,,151
The focus of enquiry into the nineteenth century Anglo-Venezuelan territorial
dispute and later the Guyana-Venezuelan territorial controversy has been largely
historical in character and lacking in attention to the international strategies deployed by
the government of Guyana in response to the controversy. Yet this is an issue which has
engendered renewed debate in the domestic media in Georgetown and amongst
opposition groups in the post-1992 period as the PPP government, which replaced the
PNC, has shown a preference for bilateral rather than international approaches.P" The
factors behind the US's decision to confront Britain in the 1880s over the Anglo-
Venezuelan dispute have been examined by a number of writers. Grenville and Young
(1966), who describe the seeming threat of war as "an illusion of conflict", focus on the
role of a former US diplomat and publicist for Venezuela in bringing Congress and the
US government's attention to the dispute. Smith (1979) argues that it was the
appointment of the US secretary of state, Richard Olney, that was the catalyst for that
country's involvement and that Washington's decision to challenge HMG was based on
its own interests in Latin America rather than a concern for Venezuela. This latter point
was made earlier by LaFeber in The American Historical Review (1961) who argued that
151 MRE (2000b). The anniversary was marked by reports of Venezuelan border troop movements, and
incursions into Guyanese airspace by Venezuelan military aircraft, Stabroek News, 8 October 1999, p.1,
and Guyana Review, January and February 1999, p.35, respectively.
152 It is perceived by many observers in Georgetown that this change of tactic has been to the detriment of
Guyana - interviews with Ronald Austin and Cedric Joseph, 8 December 1999; Anna Benjamin, 9
December 1999; Manzoor Nadir, 29 April 2000; and Rupert Roopnaraine, 10 May 2000. The debate has
been led by two independent news publications: the Stabroek News and Guyana Review.
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Britain's encroachments in Latin America in the nineteenth century was a cause of
concern to Washington. Humphreys (1969), Rout (1971) and Kissler's thesis (1971) have
focussed on the emergence of the dispute, and Almecija Bermudez (1987) studies the
same theme from the perspective of British imperial strategy against a weak Venezuela in
the nineteenth century. The role of the explorer, Robert Schomburgk, whose nineteenth
century explorations and frontier lines continue to be a source of dispute, has been
studied by Ojer (1969), while Bernardo Nunez (1967) examines key moments in the
evolution of the Anglo-Venezuelan dispute: the Yuruan incident, Cleveland and the
Monroe Doctrine. Perkins (1937) examines the influence on the Monroe Doctrine's
evolution as a result of the collision between the British and US governments over the
Anglo-Venezuelan boundary dispute. This is contrasted by Marshall's study (1992)
which focuses on the role of the press in Britain and the US in shaping public opinion and
influencing both governments. The result being a move from the initial threat of war to
the birth of an Anglo-American friendship following the US's involvement in the Anglo-
Venezuelan boundary dispute.
Analysis of Guyana's boundary disputes from the perspective of intemationallaw,
including the one over Essequibo, are offered by Benjamin (1975). An examination of
the Dutch linguistic elements in the languages of Guyana's Amerindian population - part
of the British case for prescriptive title as the successor colonial power to the Dutch - has
been undertaken by Robertson. 153 Ely's conference paper (1997) looks at the
repercussions within the Americas of the territorial dispute of the nineteenth century and
the controversy of the twentieth century. He argues that the US' involvement in the
IS3 Robertson in Boletin de Estudios Latinoamericanos y Del Caribe (1983).
54
original dispute had repercussions for Canada while latterly the controversy has impacted
on both Guyana and Venezuela's relations with Brazil as well as Venezuela's with
Suriname, given its dispute with Guyana. Cases for and against the contents of Severo
Mallet-Prevost's memorandum, which alleges foul-play in the 1899 tribunal award
settling the dispute, have been presented by Dennis and Child, respectively, both in The
American Journal of International Law (1950). Studies on Venezuela's reopening of the
once-settled territorial dispute in 1962 are provided by Ince and Joseph. 154 Written in the
immediate aftermath of the events analysed, they do not benefit from access to the
documents of the relevant foreign ministries. Joseph's later work, based on documents
released in the British and US foreign ministries is a significant step in bridging this gap.
These documents facilitate to a certain extent Joseph's exploration of the relationship
between the cold war, Guyana's domestic problems and the reopening of the dispute in
1962. His research does not include details of Burnham's role in signing the 1966
Geneva Agreement which has dictated the trajectory of relations to date between Guyana
and Venezuela, and which was not welcomed by the opposition PPP in Guyana. I
explore this important factor, arguing that the decision to sign the Geneva Agreement was
the price Burnham was willing to pay for the prize of independence.
More recently, Valerino de Abreu (1997) makes an important contribution to
furthering the understanding of the nineteenth century dispute through her analysis of
recently released material in the British archives. Braveboy-Wagner's 1984 publication
remains the most comprehensive study of this topic, covering the history, legal aspects
154 Inee in Caribbean Studies (1970); and Joseph in Caribbean Studies (1970a, 1970b).
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and developments from the nineteenth century up to the early 1980s.155 Significant
developments have taken place since 1982 which are worthy of study. The release of
foreign ministry documents from the foreign ministry archives in London, Washington
and elsewhere, has shed new light on the cold war machinations within which the once
settled dispute was re-ignited. There are also new insights into Burnham and Eric
Williams' roles in two significant developments in the controversy: the Geneva
Agreement, 1966, and the Protocol to that document in 1970. In covering all the issues
of relevance to both Guyana and Venezuela in the controversy and earlier dispute,
Braveboy-Wagner's study does not provide an exhaustive analysis of the government of
Guyana's response. This thesis offers fresh insights into the development of relations
between Guyana and Venezuela in the early 1960s and 1970s based on an analysis of
recently released documents from foreign ministries in London, Washington,
Georgetown, Caracas and Port-of-Spain. An attempt is made to fill the existing gaps in
the literature on Guyana's relations with Venezuela, both in relation to the controversy
and more generally, through a study of published primary and secondary material. This
has been supplemented extensively by interviews with key personnel, namely ministers
and policy officials directly involved in the area under study.
I argue here that the Burnham government of Guyana was particularly careful not
to solicit the support of the Eastern bloc and Cuba on a bilateral basis in the controversy
despite growing links with these areas during the Burnham government in the 1970s and
1980s. This factor is a direct result of the government's cognizance of the strategic
importance of the US in the controversy and hence the need not to take action that might
155 Braveboy-Wagner (1984a).
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push Washington into openly supporting Venezuela, given the effect this may have in
emboldening Venezuelan action against Guyana. Such an awareness on the part of the
government of Guyana is discerned, for instance, in its decision to take its case against
Venezuela to the General Assembly and not to the Security Council of the United
Nations. This is because calling for a resolution in the latter would have put the US in
the position of having to make a choice between its economic interests in Venezuela and
its support for Burnham, given that the opposition leader Cheddi Jagan was a Marxist.
The 1985 to 1992 period of Guyana's foreign policy under Hugh Desmond
Hoyte's PNC administration has not been the subject of much academic enquiry. There is
a consensus amongst the few writers of this era that foreign policy became more
pragmatic in its orientation. 156 This perception has been formed on the basis of the
refocusing of foreign policy which led to economic recovery and development being a
priority in view of Guyana's dismal economic performance. One area of the new foreign
policy has not received any analysis: the priorities accorded to different areas of the
world under Hoyte's "concentric circles" theory of foreign policy. Given the relevance of
this conceptualisation of foreign policy to the Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy,
it is worth noting here. In 1986, Hoyte enunciated what he termed the "concentric
circles" of his foreign policy, designating geographical regions in their order of
importance to the government in Georgetown. He declared:
"Let us remind ourselves that our foreign policy has three concentric circles, as I
like to think of it: first of all, cementing relations with our immediate neighbours -
Venezuela, Brazil, Suriname and, of course, CARICOM; second, cementing
relations with our hemispheric neighbours which would take in the Americas,
156 See Danns (1988); and the postscript of Garavini di Turno (1988), p.457.
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North and South, and those Antillean countries that are not part of CARICOM;
and, third, cementing relations with the rest of the world."157
This offers a clear indicator of the Hoyte regime's foreign policy, especially the perceived
importance of various parts of the world to Guyana. For the first time, cementing
relations with Guyana's immediate neighbours, rather than viewing such relations from a
security perspective, was made a priority. Significantly, relations within the hemisphere
became more important than those with states further afield, pointing to a rapprochement
with the US after relations had deteriorated during the latter Burnham years.
It is posited in this thesis that Washington's endorsement of the Hoyte
administration would, at least, have influenced Caracas' cordial engagement with
Georgetown from 1985 to 1992, if not being, in part, the result of direct intervention by
the US government. An examination of Guyana-Venezuela relations and the
international approaches of the Hoyte administration offers an interesting contrast to the
Burnham era. This is because the government's international lobbying continued, albeit
in a more subtle manner, as relations between the two states improved. In this regard, I
argue that the importance of personalities - namely the Guyanese president, Hoyte, and
his Venezuelan counterparts, Jaime Lusinchi and Carlos Andres Perez were important
factors cementing the growing ties. Bilateral and, in particular, secret diplomacy,
between Caracas and Georgetown have been productive in advancing towards a solution
during both the Burnham and Hoyte years. This is evident, for instance, in the following
outcomes: (a) The Protocol to the Geneva Agreement, 1970; (b) The Hoyte-
157 "The Economy: the diplomatic effort", Address at the opening of the Heads of Mission Conference at
the Sophia Auditorium, Georgetown, on 11 July 1986 in Hoyte (1997), p.34.
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Lusinchi/Hoyte-Andres Perez meetings which furthered talks and cooperation, the latter
of which resulted in the UN Good Offices process.
In view of the ongoing controversy over Essequibo, as witnessed by the events
surrounding the one hundredth anniversary on October 3, 1999 (discussed earlier), this
thesis concludes by arguing that though south-south institutions, such as the NAM, have
lost their influence, the most effective approach for the government of Guyana is the
continued involvement of third parties, especially international bodies, given the
country's weaknesses vis-a-vis Venezuela. The thesis argues that to simply dismiss
foreign policy as serving internal political purposes or as being "Machiavellian" in
character, as some writers have done, is to escape meaningful academic enquiry into a
small state's effective use of multilateral diplomacy.
Sources
This thesis is based on an examination of primary and secondary documents in
four countries. In Britain, research was conducted at the Public Record Office between
June 1999 and March 2001 on newly released documents covering the crucial period of
1962-1968 when the once settled dispute was re-opened and given new life as a
controversy. It should be noted that some key documents relating to the reopening of the
territorial dispute in the 1960s have remained classified for extended periods, thereby
preventing a full examination of the events that occurred. Research was also conducted
at the British Library and Newspaper Library; and libraries within the University of
London. Fieldwork in Georgetown, Washington DC, Port-of-Spain and Caracas was
conducted from August 1999 to May 2000. The research in Guyana was particularly
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difficult given the lack of an organized collection of material in any single research
facility. As such, the research of primary documents (mainly government/opposition
publications and newspapers) from the period under study involved the National,
University of Guyana and Ministry of Foreign Affairs libraries, as well as the Newspaper
Library. Some primary information was also gleaned from files at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Access was only possible by donning a breathing mask to investigate a
wood-ants and dust-ridden heap (complete with a discarded truck tyre and frog) that has
become the dumping ground for a number of foreign policy files.
Extensive interviews in Guyana with current/former diplomats and government
ministers, a former president, academics and other observers on the territorial controversy
were conducted to supplement documentary information collected and to get deeper
insights into the government's policies. The incumbent minister of foreign affairs proved
elusive, despite direct requests. Research was conducted in Caracas as a means of
obtaining first-hand the Venezuelan perspective on the controversy. Primary research
was conducted at the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores' archives. Crucially, Caracas
served as an important location for obtaining primary material relating to Guyana's
relations with Venezuela, much of which was not available in Georgetown because of the
less sophisticated preservation of important government documents. It should be noted,
however, that access was not obtained to the records of the Frontiers Department of the
Venezuelan foreign ministry since these are held in the department concerned and not in
the central ministerial archives where documents from the International Policy
Department on Guyana-Venezuela relations are available. Interviews were conducted in
Venezuela with two former presidents and former/current senior diplomatic personnel.
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State Department files in the National Archives and Records Administration in
Washington DC were triangulated with those released by the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office in London in order to obtain a broad picture of events on the
crucial period (1960s) in the evolution of the controversy. Port-of-Spain was an
important research venue from two perspectives. Firstly, in obtaining primary material
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' archives relating to Eric Williams' involvement in a
significant aspect in the history of the controversy: the Protocol to the Geneva
Agreement, 1970, which led to a 12-year moratorium on the controversy. Secondly, the
West Indiana Division of the library at the University of the West Indies, St Augustine,
and the library of the Institute of International Relations at the same campus, were useful
repositories of published primary and secondary material.
It is hoped that this thesis will contribute towards the plea made by Sutton for
more research on small states with the emphasis on "basic data collection [being] placed
before theoretical speculation". 158
158 Sutton in Clarke and Payne (1987), pp.23-24.
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Chapter 2:
The Guyana-Venezuela Territorial Controversy
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The Nineteenth Century Dispute
The state which became Guyana m 1966 was switched between competing
colonial powers until finally ceding to Britain in the 1814 Treaty of London. In spite of
such formal treaties acknowledging colonial expansion of one form or another, the exact
territory was either not defined or at best, ill-defined. This was to be the source of the
Anglo-Venezuelan territorial dispute which despite being settled by arbitration in 1899
continues in the form of a controversy today. In this chapter, Iwill look at the origins and
settlement of the nineteenth century dispute, followed by its reopening in the early 1960s
when Venezuela took the issue before the United Nations. The reconunencement of the
dispute will be of particular interest as it has since constituted arguably the most
significant aspect of the relations between Guyana and Venezuela and hence it has
informed the subject of this thesis. Moreover, the continued declassification of archival
material from foreign ministries, especially in Britain and the United States, allows for a
greater understanding than was previously possible. There is no attempt to analyse the
validity of the arguments of any of the countries involved in the controversy.
The origins of the Anglo-Venezuelan dispute in the nineteenth century are to be
found in the Spanish and Dutch expansion in the New World without the clear
delineation of boundaries. Spain had claimed the whole of South America (excluding the
Portuguese holding) as a result of the Papal Bull issued in 1493. Therein lies the original
basis of Venezuela's claim to Essequibo:
"At the root of the whole case, as presented on behalf of Venezuela, there lies the
contention that Spain, by virtue of the Papal Bull of 1493, or by virtue of the first
discovery of America and the establishment of a settlement at Santo Tome,
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became entitled to the whole territory lying between the Rivers Orinoco and
Amazon and the Atlantic."1
In 1648, however, Spain and the United Kingdom of the Netherlands signed the Treaty of
Munster at the end of the Thirty Years War. This treaty, which recognised the
independence of the Netherlands, also gave recognition to its territories in the New
World.
2
However, as was to become evident at the 1899 Tribunal, both Britain (as
successor to Dutch territory) and Venezuela (as successor to Spanish possessions) had
different interpretations of the meaning of this Treaty.3 At the 1899 Tribunal, Britain not
only argued that the Treaty gave recognition to Dutch possessions, but "... as well as the
places which they should thereafter acquire without infraction of the Treaty". Venezuela,
on the other hand, has argued that in the Guiana area the treaty only gave recognition to
Dutch holdings in what is called the Essequibo region, but that the area between the
Essequibo and Orinoco rivers was Spanish territory." It is interesting to note Rout's
argument that the Treaty of Munster merely gave recognition to territorial rights in the
New World to Spain and the Netherlands: ".. .it did not specify what or where these
holdings were".5 Moreover, as Bertram argues, "Boundaries had never been particularly
defmed under Spanish and Dutch ownership and the new possessors received the
territories defmed in the same indefinite way. ,,6 Similarly, Humphreys has argued that at
1 "British Guiana Boundary Arbitration with the United States of Venezuela. The Argument on behalf of
the Government of Her Britannic Majesty", hereafter referred to as "The Argument", (1899), p.3.
2 Rout (1971), pp.2-3.
3 The various British and Venezuelan presentations to the 1899 Award contain their respective positions.
See also UN (1962a) for Venezuela's interpretatioos. For the British interpretation, see UN (1962b).
4 "British Guiana Boundary Arbitration with the United States of Venezuela. The Case on behalf of Her
Britannic Majesty", (1899), p.13, hereafter referred to as the "The Case". Reiterated at the UN, UN
(1962a), p.119.
5 Rout (1971), p.2.
6 Bertram (1992), pp.3-4.
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the time of the 1814 Treaty of London - in which the colonies of Demerara, Berbice and
Essequibo were ceded to Britain - the boundary with Spanish possessions was not
defined, 7
A key factor behind the failure to delineate boundaries lay in the limited
knowledge of the territories, as colonial conquest expanded. This is evident in the fact
that it was not until 1835 that the Prussian Richard Schomburgk was connnissioned by
the Royal Geographical Society of London to survey what by then was known as British
Guiana. As Humphreys argues, "The sources of its [British Guiana's] great rivers and
much of its physical geography were still unknown ... ,,8 Earlier treaties had therefore
been entered into over territories that were not known in their entireties.
The connnissioning of Schomburgk to survey British Guiana in 1835 lead to the
official start of the dispute between Britain and Venezuela over part of the territory of
British Guiana and consequently also of the name of the explorer becoming synonymous
with this dispute." After completing his exploration for the Royal Geographical Society
in 1835, Schomburgk was officially connnissioned by the British Government "... to
survey the boundaries of British Guiana ,,10 He had drawn a sketch map after his original
exploration and this was later supplemented by a new map on the proposed boundary. 11
What exactly constitutes the true "Schomburgk Line" as the boundary drawn up has
became known, continues to be one of the key issues of contention in the dispute-cum-
7 Humphreys (1969), p.189.
8 ibid., p.190.
9 See for example, Ojer (1969) who has written an entire book on Schomburgk and his frootie:r lines. See
also "The Case" (1899), pp.141-145, for Britain's account of the Schomburgk Line.
10 "The Case" (1899), p.18.
11 Rout (1971), .p8
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controversy as far as Venezuela is concerned. Indeed, as Valarino de Abreu states, the
map completed after the exploration in 1835 "... came to be known to the Venezuelan
government and scholars as the "Original Schomburgk line", which according to them
gave approx. [sic] British Guiana 4920 km' of territory west of the Esequibo [sic]
River ... ,,12
Rout argues that the publication of Schomburgk's map in 1840 was the start of the
dispute between Britain and Venezuela.f A formal protest was entered against the 1840
map by the Venezuelan Minister to Britain, Alejo Fortique to Lord Aberdeen, British
Foreign Secretary, in the same year of its publication. Later, in 1841, Fortique proposed
instead a boundary treaty with Britain. He had laid claim to Essequibo river being the
boundary while HMO's refuted this contention, instead subsequently offering a
compromise boundary line at the Moroucca River which lies between the Orinoco and
Essequibo rivers. A subsequent proposal on the boundary was made by Lord Aberdeen
in 1841, but Caracas refused the compromise.i"
Unable to agree on a compromise, Britain and Venezuela entered into what
became known as the 1850 Agreement.f under which the two contesting parties
undertook not to occupy or violate the disputed area. However, what Benjamin terms "a
12 Valarino de Abreu (1996), p.14. See Appendix 1 for a Venezuelan produced map showing Venezuela'S
interpretation of what constitutes the original and adjusted and Schomburgk's lines.
13 Rout (1971), p.8.
14 Ely (1997), p.4. See Appendix 1, "Linea de Lord Aberdeen".
15 The Agreement was ratified by Britain in June 1850 and by Venezuela in December 1850 - Rout (1971),
P 11. See also Almecijia Bermudez (1987), pp.40-41, for extracts of the formal exchanges of notes between
Vicente Lecuna, Venezuelan Minister of External Affairs and Bedford H. Wilson, British Consul, Caracas
that became known as the 1850 Agreement. Bernardo NUfiez (1967) presents an account of Venezuela'S
protests against the Schomburgk map and Schomburgk's placement of markers during his survey. See
chapter 1, "EI doctor Fortique y Lord Aberdeen - La Carta Schomburgk (1841-1845)", pp.13-35. See also
Rout (1971), pp.9-10 on the exchanges between Lord Aberdeen and the Venezuelan minister Alejo
Fortique. 66
gentleman's agreement" over the disputed territory was soon to be ignored following the
subsequent discoveries of gold in the 1860s and 1870s and the ensuing rush of
prospectors from British Guiana to the disputed area." The gold discoveries in the
Yuruari basin were extensive. Humphreys describes one of the gold mines in this area,
EI Callao, as being" ... for a time one of the richest goldfields in the world ... with more
than 1,000,000 ounces [of gold] extracted between 1860 and 1883.,,17 It is little wonder
that tensions over such a mineral rich area would soon escalate with both sides issuing
mining concessions to companies'" and with what Rout describes as "... the westward
rush of Englishmen lured on by dreams of a 'second California'." 19
Venezuela again sought to raise its claims in 1876.20 This was followed by a new
Venezuelan call for the settlement of the boundary line by agreement. 21 Britain rejected
Venezuela's proposal of 1876, but offered "... to settle the matter by mutual
concession. ,,22 HMG increased its stake to territory beyond the Schomburgk Line in
1880.23 The following year, Venezuela made a new boundary proposal.i" This proposal
was rejected by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Granville, on 15
September 1881, who made his own proposal.P In 1886, Lord Rosebery as Foreign
Secretary, in concurrence with Lord Granville, who had become Secretary of State for the
Colonies, proposed that the territory between the 1881 boundary lines of Rojas and
16 Benjamin (1975), p.26
17 Humphreys (1969), pp.192-193.
18 Smith (1979), p.36
19Rout (1971), p.12.
20 See "The Case" (1899), p.136.
21 Ibid.
22 "The Case" (1899), p.127. See also Bernardo Nufiez (1967), pp.13-87, for details of the negotiations
between Britain and Venezuela from 1841 to 1884.
23 Bertram (1992), p.5.
24 See "Linea de Rojas" of 21 April 1881 in Appendix 1.
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Granville be considered as disputed. This was rejected by Venezuela which maintained
its claim up to Essequibo river." Valarino de Abreu citing Colonial Office and Foreign
Office records, claims that as early as 1877 Lord Salisbury had announced what she
refers to as "... another Schomburgk line allegedly unknown until then to the British ... ,,27
This new line moved British claims further west - 167, 830 kJn2 west of the Essequibo
river - and hence into the area of contention with Venezuela. Her thesis goes further by
contending that the new line incorporated territory that was previously recognized as
Venezuelan and therefore not in dispute.i" Valarino de Abreu asserts that the maximum
British claims had reached 203,310 kJn2 after 1887.29
Some writers have interpreted Britain's expansion of territory in the disputed area
as being part of its imperialistic manoeuvres at the time. Almecijia Bermudez, asserts,
".. .los problemas economicas afrontados por la Guayana Britanica, durante las decadas
de 1850 Y 1880, fueron tan graves que perrniteron ver en el oro descubierto en Venezuela
la alternativa salvadora. ,,30 Such an interpretation may be plausible given that the late
nineteenth century saw the height of the European powers' colonial expansion or
"Scramble for Africa", as it is known with reference to Africa However, it is worth
noting that Hwnpbreys offers the alternative explanation that the map prepared in 1886
was the II true II Schomburgk line and that previous maps were based on Schomburgk's
2S "The Case" (1899), p.128. See "Linea de Lord Granville" in Appendix 1.
26 "The Case" (1899) p.131. See "Linea de Lord Rosebery" in Appendix 1.
27 Valarino de Abreu op.cit., p.16.
28 Ibid .., based on an examination of PRO files CO 700, BG no.34, 35 and PO 925 states in a footnote the
argument that Britain had penciled in new lines en a map to extend its claims to territory between 1875 and
1866 - Footnote 35, p.16. This argument is amongst those put forward officially by Venezuela against the
1899 Award. See "Report en the Boundary Question with British Guiana Submitted to the National
Government by the Venezuelan Experts" (1967).
29 Valarino de Abreu op.cit., p.16, citing files CO 925/1319, MR 1887 (4), BG 46 and FO 925/1591.
30 Almecijia Bermudez (1987), p.19. See also Ely (1997), p.4, who expresses a similar viewpoint.
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inaccurate sketch map of 1840_31 A similar explanation has been offered by HMG.32
Subsequently, a proposal for the boundary line by Venezuela was rejected by Britain.33 It
was against this background that Venezuela requested US support." Appeals were made
in 1876, 1880, 1884 and 1887_35 Between 1881 and 1883, the US merely sought to
inform Britain of its preference for a settlement of the boundary dispute by arbitration.36
As will be seen later, subsequent US intervention on behalf of Venezuela marked a
significant turning point in the dispute.
The situation improved between Britain and Venezuela when in May 1885, Lord
Granville, the British Foreign Secretary negotiated a treaty to submit the boundary to
arbitration, a move which he had previously resisted." It is not clear, as Bertram
observes, whether Lord Granville was influenced by the US expressions on the issue,
however a change of government from the Liberals to the Conservatives was to result in
the Treaty not being ratified." Lord Salisbury's conservative government returned to
power and immediately notified the Venezuelan government that it would not be
proceeding with the uegotiatlona " Friction between the two opposing sides continued
and was to culminate in Caracas severing diplomatic relations with London in February
1897. This had followed Britain's refusal to agree to Venezuela's demand for the
31 Humphreys (1969), pp.191-192.
32 "Comments 00 Record of Discussions on Venezuelan-British Guiana Boundary Dispute on 9-10 Dec,
1965" in FO 371/185061.
33 'The Case" (1899), pp.127-128. See Appendix 1 of this thesis.
34 Bernardo Nunez (1967), p.37.
35 Valarino de Abreu, op.cit.., p.17.
36 Rout (1971), p.14; and Perkins (1937), pp.16-17. See "Linea de Granville" in Appendix 1.
37 Bertram (1992), p.5.
38 Ibid.
39 Bertram (1992), pp.5; and 115 citing Grover Cleveland, The Venezuelan Boundary Controversy,
Princeton (1913).
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evacuation of the territory between the Orinoco and the Pomeroon and for that territory to
be submitted to arbitration."
With tensions continuing to rise between Britain and Venezuela, it is not
surprising that the two sides clashed in the disputed area. Such an occurrence in February
1895 has become known as the "Yuruan Incident"." The authorities in British Guiana
had erected a police post in the Yuruan area to protect British subjects. However, Yuruan
lay in the territory claimed by Venezuela, and the latter issued orders for the British
police to be ejected. Two British officials were arrested and allegedly ill-treated. The
Yuruan incident which also involved allegations of flag burning by either side, was to
cost Venezuela £1,500 following British demands for compensation. 42 It is against this
backdrop of rising tensions that the US intervened in what was now known as the Anglo-
Venezuela dispute.
US intervention on behalf of Venezuela in the boundary dispute with Britain has
often been depicted in popular history as the moment when Washington was prepared to
go to war with Britain over Venezuela in defence of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.
However, as will be shown below, the careful examination of the facts by some writers-
notably Grenville & Young (1966) and Bertram (1992), LaFeber in The American
Historical Review (1961) and Smith (1979) - have illuminated the motivating
undercurrents behind the US's intervention.
Grenville and Young argue that the role of Williams Scruggs, a former US
40 "The Case" (1899), p.132.
41 Bernardo Nunez (1967), pp.89-102, provides a detailed insight into this incident. See also Bertram
(1992), p.13; and Humphreys (1969), p.204.
42 Humphreys (1969), p.204; Bertram (1992), p.13; and Bernardo Nufiez (1967), pp.89-102.
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diplomat and later advocate for Venezuela" ... deserves far more credit for focussing the
attention of newspapers and Congress on the Anglo-Venezuelan dispute than has so far
been given him"43 Scruggs was employed by the Venezuelan government as essentially
their propagandist/publicist in bringing Venezuela's case to the attention of the US and
lobbying for US support. One of Scruggs' actions, which has been credited with fulfilling
just those tasks, was a pamphlet he had prepared, entitled, "British Aggression in
Venezuela, the Monroe Doctrine on Trial" in 1894. The argument of the publication is
self-explanatory given its title. As Grenville and Young state, "Scruggs chose a felicitous
title for his pamphlet which, in the best tradition of the journalist, packed a punch in nine
words." The pamphlet was widely distributed to newspaper editors, senators and other
influential persons. Scruggs made reference to the Monroe Doctrine in calling for US
intervention against British encroachment in the hemisphere. 44 Moreover, he had
succeeded in getting a resolution placed before Congress on the dispute on February 13,
1895. The resolution which urged Britain to arbitration was passed by both Houses of
Congress on February 30, 1895. Grenville and Young also argue, "American
intervention had been inuninent for years. ,,45 Nevertheless, Scruggs is credited for his
role in stimulating both private and public opinion in the US, and ultimately President
Cleveland.
Another writer, Smith, has attributed the US's move to active intervention from
initial passivity to the appointment of Secretary of State Richard Olney. 46 The
43 Grenville and Young (1966), p.135. Perkins (1937) although not going into as much detail also credits
the role of Scruggs.
44 Grenville and Young (1966), pp.138-139.
45 Ibid., p.140.
46 Smith (1979), p.206.
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appointment of Olney was made following the death of Gresham on 28 May 1895.
According to Smith, "The new Secretary of State ... believed even more firmly that the
Venezuelans were the aggrieved party and that Britain had for too long deliberately
delayed a settlement. ,,47
Olney was certainly to demonstrate his conviction when he penned a letter to the
US ambassador in London for forwarding to Lord Salisbury. In this despatch, he invoked
the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 in calling for Britain to submit the territory in its entirety to
arbitration. A few features from Olney's despatch are worth quoting here in order to
gauge not only the Secretary of State's interpretation of the 1823 Doctrine, but also the
extent to which he was prepared to use that interpretation against Britain in its dispute
with Venezuela. He regarded Britain's distance from the American continent as a
significant factor precluding it from having influence there. "Distance and three thousand
miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political union between a European and
an American state unnatural and inexpedient" .48 He went on to assert what has become
known as the "Olney Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine. "Today... the United States is
practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it
confmes its interposition"." That Britain was being connnanded to arbitration is evident
in the next passage:
"You [US Ambassador to London, Thomas Bayard] are instructed, therefore, to
present the foregoing views to Lord Salisbury by reading to him this
corrnnunication (leaving with him a copy if you so desire), and to reinforce them
by such pertinent considerations as will doubtless occur to you. They call for a
defmite decision upon the point whether Great Britain will consent or will decline
to submit the Venezuelan question in its entirety to impartial arbitration .. .it is his
47 Ibid.
48 Reprinted in Perkins (1937), p.159.
49 Ibid., p.161.
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[Cleveland's] wish to be made acquainted with the fact at such an early date as
will enable him to lay the whole subject before Congress in his annual
message" .50
Lord Salisbury's reply to Olney's despatch did not arrive in time for Cleveland's
annual address to Congress as was demanded. Nevertheless, when it did arrive, his reply
was equally acerbic. He not only challenged the relevance of the Monroe Doctrine to the
Anglo-Venezuelan boundary dispute, but also sought to question the Monroe Doctrine
itself and particularly Olney's assertions of the doctrine. 51 As Perkins' summary of Lord
Salisbury's challenges, "They constituted a fitting, indeed, a crushing rebuke to the
imprudent generalizations of the Secretary of State" .52
Cleveland's response to Lord Salisbury's rebuttal was his famous message to
congress on December 17, 1895. With Britain still refusing to submit to arbitration all
territory, Cleveland appealed to Congress for funds to establish a boundary commission,
which would not only investigate the dispute between Britain and Venezuela, but which
would also be charged with demarcating and enforcing the boundary, with the US's
power behind it.53 The boundary dispute had thus been transformed into an issue of
significance, with the US seemingly prepared to embark on unilateral action. As Smith
states, "In 1895 direct confrontation could not be avoided when the Venezuela boundary
dispute was transformed into the simple but explosive question of whether or not Britain
recognized the validity of the Monroe Doctrine. ,,54 Perkins expresses a similar
50 Ibid., p.167.
51 Ibid., p.181, for an excerpt of Salisbury's reply of November 26, 1895. Bertram (1992), pp.30-35, for an
analysis of Salisbury's reply.
52 Perkins (1937), p.181-182.
53 Salisbury, reprinted in Perkins (1937), pp.191-192.
54 Smith (1979), p.xiv.
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interpretation when he states, "It was the Venezuela crisis of 1895 which, for the first
time since the Civil War, brought two great nations into sharp collision with one another
on the basis of the principles of 1823 ... ,,55 However, what at first appeared to be an issue
that would lead to confrontation between the US and UK, was to soon be transformed
into one of friendship and cordiality in Anglo-American relations. But first, what had
motivated the US to act on behalf of Venezuela?
Some commentators have argued that ultimately the US was motivated by its self-
interest, rather than that of Venezuela's. Grenville and Young refer to Cleveland's own
admission of acting on behalf of his country's interest. The Monroe Doctrine was being
applied, Cleveland wrote, "for its importance to our government and welfare." Though
the dispute of another country had provided the occasion, the American president stated,
"we are, I suppose, not looking after its interests but our own. ,,56 Exactly what those
interests are have been elaborated by LaFeber who argues that the US's action was a
direct response to the perceived economic threats from British encroachments in Latin
America. 57 Indeed, LaFeber makes "the economic influence" a significant factor in
Cleveland's policy, especially in view of the US's own economic crisis as a result of the
1893 depression.
Smith, while not placing the economic influence at the centre of his thesis,
nevertheless alludes to the US's watchful eye on British encroachment in Latin
America. 58 Moreover, as Smith later elaborates the US's reaction has to be seen within
55 Perkins (1937), p.136.
56 Grenville and Young (1966), quoting from Cleveland to Bayard, December 29, 1895. Nevins, Letters of
Cleveland, pp.417-20.
57 LaFeber in The American Historical Review (1961).
58 Smith (1979), p.4.
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the context of its own expansionist policy. "It reflected the long-held consciousness of
American hemispheric power brought to the surface by the interaction of diplomatic
events within the inherently expansionist nature of American society itself. ,,59 The
Anglo-Venezuelan dispute had become caught up in Anglo-American rivalries, or so it
seemed.
Bertram refers to the fact that only a few days after President Cleveland's famous
message that the likelihood of confrontation or a possible war between the US and Britain
appeared to have subsided. "Within a few days after the President's message on
December 17th, a trend toward peace set in, which, within a month, caused Britishers to
comment that the Anglo-American relations were better than before the outbreak of
bellicosity. ,,60 Bertram further elaborates on the extent of US friendship with Britain
when he states, "This trend quickly grew into a warm friendship and by a decade later
into a virtual entente with world-wide importance. ,,61 A number of factors account for
the changed relationship after the apparent threat implicit in Cleveland's famous message
to Congress of 1895. In the first instance, Bertram argues that the slump which occurred
in the stock markets on Friday, 20 December 1895 - three days after the President's
message - had a sobering effect on the Americans and any consideration they may have
given to a war with Britain.62 On the other side of the Atlantic, Britain was also beset by
her own problems, not least the antagonizing of European powers as a result of her
"splendid isolation", trading opportunities gained in the Orient and her share in the
S9 Ibid., p.26.




Scramble for Africa.63 Moreover, Britain faced new trouble in the Transvaal when
Kaiser Wilhelm sent his offer of assistance by telegram on 4 January 1896 to President
Kruger, following Dr Leander Jameson's leading of a group of armed police from Cape
Colony into the Transvaal.64 Against this "vulnerability", to use Smith's term, and with
Italy as her only friend of any importance in Europe, it is quite easy to see why Britain
would have preferred not to add the US to its list of enemies. 65 This is especially in view
of the US's growing significance. As Smith notes, "But while Foreign Office officials
attached a low political and cultural value to the United States they did not underrate its
commercial significance and potential. ,,66
After the President's December 1895 speech and more than a month after the
appointment of Cleveland's Boundary Commission, the American Ambassador Bayard
informed the Foreign Office on 4 February 1896 that the Commission was established
merely to ascertain facts for the President. This is as opposed to acting as an arbitral
tribunal to determine where the boundary should be. As Bertram interprets it, "The
purpose of the investigation was certainly hostile to none; the sole concern of the United
States was the peaceful solution of a controversy between two friendly powers. ,,67 The
same writer notes that signs of war had more or less abated after Christmas, following a
statement made by Senator Gray, who was known to be a close aide of Cleveland. The
senator had alluded to the essentially investigative purpose of the Boundary
63 Ibid., p.71 and Smith (1979), pp.24, 207.
64 Bertram (1992), p.71.
65 Smith (1979), p.24; and Bertram (1992), p.7l.
66 Smith (1979), p.ll.
67 Bertram (1992), p.82.
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Commission. 68 However, while Bertram argues that rumours emanating from Senator
Gray's speech influenced a change in British attitude/" Smith, on other hand, states that
the British cabinet had overruled Salisbury since 11 January 1896 in deciding that an
"honourable solution" should be sought with the US.70 Whatever the ascending order of
influences on either side of the Atlantic, the key point is that neither side was on the
verge of war.
Although Smith and Bertram differ in their interpretations of the start of Anglo-
American friendship, they both concur that far from reaching the state of war, British and
American friendship was secured." Bertram, who cites examples of Anglo-US rivalries
and Anglo-phobic sentiment in the US argues that the crisis "saw the genesis or birth time
of Anglo-American friendship". 72 In the final analysis, one should not discount Grenville
and Young's argument that the president did not in any case have any intentions of going
to war with Britain. "When the President declared 'I am fully alive to the responsibility
incurred, and keenly realize all the consequences that may follow', the phrase was
mistakenly interpreted as meaning that Cleveland was prepared if necessary to go to
war. ,,73 The plausibility of this argument may be further indicated by the fact that Britain
possessed greater naval might than the US.74
68 Ibid., pp.68-69 for more details.
69 Ibid., p.68
70 Smith (1979), p.207. See also Grenville and Young (1966), p.203.
71 For further details 00 the change of attitude away from a threat of war to demands for arbitration on both
sides of the Atlantic, including the role of the press and public opinion in this change, see Bertram (1992),
pp.75-92. While acknowledging that "... a remarkable degree of friendly accord" was soon achieved
between Britain and the US (Smith, 1979, p.20S), Smith is quick to point out that this was not merely a
result of events after December 1895, since ..... Britain had long recognized the political predominance of
the United States in Western Hemisphere questions."
72 Bertram (1992), Preface.
73 Grenville and Young (1966), p.168.
74 Ibid., p.I72.
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Britain subsequently agreed to the dispute going to arbitration. It is not
surprising, therefore, that some authors have interpreted this as a success for US
diplomacy. Smith, for instance, interprets this decision as "... a satisfying diplomatic
victory and a resounding afftrmation of the Monroe Doctrine'i." Following nearly a year
of negotiations between the US and Britain on the substance of the Arbitration Treaty -
negotiations from which Venezuela appears to have been excluded until the last moment
- the Treaty was signed between the British and Venezuelan ambassadors to Washington
on 2 February 1897.76 The treaty was later ratified by both sides in June 1897. In the
meantime, the Boundary Connnission established under Cleveland had ceased its
investigations since November 1896.77
The Arbitrators on the Tribunal were American, British and Russian: Lord Russell
of Killowen, Lord Chief Justice of Britain, who replaced Baron Herschell following the
latter's death and Sir Richard Henn Collins, Justice of the British Supreme Court, were
both nominated by Britain. Venezuela was also allowed two arbitrators, though one had
to be nominated by the President of the United States, as stipulated in the arbitral treaty. 78
In any event, the president of Venezuela nominated an American, Melville Weston
Fuller, the Chief Justice of the US; the nominee by the US on behalf of Venezuela was
David Josiah Brewer, a Justice of the Supreme Court of the US. The ftfth jurist selected
by the four nominees and who was designated President of the Tribunal was the Russian
7S Smith (1979), p.xiv.
76 See ibid., chapter 7, "The Search for a Solution", pp.95-113, and chapter 8, "The Solution and End of the
Controversy", pp.115-127 on the discussions between and within the US and Britain on the search for the
terms of arbitration. LaFeber, op. cit., p.964 quoting from the Olney Papers (Olney to Bayard, January 22,
1896) states that Olney ..... argued that he did not care to have Venezuela 'consulted at every step' ." See
also Young (1942), pp.251-252, 260; and Grenville and Young (1966), pp.175-178.
77 Humphreys (1969), p.213.
78 See Appendix 2 for the text of the 1897 treaty of arbitraticn.
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professor of international law , Frederic de Martens.i" The Arbitrators passed down their
award on 3 October 1899. The award was largely in favour of Britain which gained 50,
000 square miles approximately of the disputed territory and was said to have followed
the Schomburgk line with the exception of two modifications. 80 On the other hand,
Venezuela, which was awarded 10, 000 square miles of territory also gained control of
the strategic mouth of the Orinoco River. Venezuela was also awarded 150 square miles
of territory in the interior, thereby giving her control of the gold-mining area of the
Yuruan.t!
Smith has argued that the effect of Britain conceding to the arbitration was a
vindication of the Monroe Doctrine by acknowledging the US's pre-eminence in western
hemisphere issues.82 Moreover, despite Venezuela being awarded much less than she had
hoped for from the arbitral tribunal, there appears to be consensus among some writers,
that the US's objectives had nevertheless been achieved. Indeed Bertram states, "On the
whole the American view of the award was that it was fair.,,83 Such an argument is based
on the premise that the US's aim was merely to ensure Venezuela had obtained "a fair
trial through arbitration. ,,84 LaFeber who states that one of the US's objectives was to get
the dispute to arbitration also adds that the other objective for the US was to secure for
Venezuela control of the OrinoCO.85 Grenville and Young take their conclusions one step
further by arguing, "Olney did not champion Venezuela; that is clearly brought out by his
79 For background details on the arbitrators, see Ministry of Information ( 1981 b).
80 Bertram (1992), p.123.
81 Ibid., pp.122-123. See Appendix 2 of this thesis for the full text of the award.
82 Smith (1979), pp.24, 28. LaFeber, op. cit., makes a similar argwnent.
83 Bertram (1992), p.23. See also Grenville and Young (1966), p.178.
84 ibid., p.23.
8S LaFeber op. cit., p964. See also Grenville and YOWlg (1966), p.178 who assert that Cleveland "... hailed
the control Venezuela gained over the Orinoco as a great victory."
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behaviour during the negotiations. ,,86 They cite, as evidence of this argument, issues such
as Olney reaching agreement with Britain on the terms of arbitration without Venezuela's
consultation; the abandonment of Venezuela's claim to historical title and not allowing
Venezuela to name any arbitrators in the US draft of the treaty.87 These authors claim
that it was Salisbury who had made the concession to Venezuela where it was allowed to
name one of the arbitrators." Assuming the validity of their arguments, it may be
concluded that the US not only acted on its self-interest, but interpreted victory from that
perspective.
The Re-opening of the Territorial Dispute in the 1960s
Mallet-Prevost's Memorandum and Venezuelan Action at the UN
The 1899 Award of the tribunal had stated that the award was a "full, perfect and
final settlement"." The boundary, according to the terms of the tribunal award, was
demarcated between British and Venezuelan boundary commissioners on 10 January
1905.
90
However, on the Venezuelan part the issue has been regarded by some as far
from being fmally settled. Braveboy-Wagner states, ''Venezuelan officials protested the
award occasionally over the years particularly in the Venezuelan Congress". 91 Such
protests from Venezuela were largely confmed to the domestic political arena.
86 Grenville and Young (1966), p.175.
87 Ibid., pp.175-l76.
88 Grenville and Young (1966), p.177.
89 See Appendix 2 for full details of the award
90 Full text of the agreement between British and Venezuelan boundary commissioners reprinted in MFA
(1984b), pp.15-l6.
91 Braveboy- Wagner (1984), p.108. For full details of when interested Venezuelan parties have taken issue
with the awards, see MRE (1967). For a more updated account MRE (2000b).
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The Anglo-Venezuelan territorial dispute was re-opened by the Venezuelan
government in 1962 when that country took the issue before the UN. At the BOth
meeting of the Fourth Committee on 22 February 1962, the Venezuelan representative to
the UN, Carlos Sosa Rodriguez, registered the "serious reservations" his country held
against the 1899 Award.92 The Venezuelan government's main position was that the
1899 award was the result of a compromise, rather than a judicial decision:
"El Laudo fue resultado de una transacci6n polftica que se hizo a espaldas de
Venezuela sacrificando sus legitimos derechos. La frontera fue trazada
arbitrariamente, sino observar para nada, ni las Reglas especfficas del
compromiso arbitral ni los principios del Derecho Intemaci6nal aplicables al
casO.,,93
Subsequently, at the 348th meeting of the UN's Special Political Committee, Venezuela
had included in Agenda Item 88, "Question of boundaries between Venezuela and the
territory of British Guiana ,,94 At this time, the Venezuelan foreign minister, Marcos
Falc6n Briceno sought to put Venezuela's case forward. Apart from reiterating such
points as Venezuela's interpretation of the Treaty of Munster 1648, on Spanish versus
Dutch possessions, the basis of that country's arguments was a posthumous memorandum
published in the American Journal of International Law by one of the Venezuelan
counsel at the 1899 Tribunal.95
Given the significance attached to this memorandum and its place in the history of
the dispute, it is worth recalling some of its major points. In his memorandum, Severo
Mallet-Prevost claimed that far from being a judicious decision, the 1899 Award was the
result of a compromise. Mallet-Prevost, who had dictated his memo to Judge Otto
92 MRE (1967), pp.16-17. See also MRE (1963), pp.xxii-xl.
93 DOC-OOS, MRE (2000b).
94 UN (1962a). See also MRE (1967).
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Schoenrich, from the same law firm as himself, for publication after his death, went on to
allege the exact way in which that compromise was reached. That is, the Russian jurist at
the 1897-1899 tribunal, Frederic de Martens, was supposed to have forced both the
British and US arbitrators into making a unanimous decision:
"He [Martens] proposed a compromise that the award designate a boundary line
east of the mouth of the Orinoco, the line which was in fact adopted. If the
American judges agreed to this line, he and the British judges would also vote for
it and the award of the Tribunal would be unanimous. If the American judges did
not agree to it, he would vote with the British judges for the line claimed by Great
Britain, which would thus become the boundary line by majority vote of the
Tribunal. ,,96
Moreover, Mallet-Prevost alleged that the position of the British members and the
Russian president of the tribunal was the result of a deal entered into following the
Russian's visit to England during a recess of the tribunal. He contended:
"The decision which was accordingly rendered was unanimous but while it gave
to Venezuela the most important strategic point at issue it was unjust to
Venezuela and deprived her of very extensive and important territory to which, in
my opinion, Great Britain had not the shadow of a right. ,,97
The Mallet-Prevost memorandum was the basis upon which Venezuela at the Special
Political Committee had sought to invoke the nullity of the 1899 Award. The purpose of
Venezuela raising the issue in this group is recorded in the official UN records as
follows:
"Venezuela was not asking the Committee to make a decision on the substance of
the question. It had brought the matter before the United Nations not in order to
seek a decision but for the purpose of letting the world know the compelling
reasons that had prevented it from accepting the arbitral award of 1899 as a fmal
and defmitive settlement. Venezuela's sole desire was to seek a friendly
95 (1949), 43:528-530.
96 The American Journal of International Law (1949), p527.
97 Ibid, p.530.
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settlement of the problem with the United Kingdom and to record its support for
British Guiana's independence. ,,98
This action by Caracas represented its first major attempt to intemationalise its
reservations about the 1899 award. It is not surprising, given the nature of Mallet-
Prevost's allegations that Venezuela sought to take up the issue on the world stage. It
should, however, be noted that in a later issue of the same journal in which the
memorandum was published, Clifton Child refuted Mallet-Prevost's allegations.99 Child
also identified a number of errors of fact in Mallet-Prevost's recollection of events, based
on a thorough analysis of the verbatim records of the tribunal and newspaper reports at
the time. He surmises:
"In fact, apart from the resentment which the Counsel for Venezuela apparently
felt against the verdict, there were none of the elements of the story asMr. Mallet-
Prevost now tells it - a circumstance which makes it tempting to assume that in
nursing his grievance against the Tribunal through the years, Mr. Mallet-Prevost
allowed his imagination to supply a number of details which were missing from
the statement which he and General Harrison made [speech declaring 'victory' for
Venezuela passed to a Reuter Correspondent the day after the award] in 1899.,,100
Contrary to these findings against Mallet-Prevost, another writer in the same journal,
Williams Dennis, supports essentially, the posthumous allegations. 101 Acknowledging
some of Child's arguments, Dennis states:
"But it is submitted that this does not in any way tend to discredit Mr. Mallet-
Prevost's statement of the important facts of which he had personal knowledge
which show the unjudicial method by which the judgement of the arbitrators was
brought about, and this is the important point in Mr. Mallet-Prevost's
memorandum, not only as respects the British arbitration but as tending to
98 UN (1962a). For the text of the Venezuelan foreign minister's address to the UN on 12 November 1962,
see MRE (963), pp.xxiii-xl.




illuminate and illustrate the great defect of arbitration in general; i.e.,
compromise." 102
Further, Dennis elaborates that Mallet-Prevost had told a similar story to him thirty-four
years prior to the memorandum, although he admits that he does not recall being told of
an Anglo-Ruso deal being behind the compromise.P'' In backing up Mallet-Prevost's
allegations, Dennis also states that compromise was a feature of international
arbitrations. 104
HMG's response to the Venezuelan allegations at the 349thmeeting of the Special
Political Corrnnittee was made through its representative at the UK Mission to the UN,
R.T. Crowe. It declared that its views had not changed since they were expressed at the
1302
nd
meeting of the Fourth Corrnnittee in 1962. That is, "It still considered that the
western boundary of British Guiana and Venezuela had been finally settled by the award
which the arbitral tribunal had announced on 3 October 1899. ,,105 HMG also refuted
Venezuela's interpretation of the Treaty of Munster and sought to clarify what it regarded
as the true facts surrounding the boundary dispute and its settlement in 1899.106
Despite refuting the Venezuelan claims, it is interesting to note that the UK's
representative later went on to state that HMG, in concurrence with the government of
British Guiana, was offering a tripartite examination of the documents on the basis of
102 Dennis in ibid., p.722.
103 Ibid., pp.724-725.
104 Ibid., p.727.
lOS UN (1962b), p.123. This remains the British government's position in 1999 according to Susan
Leleune. Since the introduction of the UN Good Officer process in 1990, HMG has encouraged the
Venezuelan and Guyanese governments to pursue a peaceful diplomatic solution to their differences within
the process, Interview 8 March 2000.
106 UN (1962b), pp.123-127.
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their surety that the disagreement was based" ... on a misunderstanding which could be
put right. ,,107 The offer was made with the following caveat:
"That offer was in no sense a proposal to engage in substantive ta1ks about the
revision of the frontier, for which there was no justification; it merely reflected
the British government's anxiety to dispel any doubts that the Venezuelan
government might have about the validity of the arbitral award and to remove
once and for all the misunderstanding that had arisen. ,,108
This offer was clearly a major development in the re-opening of the issue. As Joseph
accurately concludes:
"Whatever positive interpretation may have been attributed in the past to this
caveat, the offer connnenced the first stage in the negotiations of the border issue
since the arbitral award; in essence it was the first step in the processional path
culminating with the Geneva Agreement of February 1966.,,109
This is a position adopted by the post-independence governments to 1992:
"It was not the Geneva Agreement that opened the door to discussion of the
controversy. It was in fact the arrangement, well before independence for an
examination of the documents which was an arrangement between Britain and
Venezuela on the British side to quell what they saw, this Venezuelan clamour;
but an arrangement to which the PPP administration in Guyana was party ... ,,110
Ramphal's arguments do not take into consideration the fact that while the PPP-led self-
government in 1962 was consulted by Britain, it did not have responsibility for foreign
and defence matters, which remained with the colonial power. As such, the decision
taken to grant Venezuela its request to re-examine the documents was ultimately not that
of the Jagan government. Nevertheless, Ramphal takes his argument one step further by
contending that the decision to allow examination of the documents made the Geneva
107 UN (I 962c), p.125.
108 Ibid., p.127.
109 Joseph (1998), p.30.
110 Interview with Shridath Ramphal, 23 March 2001.
85
Agreement unavoidable. "In fact, Geneva became more difficult to avoid because this
process had already started at the examination of the documents. ,,11 I As a result of this
offer for a tripartite examination of the documents and the Venezuelan government's
acceptance, the question of the boundary between Venezuela and British Guiana was
taken out ofthe Special Political Committee.P''
Examination of Documents and the Geneva Agreement
The first series of meetings at ministerial level between Britain and Venezuela
took place in London on 5, 6 and 7 November 1963. The Venezuelan foreign minister,
Marcos Falcon Briceno, represented his country while R.A. Butler represented Britain,
with Governor Ralph Grey being the British Guiana representative. The meeting was
held to review the progress that each side's experts were making in their examination of
the historical docurrents.l'? Suffice to say that at this stage both sides maintained their
positions, as had been made at the Special Political Connnittee, regarding the dispute. 114
It did not escape the Venezuelan foreign minister's attention that even the
inclusion of such items on the agenda was a major step forward for its case.
"A nadie puede escapar el hecho de que la posici6n britanica de los comienzos de
este proceso en 1962 habfa ya cambiado notablemente. Lo acordado en la agenda
distaba en gran manera de aquella primera oferta formulada por su Representante
senor Crowe, en el sentido de que estaban dispuestos Unicamente a examinar los
documentos relativo al Laudo de 1.899. ,,115
III Ibid.
112 UN (1962c), p.127.
113 See MRE (1967), pp.21-22.
114 Archivo Central, MRE, 1961: "Exposici6n al Congreso Naciooal del doctor Ignacio Iribarren Borges,
Ministro de Relaciones Extericres, sobre el Acuerdo de Ginebra, el dia 17 de marzo de 1966." This
document can also be found inMRE (1967).
us Ibid.
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The first phase of the discussions between the experts was subsequently completed in the
first half of 1964, with each side exchanging their reports on 3 August 1965.116
In the meantime, the Venezuelan Ambassador in London was engaged in
negotiations between October and December 1965. Neither side found the reports of
each other's experts acceptable at the ministerial meeting held on 9 and 10 December
1965Y7 As such it was agreed that there would be another meeting in Geneva from 16-
17 February 1966. It was at this meeting that what became known as the "Geneva
Agreement" was signed by Britain, British Guiana and Venezuela.l'" It was during these
negotiations, that the agenda was advanced in Venezuela's favour as far as it was
concerned. "... se vino a acordar una agenda que signific6 un considerable avance en
favor de nuestros puntos de vista. ,,119 These progressions are summarised as follows: the
issue was accorded the status of a "controversy" between Venezuela and the United
Kingdom Following on from this is the recognition that there is a need to resolve the
controversy.
"Mas atin para disipar cualquier duda sobre la naturaleza de las conversaciones
que no podfan ya reducirse al exam en academico de documentos, se estipul6 en el
punto segunda de la agenda que se iba a 'buscar soluciones satisfactorias para el
arreglo practice de la controversia que ha surgido como resultado de la contenci6n
venezolana de que el Laudo de 1.899 es nulo e frrito'. ,,120
Indeed, Article 1 of the Geneva Agreement states the key accord to emerge from the
Geneva meetings. That is, the decision to establish a Mixed Commission, charged with
116 Braveboy- Wagner (1984) states a total of fifteen meetings between the experts were held in London
from February to May 1964.
117 Expedi 7 itente no. ,op.Cl.




"... seeking satisfactory solutions for the practical settlement of the controversy
between Venezuela and the United Kingdom which has arisen as the result of the
Venezuelan contention that the Arbitral Award of 1899 about the frontier between
British Guiana and Venezuela is null and void. ,,121
This agreement did not therefore provide the solution to the British Guiana-Venezuela
territorial problem that was now officially deemed a "controversy". Rather it sought to
provide a mechanism through which the solutions for a settlement may be arrived at. As
will be shown in chapter 3, the meaning, especially of Article 1 of what is the very
carefully worded diplomatic agreement was to be a source of much disagreement
between Guyana and Venezuela.
The fact that Venezuela's challenge to the legitimacy of the 1899 Award at the
UN in 1962 had within four years been given recognition as a controversy requiring a
solution, clearly represented a huge step forward for that state. As its president at the
time, Romulo Betancourt stated in his presidential message of 7 March 1964:
"... el Acuerdo concert ado, con la Gran Bretafia y la Guayana Inglesa, en Ginebra,
ya que tengo la bien fundada convicci6n de que el reabre el caso de la Guayana
Esequiba ofreciendo a Venezuela una oportunidad, como nunca tuvo antes, para
hacer valer sus derechos y conseguir la reparaci6n del dafio que nos causara el
doloroso Laudo de Paris. ,,122
However, for the opposition in Guyana, the PPP, which, unlike its Venezuelan
counterparts were not represented at the Geneva talks, the issue was a "sell-out".I23 This
view was elaborated further in a statement:
"In the light of the decisions of the Geneva Conference on the British Guiana-
Venezuela border issue the People's Progressive Party wishes to denounce the so-
called settlement for the reasons that it gives substance and status to a spurious
claim that has no legal basis and also compromises the sovereignty of this country
by associating an aggressor Government in a special arrangement in relation to
121 The Geneva Agreement reproduced inAppendix 5.
122 MRE (1967), p.6.
123 See Hubbard (1967).
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the territory which is the subject of controversy and the basis for a threat of
aggression .. .In addition to this, Venezuela appears to have been given special
consideration with regard to the exploitation of the natural resources of what that
country calls Guiana-Essequibo. ,,124
Mirroring the above quoted extract from president Romulo Betancourt's March 1964
speech, Jagan concluded that the Geneva Agreement had, in effect, given the Venezuelan
claim merit. Jagan went one step further by also stating that it had also given the US
government a mechanism by which it could intervene in Guyana's domestic policies.
" ... the Geneva Agreement and the appointment of a Mixed Guyana-Venezuela
Commission have given the Venezuelan government the opportunity to say that
there was merit in the claim. The examination during the next 4 years of the so-
called border claim gives the US government the lever to intervene through the
puppet Venezuelan government in our domestic affairs against any progressive
Guyanese government. ,,125
The events charted in this section from Venezuela's re-opening of the dispute to
the Geneva Agreement leaves a number of important questions unanswered. Firstly, why
did Venezuela choose to reopen the issue at the time it did? This question is particularly
important when one considers that the Mallet-Prevost memorandum cited by Venezuela
was published since 1949. Moreover, Venezuela had registered its objection to the
Award at regional fora in 1951 and 1954.126 Ince muses, "Venezuela's proclivity for
silence on numerous occasions ... creates a credibility gap on the real reasons for the
lengthy spasms of muteness. ,,127
Rupert Roopnaraine of the Working People's Alliance. which was formed after
124 Statement released by the PPP on 19 February 1966 and reprinted in ibid., pp.29-31; and "Venezuela-
The Sell-Out" in Thunder, October-November 1966.
125 "Non-Aligned Fiction: The Foreign Policy Debate", Thunder, Apri11967. See also Jagan (1968), p.8.
126 See MRE (1967).
127 Inee (1970), pto.
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the Geneva Agreement in 1979, has expressed his disagreement with the signing of that
agreement. "My preference would have been that it had not even been signed,
personally, because whether we like it or not, it gave legitimacy to the c1aim "128 It is fair
to say that there exists a consensus amongst the parties in Guyana, with the exception of
the PNC, against the Geneva Agreement.
But why did Britain agree to a re-examination of the documents, having
previously stated that the issue had been settled? Such a question is especially pertinent
considering the fact that as late as September 1962, the reaction in the Foreign Office was
against giving into the demands for ta1k.s: "This not unexpected move by the Venezuelans
should give us cause to strengthen our resolve not to succumb to threats and blackmailing
attempts to have 'talks' on the frontier issue." 129
The Archives
Early writers on the events surrounding the reopening of the dispute - Kissler
(1971), Ince (1970) and Braveboy-Wagner (1984) - were disadvantaged by the
unavailability of archival material. Venezuela did to some extent provide some insights
into this period through the publication of a number of related documents in MRE (1967).
However, even Braveboy-Wagner, whose chapter 7 ''Cooperation and Conflict: First
Period 1962-1967" relied heavily on these Venezuelan-published documents
128 Interview with Rupert Roopnaraine, 10 May 2000.
129 Hand-written note dated 18 September 1962 in PO 3711162 667.
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acknowledged the limitations of her work in this regard, due to archival material not
being declassified and available. 130
Joseph has attempted to piece together the behind the scenes occurrences during
that period from declassified material in the US and British archives available since the
mid-1990s. He identifies a number of factors from the available PRO records that may
account for the re-opening of the dispute in 1962 by Venezuela:
"The available official British documents confrrm the persistent views that the
establishment of Self-Government in British Guiana in August 1961 along with
the promise of Independence; the new security perceptions in the Caribbean
deriving from the Cuban revolution which brought Dr. Fidel Castro to power; the
assumptions about the establishment of another Conununist state in a region
strategically vital to the United States, and the political implosion in British
Guiana presented a major problem for Anglo-American diplomacy and
cumulatively contributed to the reopening of the boundary issue between British
Guiana and Venezuela ,,131
Joseph's first point about the link between the reopening of the dispute and the onset of
self-government in BG is plausible when one considers that BG gained self-government
in August 1961 and that it was shortly afterwards - February 1962 - that Venezuela took
the issue to the UN. Indeed, as is noted in one declassifted Foreign Office despatch on
developments in Caracas at this time:
"The decision of the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly
to hear Jagan as a petitioner and the ensuing United Nations debate have re-
awakened the interest of those elements here who enjoy writing articles for the
press about the iniquities of the 1899 Arbitration award which fixed the present
boundaries between Venezuela and British Guiana .. .It was even alleged that
Venezuela intended to raise her claim at the General Assembly. ,,132
Moreover, Joseph's subsequent points about the links with the Cold War concerns in the
region are more than feasible when one considers the US and British machinations which
130 Braveboy-Wagner (1984), p.297.
131 Joseph (1998), p.5. See also Joseph's article in Guyana Review, December 1968, pp.58-61.
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occurred in BG in the early 19608 in order to prevent the Marxist-led PPP government
from leading the country to independence. 133 The US's policy on Venezuela contrasted
with that on BG since the strong anti-communist stance of the newly democratic
Betancourt government in Venezuela was looked on favourably in Washington. The
US's view in 1962 is summarised in a draft paper as follows: "The focus of the draft
paper is necessarily and properly on support for the present Venezuelan Government as
the best of the available alternatives to promote a stable, constitutional and prosperous
Venezuela friendly to the US."134 Moreover, the US had significant investments in
Venezuela which no doubt influenced the interest it showed in that country's politics. As
this document from the State Department archives notes:
"US economic interest in Venezuela is quite substantial, since total US trade with
the country is greater than with any other in Latin America and US direct
investment in Venezuela (about $3 billion) is larger than in any other country
except Canada. In fact, foreign capital and technology (US, British, Dutch), have
been primarily responsible for development of the country's natural resources. ,,135
The issue of communism and the PPP government were also of direct interest to
Venezuela not only because of geographical proximity, but also because the Betancourt
government in Venezuela was fighting its own insurgency problems from communist-
inspired guerrillas. One US State Department telegram reports in 1962 that " .. .left-wing
and communist elements in Venezuela have instigated violent disorders in Caracas and
elsewhere in Venezuela causing numerous deaths and extensive property damage."!"
The Venezuelan ministry'S annual report, Libro Amarillo, also contains a number of
132 British Embassy, Caracas, to Foreign Office, 19 January 1962, FO 3711162663.
133 See Chapter 1 of this thesis.
134 Memo from the US Embassy in Caracas to the Venezuelan Desk Officer in Washington, April 27, 1962
which summarises a draft paper received entitled "Venezuela: State Department Guidelines for Policy and
Operations", Pol 32-1 Guyana-Venezuela, RG59.
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documents which demonstrate its concerns about its internal communist problems. 137
Moreover, the government in Caracas may also have been motivated by the need to act
before BG's independence. Its adversary would then have been Britain as opposed to the
perceived image problems it may have when resurrecting the claim against a weaker
adversary. This was admitted by the Venezuelan delegate to the UN in 1962: "He [the
Venezuelan delegate to the UN] said that the Venezuelans had made a public move now
because they thought that any move after independence would lay them open to
accusation of bullying a small country.r ':" Certainly, the Betancourt government was
motivated to get the issue raised before Britain granted BG independence. A memo of a
conversation with a Venezuelan First Secretary in Washington, dated 12 September 1962
states:
"... Venezuela has placed the boundary question on the agenda of the forthcoming
Seventeenth General Assembly as a means of bringing it before world public
opinion. Through this device it hopes to exert pressure on the British to get the
latter to agree to negotiate a revision prior to granting independence to British
Guiana. II 139
Some theories have been proffered by British diplomats about the motivations of
Caracas: "The Venezuelan Government's present initiative no doubt has been inspired by
recent events in S.E. Asia, but may also be designed to divert attention from President
Betancourt's present internal difficulties. II140 The official Venezuelan explanation for
135 From Roger Hilness to Mr. Martin, Latin America Policy Committee, 28/5162, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
136 Mr Barall to Mr. McGhee, January 31,1962, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
137 They are "Defensa Contra La Subversion e Intervencion del Comunismo Intemacional", MRE (1963),
pp.76-77; "Comisirn Consultive Sobre Asuntos Relativos ala Adopci6n de Medidas de Seguridad contra la
acci6n Subversiva del comunismo internacional", ibid., pp78-79; and "Cornisi6n Especial de Consulta
Sobre Seguridad Centra la Acci6n Subversiva de Comunismo Internacional", ibid., pp.79-80.
138 British Embassy, Caracas, to Foreign Office, 23 August 1962, FO 3711162668.
139 US State Department Records Relating to Venezuela 1960-1963, 47.3 US-Venezuela Trade, 1962 to FT
18 Munitions Cootro11963, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
140 Hankey to Crowe, January 17, 1962, FO 371/162663. Again repeated by Hankey on 22 January 1962 ..
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reopening the dispute was of course the evidence that had come to light in Mallet-
Prevost's posthumous memorandum 141
Yet more theories exist. As part of the location of the reopening within the
framework of Anglo-American diplomacy, Joseph tackles indirectly the issue of whether
it was the US which had instigated Venezuelan action given the former's interest in
destabilizing British Guiana's Jagan. Such a premise has, of course, been made by the
PPP over the years.142 No declassified material has so far confirmed the PPP's theory in
absolute terms. However, Joseph has identified a State Department paper dated 15
March 1963, which shows clearly that the Venezuelan issue had become caught up in the
USlBritish actions to delay independence for BG in order to prevent a PPP government.
In the paper entitled, "Possible courses of action in British Guiana", one of the means
stated is a "thorough airing of the Venezuelan claim" 143 as a mechanism to delay British
Guiana's independence. Joseph was unable to gain further insight into this possible link
between US action and the Venezuelan claim since this topic could not be gleaned from
the other declassified documents. As he deduces aptly, "No other reference to this latter
device is available in the unclassified documentation but the significance of its
consideration is inescapable." 144 Joseph argues further:
"Indeed the timing of the reopening of the border issue by Venezuela, apart from
the comtemporaneity of the impending Independence of British Guiana
constitutes good reason for a related examination into factors of hemispheric
141 Inwriting about possible Venezuelan motives, it should be noted that the writer did not gain access to
the archives of the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry's Frontiers Department which are retained in that
department rather than kept in the Foreign Ministry's central archives.
142 See for instance, Jagan (1984).
143 Paper no. 272 prepared by the State Department, 15 March 1962 and cited in Joseph (1998), p.32.
144 Joseph (1998), p.32.
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bearing. ,,145
Apart from the actions of the US government against the PPP government, a
statement of the UK's representative to the UN, Gore, would probably have set the alarm
bells ringing in the ears of the PPP government about where Washington stood. "The
United States also looked forward with anticipation to the day when an independent
British Guiana with a freely elected non-totalitarian government representing all the races
there could be welcomed to the United Nations. ,,146 This was an unambiguous indication
of the US's dislike for the Jagan-led government and it contrasts with the US's courting of
the Betancourt regime which, like the US, feared the communist threat. Indeed the two
governments issued a joint communique on 17 December 1961 in which they reaffirmed
their friendship and cooperation in areas such as the Alliance for Progress and economic
cooperation.l'" However, confirmation of whether the US instigated Venezuela to reopen
the dispute will have to remain a hypothesis until all the relevant files become available.
We turn now to the second question: why did Britain agree to an examination
after being initially resolute against any such action and fully cognizant of its
ramifications? Ince in his 1970 article argued that Britain had agreed to an examination
of the documents after coming under pressure in the UN.148 This argument is also made
in the available documents of the US State Department archives. Recording a




147 "Communicado Conjunto del Presidente Romulo Betancourt de Venezuela y del Presidente John F.
Kennedy de los Estados Unidos de America", Caracas, December 17 1961, MRE Archivo Central,
Expediente No.7, 1961, Interior.
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1965 notes, "Edmonds [British Embassy, Caracas] said the British decision to agree to
discuss the dispute - he stressed that there was no agreement to negotiate, only that there
was evidence - had been motivated by a desire 'to help Betancourt through a difficult
year'." Crucially, the memo adds in parenthesis, "(Edmonds did not say that it was
designed to get Britain off the spot in the Special Political Committeej.t+" While this
argument seems credible, it will probably not be confrrmed until the relevant PRO
documents are declassified. 150 Nevertheless, based on the available documents which
show that Kennedy was anxious for BG's independence to be delayed, Joseph has argued
that it was within this context that Britain's decision to offer a tripartite examination must
be placed. "It was this highly charged milieu which defined British policy to commence
negotiations on the arrangements for a tripartite study of the documents, or in the State
Department's projection, 'a thorough airing of the Venezuelan c1aim,."l5l
We return. now to our third question: what took place during the re-examination of
the documents? We already have some indication of the developments, as a result of the
Venezuelan publication MRE (1967). In the available Foreign Office records, there is an
indication that the tripartite examination may have been little more than a procedural
arrangement along the path of reopening the dispute, especially as far as the Venezuelan
government was concerned, as one document indicates: "The Tripartite examination was
148 Ince (1970), p.14.
149 Pol 32-1, op.cit.
ISO It is not possible to gain a broader insight into the behind the scenes diplomatic negotiations of this
period in the PRO, as a number of files still remain closed. Even in those files which are open, some
documents have been retained in the Department of origin and may, therefore, never be available for public
perusal. Fer instance in file PO 3711162669, at least six documents have been retained in the department of
origin. In file FO 3711162670, at least three documents have been closed until 2013. From what this
writer can deduce these documents, especially AVI0811133, hold the despatches about the decision of
HMO to propose a tripartite examinaticn of the documents in response to Venezuela's raising of the issue.
This writer's research at the PRO was completed in 2001, three years after that of Joseph's (1998).
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in any case a 'farce' as far the Venezuelans were concerned as they had already spent
many years pursuing all the relevant British documents ... "152 Beyond this statement and
the details in MRE (1967), not much more can be gauged from the available PRO files at
this stage.
In attempting to answer our fmal question - Why the Geneva Agreement? - we
need to recall that at the December 1964 elections, the PPP was defeated following the
change of the electoral system from first-past-the-post to proportional representation and
the PNC in coalition with the UF, took the reigns of power. The December examination
of documents was therefore occurring at the time of the coalition government headed by
Burnham. The US and Britain had succeeded in removing the threat posed by Jagan's
Marxist-inspired PPP government. The available US and British documents point to the
importance of Burnham not only in Anglo-American diplomacy, but also in Anglo-
American- Venezuelan considerations over him, in determining the course of the dispute.
The US State Department records sum up the favourable light with which Venezuela
viewed Burnham "When Burnham took office in British Guiana in December 1964, the
immediate concern [of Venezuela] over the communist problem was relieved.,,153 The
memo also records that Burnham was invited by Venezuela's president Leoni to visit
Venezuela and notes that there followed a period of growing friendly relations between
British Guiana and Venezuela." 154 Another State Department telegram that records a
conversation with the Venezuelan foreign minister, Iribarren Borges, gives further insight
151 Joseph (1998), p.33.
152 "Comments on Record of Discussions on Venezuelan-British Guiana Boundary Dispute on 9-10
December 1965", PO 3711185061.
153 Memo from Samuel D.Eaton to Mr Vaughn, 19 July 1965, Pol 32-1 op.cit.
154 Ibid.
97
into how Burnham was perceived in Caracas. "FONMIN said he thought there was
chance of resolving dispute because (1) area claimed is 'almost completely unpopulated'
and (2) Government of Venezuela was most sympathetic to Burnham Government,
wanted only friendliest relations, and was prepared extend political and economic 'under
proper circumstances'<'Y It is interesting to observe that the Burnham factor is not
covered by Joseph (1998).156 Rather, he identifies a number of factors behind the British
government's actions. "It is submitted that the intensity of the pressures from all quarters
on the British Government and its strong inclination to get out of British Guiana and
grant Independence earlier rather than later, stimulated the drift towards "ta1ks" and
"negotiations" with Venezuela."!" Joseph's analysis therefore excludes the involvement
of the premier in Georgetown.
In one of his early ministerial speeches, Ramphal declared that not only was the
Geneva Agreement inevitable after the earlier decision on the docwnents, but that it
"... became a requisite to independence ... ,,158 It may be stated more accurately as being
the price that Burnham was prepared to pay in order to lead BG to independence. The
contention in this thesis is that Burnham was anxious to have some sort of settlement
before independence for his own expediency. A State Department telegram of 8
December 1965 records that "He [Burnham] has told the British he would prefer to deal
with Venezuela's claim later'. Piper [Colonial Office] assumes this means after
independence when Burnham thinks he can more effectively put the screws on Jagan thus
155 Telegraph 116,31 July 1965, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
156 In fairness to Joseph, he relied 00 State Department records declassified and reprinted in the Stabroek
News newspaper in 1996 and so may not have had access to the same records as this writer.
157 Joseph (1998), pp.38-39.
158 MEA (1970), p.1l.
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providing himself more elbow room for handling the dispute." Moreover, Burnham's
position was based on his perception of the case with which he could win the support of
the Afro-Asian lobby in a multilateral context as a key part of the government's
international approaches to the controversy. The same despatch notes, "After
independence he can also enlist Afro-Asian sympathy by direct lobbying in UN General
Assembly. ,,159As will discussed from chapters 3-6, this aspect - utilising the UN - was to
become an essential feature of Burnham's post-independence handling of the controversy.
For now, we should also note that the US was keen for a solution before independence.
A State Department memo notes, "I think that in this instance we should urge both the
UK and the Venezuelans to expedite a solution so that the claim will not be hanging over
the colony when independence is achieved.,,160 Such a viewpoint can perhaps be read in
the context of the US wanting to minimize problems for someone - Burnham - whom
they had helped into power. A similar perspective existed on the British side. During the
December 9, 1965 talks which led to the decision to hold further talks in Geneva, the
Venezuelan Foreign Minister was warned by the British Secretary of State about the
dangers for Burnham if Venezuela was to press its claim. "He [Michael Stewart] also
referred to the dangers which could result if, by pressing their claim, the Venezuelans
159 Telegram 2615, 8 December 1965, Pol 32-1 op.cit.
160 From John Leddy to Mr Vaughn, August 5, 1965, Pol 32-1 op.cit.
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were to create political difficulties for Mr Burnham. ,,161 US, British and even
Venezuelan considerations of preventing a communist-led government in BG and thus
the necessity not to do any damage to the Burnham government's own considerations
were key factors behind the negotiations that led to Geneva.
It was during the talks on 9-10 December 1965 that Burnham, British Guiana and
Venezuela had discussed their respective proposals for taking the dispute forward.
Amongst the proposals from the latter was the establishment of a mixed connnission.
This was carried forward for discussion at the Geneva talks: "A mixed commission
should be set up to solve the territorial controversy, to formulate plans for collaboration
in the development of Essequibian Guyana and British Guiana, and to carry out these
plans. ,,162
The British proposal at the talks was for an Antarctic-type treaty hold on claims
for a fixed number of years appears to have been influenced by Burnham's refusal to go
along with their preferred proposal.
"By far the best solution would have been for Her Majesty's Government to offer
to refer to the International Court of Justice the question of the validity of the
1899 Award. Unfortunately Mr Burnham refused to go along with this and we
were therefore obliged to fall back on trying to save the Venezuelans' face by
means of an Antarctic-type freezing of claims ... ,,163
It is interesting that Burnham did not want the matter referred to the IeJ when the US
State Department's own thorough assessment of all the issues raised by Venezuela
161 "Record of Discussions Between the Foreign Secretary, The Venezuelan Minister for Foreign Affairs
and the Premier of British Guiana at the Foreign Office on 9 December 1965", PO 3711185062.
162 Ibid.
163 From Foreign Office to Ward, British Embassy Rome, 4 February 1966, PO 3711185062.
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concluded that Venezuela's case would be weak before the ICl164 Although no
reasoning was given, a State Department memo of 28 January 1965 was also against
recommending that the issue be referred to this international judicial body. "I
agree ... that we should not, at this time, suggest to the UK or to Venezuela that the
boundary dispute issue be referred to another arbitration tribunal or the ICJ.,,165 The
question that remains - which this writer is unable to answer - is whether the similarity
of Burnham's views with the State Department was merely coincidental!
On another level, however, Burnham's reluctance to take the controversy before
the IeJ can be understood in the context of the uncertainties a court case would introduce
into any dispute. As Francis has contended of border disputes in general:
"There is a temptation to say that an easy way out of the dilemma is to submit the
dispute to arbitration or to the International Court of Justice, since border disputes
could be resolved by strict application of law. This could mean that there will be
a winner and a loser. Herein lies the problem Few states after holding
tenaciously to a claim, will be prepared to submit it to third-party settlement and
risk losing everything. ,,166
Guyana's attorney-general at the time, Shridath Ramphal, has expressed similar views
with regards to the territorial controversy of his country with Venezuela: "You could
never be certain in a court. That is the whole point of a court case. There is always that
element of doubt and of course it is a doubt that lingered with the Venezuelans. They
164 Memorandum, September 7, 1965 with attached analysis "The Venezuela-British Guiana Boundary
Dispute in the International Court of Justice", Pol 32-1, op.cit.
165 Memorandum from Mr Adams to CV, Mr Margolies, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
166 Francis in Bryan et al (1990), p.227.
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weren't rushing to the International Court. ,,167The record of a meeting between Burnham
and the British prime minister in 1969, Harold Wilson, gives indication of the Guyanese
leader's same concern about the uncertainties of the ICJ, especially regarding Latin
American disputes. "In reply to a question Burnham also made clear his reluctance to
take his case to the International Court. He said that past experience of the handling by
the Court of Inter-Latin American disputes was not encouraging. ,,168The possibility of a
prejudicial outcome to its case, therefore, served as a reason for the GOG's reluctance
towards taking the controversy to the 10.
With all parties concerned agreed on the need to fmd a solution before
independence, difficulties on what form that solution would take were manifested at the
Geneva talks. "The difficulties remained formidable. Neither side could afford to yield
an inch on its legal position. ,,169 The outcome was thus viewed by Britain in the
following terms: "We regard the Agreement as an honourable compromise between two
diametrically opposed points ofview.,,17o
Venezuela'S Claims for Nullifying the 1899 Award
It is worth us sunnnarising Venezuela's claims for the nullity of the 1899 award.
These positions, which have been refined since the reopening of the dispute in 1962 and
as Venezuela has found new evidence in the archives that, in its opinion backs up its
claims, have continued to be a mainstay in Venezuela's position. That is, more than 100
167 Interview with Shridath Ramphal, 23 March 2000.
168 A.M Palliser, PM's Office to DID Maitland, FCO, 17 January 1969 (summary of a meeting between
British and Guyanese PM on 16 January 1969), PREM 13/269.
169 Foreign Office to British Embassy, Caracas, 25 February 1966, PO 371/185063.
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years after the Paris Award was supposed to have settled the dispute forever. We now
present a summary of Venezuela's claims.'?'
1. Venezuela's position on the Schomburgk Line is asfollows:
(a) the 1835 Schomburgk Line is the true line which shows the Essequibo River as the
boundary;
(b) the 1840 map is thus referred to as the "pseudo" Schomburgk Line; and
(c) Britain is said to have subsequently falsified maps to show expanded claims to
territory as the mineral wealth of the disputed area became known.
2. Venezuela claims it was:
(a) excluded from the negotiations between Britain and the US on the terms of the treaty;
(b) forced under pressure from the US to accept the terms of the treaty negotiated
between Britain and the US; and
(c) not allowed to nominate any of its nationals onto the Tribunal.
3. Venezuela claims the award is null and void because the 1899 Award was:
(a) not based on law but rather the result of a compromise obtained by a political deal;
(b) the boundary line adopted was not only forced upon the Arbitrators, but is supposed
to have been prepared in the Foreign Office months before the Award was made;
(c) the Arbitrators did not use the intemationallegal principle of uti possidetis jurist in
making the award and also did not stipulate how the 50-year prescription title adopted
was to be computed;
(d) the Paris Tribunal exceeded its powers by stipulating about free access on the Barima
and Amacuro Rivers, which was outside of its remit;
(e) no reasons were given by the Arbitrators for their decisions.
4. On the demarcation of the boundary, Venezuela asserts:
(a) it was pressurized to demarcate the boundary in 1905 in accordance with the 1899
Award in view of a threatened unilateral demarcation by Britain;
5. The reasons why Venezuela delayed voicing its objections internationally are:
(a) its endogenous political difficulties and being a weak country at the time of the
Award, nevertheless, successive generations of Venezuelans have been taught about the
injustices of the award; and
(b) it was only able to substantiate its objections with evidence following the release of
foreign office documents at the PRO and the private papers of those involved in the
Award.
170 Foreign Office and Corrnnonwealth Relations Office to certain missions, 21 February 1966,
F03711185063. See the same document for details on how the compromise agreement was reached.
171 This summary of Venezuela's claims is taken from "Report 00 the Boundary Question with British
Guiana submitted to the National Government by the Venezuela Experts" (1967) and MRE (2000b).
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A point by point rebuttal of the above claims has been made by Britain. 172 Some
writers have also criticised the Venezuelan standpoint from different stances. Joseph,
whose two articles (1970) and (1971) analyse the arguments and evidence presented by
both sides at the 1899 tribunal, refutes Venezuela's claims of a diplomatic compromise
based on the Mallet-Prevost memorandum He argues that although there was
compromise, it was not of a diplomatic nature, but rather it was of a form essential in
such a complex case. Braveboy-Wagner (1984) analyses the legal issues surrounding the
case and concludes that Guyana's position is stronger legally. Some publications,
especially those from Venezuela, back that country's c1aims.173 One non-Venezuelan
writer, Betty Jane Kissler, who analysed the validity of Venezuela's arguments for her
PhD concludes, "Venezuela appears to have a valid case to ask for the negotiation of a
different boundary" .174 However, since Kissler's analysis was based - by her own
admission - on an analysis of Venezuelan documents only in the absence of the
availability of PRO documents, her analysis is questionable.
Summary
In this chapter, I have attempted to trace the history of the Venezuelan-British
Guiana boundary dispute from its origins to settlement in the nineteenth century and its
re-opening by Venezuela in the latter half of the twentieth century. The dispute-cum-
controversy has many facets, too numerous to analyse fully here. Suffice to say, I have
172 Full details can be found in PO 3711185062.
173 See chapter 5, "The Dispute: Legal Aspects", pp.111-129, of her book. By far the most comprehensive
of the many Venezuelan publications on the issue is the foreign ministry of Venezuela's prolific collection
of documents, MRE (2000b).
174 Kissler (1971), p.271.
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identified the key factors of why the boundary between Venezuela and Guyana has not
been mutually settled - as far as Venezuela is concerned - and continues to be at the
centre of relations between two countries, one hundred years after the Paris settlement of
1899. This therefore is the basis for this analysis from chapters 3-6 of Guyana's foreign
policy and its relations with Venezuela. Specifically, I have looked at how the dispute-
cum-controversy was intricately linked to British Guiana's decolonization politics. In this
regard, I have argued about the significance not only of Anglo-American and Anglo-
Venezuelan diplomacy, but the key and overlooked role played by Burnham His
perceptions about the ease with which the support of the Afro-Asian lobby could be
obtained provides the genesis of the international approaches of the government of
Guyana from 1966 to 1992, which I will analyze in chapters 3-6.
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Chapter 3:
The BurnhamID'Aguiar Coalition Years 1964·1968: the Era of
Heightened Tensions between Guyana and Venezuela
106
Guyana's Relations with Venezuela
The coalition government of the UF and the PNC first assumed power following
the December 1964 elections during the period of internal self-government. The leaders
of that coalition government were Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham and Peter D'Aguiar
of the PNC and UF respectively. Our focus begins at independence since this is the time
when the coalition government assumed responsibility for external affairs from Britain.
Reference, will however, be made to relevant and key events which preceded the granting
of independence.
When the colony of British Guiana gained its independence on 26 May 1966,
Venezuela offered recognition of that independence, but made an important reservation.
As the Venezuelan foreign minister declared at the UN:
"Par 10 tanto, Venezuela reconoce como territorio del Nuevo Estado el que se
sinia al Este de la margen derecha del rio Esequibo, y reitera ante el Nuevo pais, y
ante la comunidad internacional, que se reserva expresamente sus derechos de
soberanfa territorial sobre toda la zona que se encuentra a la margen izquierda del
precitado rio; en consecuencia, el territorio de la Guayana Esequiba sobre el cual
Venezuela se reserva expresamente sus derechos soberanos, limita al Este con el
Nuevo Estado de Guyana, a traves de la linea media del rio Esequibo, tornado este
desde su nacimiento basta su desembocadura en el Oceano Atlantico." 1
A similar, emphatic and unambiguous statement regarding Venezuela's position on
Essequibo was made by that state's representative at the Security Council on 21 June
1966.2 The end of colonialism in Guyana came with a reminder that the territorial
controversy between Guyana and Venezuela would be significant in determining
relations between the two states.
1 "Reconocimiento de Guyana por parte del Gobiemo de Venezuela", MRE, File: Guyana, Expediente,
No.2-66.
2 Speech inMRE (l967b), pp.ll1-115.
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Prior to independence, two actions undertaken by Venezuela since its re-opening
of the dispute at the UN in 1962 sent clear signals to Georgetown of the seriousness with
which Venezuela viewed its attempts to claim the Essequibo territory. The Venezuelan
government, by its own admission, was active in securing the 1964 Act of Washington,
which prohibited countries like Guyana and later Belize fromjoining the OAS because of
territorial problems with existing members. Venezuela made no secret of its involvement
in securing this Act as the following extract indicates:
"Por iniciativa de Venezuela, y de otros pafses latinoamericanos, que merecfo la
probacion unanime de la Primera Conferencia Interamericana Extraordinaria de la
OEA (Washington, diciembre de 1964), se incluyo en el'Acta de Washington' una
disposicion que establece 10 siguiente: 'Que el Consejo de la Organizaci6n no
tomara decision sobre solicitud alguna de admisi6n presentado por una entidad
polftica cuyo territorio este sujeto, total 0 parcia1mente y con anteriodad a la fecha
de la presente resoluci6n, a litigo 0 reclamaci6n entre un pais extracontinental y
uno 0 mas Estados miembros de la Organizaci6n, mientras no se haya puesto fin a
la controversia mediante procedimiento pacffico', ,,3
The 1964 Act of Washington had implications not only for Guyana-Venezuela relations,
but also had wider hemispheric resonance. For instance, the Act prevented a resort to the
~AS's mechanisms for conflict resolution, should such facilities be required, due to a
failure of the Mixed Connnission between Guyana and Venezuela that had been
established by the terms of the Geneva Agreement and whose task it was to find a
solution initially. The Act also meant that Guyana was excluded from the inter-American
security mechanism since this was administered through the ~AS. 4
The other Venezuelan action prior to Guyana's independence was the publication
in 1965 of a map by the Direcci6n de Cartografia del Ministerio de Obras Publicas with
3 MRE (1969), p.xxxi.
4 For details of the OAS's conflict resolution mechanisms, see Braveboy-Wagner (1984), pp.25-36.
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the attachment to Venezuela's territory of the largest of Guyana's three counties,
Essequibo. The area claimed by Venezuela, has been depicted as a "Zona en
Reclamaci6n" on that country's map which was launched at a press conference on 2
February 1965.5
Guyana's relations with Venezuela during the coalition years may be described as
fraught, as tensions mounted in response to Venezuela's actions. I begin examining
relations in this period by focussing on the Mixed and Sub-Commissions. In the first
instance, relations between the two states were formally laid down under the terms of the
pre-independence Geneva Agreement, which was signed by the coalition government,
Venezuela and Britain. Under this Agreement, it was agreed in Article 1 that:
"A Mixed Commission shall be established with the task of seeking satisfactory
solutions for the practical settlement of the controversy between Venezuela and
the United Kingdom which has arisen as a result of the Venezuelan contention
that the Arbitral Award of 1899 about the frontier between British Guiana and
Venezuela is null and void. ,,6
The Agreement, therefore, provided a formal forum for the pursuit of an end of the
problem between Guyana and Venezuela.
The first meeting of the Mixed Commission took place shortly after independence
from 2-4 July 1966 in Caracas." It was perhaps no accident that the Venezuelan
delegation arrived in Georgetown for the second meeting of the Mixed Commission
aboard a naval destroyer, the "Almirante Brion", thereby demonstrating Venezuela's
5 US Embassy, Caracas to State Department, 10 February 1965, Pol 32-1 Guyana-Venezuela, RG59. See
Appendix 4 for a Venezuelan map which continues to show Essequibo as the "Zona en Reclamaci6n", one
hundred years after the 1899 Paris settlement.
6 See Appendix 5 for the full text of the Geneva Agreement.
7 MRE (1967a). See also Braveboy-Wagner (1984), chapter 8, pp.149-180, on the dates of the meetings of
the Mixed Commission.
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naval supremacy vis-a-vis Guyana," Tensions between the two states over the terms of
the Mixed Commission soon became evident. 9 Those tensions centred on Article 1 of the
Geneva Agreement which appears to have been worded in deliberately vague diplomatic
language in order to make it acceptable to all signatories. In doing so, this made the
Agreement open to different interpretations by different parties involved. Thus on the
one hand, the GOG interpreted Article 1 to mean that its Venezuelan counterpart has to
prove first that the Award is null and void before any discussions of a settlement can take
place:
"The language of this provision does not admit to ambiguity. It must be clear to
anyone reading it with detachment, and not bent on misrepresenting its meaning
that the issue which the Mixed Commission was established to settle was whether,
as the Venezuelans contended, the Arbitral Award was a nullity. Guyana has at
all times been willing to examine this matter in depth with a view to securing a
practical settlement of the controversy... ,,10
The Venezuelan government, on the other hand, argued that the mere singing of the
Geneva Agreement is recognition of the existence of a controversy and thus the purpose
of the Mixed Commission is to fmd a solution:
"EI Acuerdo de Ginebra de febrero de 1966 signiftca: a) el reconocimiento por
parte de Inglaterra y Guayana Britanica, de la controversia existente entre esos
dos pafses y Venezuela como consecuencia de nuestra reclamaci6n ...No
s6lamente reconoce el Acuerdo de Ginebra la controversia, sino que ademas
acepta la necesidad de resolverla y fija los procedimientos conducentes. ,,11
With such differing interpretations it would probably have been evident that the Mixed
Commission's task would result in failure.
8 Guyana Graphic, 12 September 1966, p.16.
9 Although Britain was a signatory to the Geneva Agreement, the Mixed Commission's meetings were only
attended by Guyanese and Venezuelan representatives.
10 "Statement on Guyana-Venezuela Relations by the Prime Minister of Guyana, The Hon. L.F.S. Burnham,
to the National Assembly (and later circulated to UN representatives), 12th July 1968" in IIR (1970), p.no.
11 MRE (1969), p.xxxi.
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The Mixed Commission included a spin-off, known as the Sub-Commission, which first
met in February 1968. As one FCO telegram records: "The idea of joint development
was proposed as a means of showing some progress and a joint Sub-Commission was set
up.,,12 It provided the framework to discuss and develop relations outside of the
territorial controversy, namely "mutual economic and cultural co-operation between
Venezuela and Guyana and to remove the sensitive issue of joint economic development
of the disputed territory from the agenda of the Mixed Boundary Connnission. ,,13
Separating such issues by creating a new body did not advance the discussions between
the two states, since both sides continued to have differing views on the terms of any
joint development: the Guyana side wanting joint development to relate to its own
Development Plan and thus effectively the whole of Guyana, while the Venezuelans
wanted it to relate exclusively to Essequibo." As such, the life of the Sub-Connnission
was relatively ephemeral since it came to a de facto end when the Venezuelans withdrew
from that body at the end of its second meeting on 4 July 1968.15
Conflict Outside the Framework of the Geneva Agreement
The Raul Leoni government in Venezuela (1964-1968), which succeeded the
Betancourt administration, took a tough stance on the dispute-cum-controversy. This
hard-line approach, which is evident in a number of actions, should probably be
understood, as one Venezuelan diplomat has argued, in the context of Venezuelan
12 FCC Guidance telegram no. 194, 25 July 1968, PREM 1312699.
13 Guyana Graphic, 4 June 1968, p.l.
14 Guyana Graphic, 7 July 1968, p.l. Also interview with Harry Dyett, one of Guyana's representatives on
the Sub-Commission, 13 December 1999.
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democracy being in its infancy. The military, which had given up power in 1958 still had
some influence in the territorial issue with Guyana. 16
On the surface, the Leoni government's aggressive stance translated into
Venezuelan occupation of the Guyanese half of Ankoko island which is located at the
junction of the Cuyuni and Wenamu rivers. This island had been divided roughly in half
between Guyana and Venezuela by the 1905 demarcation of the boundary.!" The
announcement of Venezuela's occupation of Guyana's territory was made on 14 October
1966, approximately one month after the second meeting of the Mixed Commission.
According to Burnham, "some time during last month a number of Venezuelans crossed
into the Guyanese side [of Ankoko] and have since been carrying out certain works on
our territory. ,,18 While the Venezuelan occupation of the Guyanese half of Ankoko has
not been disputed, questions were raised as to the timing of Burnham's announcement,
namely whether his motive was an attempt to delay the withdrawal of British troops. The
PPP, for instance, while supporting the government's opposition to this Venezuelan
action raised the issue of whether there was a link between the coalition government's
announcement and the timing of the withdrawal of the British army:
"The People's Progressive Party, in a prepared statement issued on Saturday,
October 15, supported the Government's opposition to the Venezuelan aggression
but expressed the hope that the affair was not a manoeuvre to retain inGuyana the
British troops which were due to be withdrawn at the end of that month. ,,19
15 Guyana Graphic, 7 July 1968, p.l. Also "Statement on Guyana-Venezuela Relations by the Prime
Minister of Guyana, The Han. L.F.S.Bumham, to the National Assembly", 12 July 1968 in IIR (1970). See
also Guidance telegram no. 194, op. cit. and MRE (1969).
16 Interview with Jose Quintero, 21 February 2000.
17 The Venezuelan government's response of 18 October 1966 to the government of Guyana's protest states
that Ankoko was always part of Venezuela's sovereignty - document no.5, MRE (1998), pp.336-34l. From
the descriptim of the 1905 demarcation in which Venezuela participated, the island was divided between
Guyana and Venezuela, MFA (1984b).
18 Script of Burnham's radio broadcast, 14 October 1966, printed in Hubbard (1967), pp.42-44.
19 Hubbard (1967), p.45.
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Similarly, the Venezuelan publication La Republica also queried whether Burnham's
announcement was linked to the withdrawal of British troops."
Whatever the motive behind the coalition government's announcement, the
majority of British troops withdrew as planned, save for senior officers, such as colonel
Ronald Pope who remained to head the local anny in its infancy. Protests from the
PNCIUF administration to Betancourt were met with the firm stance from the latter that
Ankoko was and is an integral part of Venezuela.21 Moreover, the Venezuelan
government went on to suggest:
"...si el Honorable Gobiemo de Guyana tuviera alguna reclamaci6n que formular,
debera hacerlo a traves de la Comisi6n Mixta creada al efecto por el Acuerdo de
Ginebra, el 17 de febrero de 1966, de conformidad con los dispuestos en el
parrafo II, del articulo 5, del mismo Tratado."22
This attempt to bring Ankoko within the framework of the Mixed Commission was
strongly resisted by the government in Georgetown which gave specific instructions to its
members in the Commission not to discuss the issue within that forum 1123 As such, any
bargaining position that Venezuela may have hoped to gain in the negotiation process
from its total occupation of the river island was lost after the GOG's refusal to include the
issue on the agenda of the Mixed Commission.
With one side insisting that Ankoko be discussed by the Mixed Commission and
the other that it be discussed outside of that body, the island became and continues to be a
potent, if not problematic symbol, of the territorial controversy. As far as successive
20 Reported in Guyana Graphic, 20 October 1966, p.l.
2! "No.5, Nota de Iganacio Iribarren Borges para Linden Forbes Burnham, 18 October 1966", MRE (1998),
rp-336-337.
Ibid. See MEA (1966), for details of the government of Guyana's protest to the Venezuelan government.
23 Guyana Graphic, 12 November 1966, p.l.
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governments of Guyana have been concerned, the symbolism of Ankoko continues to be
of significance. In this respect, it should be noted that the Venezuelan Defence Minister,
General Ram6n Florencio Gomez, was reported to have converted the island into a
Venezuelan military base." The Chief of Staff of the GDF who described Ankoko as
still being "a major issue" stated that at the time of the announcement of its occupation,
"in the eyes of people like Forbes Burnham and Shridath Ramphal (Guyana's Prime
Minister and Minister of State, both with foreign policy portfolios), they felt that the GDF
was not a year old at the time and by no stretch of the imagination could the GDF take on
the Venezuelan armed forces. ,,25 It can be argued that Venezuela's continued occupation
of the whole of Ankoko is a demonstration of its relative military strength and a symbol
of its "reclamacion" policy.26
Other Problematic Issues
The Act of Washington, which by Venezuela's admission prevented Guyana from
joining the OAS, was also used to exclude Georgetown from being a signatory to the
Treaty of Tlatelolco, also known as the Latin American Denuclearisation Treaty of 14
February 1967. It can be argued that Guyana's exclusion from this treaty would not have
amounted to much in terms of the resulting nuclear threat posed by that state. But the
significance laid in the fact that the GOG had once again been excluded from a regional
24 Ibid., 19 October 1967, p.20.
25 Interview with Joe Singh, 10 December 1999. The GOP was formed on 1 November 1965.
26 In this respect, it is interesting to note that a senior Venezuelan foreign ministry official admitted to this
writer in an anonymous interview that Venezuela was wrong to occupy Guyana's half of Anacoco, as the
Venezuelans call the island. To the best of this writer's knowledge, however, such a perspective has never
been made the official Venezuelan position.
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body by virtue of its territorial controversy with Venezuela.F Guyana's exclusion from a
treaty designed to prevent the regional proliferation of nuclear weapons would have been
viewed - although not expressly so - as a triumph for Venezuela in the controversy with
that state.
Tensions between Georgetown and Caracas continued to rise when in April 1967,
the Guyanese government accused a Venezuelan diplomat of engaging in subversive
activity among Guyana's Amerindian population. This followed a Conference of
Amerindian Chiefs in the Kabakaburi area of the Essequibo region claimed by Venezuela
in which the Chiefs were said to have been" ...induced to pass a resolution favouring joint
development of the disputed border area ... ,,28 The Guyanese Government accused
Venezuela of actually organising the meeting of the Chiefs. Inhis speech to the National
Assembly on the issue, Ramphal said:
"Do they expect us to ignore the purposes that lay behind the irregular activities
of Snr. Taylbardat, who as a Second Secretary at the Venezuelan Embassy in
Guyana, was responsible for organising and fmancing a clandestine meeting of
Amerindian tribes in GUlana and attempting to induce them to express support for
the Venezuelan claim. ,,2
The resolution passed by the Chiefs was clearly one to be capitalised on by Venezuela in
the controversy, as the following explanation by its MRE indicates:
"Conferencia de la 'Asociaci6n Amerindia de Guayana celebrada en la aldea de
Cabacaburi, Distrito de Pomer6n de la Guayana Esequiba, en la cual se plantea la
inequitud de independizarse del Estado guyanes, ya adhierirse a la posici6n
Venezolana de reclamar el Esequibo. Este movimiento separatista creador del
27 MRE (1968), pp.xviii.
28 Report of an announcement made on April 14, 1967 in Hubbard (1967), pp. 56-61. See also Sunday
Graphic report 'Venoes still Dabbling InOur Affairs', 10 March 1968, p.l.and "Statement on Guyana-
Venezuela Relations by the Prime Minister of Guyana", 12 July 1968 in IIR (1970), pp.720-723.
29 Extract from Ramphal's speech to the National Assembly, 17 July 1968, reprinted in Trinidad Guardian,
24 July 1968.
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partido amerindio 'Guyana National Party' fue perseguido y exc1uido del sistema
electoral guyanes. ,,30
Whatever the true story behind what happened at Kabakaburi, a Venezuelan Second
Secretary, Leopoldo Taylhardat, was declared persona non grata and expelled from
Guyana on 30 April 1967.31
The Guyanese MFA has not published figures on the economic losses resulting
from Venezuela's claim to Essequibo, but it is possible to gain an insight into the
economic implications of the controversy on Guyana. The country's exclusion from the
OAS by virtue of the 1964 Act of Washington meant in effect that it was also barred from
accessing the economic funds of bodies linked to that regional grouping, namely the
Alliance for Progress and IDB. Ince, for instance, writing on Trinidad and Tobago's
decision to join the OAS, states, "...the OAS as an alternative economic source to
Connnonwealth preferences was desirable in the eyes of the decision-makers.v'?
Exclusion from the OAS therefore carried economic repercussions for Guyana.
During the period of the coalition government, the Venezuelan government took
two notable steps which could stymie the economic development of the Essequibo, so
long as it remained under Guyanese sovereignty. These actions on the part of Caracas
involved public declarations of its intent not to recognise any concessions issued for
exploration, namely of oil, in the mineral-rich Essequibo:
"La Cancilleria juzg6 conveniente ratificar el 14 de mayo de 1968 las
declaraciones de 1965, por las cuales se manifestaba que Venezuela no reconocfa
30 MRE (1998), p.415.
31 Hubbard (1967), pp.56-58; and MEA (1968c), p.60. A British citizen, Michael Wilson, was also
expelled for his part in the alleged subversive activities on 27 April 1967, ibid.
32 Ince, pp.265-295 in Ince et al. (1986), p.281. Guyana's diplomatic machinery subsequently succeeded in
gaining access to IDB funds while its bar en membership of the OAS continued until 1991 - see chapter 4
of this thesis for details.
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las concesiones petroleras 0 de otra Indole que tengan por objeto el territorio al
Oeste del rio Esequibo. Esta declaracfon de 1968 fue formulada invocando como
nueva base jurfdica el articulo 5° paragrafo 2° del citado convenio ...,,33
Subsequently, the Leoni administration followed up this declaration by issuing an English
language advertisement in the London Times newspaper that it would not recognise
exploration concessions issued by the Guyanese government. The advert read in part:
"In view of the fact that the Esesquibo Guiana is claimed by our country as by
right it belongs to it, the Venezuelan Ministry of Foreign Affairs publicly and
categorically once more state that they do not recognise any type of such
supposed concessions, either granted or to be granted by the Guyana Government
over the territory stretching to the west of the Essequibo River, from its source to
its mouth. ..These and other reservations which derive from the unwavering
Venezuelan right over the Essequibo Guiana, were upheld by the Geneva
Agreement (article V) of the 17th February 1966.,,34
The Leoni government was of the view that since it did not recognize the 1899 award as
valid and that also the Geneva Agreement did not prevent Venezuela from
communicating its refusal to recognize concessions, it was within its rights to issue the
advert." It is possible that the advert was strategically planned since it was placed in the
Times newspaper in June 1968 at a time when "...Guyana's Prime Minister was in London
on a visit to promote investment for development...,,36 The coalition government
responded by rejecting the advert as a form of "economic blackmail" and also wrote to
the Times stating that the issuing of concessions was not a violation of the Geneva
Agreement. 37
33 See press release, "Comunicado del Gobiemo de la Republica de Venezuela rechazando cualquier tipo de
concessiones otorgadas por el Gobierno de Guyana para exploitar las riquezas naturales en la zona de
reclamacion, Caracas, 14 de mayo de 1968, MRE (1969), p.10.
34 Text of advert reprinted in the Sunday Graphic, June 16, 1968.
35 Document no.6, MRE (1998), p.347.
36 "Note: GuyanalVenezeula Relations" by Ramphal, 4 June 1969 enclosed in K.G. Ritchie, British High
Commission, Georgetown, 6 June 1969, to E.A.W. Bullock, FCO, FCO 46/317.
37 Ibid.
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One of the most dramatic actions taken by the Leoni government and which led to
a heightened state of alert in Guyana was the issue of presidential decree no.1152 by
Venezuela on 9 July 1968, under which it claimed sovereignty over waters located
between three and nine miles off the Essequibo coast. 38 The Venezuelan government's
explanation was as follows:
"...el mar territorial de Guyana es de solo tres millas y Venezuela considera suyo
el territorio de la Guayana Esequiba nuestro Pais puede y debe can toda razon
aplicar la ley [de 23 de julio de 1956 sabre Mar Teritorial, Plataforma
Continental, Proteccion de la Pesca y Espacio Aereo] vigente a las nueve millas
de mar que nunca ha dejado de ser venezolano, mientras reserva sus derechos
sabre las tres millas detentados por Guyana. ,,39
The Leoni decree, as it became known in Guyana, did not, therefore, annex the territory
claimed by Venezuela, but rather moved the disputed area to the sea, thereby escalating
the perception of threat in Guyana. The extent of the potential threat can be gauged in the
following newspaper report:
"The decree meant that Guyana's vessels will be trespassing as soon a [sic] they
sail north of the three-mile Guyanese limit, and ships sailing from Georgetown to
Trinidad and the rest of the Caribbean must round the 12-mile Venezuelan limit
north of the Guyanese capital in order not to enter Venezuelan waters. ,,40
The newspaper went on to relay the international fears generated by the decree:
"Diplomats in Caracas, particularly from the United States of America and
Canada are said by the Reuter report to have expressed great concern over the
outcome of the dispute which they said, had entered its very critical and
dangerous state. ,,41
The fears generated in Guyana by the Leoni decree would probably have been
compounded by reports that Venezuela intended to patrol the waters claimed by the
38 FeD 141492.
39 MRE (1969), p.l0.
40 Guyana Graphic, 11 July 1968, p.l.
41 Ibid.
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decree. "A Venezuelan Navy destroyer was yesterday expected to have started patrolling
the waters off the western Guyanese coast claimed by Venezuela on Wednesday,
according to usually reliable military sources in Caracas." The newspaper did note
further, "A source close to the Guyana Government last night said the Government had
received no such report from Caracas and had no knowledge of the presence of any
Venezuelan ships in Guyana waters.,,42 This was unlikely to have quelled fears in
Georgetown.
Whether or not the extent of the threat was as grave as it was perceived, the
government and the opposition in Guyana took the Leoni decree very seriously. In a
debate in the National Assembly, Burnham declared the decree "a nullity". Further, he
charged, inter alia, that the decree violated the Geneva Convention on the territorial sea
and the contiguous zone, international law and the charter of the United Nations.P The
Attorney-General and Minister of State, Shridath Ramphal, in his speech during the
debate in the National Assembly drew on the implications for other states if Venezuela's
action was condoned.
"Most of the world's frontiers would be thrown into chaos and confusion if all that
a party to a boundary settlement needs to do to secure its revision is to allege that
the settlement is not valid without being required to prove its allegation to be
true. ,,44
Although the opposition leader, Cheddi Jagan, saw the Leoni decree and the Venezuelan
controversy as a whole, to be part of a US-British-PNC conspiracy to keep the PPP out of
power, the latter nevertheless supported a resolution passed unanimously in the National
42 Sunday Graphic, 14 July 1968, p.l.
43 "Statement on Guyana-Venezuela Relations by the Prime Minister of Guyana, The Hon. L.P.S. Burnham
to the National Assembly", 12 July 1968 in IIR (1970), pp.720-723.
44 "Extracts from speech by The Han. S.S. Ramphal .;." , p.43 in MEA (1968a), p.43.
119
Assembly in which the decree was declared a nullity and conderrmed it "...as an act of
aggression against Guyana. ,,45
Apart from escalating tensions between the two states, Rout has argued that the
Leoni decree had some economic ramifications, namely that Dutch Shell - one of the
companies which had signed contracts for petroleum exploration by April 1965, "...chose
not to exercise its option", following the decree." This argument is not borne out in the
declassified records of the FCO. Two press releases issued by a government department
in Georgetown and contained within those files point to the companies continuing (and in
one case, increasing) their operations. One notes the inverse, that is, Shell extended its
explorations:
"Guyana Shell Limited, who holds Oil Exploration Licence No.20S, to explore for
oil over an area of approx. 9600 square miles on the off and inshore of Guyana,
has gone a step further and has applied for ten prospecting licences to cover the
same area held under the Oil Exploration Licence. ,,47
In another press release it was stated: "The Vice-President of Continental Oil Company,
Mr Richard Hittle, today asked Mr Clarence Hughes, the Company's local representative,
to state categorically that Continental intends continuing oil prospecting operations in
Guyana".48 By the GOG's own admission and contrary to Rout's premise, the Leoni
decree did not have any adverse impact on oil exploration by multinational companies.
45 "Note from Government of Guyana bringing to the attentioo of the Venezuelan Government the
Resolution passed unanimously by the Guyana National Assembly condemning the decree - 19th July
1968", ibid., pp.25-27.
46 Rout (1971), p.71.




The International Approaches of the Government of Guyana
Venezuela's seeming determination to have Essequibo transferred from Guyanese
territory to its sovereignty, clearly influenced the need for the GOG at independence to
devise strategies in response, be they diplomatic, military or both. Two of the most
significant factors determining the choice of manoeuvres to be deployed when a state is
faced with threats to its territorial integrity is the relative economic and military strength.
As can be seen in Table 1, Guyana was economically and militarily weaker than
Venezuela, thereby making the choice of military strategies almost non-existent for the
government in Georgetown. One former Guyanese army officer, Norman McLean,
stresses the defensive rather than offensive role of the GDF:
"I want to emphasise that we are a defence force. We are not an army; we are not
a navy; we are not an air force. We have no offensive capability ... Normally
when you talk about an army, it has several arms: army, navy, air force etc, each a
conunander-in-chief. But they have a capability to carry aggression to an enemy.
In a defence force, the emphasis is on defending what is already yours, what you
occupy. 1149
Granger conveys the extent of the GDF's limited defence capacity at independence:
"...we [GDF] used whatever national resources we had, for example, the aircraft
which lifted troops into the area [to get to the area of the border with Venezuela]
was the property of Guyana Airways, a very simple six-seater sea-plane called the
'Grumman Goose'. We had to land in the river then take a boat; there was no
airstrip...Our weapons were second world war weapons, they were not automatic.
Our radio equipment was very backward. Basically, we were prepared for the
second world war in 1966."50
Conversely, the coalition government, which also had to respond to threats, albeit on a
lesser scale, to Guyana's territorial integrity from Suriname, did not seek to
intemationalise the dispute with Suriname. That is, not to the same extent as the
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controversy with Venezuela - since the Guyana Police Force was able to repel
successfully Surinamese incursions into Guyanese territory.51
The need for the government of Guyana to devise foreign policy strategies or
diplomatic initiatives in response to perceived threats from Venezuela was made even
more important by the fact it had failed to secure a defence agreement with Britain or
another power, as Belize was to do subsequently with Britain upon its independence in
1981.52 One Guyanese source states that the reason why no defence pact was secured at
independence was "because no such power was willing to give such an undertaking." The
source notes further, "A defence undertaking is one of the hardest of undertakings to
secure and the only countries that could remotely be effective in that kind of context were
Britain or the United States; and Britain as a matter of principle, as a matter of policy
never did. ,,53 Indeed, evidence does exist that Burnham did raise the issue of a defence
agreement during the discussions with Britain about independence. A telegram from the
US embassy in Georgetown to Washington makes this clear: "It should be remembered
that we have no defence agreement with Guyana, although the Prime Minister of Guyana
specifically asked for one at the time of the Independence Conference in 1965 with the
threat from Venezuela in mind. ,,54 So, it was not for want of trying that Guyana
proceeded into independence without a defence agreement.
49 Interview with Norman McLean, 4 May 2000.
50 Interview with David Granger, 9 December 1999.
51 Searwar (interview, 8 December 1999) has argued that the Burnham government did not regard the
Surinamese threat seriously, following its victories in expelling Surinamese incursicns into the disputed
territory in the late 1960s. See Pollard in Manigat (1977) on the history of the Guyana-Suriname border
dispute. MEA (1968a), details the incidents with Suriname in the 1960s.
52 Menon in Institute of International Relations (1978), pp.115-145, offers a legal analysis of the Belize-
Guatemala dispute.
S3 Anonymous interview.
54 R.C.C. Hunte to K.T. Nash, Ministry of Defence , 31 July 1968, FeD 16/119.
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The failure of the GOG to secure a defence pact with Britain, at least, was due to
the latter wanting to pull out of Guyana altogether, as the sunset of the British empire had
begun. This can be gleaned from the declassified State Department files: "[the] UK will
not guarantee BG's borders after independence and has not interest or intention of
becoming involved militarily in South America ,,55 Subsequently, in a meeting between
British and US diplomats, Patrick Dean, the British ambassador to Washington informed
State Department officials that Britain would maintain troops in Guyana until October
1966.56 As such, British troops only remained in Guyana for five months after
independence.
Further evidence of Britain's reluctance to commit itself to the defence of Guyana
in the event of a Venezuelan attack exists. When challenged in the House of Lords about
whether Britain had a moral duty to defend Guyana's territory, Lord Shepherd, the FeD
Minister of State, made it clear that his government was contented with Venezuela's
assurances that it would not invade Guyana 57 Given that Lord Shepherd spoke in the
wake of the Leoni decree of July 1968 when tensions were at an all-time high, it becomes
even clearer that Britain did not want to commit troops to Guyana Such an argument is
consistent with Payne's assertion that Britain had retreated from the Caribbean in general
since the 196Os, with only some renewed interest in the region in the 1980s as a result of
economic and political crises there. 58
In the absence of a defence agreement with a militarily powerful country, it is
apparent that diplomacy would become the channel through which the GOG would
S5 Georgetown to State Department, 18 September 1965, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
56 Memorandum of Conversation, State Department, 27 November 1965, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
57 Guyana Graphic, 9 November 1968.
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defend the state's territorial integrity. Burnham was aware of the limitations of receiving
outright support from Britain and the USA. As such, his government chose the viable
alternative option of lobbying for international support:
"GOG leaders have long recognized constraints on full support from US and UK
and felt their only really effective defence against Venezuelan aggression is
widespread international understanding and sympathy. Informing the world of
their fears is thus a positive move to defend their country in their eyes. While
they are aware that such moves could incite Venezuelan hawks, they see no
alternative but to attempt to inhibit aggression and win international help by this
means. ,,59
Shridath Ramphal, minister of state with responsibility for foreign affairs at
independence, describes graphically the significance of foreign policy vis-a-vis
Venezuela to his government: "Guyana had a cause from the beginning, the cause was its
territorial integrity and that cause gave its foreign policy focus. It provided a catalyst for
everything we did. ,,60 A subsequent Guyanese foreign minister, Rashleigh Jackson, has
also commented on the centrality of territorial integrity in the foreign policy of Guyana
from independence: "The question of territorial integrity and security were prime
determinants of foreign policy at the beginning and have remained significant ever
since. ,,61 The strategies devised for handling the territorial controversy with the much
more powerful Venezuela centred, therefore, on diplomatic initiatives. As Singh notes of
the role allocated to the GDF:
"The army would be the eyes and ears while the diplomats would pursue action in
the UN, the Commonwealth, the Non-Aligned Movement, CARIFf A and other
[international] fora. All of these fora were going to be used to articulate Guyana's
58 Payne in Sutton (1991), pp.13-36.
59 Telegram no. 195, 26 February 1970, Georgetown to State Department, Pol 32-1 Guyana-Venezuela,
~.cit.
Interview with Shridath Ramphal, 23 March 2001.
61 Interview with Rashleigh Jackson, 30 August 1999.
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position and secure the legitimacy of its frontiers, and in so doing, Venezuela
would be seen as an aggressor and the brunt of world opinion would be against
Venezuela. ,,62
The army's role developed, then, as an auxiliary to Guyana's foreign policy machinery.
In the words of a former Guyanese ambassador, "the foreign ministry was the only line of
defence [at the inception] vis-a-vis Venezuela. ,,63
The GOG's approach to the threats, real or perceived, from Venezuela, has
centred on publicising the problems on the international stage with a view to winning
support from the international community and in so doing providing a deterrent to
Venezuela's occupation of Essequibo. The limited number of states which had diplomatic
representation based in Georgetown provided some opportunity for the coalition
government to lobby for international support on its home territory. This was especially
noted after the Leoni decree when the Burnham administration intensified its
international lobbying. The British High Commission in Georgetown was especially
singled out at this time because ofHMG's role as a signatory to the Geneva Agreement."
Although India did not have a High Commission in Guyana during the period
under discussion, the then Prime Minister of India, Indira Gandhi, made an official visit
to Guyana at the invitation of the Guyanese government from 12-13 October 1968.
Winning the support of India in the territorial controversy was important given that state's
relative power among developing countries. Gandhi's visit to Guyana was clearly of
significance in Guyana's politics, not only in view of the large percentage of the
population of Indian descent, but also given the recent racial tensions, described in
62 Interview with Joe Singh, op.cit.
63 Interview with Rudy Collins, 10 September 1999.
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chapter 1. Searwar, whose conference paper focuses on the role of Asians in Guyana's
foreign policy, elaborates that the GOG "... sought to utilise Guyana's dominant ethnic
composition (East Indians and Blacks) as a source of strength rather than weakness and to
project Guyana on the international stage as an Afro-Asian state." Moreover, Searwar
asserts the dual benefit to Guyana both domestically and internationally, especially
regarding the territorial controversy with Venezuela in the latter:
"The advantages of projecting Guyana as an Afro-Asian state were mainly two-
fold, as follows (i) it was a valuable instrument promoting nation-building and
cohesiveness; (ii) it enabled Guyana to mobilise support towards the maintenance
of its territorial integrity, the diplomatic sup~rt of the Third World in which the
Afro-Asian states continue to be a majority." 5
Gandhi's visit could therefore be seen as an endorsement by the Indian government for
the Burnham regime and Guyana's territorial integrity." While acknowledging that the
black dominated PNC government was cognizant of its local East Indian population's ties
with India in its foreign policy strategies, Ince argues that ideology was central in the
relationship Guyana cultivated with India.67
The Commonwealth
As a former British colony, Guyana was first represented as a member of the
Corrnnonwealth shortly after independence at the CHOGM held in London from 6-15
September 1966. As well as the sense of family affmity, in terms of belonging to a body
made up of ex-British colonies, the principles of the Conunonwealth as later enunciated
64 "Statement in National Assembly on Guyana/Venezuela Relations, 12 July 1968" in Burnham (1970),
£.169.
s Searwar (1989), mimeo., p.ll.
66 See communique issued at the end of Gandhi's visit in MEA (1968c), pp.87 -88.
67 Inee in Inee (1979), pp.218-219.
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at the 1971 CHOGM would have appealed to successive Guyanese governments, given
threats to its tenitorial integrity:
"The Commonwealth of Nations is a voluntary association of independent
sovereign states, each responsible for its own policies, consulting and co-
operating in the common interests of their peoples and in the promotion of
international understanding and world peace. ,,68
This body was to become an important plank in Guyana's foreign policy strategies against
Venezuela. Indeed, during this period of the coalition, Guyana utilized the
Connnonwealth as part of its intemationalising of the threats posed by the Leoni decree.
Hence, in terms of approaches, Burnham announced, ".. .1 am arranging for this present
statement to be communicated to Member States as well as to be specifically circulated to
Conunonwealth governments through the Commonwealth Secretary in London.'?" This
was certainly carried out by the Commonwealth Secretariat which also circulated "A
Note of Protest from the Government of Guyana to the Government of Venezuela
delivered on 19 July 1968" to member states."
Subsequently, at Guyana's annual heads of mission conference which was held
from 2-5 August 1968, the strategy specifically devised for the Commonwealth - the
targeting of African members of that body to support Guyana in its tenitorial problems
with Venezuela - was elaborated:
"The Conference discussed ways and means of obtaining more specific support
from Commonwealth members, particularly African members, in Guyana's
struggle with Venezuela. The logistical aspects of this were regarded as
especially deserving of further improvement. For example, various members of
the Commonwealth - not only in Africa but also in the Caribbean - might be
telling GOG either directly or via its High Connnissioner in London that they
68 CROGM (1971), "Final Communique", Commonwealth Secretariat (1987), p.156.
69 "Statement in the National Assembly on Guyana/Guyana Relations, 12 July 1968" in Burnham (1970),
f.' 169.
o FCa 141492. .
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fully endorsed the Guyanese position, but word to that effect was very low in
trickling down to their representatives in New York, and sometimes never got
there at all. ,,71
Winning the support of the Commonwealth countries has therefore been viewed as a key
element in Guyana's strategies in response to threats from Venezuela. Such an
endorsement was clearly of value when Guyana submitted its application to join the
United Nations. The Commonwealth states sponsored Guyana's application
collectively.P In a symbolic sense, the Connnonwealth not only gave recognition to
Guyana's sovereignty, but also served as a springboard for Guyana's entry into a world
body which it later utilised in order to preserve its territorial integrity.
The United Nations
Key in the government of Guyana's initiatives to internationalise Guyana's
territorial controversy with Venezuela during this period, was the UN, and specifically,
the General Assembly. As was mentioned before, Guyana joined the UN shortly after
independence on 20 September 1966. It was shortly after this initiation into the world
body, that the GOG utilized its membership to draw international attention to Venezuela's
actions against Guyana. The Ankoko issue was raised at the UN on 18 October 1966 by
Guyana's permanent representative, John Carter.73 The fact that the GOG utilised any
available opportunity in the General Assembly to raise its problems with Venezuela is
indicated by the fact that as the Guyana Graphic reported:
"Sir John was at the time addressing the General Assembly on a motion
welcoming newly-independent Botswana and Lesotho to the UN. Sir John briefly
71 Carlson, Georgetown to Department of State, 13 August 1968, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
72 Commonwealth Secretariat (1987), p.123.
73 Guyana Graphic, 19 October 1966, p.l.
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explained the Guyana Government's attitude on the question and referred to the
recent intrusion by Venezuelans into Guyanese territory on Ankoko Island. ,,74
In 1967, at the annual session of the General Assembly, Guyana's Attorney General and
Minister of State, Shridath Ramphal, used his address to calIon the world community to
stand up for a principle important to Guyana in view of its territorial problems. That is,
the non-acquisition of territory by force:
"... Mr President, there is one overriding principle which must not be lost sight of
- it is that the acquisition of territory by force cannot and must not be condoned
either individually by Member States or collectively by International Community.
This principle has been reinforced by what must surely be the lesson of recent
events - that recourse to force and the perpetuation of a state of war offers no
solution to international disputes. The Charter of this great Organisation upholds
this principle and Member States cannot afford simply to pay lip service to it." 75
Ramphal went on to convey his message in terms of the burden on development of poorer
countries like Guyana facing threats to its territory:
"In the seventh decade of the twentieth century the developing nations in
particular need a firm assurance - which only a keen international conscience and
effective world order can provide - that they can be free to use their slender
resources, both human and material in the tasks of change and improvement to
which they are so inevitably committed. They need to be free of the burden of
bearing arms in defence of their right to survive as sovereign states. Issues vital
to the survival of the small state inmany parts of the world are at stake. ,,76
Drawing reference specifically to his state's own predicament, Ramphal called on the UN
to back the territorial integrity of small states:
"Many of us live in the shadow of territorial claims - claims often advanced by
larger and more powerful neighbours - which threaten the right of small states to
make their way in the world. This Organisation must stand behind the
independence and the territorial integrity of all states, including those which it has
helped to bring to freedom ,,77
74 Ibid.




In the same address, Ramphal also expressed his government's "deep disappointment" at
Guyana's exclusion from the Latin American Denuclearisation Treaty as a result of the
controversy with Venezuela. Similarly, Guyana's deputy permanent representative to the
UN, Ann Jardim, also took the issue of Guyana's exclusion from the Treaty of Tlatelolco
to the First Committee of the General Assembly, crucially calling on the group" ... to vote
in support of a Resolution which will enshrine that exclusionary article [of the Treaty of
Tlatelolco] at the highest level in the General Assembly of this World Organisation." In
calling for the Resolution against Guyana's exclusion, Jardim drew on the anachronism of
her country's exclusion from a treaty aimed at achieving regional peace:
"By its very nature a resolution such as this demands acceptance of the principle
of universality but this Treaty by its own provisions makes universality
impossible. One would have hoped, Mr. Chairman, that the cause of World Peace
would have ascended any existing and unrelated regional difficulties. ,,78
The outcome of the Resolution called for by the Guyanese delegation to the UN was
successful in tenus of the results of voting in the First Committee and the General
Assembly.79 Moreover, the Venezuelan position came under severe criticism from the
African members of the UN in the General Assembly. As this FCO despatch reports:
"The Venezuela/Guyana dispute last came into the open here during the
discussions at the XXIInd General Assembly Session on the Treaty for the
Denuclearisation of Latin America On that occasion the Venezuelans went no
further than refusing to abandon their claim. Even this provoked some bitter
speeches from a number of Afro/Asians, and the delegations of Algeria,
Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritania,
Togo, Uganda, Tanzania, Upper Volta and Zambia refused to vote for the
endorsement of the Treaty because of the Venezuelan attitude."
78 Extracts from Ann Jardim's speech to the First COmmittee of the General Assembly, 17 December 1968,
MEA (1968b), pp.30-31.
79 D.H.T. Hildyard, UK Mission, UN to P.T. Hayman, FCO, 17 June 1968 in FCO 7/1325/1.
130
Conveying the extent of support for Guyana amongst Mrol Asian states, the despatch
further notes, "Guyana is, with the other Commonwealth Caribbean countries, by way of
being almost an honorary member of the AfrolAsian group of new member nations,
having so much in common with them racially, culturally and historically. ,,80
It can be argued that at the very least, the African representatives' position was
derived from what may be deemed OAU ideology. The members of that body passed a
resolution, "Border Disputes among African States" at the Cairo Summit in 1964, in
which they agreed to the maintenance of the status quo of the frontiers inherited at
independence. Given the potential for conflict resulting from the arbitrarily drawn
colonial frontiers which split ethnicllinguistic groups between different states, the OAU's
position since 1964 represented foresight about the problems that may ensue from
challenges to existing borders." This point did not go amiss on the government of
Guyana since it repeatedly called on Latin American and Caribbean states to follow the
example of the OAU in accepting inherited boundaries.V
In spite of the prolific condenmation of Guyana's exclusion from the Treaty,
membership still appeared to be illusionary for the country:
"Despite repeated requests to the Depository Government that a date be set for
Guyana to sign the treaty in conformity with General Assembly Resolution 2286
(IIXX) and the express understanding of many delegations who spoke during the
debate on that resolution, Guyana has not as yet been permitted to sign. ,,83
80 Ibid.
81 For more details on the rationale for this DAU resolution and the charter of that organization see
Cervenka (1968), pp.93-94 and pp.231-239 respectively.
82 See, for instance, Burnham (1981b), p.8.
83 MEA (1968c), p.59.
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Such a circumstance is perhaps indicative of the support Venezuela was able to receive
from the Latin American Group, irrespective of criticisms from other caucuses in the UN,
namely the Afro-Asians.
The Leoni decree issued in July 1968, warranted a full onslaught from Guyana's
diplomatic machinery at the UN. As the decree took place at a time when the annual
session of the General Assembly would not have been sitting, the matter was taken to the
Secretary General of the UN.
"Guyana's Permanent Representative at the United Nations, Sir John Carter, was
drawing to the attention of the United Nations Secretary-General, U Thant, the
text of Prime Minister Forbes Burnham's statement on Wednesday night in which
he accused the Venezuelan Government of embarking on a course of
'international piracy' against this country.,,84
In a subsequent letter to U Thant, Guyana's Permanent Representative requested certain
key documents be circulated to UN member states in order to draw attention to what
Guyana regarded as "... a calculated breach" of Article V(2) of the Geneva Agreement. 85
As an indication of how seriously the Guyanese government viewed the threat from
Venezuela, it should be noted that in addition to this lobbying, Burnham later presented
himself at the UN to Secretary General U Thant to discuss Venezuela's actions."
The GOG sought to lobby various groups at the UN as part of its attempt to gain
support against Leoni's decree, as the Guyana Graphic reported:
"Guyana will be engaged in a series of activities at the United Nations later this
week when it intends to solicit the support of all the regional groups of the worlds
[sic] organisation in opposing Venezuela's policy of aggression against this
country. Guyana's Permanent Representative at the UN, Sir John Carter, will
84 Guyana Graphic, 12 July 1968, p.l.
8S "Letter from Sir John Carter ... to the United Nations ... Secretary-General ... requesting the circulation for
the information of Member States of copies of Statement by the Prime Minister and Notes of Protest to the
Government of Venezuela, 22nd July 1968" in MEA (1968b), pp.28-29.
86 Guyana Graphic, 23 July 1968, p.l.
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lobby the Eastern Bloc, Afro-Asian, Latin American and other regional groups as
part of this country's move to expose to the world the hostile attitude of
Venezuela which seeks some two-thirds of Guyana's territory. ,,87
The above reference to the lobbying of the Eastern Bloc is interesting since, as mentioned
in chapter 1, a number of writers have described the foreign policy of the coalition
government at this time as essentially pro-west in orientation and relations. Indeed in
Burnham's speech on the Leoni decree to the National Assembly in Georgetown, no
reference was made to lobbying the Eastern Bloc in the description of Guyana's
international strategies in response to the decree. Instead, Burnham refers only to the
measures taken in relation to the UN Secretary General, the Commonwealth Secretary
[sic], the British High Connnission, and "... discussions with the accredited
representatives of other friendly governments in Georgetown ... informing them of the
development and inviting their support for Guyana in the face of the Venezuelan acts of
aggression. ,,88 The Eastern bloc countries were not included since none of them had
resident diplomatic missions in Georgetown at the time. This is not to say that the
Eastern Bloc countries were not lobbied. The Guyana Graphic has reported on the Prime
Minister's direct lobbying of the Eastern Bloc in the UN:
"The communique referred to Mr Burnham's meetings with various diplomatic
missions at the UN including those from Latin America, the Eastern Bloc
countries, the Soviet Union's Permanent Representative, Mr Jacob Malik, the
Afro-Asian Group, Arab and Israeli nations, and Secretary General U. Thant. ,,89
87 14 July 1968, p.1. See also Guyana Graphic, 19 July 1968, p.l, which reports m John Carter's briefing
to the 24-Member Latin American Group at the UN. This speech is also printed inMEA (1968c), pp.l06-
116.
88 "Statement in National Assembly ... 12 July 1968", Burnham (1970), p.169.
89 1 August 1968, p.l.
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What is clear is that in so far as the Eastern bloc was openly lobbied for support, this was
done under the umbrella of trying to influence groups at the UN. The GOG's widespread
lobbying at this international body was effective since such was the onslaught at the UN
that the Venezuelan government contemplated its withdrawal from that organization.90
A number of states had in fact expressed their individual support for Guyana as a
result of its lobbying. The US was officially neutral on the issue. "US Ambassador
Bernbaum told newsmen after a meeting with Foreign Minister Ignacio Iribarren Borges
on Monday that his country's policy was one of 'complete neutrality in an issue involving
two friendly nations'. ,,91 However, subsequent US action was tantamount to support for
Guyana. "In a communique from Prime Minister Burnham's office last evening .. .it was
stated, 'The United States Government has taken the position that the rights of states to
territorial waters to the nine-mile contiguous zone and to the continental Shelf can only
attach to the coastal state ... ,,92 In other words, the US was effectively stating that
Venezuela had no right to the territorial waters claimed by the Leoni decree. This line
appears to be consistent with a brief dispatched by the British ambassador in Washington:
"The State Department have told us they intend to issue a statement (they hope on
25 July) to the effect that while they are neutral as to the substance of the
territorial dispute between Guyana and Venezuela, they regard the recent
Venezuelan Decree on territorial waters as invalid in intemationallaw. ,,93
A subsequent despatch noted, however, "The State Department have now decided not to
issue a statement, since they see the Venezuelans as cooling off and do not want to
90 Guyana Graphic, 17 July 1968, p.l.
91 Ibid.
92 Guyana Graphic, 1 August 1968, p.l.
93 P. Dean, Washington, to PO, telegramno.2236, 23 July 1968, FCO 141492.
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exacerbate them ,,94 The preferred course of action now being that "... the State
Department will suggest to Burnham that he might state publicly on return home that he
had been informed here [Washington] of the US view as described in para 1 of my
telno.2236." The Guyanese leader's announcement cited earlier is a direct result of this
agreed modus operandi. It indicates Burnham's cognisance of the fme line which the US
threaded between its support for him and the need to protect its interests in Venezuela.
Another crucial element of support for the GOG, even ahead of its permanent
representative briefmg the Latin American Group, was that some unnamed countries
within this group were urging restraint on Venezuela:
"Several Latin American countries yesterday were believed to be pressing
Venezuela to drop its request of a reopening of the 1899 border arbitration with
Guyana because they also have frontiers defmed by similar arbitral decisions. ,,95
As will be seen later in this chapter, Brazil, with its many borders settled by arbitration,
was to become a crucial counter-weight for the government of Guyana in its territorial
controversy with Venezuela The British position was reported in a newspaper as
follows:
"Britain yesterday told Venezuela it was disturbed at a recent decree by
Caracas ... British sources said. The concern was expressed when the Foreign
Office sununoned the Venezuelan Charge D'Affaires inLondon, Ramon Delgado,
for a meeting with top official John Reith. Britain maintains that the Venezuelan
decree is contrary to the 1966 Geneva Agreement ... ,,96
The extent of British cautiousness in responding to the Leoni decree is, however revealed
in FCO despatches:
"In the Aide Memoire handed to the Charge d'Affaires of Venezuela in London on
16 July 1968, HMG indicated their concern at reports of the Venezuelan
94 P. Dean, Washington, to PO, telegramno.2271, 25 July 1968, ibid.
9S Guyana Graphic, 17 July 1968, p.l.
96 Ibid.
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Presidential decree of 9 July 1968, and consequently wished to reserve their
position on the legal aspects of the decree. ,,97
Britain was actually being urged by the US to condemn the illegality of the decree:
"... The State Department remain hopeful that we shall conclude that [the]
Venezuelan decree is invalid in international law, and that as a major maritime
power, we shall tell the Venezuelans SO.,,98
Despite US urging, another FCO despatch notes:
"1 entirely agree with American Department that there is no point in
demonstrating our public support for Mr. Burnham in a way that will provoke the
Venezuelans, at a time when most indications are that the Venezuelans realise
their decree was a mistake ... ,,99
In spite of the support given out to Guyana after its initial actions in the UN
following the decree, one of Guyana's strongest protests against Venezuela at the UN was
made on 3 October 1968. Such an approach appears to have been decided on at the
August 1968 annual conference of Guyana's heads of mission. In the US ambassador's
report on the conference based on a briefmg he had received from the MEA's Permanent
Secretary, Rasbleigh Jackson, he states, "The Conference apparently felt that Guyana
should pursue a yet more active policy in the UN ... " Indicative of the significance
accorded to GuyanalVenezuela Relations at this time in Guyana's foreign policy, the
ambassador also notes unsurprisingly, "This topic, of course, absorbed most of the
Conference time."}OODrawing attention to Venezuela's actions against Guyana - Ankoko,
alleged interference in Guyana's internal affairs, exclusion from the Tlatelolco Treaty and
the Leoni decree - Rarnphal in his speech at the 1968 session of the UN lamented:
97 E.A.W. Bullock to Mr Hunt, 9 August 1968, reo 141492.
98 P. Dean, Washington, to PO, 25 July 1968, telegramno.2271, feD 141492. See also despatch in same
file from Dean, telegram no.2333 which refers to continued pressure from the US.
99 E.A.W. Bullock to Mr Hunt, op.cit.
100 Delmar Carlson, Georgetown to State Department, August 1968, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
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"This has been the experience of Guyana's first years of Independence. It is not a
heartening commentary on the emergence of an ethos of intemationallegality and
it is a depressing reflection on how readily some of the most important traditions
by which countries have lived - including in this case principles of national self-
determination and resistance to imperial domination - can become tarnished by
power and frenzied ambition. "
Moreover, relying on a technique deployed in his earlier speech to the National Assembly
in Georgetown, Ramphal focused on the implications for other states if Venezuelan
actions are condoned, in an attempt for states to support Guyana in view of the threats
that they may face:
"... it could be the experience of any state at the hands of some powerful
neighbours, once boundary settlements lose their sanctity and become forever
arbitrable in response to the dictates of power. My Government invited this
Assembly to consider the chaos and confusion into which most of the world's
frontiers would be thrown if all one party to a boundary settlement need to do to
secure that boundary's revision is to constitute itself a judge in its case; to assert
that settlement is not valid; to proclaim a new boundary consonant with its own
ideas and to assume the right, once it has strength and power, to extend its
frontiers into the territory of a neighbouring State."!"
In this emotionally charged speech, Ramphal also drew attention to the development
implications for poorer countries like Guyana which by implication would have to divert
money for development to defend its territory from outside threats:
"Every million dollars that a developing nation spends on defence, whether it be
on aircraft or on ships or on a standing army, or on any of their adjuncts,
represents a million dollars diverted from development ... At its most conservative,
however, and I use units of cost that are relevant to my country, every million
dollars spent on arms would provide school places for 50,()()() children, would
settle 1,000 families in developing areas, would build 50 miles of secondary road
into new areas of land development, would provide 10 medical clinics for the
men, women and children on whom the burden of development must really
fall. ,,102
101 "Extracts from the address given by ... S.S. Ramphal ... in the General Debate of the 23rd Session of the
UN General Assembly, 3rd October 1968, MEA (1968c), pp.131-140. Speech published in its entirety as
"Statement by the Hon. Shridath S. Ramphal, Minister of State, General Debate, October 3, 1968, by the
Permanent Mission of Guyana to the UN, NY, NY".
102 Ibid.
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The GOG clearly felt confident of the support it would receive in the General Assembly
for it to have continued its onslaught against Venezuela in the aforementioned speech.
Guyana's successes in the General Assembly aside, questions have been raised -
not least by the Opposition PPP and specifically its leader Cheddi Jagan - as to why the
Guyanese government opted to discuss the issue in the General Assembly rather than at
the Security Council, especially during this period of heightened tensions with
Venezuela. By the terms of the UN Charter, the latter body is the most important organ
of the UN for discussing what in the GOG's own words are "... small states faced with
Aggression't.l'" Article 24 states:
"1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carryin~ out its
duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. "I
While in Article 34 under the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes", the charter declares:
"The Security Council may investigate any dispute, any situation which might
lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine
whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security.
Article 35 makes it clear, however, that a state may have resort to the General Assembly
and not just the Security Council. 105
The Guyanese government was not acting out of the ordinary in choosing the
General Assembly to air its grievance, but the question is why? This I will attempt to
answer below. While by the terms of the Geneva Agreement, the territorial disagreement
is a "controversy" rather than a dispute which has to be dealt with in the terms directed by
103 Ramphal's 1968 speech to the UN, op.cit.
104 Charter of the UN, www.un.org
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that Agreement, acts such as the occupation of the whole of Ankoko island and the Leoni
decree could arguably be defmed as acts of aggression or constituting a dispute and
therefore be taken to the Security Council. It may be argued that this demand made by
Ramphal before the General Assembly would have been apt before the Security Council:
"What are small nations to do faced with threats of this kind? It is Guyana today,
but who knows who may be the victim of expansionist ambition tomorrow? Meet
aggression with force, be ready whatever the cost, whatever the sacrifice, to
defend the State against those who violate its territorial integrity. Yet, is this the
answer that the collective voice of the international community is to give to the
smaller States of the world at this stage of organised international effort?" 106
The PPP's newssheet, Thunder, reported that "The Government has repeatedly refused to
take the question of Venezuela's aggressive actions to the UN Security Council ." 107
Moreover, Jagan raised the issue of the government not taking Guyana's problems with
Venezuela before the Security Council during the debate on the Leoni decree in the
National Assembly.
"Why did we not go to the Security Council? That is what they are there for. Do
we have our illustrious Mr. Braithwaite and now Mr. Carter [Guyana's former and
present Ambassadors at the UN] as window-pieces there? This is the time when
the matter should have been brought up innnediately. But before this
Government can take the matter to the Security Council it has to go through a
certain set of reasoning, who will support it and who will not .. .It is clear from
what we see now, the neutrality of the United States and the virtual toeing of the
US line by Britain that these countries would not have liked the question to go to
the United Nations". 108
A Guyana Graphic report shortly after Jagan's speech appears to give credence to Jagan's
line of reasoning. Headlined, "Stay Away from the Security Council: US", the report
states:
lOS Ibid.
106 "Extracts from the address given by the Hon. S.S. Ramphal .... in the General Debate of the 23rd Session
of the UN General Assembly, 3rd October 1968, MEA (1968c), p.133.
107 Thunder, vo1.19, No.7, June 1968, p.7.
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"The American Government is not anxious for Guyana to take its territorial
controversy with Venezuela to the United Nations Security Council at this time.
The Graphic was reliably informed yesterday that the reasons for the Americans'
anxiety were clearly stated to the Guyana Government by the US Ambassador in
Georgetown, Mr Delmar Carlson. To quote authoritative sources, 'the intricacies
and ramifications' that would be involved if the border row with Venezuela went
before the Security Council at this stage were impressed upon the Government.
And while these 'intricacies and ramifications' are not for public disclosure, it is
understood that America is anxious to avoid having to choose her side in the
controversy between two 'friendly countries'."
The report also stated, "The same sources also confirmed that the US government was
seeking to influence both Venezuela and Suriname against pressing their border claims
on Guyana at this stage since this may add to the problems of Prime Minister Forbes
Burnham's government and militate against him at the forthcoming elections.P" So, if
the newspaper reports are accurate it may be argued that the Guyanese government was
offered US assistance in getting Venezuelan and Suriname to downplay their threats
against Guyana in return for the coalition government not taking those threats to the
Security Council.
Giving credence to possible US behind-the-scenes activity, Nagamootoo, writing
for the PPP notes, "On arriving in NY Burnham said that his government was considering
taking the border dispute before the UN Security Council in order to appeal for
protection. The government would also appeal to 'friendly nations' - Canada, Britain and
USA. ,,110 This is corroborated in an FCa despatch which notes, "He [Burnham] is
considering raising it [the Leoni decree] in the Security Council or the General
108 Jagan (1968), pp.16-17.
109 Guyana Graphic, 20 July 1968, p.l.
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Assembly". 111 Nagamootoo notes that subsequently, "Guyana merely brought the
question of Venezuela's aggression to the attention of the United Nations, and lodged a
protest with its Secretary-General. The government did not press for a debate of the issue
in the Security Council. ,,112 The inference being Burnham was steered from this body.
Cold War machinations aside, it has to be considered that any government
wishing to take an issue to the Security Council for a resolution has to give a thorough
analysis as to the likely outcome of the voting of that Council. Given that by Article 27
of the UN Charter, the five permanent Members have the veto, the analysis of their
voting, whether it be for, against, or abstention, has to be weighted. The uncertainty
involved in predicting the outcome of the Security Council would ultimately mean that a
government has to think carefully before taking a matter before that body for a vote. 113
As one Guyanese source has said, "If you took a course of action which led to major
powers either abstaining or exercising a veto, then you have done yourself a
disservice. ,,114 Guyana found allies in the Afro-Asian bloc in the General Assembly,
which because of the big powers' or permanent members' veto in the Security Council did
not count for much in that forum It can be argued that the General Assembly, by its
relative certainty in terms of support for Guyana, would to a greater extent, have been the
wiser choice for Guyana In the fmal analysis, since the Ankoko issue and the Leoni
decree did not amount to large-scale aggression on the part of Venezuela, risking the
110 Nagamootoo (1981), p.13.
111 C.B. Diggines to Private Secretary, 15 July 1968, FeD 7/296. See also telegram no. 194,25 July 1968:
"He [Burnham] has wisely decided not to do so [go to the Security Council] at present", PREM 1312600.
112 Nagamootoo, op.cit.
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ramifications of a major power veto in the Security Council would not have made calling
for a resolution in that forum the most efficacious policy decision to pursue.
The English-Speaking Caribbean
At the regional level, two areas were most important in Guyana's foreign policy
strategies in countering Venezuela during the coalition period - the English-speaking
Caribbean and Brazil. I will discuss the English-speaking Caribbean in Guyana's foreign
policy strategies against Venezuela first. As a former British colony, Guyana has
historically been considered a part of what is now known as the Connnonwealth
Caribbean because of its cultural, trade and other ties with the English-speaking
Caribbean. Even without the existence of the territorial controversy, developing relations
at independence with this group of countries can be viewed as a natural progression.
Ramphal, who had served on the defunct West Indies Federation which Guyana did not
join and who is regarded by many as a strong advocate of Caribbean unity, summed up
the importance of the English-speaking Caribbean:
".. .it was perhaps inevitable that our relations with our sister countries in the
Caribbean should occupy much of our time in the first year of Independence. We
have on several occasions affirmed the importance which the Government of
Guyana attaches to the cause of West Indian unity and we have more than pledged
ourselves to the maximum degree of consultation and cooperation within the area
in matters of connnon concern. ,,115
113 Article 27, chapter 3, "Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members ... "
114 Anonymous interview.
115 Ramphal (1967), p.13. See Emery's thesis (1963), 00. reasons for Guyana's non-participation in the
West Indies Federation which was formed in 1958 and dissolved in 1962.
142
Evidence of such consultation and cooperation in the area of foreign policy was later
enshrined in the treaty establishing the Caribbean community.i"
During the period under study, only the four largest English-speaking Caribbean
countries were independent - Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.
Nevertheless, the GOG placed relations with the Corrnnonwealth Caribbean as a key
plank in its foreign policy and as will be seen, in its foreign policy strategies in relation to
Venezuela. Manley asserts that it would be more accurate to describe the connnitrnent to
Caribbean unity "... as the prime element of Guyanese foreign policy ... " in the late
196Os, "... such was the dedication of Forbes Burnham and the government he led to this
goal" .117 Luard, for instance, has asserted the significance of the Caribbean in relation to
Guyana's geographical isolation as an English-speaking country in South America and its
territorial problems. 118 Glasgow has also argued that Caribbean unity was necessitated
by territorial and internal racial problems. 119
The government of Guyana's pursuit of Caribbean unity during this period has
been palpably demonstrated by its instrumental role in a concrete step towards such unity
- that is, in the creation of CARIFT A. This body, formed by Guyana, Barbados, Antigua
and Trinidad and Tobago, came into being on 1 May 1968 when the instruments of
ratification were deposited by the four countries. 120 Collins has argued that Eric
Williams was one of the main proponents of a regional secretariat, but that the GOG
became the most active one on Caribbean integration and hence pushed for the regional
116 See chapter 5.
117 Manley (1979), p.28.
118 Luard thesis (1979), p.25.
119 Glasgow inDavis and Wilson (1975), pp.178-197.
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secretariat which was eventually located in Georgetown in 1969. He asserts further that
such a stance on Caribbean unity gave Burnham the recognition of Caribbean leaders and
hence legitimacy which he did not enjoy on the domestic scene. 121
CARIFf A was essentially a body concerned with trade and economic issues, 122
but as Luard asserts that body did serve as a mechanism through which Guyana could
win support in the controversy with Venezuela. "The protective union of Conunonwealth
Caribbean regionalism created for Guyana an identity with which to counter isolation and
a diplomatic counter-force or buffer zone to ward off Venezuelan aggression.,,123
Similarly, Glasgow, who argues that Caribbean unity is "... one of the main planks of
Guyana's foreign policy", cites the state's territorial problems and ethnic problems as
influencing the coalition government's decision to join CARIFf A124 Moreover, its
successor, CARICOM, offered the opportunity for co-ordination of foreign policy which
did have some benefits for Guyana in terms of regional support.
Ferguson, who states that the pursuit of relations with the Caribbean" ... had
several dimensions", argues against criticisms from some quarters that Burnham favoured
Caribbean unity, especially the pursuit of immigration from Caribbean countries, to
Guyana in order to boost his electoral popularity. He counters, "The fact is, that, as
eminent a West Indian as Arthur Lewis advocated at the time that Guyana's industrial
120 MEA (1968c), pp.5-13. By 11 August 1968, all Commonwealth Caribbean countries had become
members of CARIFf A, ibid.
121 Collins in Preiswerk (1969), pp.l08-1l5.
122 Economically, at least, CARIFf A, does not appear to have provided Guyana with much success. Jagan
argues, "At the end of the first two years, Jamaica increased her exports by nearly 60%, Trinidad by over
30% and Guyana by a miserly 5%." Jagan, in Marxist terms, thus concludes, " ... under the imperialist plan
for the Caribbean [Guyana] has been relegated to the role of an agricultural producer for an industrialized
West Indies", Jagan (1979), pp.72-73.
123 Luard's thesis (1979), p.40.
124 Glasgow in Davis and Wilson (1975), p.183.
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potential would be realised in line with a conscious policy that included the settlement of
the hinterland to deal with the problem of under-population." He argues further that "To
see [domestic political considerations] as the sole or even the main consideration
devalues the historically consistent advocacy of regionalism that Burnham displayed
when he was both in opposition and in power. ,,125
The government of Guyana's emphasis on Caribbean unity may have been due to
more than a desire merely to build on ties developed during colonial times. For
Burnham, at least, one element was a calculated attempt to boost his political appeal by
favouring immigration from the Caribbean to Guyana as part of the pursuit of closer
relations with the Caribbean:
"According to the Minister [of the Pakistani Embassy in Washington], Iftikhan
Ali, he was deeply impressed with Burnham's shrewd and pragmatic approach to
creating a stable anti-Jagan government in Georgetown. He said that Burnham
plans to place the Hindu majority in a state of perpetual minority by a two-prong
policy. First and most important of these is to open the gates to large-scale
immigration from Trinidad and Jamaica which would greatly increase the Negro
proportion of the population. "
In effect, the emphasis on closer Caribbean relations became caught up in domestic
politics. The implications, however, went further:
"Secondly, Burnham is seeking ways of driving an effective wedge between the
Muslim-Pakistani and the Hindu portions of the East Indian population of British
Guiana. Minister Ali said that that Muslims constitute 15 percent of the East
Indian population at present and that the natural hostility between the Hindu and
Muslim lends itself very well to Burnham's plan. He also indicated that one of the
things Burnham discussed with him was the possibility of increasing immigration
from East Pakistan which would also swell the non-Hindu portion of the
population. ,,126
125 Ferguson (1999), p.125.
126 Delmar Carson, Georgetown, to Lincoln Gorden, State Department, 4 August 1966, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
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The Indo-Pakistani conflict lent itself readily to the domestic scene in Georgetown and in
the case of Pakistan's position presented advantages to Burnham. Further evidence that
this particular aspect of Caribbean unity had links to domestic politics is summed up in
the following report which also gives an indication of US support for the policy.
"... Burnham related to the President [of the USA] the idea of immigration from
the over-populated British West Indian islands to Guyana and the needed electoral
benefit to the Burnham administration. The President's [of the USA] subsequent
inquiry to you as to whether we are on top of this idea has been interpreted as a
very significant indication of the President's sympathetic attitude toward it.,,127
Whatever was the descending order of motivating factors behind the emphasis on closer
relations with the Corrunonwealth Caribbean, the pursuit of such relations as one of the
foreign policy strategies to counter threats from Venezuela was of significance.
The other three independent Caribbean states of Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad
and Tobago were not in a position to provide Guyana with military assistance, but their
significance lay in the verbal support which they could give to Guyana directly or via
regional and international organizations. Thus, after the Leoni decree, the Jamaican
Prime Minster, Hugh Shearer, was reported to have cabled the Venezuelan president
Leoni urging restraint. "Mr. Shearer's message to Senor Leoni Tuesday night stated 'in
the interest of hemispheric peace, I urge you to refrain from the use of force against
Guyana in the present dispute,.,,128Similarly, it was reported that the Barbadian Prime
Minister, Errol Barrow, cabled the Venezuelan government asking for "'an early
assurance' that Venezuela would not depart from the principles of the United Nations
Charter. ,,129Likewise, Trinidad and Tobago's Prime Minister, Eric Williams, who was to
127 Ibid.
128 Guyana Graphic, 18 July 1968, p.l.
129 Ibid., 19 July 1968, p.l.
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playa broker role between Guyana and Venezuela at the end of the Mixed Commission
in 1970, also cabled President Leoni expressing his concerns.P" Barbados' Prime
Minister, Errol Barrow, went even further by denouncing the Venezuelan claim as
"politically motivated". Barrow is reported as stating, "Anyone who has studied the
problem can find no grounds to support it ... ,,13l The Barbadian government also spoke
out against Venezuela in the General Assembly on Guyana's exclusion from the Treaty of
Tlatelolco. "'The refusal of Venezuela to countenance signature by Guyana of the Latin
American Denuclearisation Treaty, is in essence, a threat to the security of the
hemisphere, Deputy Premier J. Cameron Tudor of Barbados told the UN General
Assembly. ,,132
Latin America
As a British colony in South America, British Guiana's links with the non-English
speaking states in the region were few. The extent of the colony's remoteness is summed
up by Ramphal:
"But save for ... contacts with North America we lived in almost complete
isolation from our neighbours in the hemisphere. A sprinkling of contacts in the
Caribbean itself, perhaps notably in Aruba and Curacao, represented our main
point of reference with the non-British islands ... We were a part of South America
and we looked outward to the Caribbean - naturally enough - but without hardly
ever a glance over our shoulders at our neighbours on the mainland. ,,133
130 Ibid., 20 July 1968, pI.
131 Ibid., 13 September, 1968, p.l.
132 Ibid., 23 October 1968, p.I.
133 Ramphal (1967), p17-IS. See also Preiswerk in Journal of Inter american Studies and World Affairs
(1969), pp.245-271.
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In recognition of such isolation from its Latin neighbours, Rarnphal expressly stated
shortly after independence, "Guyana has recognised in full measure the need for these
new relationships, particularly with Latin American countries ... ,,134
Brazil has emerged as the most important state in GOG's pursuit of relations with
Latin America during this period, especially in relation to Guyana's territorial problems
with Venezuela. In that regard, it can be argued that the significance of Brazil to Guyana
lay in its sheer economic and military might vis-a-vis Venezuela, which could be used by
Guyana as a buttressing force in the absence of a defence agreement. It was Brazil,
however, which made the first overtures to the GOG, as a despatch from the US Embassy
in Rio de Janeiro reveals: "... GOB has taken initiative [to] promote closer friendly
contact with Guyana." 135 The Desk Officer for the Americas in the Brazilian foreign
ministry, Itamaraty, had delivered "an official invitation" to the GDF's chief, colonel
Pope inviting him to the Eighth Annual Conference of American Anny Conunanders
which was scheduled for September 1968. As the despatch notes, however, "Mindful
that Guyana may be reluctant to make [a] military meeting [the] first official contact
between countries, GOB also suggested that [the] Guyana delegation be diversified so
that wider ranging talks and contacts in Rio could be possible. ,,136
The courting of relations by Brazil to Guyana can perhaps be understood in the
context of what has been labelled its "sub-imperialist role" in the 196Os. As Kirton
elaborates:
"There has been the view that in the 1960s, Brazil gained a level of regional
economic and political power that could be characterised as similar in some
134 Ramphal, op.cit., p18.
135 Telegram from Belton, to State Department, 14 May 1968, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
136 Ibid.
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respects and with some limitations, to the hemispheric economic predominance of
the United States. In fact, Brazilian sociologist Ruy Maino Marini, writing in
1965, argued that Brazil had taken on a sub-imperialist role in the region, and as
he noted, had expressed the intention of becoming the centre from which
imperialist expansion in Latin America would radiate. ,,137
In focusing on the period 1968-1978, Kirton concludes, "Undoubtedly, relations between
the two countries in that period reflected the sub-imperialist role which Brazil had
summed up during that period. ,,138
The GOG was keen to act on the positive signals emanating from Itamaraty.
Another US despatch, this time from its embassy in Georgetown, reveals that the August
1968 conference of Guyana's heads of mission "... agreed on the need to intensify
relations with Hemispheric countries, particularly Brazil. .. " That in effect meant the
GOG opening a resident diplomatic mission in Rio de Janeiro, irrespective of logistical
problems. "It was ... decided that relations should be opened as promptly as possible with
Brazil... even though the staffmg of another Embassy would present difficult problems of
personnel and fmancing ... ,,139 The decision to go ahead with the establishment of an
embassy in Rio was made against the background of an awareness of the adverse effects
that Brazil's close links with Portugal might have on Guyana's cultivation elsewhere of
Afro-Asian relations:
"With respect specifically to relations with Brazil, the Conference discussed at
some length the problems which such relations might raise in terms of Guyana's
relations with the Afro-Asians, in view particularly of the 'close-axis' existing
between Brazil and Portugal and the adverse reflections of Brazil's pro-
Portuguese position in Afro-Asian councils. Nonetheless, the Conference decided
that Brazil was too close a neighbor and too important a power to be further
ignored ... ,,140
137 Kitten in Jeffrey and Menke (1991), pp.214-215.
138 Ibid., p.216.
139 Delmar Carson, Georgetown to State Deparunent, 13 August 1968, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
140 Ibid.
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In a case of realpolitik, the coalition government no doubt placed the value of Brazil,
especially regarding the territorial controversy with Venezuela, above a possible upset of
the Afro-Asian bloc.
The GOG's decision at its annual heads of mission conference has to be
understood especially against the background of the Brazilian government's communique
released a month before the conference, which as one British diplomat concluded,
"... amounts to a formal declaration of support for the Guyana position" in the territorial
controversy with Venezuela 141 It is interesting to observe that in the annual report from
Venezuela's mission in Caracas, a recognition of lack of support for the Venezuelan
claim was registered:
"Desde el momento mismo que el suscrito tom6 posession de la Jefatura de la
Misi6n Diplomatica en Georgetown, hizo del conocimiento de ese Despacho las
aprehenciones que tenia sobre la polftica que el limftrofe pais sureno seguiria ante
la reclamaci6n Venezolana y las posibles acometidas del Gobiemo Nacional en
Guyana. El desarollo ulterior de los acontecimientos ba confirmado mi inicial
sospecha de que Brasil se opondrfa a la reclamaci6n y tratarfa de boicotear las
iniciativas de Venezuela en este pais, especialmente aquellas realizadas a traves
de esta Representaci6n diplomatica, ,,142
The annual report of the Venezuelan foreign ministry, Libro Amarillo 1968, was even
stronger in its appraisal of the Brazilian position on Venezuela's claim to Essequibo. "La
Misi6n ha ido adelantando al Despacho, por razones hist6ricas y geopolftico-economicas,
es el principal enemigo de Venezuela en sus tareas de recuperaci6n del territorio
Esequibo. ,,143 The opening of the Brazilian embassy in Georgetown was interpreted as
part of that country's strategy against the Venezuelan claim:
141 Christian Adams, Rio de Janeiro to M.W. Atkinson, FCO, 2 August 1968, FCO 7/298.
142 Pais Guyana Expedienteno.D.G. 2.317-16, InformeAnnuall968.
143 MRE (1968), p.39.
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"Se bien ayer se encontraba ausente del teatro de operaciones hoy, al instalar una
Misi6n diplomatica en Georgetown le sera mas facil obstaculizar nuestras
acciones y trabajar por el logro de los objectios sefialados por Itamaratf y la
Escuela superior de Guerra ,,144
The communique emanating from Itarnaraty on 27 July 1968 in the wake of the
Leoni decree earlier the same month states, "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been
watching with due concern, and the attention which the subject demands, the
deterioration in the dispute between Guyana and Venezuela." In an unambiguous
reference to its support for Guyana regarding Venezuela's contention against the 1899
Award the communique stated, "... the Brazilian Government at this stage wish to re-
affirm their traditional position with respect to the inviolability of treaties and the faithful
execution of international agreements.,,145 Although a subsequent note in British files
states, "The Brazilians do not wish to be involved militarily", 146the communique from
Itarnaraty sent a clear signal as to Brazil's position. Similarly, when Guyana's
representative drew the attention of the Latin American Group at the UN to the Leoni
decree and other Venezuelan action, Brazil (along with the other important source of
support for Guyana - the Connnonwealth) supported Guyana "Deputy Secretary-General
has since told me that [the] Brazilian representative spoke up strongly on Guyana's
behalf, as did Corrnmnwealth: other Latin Americans were silent, presumably being
without instructions. ,,147
144 Ibid.
145 "Translation of a statement issued by Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the 27th July 1968", PO
7/298.
146 Handwritten note re: Despatch of 5 September to Wallace and Mr Diggines, PO 71298.
147 J.E. Russell, Rio, telegramno.356, 19 July 1968 to PO, FCO 7/298.
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The coalition government's decision to send representatives on a four-day visit to
Brazil from 26-30 August 1968, was clearly intended to capitalise on the friendship
emanating from Brazil and the window of opportunity which that friendship presented in
its territorial problems with Venezuela. 148 A British embassy despatch concluded that the
visit" ... may not have produced any immediate and concrete political decisions, but it has
certainly started an effective dialogue between Brazil and Guyana: and there are likely to
be useful results in economic and technical cooperation." 149 Above all, the message
being sent out to Venezuela as a result of the visit and Brazilian action, would have been
of intrinsic value to Guyana Brazil has, therefore, emerged as the most important Latin
American state in Guyana's foreign policy strategies to win that region's support in the
territorial problems with Venezuela
The International Approaches in a Cold War Context
The preceding sections of this chapter point to the very activist foreign policy
strategies of the coalition government as it sought to win support for its position in the
territorial controversy with Venezuela It can be argued that in so far as Guyana
maintained its territorial integrity that the strategies deployed were successful. The
government had clearly identified and acted to cultivate the support of those countries or
groupings, such as the Afro-Asian lobby in the UN from which it would receive
sympathetic understanding.
While the government of Guyana's intemationalising of the conflict had won the
country support and resulted in criticism of Venezuela in a number of cases, the
148 MEA (1968c), p.73.
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declassified records of the British FCO not only corroborate some newspaper reports and
PPP allegations at the time about Cold War machinations behind the scenes in support of
Burnham, but also reveal new insights into such manoeuvres. Opposition leader, Cheddi
Jagan's allegation that the Leoni decree was part of the US-British-PNC conspiracy to
keep him out of power was discussed earlier in this chapter. Likewise one newspaper at
the time made the following report:
"The sources said Washington was evidently interested in avoiding problems to
Guyanese Prime Minister Forbes Burnham who will once more be called to test
his popularity in forthcoming general elections. The Dutch, the Surinam and the
Venezuelan Governments were asked to 'ease demands against the Guyanese
Government at least for some time', the sources said. As far as Washington was
concerned, there were only two tactical approaches to the internal Guyanese
problem in order to facilitate Burnham's second consecutive victory. The first
was that countries with border claims against Guyana - Venezuela and Surinam
create as few problems as possible to the Burnham administration. The second
was for Venezuela to continue its pressure, making sure the Guyanese realised the
danger they would incur if leftist Cheddi Jagan triumphed in the elections. Of the
two approaches Washington was strongly in favour of the first while it
condemned an in-between measure, the source said. ,,150
Subsequently, although the same report quoted US ambassador Bembaurn declaring
"... that his country's policy was one of 'complete neutrality in an issue involving two
friendly nations", 151 a later article declared the implicit support of the US government for
Guyana. The Guyana Graphic reported:
"In a communique from Prime Minister Burnham's office last evening, following
an almost day long conference with some of his top aides, it was stated: 'The
United States Government has taken the position that the rights of states to
territorial waters, to the nine-mile contiguous zone and to the continental shelf can
only attach to the coastal state .. .'."
149 John Kennedy, Rio to Michael Stewart, PO, 5 September 1968 peo 7/298.
ISO Guyana Graphic, 17 July 1968, p.l.
lSI Ibid.
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The report further stated that "Washington has been deeply involved in behind-the-scenes
moves to get both Venezuela and Guyana to de-escalate the controversy before it came to
the boil and provoked a serious crisis. Notes have been sent by the US State Department
to both the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry and Guyana Ministry of External Affairs. ,,152
Given the known US support for Guyana and its determination to keep Jagan out
of power, that Washington may have exerted influence on Guyana's neighbours to ease
the tensions during the Guyanese elections, is plausible. The cautious response of the
British government to the Leoni decree was referred to earlier. Such caution reflected
three British concerns, as this FCO despatch reveals: "... we have to be careful not to act
as ifwe were still the colonial power." Additionally, as the despatch further notes:
"In Venezuela we have investments valued at about £500 million, exports in
1967 of £21.6 million (including oil purchases) made necessary by the closure of
the Suez-Canal). Moreover, we have no effective means of bringing direct
pressure on the Venezuelans." 153
Against such a background, the guidance telegram concludes:
"It follows from this that while we generally sympathise with Guyana over
Venezuela's recent actions, our own role must in practice be limited to providing
advice and moral support to Guyana, to representations to Venezuela to reduce
tension and to action to persuade the United States and Latin American
Governments to talk similarly to Venezuela ... ,,154
Such British strategies were put into action, as the following despatches indicate:
"It has been suggested that certain quarters in Venezuela consider that a victory
by Dr. Jagan in the elections later this year would further the Venezuelan cause
since they assume that, in that event, the Americans would not oppose military
intervention by the Venezuelans. This is dangerous thinking and the Foreign
Secretary took the opportunity of his talks with Dr. Iribarren [2 July 1968 in
London] to draw attention to the undesirability of any course of action which
might further the coming to power of a "Castroist" government in Guyana.
152 Guyana Graphic, 1 August 1968, p.l.
153 Guidance telegram no. 194,25 July 1968, PREM 1312699.
1S4lbid.
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Clearly, any visible support Govenunent can get from third parties will help in
these circumstances and we therefore think it important that we should do what
we can to encourage the Brazilians in their intention to establish closer relations
with Guyana .. .1 think the main point to be made is that we regard it as essential,
not only for our interests in Guyana, but also for the stability of the area as a
whole, that the Burnham Govenunent should succeed at the forthcoming
elections. It is therefore important in our view that the disputes with Venezuela
and Surinam should not take a tum which could weaken Mr Burnham's
position. ,,155
Moreover, British thinking was reflective of Anglo-American diplomacy in action as this
other FCO despatch on the need for British action notes:
"The United States, the Canadians and the Brazilians have all made known their
disapproval of the Venezuelan decree and we cannot do less, not only from the
point of view of Anglo-Guyanese relations, but also in support of the agreed
Anglo! American policy to do all that we properly can to help the present coalition
govenunent in Guyana win the coming elections. ,,156
The need to keep Jagan out of power therefore led not only to the US exerting its
influence on Guyana's neighbours, but also to action by Washington's key ally.
A British diplomat was also keen to impress upon Venezuela the British thinking
regarding Burnham remaining in power:
"I suggested to the Ambassador [Venezuelan in Rio, Elbano Provenzali] that
irredentist pressure by Venezuela on Guyana now might produce the most
undesirable political reactions there: it was surely in our interest that Burnham
should remain in power: a Jagan government could hardly be to the best interest
of Venezuela or Latin America in general. I do not know if this is really a good
line: but he did not contest it. ,,157
The extent that the Brazilian government also concurred with HMG's govenunent's line
of reasoning regarding the Brazilian position in relation to Venezuelan action is revealed:
"I believe that the Brazilian government shared my concern that the situation
should not further deteriorate, particularly in view of the forthcoming elections in
155 C.E. Diggines, Rio, to FCO, July 1968, FCO 7/298.
156 E.A.W. Bullock to Mr Hunt, 9 August 1968, FCO 1411492.
157 John Russell, Rio to C.E. Diggines, American Department, Foreign Office, 19 July 1968, FCO 71298.
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Guyana. The Brazilian government were particularly concerned at the recent
Venezuelan Presidential Decree which they did not regard as helpful. ,,158
Brazil's concurrence with Britain and US concerns can be understood against the
background of Brazil's concerns about political developments in British Guiana since the
1950s. As Kirton notes:
"By 1953, General Carlos de Meira Mattos writing [in] the Correio Paulista
argued that the greatest problem facing Brazil in its links with the Guianas was
'the danger which leftist leader Cheddi Jagan could present in the region.' By
1964, the Brazilian government had welcomed the coalition government of the
People's National Congress ... under Forbes Burnham and the United Force ... with
its leader Peter D'Aguiar which had assumed power with United States
support. ,,159
In so far as Venezuela toned down its confrontational action against Guyana after the
Leoni decree and for the remainder of 1968, this has to be understood in the context of
both the government of Guyana's foreign policy strategies and the Cold War-inspired
understanding of the US, Britain, Brazil and eventually Venezuela, in not doing anything
to effect a victory for Jagan at the December 1968 polls. It should be noted that while
such coordination to ease Burnham's path to victory was important, Burnham himself -
perhaps in awareness of western support for him in a cold war context - devised his own
mechanisms to effect a victory in the 1968 elections. In this regard, the introduction of
overseas and proxy voting which facilitated fraudulent voters' lists was a crucial element
behind Burnham's victory. 160
158 FeD to Rio de Janeiro, telegram 530, 16 July 1968, feD 7/296
159 Kirton in Jeffrey and Menke (1991), p.216.
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Summary
This chapter has traced the evolution of the international approaches of the
government of Guyana to the Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy in the immediate
post-colonial period in Guyana. I have argued that the decision to pursue such strategies
was necessitated by Guyana's economically and military weak position vis-a-vis
Venezuela. The government was able to enhance its influence through utilization of
international fora such as the UN and strategically important groupings and countries. In
this regard, the government demonstrated recognition of the realpolitik within which its
geographical location in the western hemisphere, US interests in Venezuela and the US
determination to keep Jagan out of power, had placed it. Hence, the GOG's lobbying did
not involve the Eastern Bloc countries on a bilateral basis. The territorial controversy is
to be understood in a cold war context and Guyanese domestic politics, both of which are
intertwined and served to the advantage of Burnham. Even with these factors, the extent
to which a small state can exert its international influence on the international stage
through use of appropriate channels has been demonstrated.
160 See chapter 1.
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Chapter 4:
The Burnham Years 1969·1980: from Cooperation to Major
Tension
158
Burnham's PNC party assumed power after the December 1968 elections as a
government in its own right for the first time. He was to remain in power until his death
in August 1985. The Burnham years of the territorial controversy will be examined
across two chapters. The present chapter is divided into two sections to facilitate our
analysis of this lengthy term of office, which witnessed variations in the relationship
between Guyana and Venezuela. Part one, which covers the first year of the Burnham-
led government, examines Guyana's relations with Venezuela and its international
approaches which amounted to a continuation of the strategies employed by the coalition
government. In part two, the focus is on the Protocol of Port-of-Spain which effected a
change in the trajectory of relations for much of the 12-year life of this agreement. Parts
one of this chapter and the next chapter, is illustrative of my argument that the use of
foreign policy as a defence mechanism comes in response to threats, real or perceived
from Venezuela. At the same time, it is clear that between 1969 and 1992 the GOG
operated under a siege mentality which meant it was distrustful of Caracas' intentions.
Hence, as will be evident in parts two of this chapter and chapter 5, the government
sought to maintain awareness in international fora about its position on the Guyana-
Venezuela controversy, albeit on a lower and more subtle key, at times of good relations
between the two states.
Part I: The First Eighteen Months of the PNC Government
Guyana-Venezuela Relations
The cycle of conflict in the relations between Guyana and Venezuela which
characterised the first two years of independence, continued for a third year. This time,
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the international approaches of the Guyanese government were conducted by the PNC
administration which dropped its coalition partner just prior to the elections at the end of
1968. Tensions between the two states started on 2 January 1969, when a group of cattle
ranchers launched an armed attack on the police station in the principal government
administrative town of Lethem in the Rupununi district which lies within Essequibo. The
Guyanese government implicated its Venezuelan counterpart in this action. The attack -
by the European descended Hart and Melville families, along with their Amerindian
workers, marked the start of the group's attempt to secede from Guyana. 1 Despite the
town's remote location from Georgetown, reports about the secessionists cutting off radio
connnunications with the capital and blocking airstrips in the area (thereby removing the
quickest means of access from Georgetown) reached the capital. In response, armed
forces soon gained access to the town and regained control.2
On the surface, this was a rebellion from a remote hinterland location against the
psychologically distant government in Georgetown. That is, until the statement of one of
the captured secessionists reportedly revealed the Venezuelan government's complicity in
the plot to establish a separate state.3 His account also provided details of the military
training and weapons received from the Venezuelan army which had flown them to and
from their training camp in Venezuela. 4• The GOG wasted little time in blaming the
Venezuelan government for the rebellion. According to Burnham's radio broadcast:
1 "Text of 'Radio broadcast to the nation on disturbances in the Rupununi savannahs"', 4 January 1969,
Burnham (1970), pp.171-176. See also MEA (1969), pp.39-41. The British-descended Harts and Melvilles






"... within a few hours of the attack on Lethem, the Venezuelan press and radio
were reporting an Amerindian uprising in the Rupununi and suggesting that it
arose out of the wish of these Guyanese citizens to come under the sovereignty of
Venezuela .. .In addition, Valerie Hart, the wife of one of the Hart brothers, and a
candidate of the United Force, at the recent election, was taken to Venezuela by
the aircraft that brought the armed gang. In Venezuela, Valerie Hart has been
provided with facilities for broadcasting appeals for assistance in support of what
she describes as an uprising of the indigenous population. These appeals are
beamed to the United States but call for assistance from all possible sources. ,,5
Burnham then charged that the rebellion was part of a pattern of Venezuelan interference
in Guyana's domestic affairs.6
The government in Caracas denied that it was involved in the uprising, but saw it
as their duty to give refugee status to people coming from an area it regards as part of
Venezuela. As President Raul Leoni stated in his last major speech:
"The Venezuelan Government have not played the smallest part in such events
[the Rupununi rebellion] but they have considered it their obligation to protect
with Venezuelan nationality those of the persecuted who took refuge here, as
being natives of that vast portion of our territory of which we were at the end of
the last century, swindled by a venal award, coloured by the imperialist voracity
then in vogue. To these Venezuelan refugees we are not only offering moral
support, but we are promising land, credit, housing and tools to work with,
because they are industrious people who do not want to be a burden on a
fatherland which has opened to them its fraternal arms. ,,7
While not admitting complicity, the Venezuelan president conceded that his government
was taking care of the rebels' welfare afterwards. As Rout notes, however, "Caracas
officialdom heatedly denied complicity in the affair, but they convinced few beyond their
national boundaries. ,,8 Following the rebellion, the Burnham government was cognizant
S Ibid.
6 Ibid., p.174. The Guyanese ambassador to Venezuela was also reported as telling Reuters that ..... his
government was absolutely certain Venezuela was involved in the four-day uprising. ", Express, 8 January
1969, p.13.
7 British Embassy, Caracas to FCO, 14 March 1969, FC0711325/1.
8 Rout (1971), p.66.
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of the need to develop the remote Rupununi region, including the granting of land titles to
Amerindians.9
The differences between Guyana and Venezuela in the interpretation of the
sanctity of treaties - a factor which is at the heart of the controversy over the 1899 award
- manifested itself as an area of difficulty between the two states during the UN
Conference on the Law of Treaties. This occurred at the first session of that conference
in April 1968 when Venezuela attempted to modify article 42 of the draft agreement
which placed limits on states' powers to invalidate or terminate treaties. 10 Further
attempts were made by Caracas to modify the said article at the next conference in May
1969. Guyana claimed success in ensuring that article 42 was adopted without
amendment.
The inauguration on 11 March 1969 of the new Venezuelan president, Rafael
Caldera of the COPEI party, who replaced the AD's Raul Leoni, did not immediately
alter Guyana's relations with Venezuela In June 1969, for instance, the Guyana
Graphic's headline read, "Reid [Guyana's acting prime minister] hints trouble brewing on
border" following reported incidents of shooting. Meanwhile, the GDF and armed
policemen were deployed to guard key installations in the Guyanese capital including the
radio stations, conveying a heightened sense of alert about possible Venezuelan action. 11
The following day, a newspaper noted, "Tension eased on the Guyana-Venezuela border
yesterday, but sources close to Government said that the nation's security forces will
9 See Braveboy-Wagner (1984), pp.191-199, m the Burnham government's plans for the development of
this region.
10 MEA (1969), pp.37-38.
11 Guyana Graphic, 7 June, 1969, p.l.
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remain on the alert.,,12 In August 1969, the tables were turned around with Venezuela
accusing Guyana of aggression. "Venezuela tonight accused neighbouring Guyana of
adopting a warlike and provocative attitude by building up its forces on the two nations'
common border under the guise of countering an alleged Venezuelan invasion of disputed
territory." The report based on Venezuelan foreign minister, Aristides Calvani's press
conference continued, "Calvani also ... charged that Guyanese Prime Minister Burnham
was setting up a 'racial government in the very heart of Latin America where we always
maintained the principle of racial integration,.,,13 In effect, both sides were trying to win
the propaganda war.
Details of a protest about Venezuelan troop movements along the border are
recorded in a despatch from the US embassy in Georgetown to the US Department of
State. The telegram notes that although the US was informed by its Guyanese
counterpart, this latest incident was still not public knowledge in Georgetown." The
GOG also reported incidents taking place on 21 February 1970, just prior to Guyana's
republic celebrations on 23 February 1970.15 In the by now established pattern of
exchanges between Caracas and Georgetown, Caldera stated that Venezuelan troops did
not fire the first shots, blaming instead Guyana's troops."
A former colonel of the GDF, David Granger, has suggested that Venezuela may
have been using military threats to force Guyana to the bargaining table:
12 Ibid., 8 June, 1969, p.l.
13 Trinidad Guardian, 21 August 1969, p.l. See also Guyana Graphic, 23 August 1969, p.l.
14 Telegram 064,21 January 1970, Pol 32-1, Guyana-Venezuela, RG59. See also earlier telegram 048,
?l'.cil.
1 Skerret (1982), p.22; and MEA (1970b), pp.84-85. See also telegram no. 119, Elwood, Port-of-Spain to
State Department and telegram 094, Herron, Caracas, to the State Department, 26 February 1970, both in
Pol 32-1, op.cit.
16 Telegram 969 from Herron, Caracas, to State Department, 27 February 1970, Pol 32, op.cit,
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"... Venezuela was prepared to use military power to bring about a favourable
solution to the controversy. I think they were prepared to use aircraft or
harassment or even ground forces to drive Guyana to the bargain table and I think
they are still prepared to do so". 17
This argument is plausible when viewed against the background of this period during
which the Mixed Commission was in a state of deadlock. A comment in a telegram from
a US diplomat in Caracas, regarding the shooting incidents around Guyana's republic
celebrations suggests that the Venezuelan government may not have sanctioned the
military action. "On Venezuelan side, we have continuing concern [about] whether
senior civilian authorities [are] able [to] maintain control [over] their military forces." 18
This implies that the Venezuelan military, at least, may have had a separate agenda from
the Caldera government.
Despite the tensions between the two states, the meetings between Guyana and
Venezuela within the framework of the Mixed Commission continued after Burnham's
PNC had emerged as the sole party in the Guyanese government. A total of seventeen
sessions had taken place up to 17th February 1970 when the Mixed Commission expired
according to the four-year terms set out in the Geneva Agreement under which its
mandate was established. 19 Both sides failed to reach a solution on the territorial
controversy.
A former Venezuelan diplomat and writer on Guyana's foreign policy, Sadio
Garavini di Tumo, has argued that the concept of the Mixed Commission was doomed
from the start since it put the two contesting countries in the positions of both judge and
17 Interview with David Granger, 9 December 1999.
18 Caracas to State Department, 26 February 1970, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
19 The last meeting of the Mixed Commission was held in Kingston, Jamaica from 13-16 February 1970.
See MEA (1970b), pp.85-86.
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jurors in their own cases. He contends that the difficulty also laid in the two sides trying
to find a political solution to a juridical problem, hence both Guyana and Venezuela had
their own interpretations as to the purpose of the Mixed Corrnnission. As Garavini di
Turno notes:
"Una Comisi6n Mixta, integrada solo por las partes, es una instituci6n
claramente politica y dificilmente podrfa esperarse de ella un dictamen jurfdico.
Si su mandata fuera jurfdico, las partes se encontrarfan en la insostenible posici6n
de ser juez y parte. ,,20
Given the noted reluctance of either side to refer the controversy to the ICJ, it was
unlikely at the time that Guyana or Venezuela would have submitted to a process in
which they were mere observers. Garavini's argument is evident in the record of one of
the Mixed Connnission's meetings. It will be recalled that the Mixed Corrnnission had
faced deadlock over Guyana and Venezuela's disparate interpretations of Article I of the
Geneva Agreement. The following extract of the report of the thirteenth meeting of the
Mixed Connnission, which was held in Antigua in June 1969, gives an insight into the
kind of impasse faced:
"On the question of Venezuela's demand for priority of development to be given
to the Essequibo region there was much closed discussion involving a retracing of
previous arguments. Venezuela in justification of the demand referred to the
political character of her claim Guyana, however, reminded Venezuela of the
fact that the parties in the Connnission had reached a position of deadlock on the
jurisdictional question of the competence of the Connnission to consider a
rearrangement of the existing boundary unless the Venezuelans first made good
their assertion that the arbitral award under which Guyana now holds the territory
was a nullity. Venezuela had refused to make good that contention and Guyana
had in turn refused to consider any further issues unless that contention had first
been disposed of. It was against this background and on the specific undertaking
that the basic position of each party on this jurisdictional question would not be
prejudiced that the parties had agreed to pass on to a consideration of proposals
for economic cooperation. The political aspect of Venezuela's claim was only
20 Garavini di Turno, Sadio (1999), mimeo., copy of an article published in a Caracas newspaper in March
1999. Also interview with Garavini di Tumo, 28 February 2000.
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another reflection of her contention on the jurisdictional issue and was
accordingly inadmissible as a factor to be considered on the question of economic
cooperation. ,,21
In essence, both sides pursued separate agendas. The Venezuela president, Rafael
Caldera, was later reported in a press conference as stating:
"This Corrnnission, because of Guyana, has not achieved the objectives of the
agreement. The specific aim of the agreement was to find a satisfactory formula
for a practical solution of the matter, and the Guyanese delegates for four years
have refused to discuss all Venezuelan initiatives, raisin~ instead the juridical
question of the validity or invalidity of the arbitral award ."2
With each side having its own interpretation of the Geneva Agreement and blaming the
other for stalling the work of the Mixed Commission, it was ultimately doomed to failure.
Although the Mixed Corrnnission did not succeed in bringing about a solution to
the territorial controversy, it offered the advantage of engaging both sides in dialogue.
This factor was noted in a newspaper report: " ... observers believe the value of the
commission's meeting is in perpetuating a dialogue between the two countries ."23
Further, it was observed:
"It [the Mixed Commission] has prevented tempers from flaring so high as to
precipitate an attack on Guyana from the western and stronger neighbour. But
while the commission served as a forum that did nothing but talk, the talking did
serve as a cushion to absorb the shocks from outside its own confmes and even
within.,,24
Dialogue as an important element in the relations between states was therefore
maintained. The talks held and their outcome will be discussed in part 2 of this chapter.
21 Report signed by Donald Jackson and Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Guyanese members of the Mixed
COmmission, 10 JW1e1969. This report, which still remains classified inGuyana, was attached to a
despatch of 13 JW1e1969 from K.G. Ritchie, Georgetown to E.A.W. Bullock, FCO, who stated that he
obtained it "on a strictly private basis", FCO 7/1325/1.
22 Report on Caldera's press conference in telegram 203 from Herren, Caracas, to State Department, 16
January 1970, Pol 21-1 Guyana-Venezuela, RG59
23 Guyana Graphic, 13 April 1969, p.1.
24 Sunday Chronicle, 13 July 1969.
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The International Approaches of the Government of Guyana
The foreign policy strategies employed at the international level during the PNC's
first eighteen months in government represented a continuation of the strategies
developed during the earlier PNC-UF coalition government. That is, a utilization of
selected international institutions and selected regional states andlor groupings. In the
words of one of Guyana's ministers whose portfolio included foreign affairs, those
diplomatic initiatives represented, ..... the art and technology of national self-defence
through international action."25 Hence as one newspaper noted:
"From the corridors of the United Nations building in New York to Paris, the
Fletcher's Law School in America to Jamaica, wherever Guyana's representatives,
and in particular, Mr. Ramphal, appeared the opportunity was seized to influence
understanding and support for Guyana's case against Venezuela's spurious
claim...26
Such a statement was made in 1969 at a time of heightened tensions with Venezuela.
The strategic timing of the annual heads of mission conference which continued
to be held during the Burnham years gives an indication of the significance of the UN in
Guyana's foreign policy, as this extract indicates: "The Conference is usually held in
August, a timing which enables the Conference to work out Guyana's position on the
main issues likely to come before the new session of the General Assembly which opens
in September."27 At the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly in 1969,
Guyana's then minister of state drew the attention of the international community not
only to what in his government's opinion were the most recent acts committed by
2S "Statement by the Honourable S.S. Ramphal, Attorney General and Minister of State during the debate
on the Protocol of Port- of-Spain in the National Assembly, on 22nd June, 1970", MEA (1970a), p.ll.
26 Sunday Graphic, 14 December 1969, p.14.
21 MEA (1969), p.69.
167
Venezuela against Guyana, but as a direct concomitant called on that body to ensure the
security of small states. Starting with the latter, Ramphal opined:
"Especially in the area of international security, Guyana considers that there is a
pressing need for the middle and smaller states to assert a positive role and,
resisting the pressures towards bi-polarisation, to bring to bear on the problems of
international security that influence which their solidarity in support of the
Charter can produce. As one of the non-aligned countries of the world, we stand
ready to play our part, however small and modest it may be in all such collective
efforts designed to ensure peace in the world and more especially the security of
those who least have the capacity to breach that peace - the small developing
nations. ,,2S
The GOG was likely to be a beneficiary if such a prograrrnne was implemented, hence its
calculated gesture of offering to be a contributor to the scheme. In the same speech,
Ramphal also called on the UN to fulfil its charter obligations for peacekeeping,
especially in developing countries. It becomes clear that this is an area which the
Burnham government no doubt calculated it may be in need of one day. As Ramphal
states:
"It [international peacekeeping machinery] would also of necessity help to avoid
the current diversion of energies and resources within small States from the urgent
tasks of development to the essential requirements of defence - a diversion which
small States have no option but to make when faced with hostility from across
their borders and the absence of effective international machinery that will deter
or restrain the intruder. ,,29
The defence or development dichotomy choice invoked in Ramphal's speech to the same
body the previous year was once again being used, this time in a call on the UN to have a
peacekeeping machinery for small states. In linking his call for the security of small
28 "Address by the Hon. S.S. Ramphal ... Chairman of the Guyana Delegation given in the General Debate
of the 24th Session of the General Assembly October 6,1969", reprinted in ibid., pp. 91-104. The same
sEch was also published as inRamphal (1969).
2 Ibid.
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states to their self-determination, the underlying concern with the territorial controversy
is evident:
"Having thus affirmed the right of men to govern themselves, the right of new
nations to exist, this Organisation must provide just and effective means to protect
those rights and to secure those States; for it would be to argue a curious logic that
having given life to the small States under conditions in no way related to the
material power they might later exercise in world affairs but which had everything
to do with rights of their peoples as men, Member States of this Organisation
should remain unmoved as these new nations fall prey to the expansionist
ambitions of older or far more powerful neighbours and the aspirations of their
peoples are crushed. ,,30
Further, he is unambiguous in the motivation for the particular line of advocacy:
"The threatened State has no option. My own country's experience has led us to
this advocacy; but it could, and would, be the experience of many another small -
and not so small - State if there continues to be no effective machinery for
international security and if the practice were once established that treaties,
however solemnly concluded and however consistently acknowledged and
respected, may be repudiated unilaterally at the whim of the more powerful
signatory. ,,31
The impact of the technique of broadening the context of the problems resulting from the
territorial controversy with Venezuela in order to elicit international support was
evidently not lost on the Guyanese government.
Ramphal also drew the attention of the General Assembly to the Rupununi
Rebellion in which the Venezuelan government's complicity was asserted, and also to
attempts by Caracas to stymie the development of Guyana. On the latter, the contextual
application was widened to appeal to Latin American states, in particular. He stated:
".. .it is aggression of the type that the Latin American region of which we are a
part itself recently proscribed when in the Consensus of Vina del Mar it stipulated
respect for the principle that 'no State may apply or encourage economic and




the contrary, every effort must be made to avoid policies, actions, and measures
which may endanger the economic and social development of another State. "32
Responding to the address of the Venezuelan permanent representative to the UN, the
Guyanese equivalent not only refuted Venezuelan's arguments, but in what can only be
described as diplomatic PR, demonstrated the racial diversity of Guyana's delegation:
"Today we have with us in our delegation to this Session of the Assembly the
Parliamentary Secretary for Amerindian Affairs, himself a Guyanese of
Amerindian origin - a member of our Parliament and our Government with
special responsibilities for the welfare of the indigenous people of Guyana ,,33
Such a presentation was important against Venezuela's charging of the Burnham-led
government being racist, and specifically, of the Rupununi rebellion being one that
included ostracised Amerindians against the government in Georgetown."
In an appeal to Latin American governments, Guyana's permanent representative
called for the adoption of similar principles to that of the Organization of African Unity
under which the boundaries inherited from colonial times are regarded as settled:
"Let us in South America learn from the example of Africa, the wisdom of not
reopening the boundaries of a continent which were the product of another era
and the work of forces external to it for which our generation bears no
responsibility. ,,35
This is a message that would have had resonance among the African members at the UN;
yet another significant factor in the GOG's battle to win international support.
While the General Assembly continued to be the main forum at the UN in which
Guyana drew the attention of the international community to the controversy, the
32 Ibid.
33 "Statement by ... Mr P.A. Thompson, the Permanent Representative of Guyana in response to Venezuela's
reply to Guyana's statement in the General Debate, October 8, 1969", MFA (1969), p.I07.
34 The address of the Venezuelan permanent representative, Andres Aguilar to the General Assembly is
reprinted as document no. 19 in MRE (1998), pp.349-350.
35 "Statement by ... Mr P.A. Thompson ... ", op.cit., p.llO.
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Burnham government also informed the Security Council of certain acts committed
against it by Venezuela For instance, this part of the UN was notified of armed attacks
on the Guyana border outpost at Eterinbang during the country's independence
celebrations.36 The GOG also notified all governments with which it had links of the
incidents.37 Given the fact that Guyana had begun the expansion of its diplomatic
relations around this time, such notification would have reached a larger and more
diverse range of countries than during the coalition years.38
Fortuitously for the Burnham government, the first CHOGM after his
administration took office was held from 7-15 January 1969. This was also less than a
week after the Rupununi rebellion, thereby presenting the GOG with an almost
immediate international forum at which to draw attention to what was in its opinion an
act against the state of Guyana connnitted with the support of Venezuela Unlike future
Conunonwealth summits, we are given a deeper insight into the issues raised by the
Burnham government, than what is contained in the official communiques,
Attention was drawn to Venezuelan involvement in "...the provision of training
and sophisticated military equipment" to subversives in Guyana, clearly a reference to the
Rupununi rebellion. Moreover, Burnham used the Sunnnit to chide the international
connnunity for its seeming selectivity in responding to charges of aggression:
"All Guyana got in support against this aggression, the Prime Minister said, was a
series of quiet notes: but when Russia attempted to crush Tito or invade
Czechoslovakia, everyone rallied to the aid of democratic principles and the West
36 MEA (l970b), pp.84-84.
37 Guyana Graphic, 26 February 1970, p.1. The Venezuelan ambassador in Georgetown is reported to have
said that Guyanese soldiers had also been firing shots at its border posts since December 1969, Guyana
Graphic, 7 March 1970, p.l. The Venezuelan government also informed the Security Council that it had
no hostile intention towards Guyana, but sought reclamation of Essequibo, ibid., 10 March 1970, p.1.
38 See Ferguson (1999), p.101, for a list of the states with which Guyana established diplomatic relations
between 1966 and 1985.
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delivered a sharp rebuke to Russia. Guyana was sophisticated enough to
understand that quiet notes were relevant at times ... "
Questioning the remit of the Commonwealth, he continued:
"... but what really did the Commonwealth exist for if this was all the assistance
Guyana got? Guyana felt disillusioned and bothered by what appeared to be
discrimination on the basis of whether the would-be aggressor was connnunist or
not. ,,39
Although the situation in Czechoslovakia hardly compared with that of the Rupununi
rebellion, Burnham's emphasis was nevertheless on the need to protect the territorial
integrity of small states. As such, he called for the Commonwealth to explore its
potential to protect and preserve its members, especially small states' territorial
integrity.40 Burnham's lobbying at this Corrnnonwealth meeting was rewarded by the
expression of concern issued in the communique at the end:
"The Meeting also noted with concern and sympathy the difficulties which
Guyana was experiencing in connection with Venezuela's claim to more than one-
half of Guyana's territory. Acknowledging that threats to the territorial integrity
of the State make inevitable the diversion of resources and energies from the
constructive tasks of development, many members shared the view advanced by
Guyana's Prime Minister that there was an urgent need for an international effort
to secure the territorial integrity of every State - and especially of the small
developing countries of the world. ,,41
This confirmed CHOGM as a bedrock of support for Guyana's territorial integrity and
hence an integral part of the government's international approaches.
At the regional level, the CARIFf A heads of government had expressed their
solidarity with Guyana in the territorial controversy with Venezuela As Manley notes:
"The heads of government for the region in their conference at Port of Spain,
Trinidad, in February 1969, expressed their 'grave concern over the threats posed
39 Report on Burnham's participation at the 1969 CHOGM, MEA (1969), p.60.
40 Burnham quoted in ibid., p.61.
41 "Final Communique", CHOGM, 7-15 January 1969, Commcnwealth Secretariat (l987), p.139.
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to Guyana's territorial integrity' and over 'the most recent instances of interference
in her internal affairs. 11142
This suggests that the GOG took the opportunity of the CARIFT A meeting to lobby for
support, despite the organization only having economic and trade remits.
The courting of relations with Brazil as a strategic ally in the Guyana-Venezuela
territorial controversy continued as a lynchpin in the GOG's international approaches at
the regional level. There are many facets which this took: for instance, technical
cooperation was explored during a visit to Guyana from 15-18 July 1969 by a Brazilian
professor, Barros Palissy, who served as the Technical Adviser to Brazil's National
Service for Technical Apprenticeship. A month later, then Minister of State Ramphal,
accompanied by senior personnel from the MFA, visited Brazil. The group's tour
included meetings with the Brazilian president and senior officials at Itamaraty.f
Various areas of cooperation were discussed, including agreements to implement a
scholarship prograrrnne and the cultural exchanges. As an indication of the desire by
Georgetown to enhance relations, the talks also centred on the decision to establish a
Guyanese embassy in Brasilia 44 Significantly, the ministerial visit was followed by a
prograrrnne of military cooperation, with two senior GDF officers embarking on a
training course in jungle warfare at Brazil's Instruction Centre for Jungle Warfare in
Manaus. Other areas of cooperation, including trade between the two states, and
exchanges of visits, such as that of Guyana's Minister of Trade to Brasilia and of the
42 Manley (1979), pp.34-35, quoting from the communique issued at the end of the Conference.
43 MEA (1969), pp.51-52.
44 "Communique" issued at the end of the visit in ibid, pp.52-53. Guyana's first ambassador to Brazil, Ann
Jardim, later presented her credentials to the Brazilian president on 13 November 1969, ibid., p.54.
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renown Brazilian educator professor Gilberto Freyre to the University of Guyana - were
undertaken in 1969.
As was the case during the period discussed in chapter 3, Britain was clandestine
but active in smoothing the way for closer relations between Georgetown and Brasilia.
As a British despatch records:
"We [Britain] have been giving the Brazilians any information relevant to their
border control activities and have been quietly encouraging their stand against
Venezuelan territorial claim ... This discreet co-operation is welcome here and
there are no signs of the Brazilian stand weakening. Nevertheless, the Brazilians
have played their own hand up till now and have shown little disposition to
discuss their policy with others: they are clearly anxious not to prejudice
unnecessarily their relations with Venezuela ,,45
Even with Itamaraty exercising the diplomatic balancing act with Venezuela, the British
intervention was significant in smoothing the trajectory of Brazil's growing ties with
Georgetown. So in response to perceived threats from Caracas in 1969 and early 1970,
the Burnham government deployed its foreign policy strategies at the regional and
intemationallevels as the means of defence at its disposal.
Part II: The Period of the Protocol to the Geneva Agreement
Guyana-Venezuela Relations
Washington's continued interest in ensuring Burnham remained in power was an
important driving force behind the negotiations that led to the Protocol to the Geneva
Agreement. The Protocol of Port-of-Spain, as it is more commonly known, was signed in
Trinidad, on 18 June 1970 by representatives from Britain, Guyana and Venezuela." It
amounted to a de facto moratorium of twelve years on the territorial controversy, with the
4S J. Russell, Rio to FeO, 1 July 1969, FeO 711325/1.
46 See Appendix 6 for the full text of the Protocol.
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opportunity for a renewal at the end of that period. The Protocol also put into suspension
Article IV of the Geneva Agreement which dealt with the UN charter's Article 33
mechanisms for peaceful resolutions of disputes." We can now gain an insight from
Department of States files into the factors that lay behind the signing of the Protocol,
including the role of Eric Williams, within whose good offices the Protocol was
brokered. First, however, we turn our attention to the reasoning provided by one writer
who did not have access to declassified foreign policy material at the time of her writing.
Braveboy-Wagner argues that Williams, who had sent messages to both
governments in Guyana and Venezuela in the wake of the Leoni decree of 1968 urging a
peaceful resolution, later expressed an interest in facilitating a resolution. 48 Given that
Trinidad had good relations with Guyana and Venezuela, both of which needed the good
offices of a third party, Port-of-Spain was also an obvious venue for meetings between
the two sides. She notes that for the GOG, the motivating factors in signing the Protocol
was the understandable need to wrest itself from the territorial conflict in order to
concentrate on development." Braveboy-Wagner bases her arguments about the factors
influencing the Venezuelan government's decision to sign the Protocol from insights
provided by Hermann Gonzalez-Oropeza of that country's foreign ministry. These are,
firstly, Venezuela's border dispute with Colombia had been revived, and therefore, the
Venezuelan government needed respite from at least one territorial problem Secondly,
47 See Appendix 5 for the full text of the Geneva Agreement.
48 Braveboy-Wagner (1984), pp.173-177.
49 This had been established in the GOG's speeches on the territorial controversy, notably before the UN:
"Statement by the Honourable S.S. Ramphal ... during the debate on the Protocol of Port-of-Spain in the
Natiooal Assembly, on 22nd June, 1970", MEA (1970a), p.14. See also Ramphal (1970), p.3, where
Guyana's need to be free of territorial problems is cited not just for its own development purposes, but in
terms of regional goals.
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Venezuela's tarnished image as a third world country due mainly to Guyana's diplomacy
at the UN. Thirdly, was the desire of the new COPEl administration for better relations
with the English-speaking Caribbean. 50
The recently released Department of State files on the territorial controversy
allow us to delve deeper into the factors behind the signing of the Protocol. The
Venezuelan foreign minister, Calvani, was reported as favouring continued negotiation as
the Mixed Commission neared its ending. This was also the preferred option of the US
embassy in Caracas:
".. .it is shortsighted for Guyana to miss the opportunity of continuing
negotiations with Venezuela. The result of an end to bilateral discussions, as we
see it here, would be an emotional build up on both sides and perhaps later lead to
a confrontation of some kind. The British seem to appreciate this danger. "
The same despatch cautioned against US intervention, especially given apparent British
involvement:
"[British] Ambassador Hopson's active interest in this matter gives us hope that he
may better able to achieve something at this end without any assist on our part. In
fact it would probably complicate matters and erode the sound policy position we
have maintained if we should insert our good offices. ,,51
One such occasion necessitating Hopson's intervention came towards the end of the
Mixed Commission talks when it was evident that it would end in deadlock.
"UK Ambassador Hopson informed EMBOFF [embassy official] that British
'leaned heavily of [sic] GOTT [government of Trinidad and Tobago] PRIMIN
[prime minister] Williams during visit here last week to make strong pitch to
GOV re need to meet soonest with Guyanese officials in order to discuss future of
Mixed Commission and/or next steps for continuing negotiations re border
dispute. ,,52
50 Braveboy-Wagner (1984), pp.173-175.
51 Telegram 182, Herron, Caracas to State Department, 15 January 1970, Pol 32-1, op.cit. Unfortunately,
the British records are not yet available to give further insight into Ambassador Hopson's activities.
S2 Herron, Caracas to State Department, 9 February 1970, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
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The lobbying was successful since Venezuela dispatched its Foreign Policy Director,
Marcial Perez Chiribogo, to Port-of-Spain for dialogue with Ramphal.
Both sides were interested in continuing negotiations, as is borne out in the
agreement reached between the governments in Caracas and Georgetown. On the eve of
the Mixed Commission's legal expiration on 17 February 1970, the Guyanese and
Venezuelan governments agreed on an extension for a period of 90 days "... to prepare
the fmal report'v" This manoeuvre was used to facilitate further discussions between the
two countries on how to proceed. The 90-day period was to "... be used for further
discussion of alternative courses of action following the expiration of the
Commission ... ,,54 The same Intelligence Note from the US Bureau of Intelligence and
Research records the Guyanese government's hopes of securing a lengthy moratorium on
the territorial controversy. "Ramphal ... said that Guyana hopes to persuade Venezuela to
accept a 25 to 30 year 'moratorium' on the boundary dispute so that the process of
development can go on." While welcoming the 90-day proposal as "a positive
development", the Intelligence Note cautions, "we do not believe, however, that the two
parties are any closer to a solution of the dispute". Further, Guyana's hopes of a long
moratorium were recorded with pessimism: "We do not share Ramphal's hope that the
Venezuelans will agree to an extended moratorium. They favour continuing talks which
would lead to a swift 'resolution' of the dispute and a resolution always has included a
concession, preferably territorial, by Guyana.,,55 It is interesting to observe at this stage
that a conclusion to the controversy was viewed as involving some sort of territorial




concession and not specifically the entire Essequibo. This factor is a recurring theme in
Caracas' deliberations with Georgetown, as will become evident in subsequent chapters.
The Guyanese Minister of State [with responsibility for foreign affairs], Ramphal
was given the responsibility" ... for developing GOG position on alternative courses of
action in dispute ... ,,56 Although Braveboy-Wagner notes that the talks which led to the
Protocol had started in March 1970, it is now evident that Ramphal had been making
attempts to start up a dialogue outside of the framework of the Mixed Conunission since
January 1970, that is a month before the Mixed Conunission was due to expire.57
"Guyanese thinking is leading to [the] conclusion that talks would perhaps be more
effective if carried out directly at government-to-government level. ,,58 Such thinking
was also in line with that of a US diplomat, as recorded in the memorandum of a
conversation on the territorial controversy between US and Venezuelan diplomats: "The
reporting officer added his personal views that there may be need for a high-level
Venezuela/Guyana discussion outside of the Mixed Conunission to break the apparent
impasse. ,,59 Although not stating why, the same Memorandum records the view of the
Brazilian Charge d'Affaires in Caracas: "Caldera and Calvani were serious in their
expressed desire to find a peaceful solution to the border problem with Guyana. ,,60
Braveboy-Wagner's arguments about the Venezuelan government having to pay attention
to its revived border dispute with Colombia while at the same time wanting to repair its
tarnished image in the Third World and to foster relations with the English-speaking
56 Telegram 106, King to State Department, 3 February 1970, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
57 Braveboy-Wagner (1984), p.174.
58 Telegram 47, 17 January 1970, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
S9 Memorandum of Conversation, 6 January 1970, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
60 Ibid.
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Caribbean, may provide the reasons why the Venezuelan government favoured such an
outcome.
Despite its professed neutrality on the controversy, Calvani was aware that
Washington favoured Burnham's leadership in Guyana A US diplomat recorded a
conversation with Caldera in which he "... complained that the US had done nothing to
help Venezuela obtain a redress of the situation ... He [Caldera] added that his government
actually felt that, if anything, the US was favourable to the Burnham government in this
matter. ,,61Later, Calvani vocalised his awareness of US policy on Burnham:
"He [Caldera] then stated that the GOV understood and respected the major
aspects of US policy on this problem Our efforts to favour Burnham and to help
Guyana, a new and poor state, were meritorious in his eyes. Our preoccupation
about a possible Jagan and/or conununist takeover of Guyana was shared by the
GOV."62
Calvani's understanding of the geopolitical situation and his endorsing of it, is evident.
The same telegram records Calvani's expressed desire for the good offices to help in
carrying forward the discussions between Caracas and Georgetown.
Washington was keen to encourage dialogue between Guyana and Venezuela.
As such, it was felt that the US should encourage the process being developed:
"I believe it is in our interest to do whatever may be appropriate to encourage the
GOV to be receptive to Ramphal's efforts [to] reopen channels of conununication
in order [to] discuss future course of relationship between [the] two
governments. ,,63
Later we learn that Venezuela's foreign minister preferred "quiet diplomacy" in the
negotiations.I" It was within those secret negotiations that a meeting of minds occurred
61 Telegram 108, Georgetown to State Department, 10 January 1970, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
62 Telegram, 644, Caracas to State Department, 7 February 1970, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
63 Telegram 73, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
~elegram 15502, Georgetown to State Department, 1 February 1970, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
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between Calvani and Ramphal. 65 This factor points to both the advantages of secret
diplomacy and to the oft-ignored importance of the interaction of personalities in
negotiations. The private deliberations were to last until the signing of the Protocol in
June 1970, with the exception of limited briefmg to the media as the following report
from the Guyana Graphic indicates:
"Surrounded by a blanket of secrecy, officials of the Governments of Venezuela
and Guyana, at the boardroom of the Guyana Development Corporation,
yesterday afternoon began talks which appeared to be a continuation of the
dialogue started in Tobago a while ago, to lay the foundation for talks at a future
date between top-level parties of the two Governments with the view of a
peaceful settlement of the Venezuela-Guyana border dispute. ,,66
Even with the intervention of Eric Williams and the behind the scenes manoeuvrings of
countries such as the US, the Protocol meant effectively that both the Guyanese and
Venezuelan governments were able to maintain some degree of control over the next
stage in the controversy. One alternative, namely the 10, would have wrested control
from both sides.
It is worth us exploring the role of the Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Eric
Williams, in the Protocol of Port-of-Spain, since this has not been the subject of much
academic enquiry. His involvement reveals yet another instance of Cold War concerns
over the GOG and the perceived need to moderate Venezuelan behaviour in order to aid
Burnham. Through Rout's research, it is known that the Venezuelans suggested that
Williams should act an intermediary between Caracas and Georgetown, as the
negotiations developed outside of the framework of the Mixed Connnission. He is
precise in stating that the Trinidadian prime minister was approached during a state visit
65 Interview with Shridath Ramphal, 23 March 2001.
66 Weekend Post and Sunday Argosy, 15 March 1970, p.3.
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to Venezuela from 2-6 February 1970.67 Evidence in State Department files on the
Venezuelan government's motives in seeking out Williams does back at least one point
made by Braveboy-Wagner. That is to say, the Caldera government's desire to build up
relations with the English-speaking Caribbean was an instrumental factor in the
willingness of Caracas to engage in meaningful dialogue. This can be gleaned from the
following telegram report:
"I referred to the conversation which I had had ... with ... Calvani and exchange of
views we had had on the insecurity of the Guyanese people and the Guyanese
government who felt they were facing the world alone and in a vacuum. The
president said he appreciated this feeling and that he had talked to Prime Minister
Eric Williams about it. In fact, he said that he had invited Williams to
Venezuela at this time in an effort to demonstrate Venezuelan goodwill toward
the areas of the Caribbean populated in large by the black race. ,,68
Payne argues that Caracas' Caribbean policy was developed by the Caldera government
but bore more fruit under his successor Carlos Andres Perez who had the petro-dollars to
back it Up.69 It may be argued that the emergence of such a policy was a motivating
factor in the GOV seeking Williams' good offices, given his influence in the region
within which Venezuela wished to focus its foreign policy. Evidence exists to suggest
that the Venezuelan foreign minister, Aristides Calvani, certainly wanted to rid his
government of the territorial controversy:
"Calvani added that this was an inherited problem, one created by the
Betancourt-Leoni administration inwhich former foreign minister Marcos Falcon
Briceno played a key role. He asserted it was not a popular issue but one kept
alive by an elite group who were supported by important public information
media. ,,70
61 Rout (1971), p.95.
68 Telegram 644, Herron, Caracas to State Department, 7 February 1970, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
69 Payne (1984), pp.114-117.
10 Telegram 509, Herron, Georgetown to State Department, 2 February 1970, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
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There was, therefore, a paradigm shift in the Venezuelan government's position on the
controversy under Caldera. Another factor influencing the Caldera government's choice
of Williams may have been the latter's recently successful good offices in the Guyana-
Suriname dispute which led to progressive discussions on the way forward in April
1970.71
There were benefits for Williams from the use of his good offices: for instance,
the influence to be derived from brokering a role between Caracas and Georgetown on a
major and contentious issue. Williams' fear of the Guyanese opposition leader, Jagan's
return to power, may have motivated his desire to become involved, as can be deduced
from the following despatch:
"...Williams expressed concern over possibility that Jagan might make
comeback in next Guyanese elections. He had said Burnham speaks
optimistically of his ability to drain off strength from Jagan and of political effect
of West Indian immigration. However, based on his own political experience in
Trinidad, he is worried that Burnham's optimism may not have sound
foundation .... He said as election day approaches, race becomes a more important
factor. Williams asked if Embassy Georgetown's assessment of Jagan's strength
and prospects in next elections could be shared with him".
Moreover, it is noted, "[the] thought of Jagan coming to power is as abhorrent to
Williams as it is to us, and I hope we can provide him with something that will be
responsive to his request.,,12There was, in effect, a meeting of minds between Port-of-
Spain and Washington on Jagan. The Trinidadian leader was provided with what was
likely to have been interpreted by him as a positive analysis of Burnham's chances of
remaining in power:
71 See telegrams 44,289,299,359,364,806,975, 1237 from Georgetown and The Hague, to Statement
Department, Pol 32-1 Guyana-Surinam, RG 59 files. See also Airgram of 22 April 1970 which contains
the communique issued at the end of the talks.
72 Telegram 128, Elwood, Port-of-Spain to Statement Department, 25 February 1970, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
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"Next election will not be held until 1973 and there are obvious hazards in
attempting [to] predict [the] outcome of election so far in advance. However if
present political-racial stability is maintained and if out come [of] Venezuela-
Guyana border dispute is not heavily damaging to Burnham. we anticipate that he
will retain control of the government.t'"
If the prime minister of Trinidad required confirmation of the importance of a successful
outcome of Guyana-Venezuelan negotiations and justification for his involvement, this
was given in his discussions with the State Department: "Our caveat that Burnham's
political future will depend heavily on his ability [to] handle border problem [was] seized
on by Williams to concentrate most of our discussion on GuyanaIV enezuela dispute. ,,74
The files of the Trinidad and Tobago foreign ministry reveal a broader show of
interest on Williams' part in the Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy than was noted
by Braveboy- Wagner. In the wake of the Leoni decree, we gain an impression of the
salience of the issue to Port-of-Spain:
"Owing to the human relations and economic cooperation between Trinidad and
Tobago and Venezuela on the one hand and Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana on
the other hand, the policy of Trinidad and Tobago at this serious stage of the
dispute should be to continue to try and foster good relations with these two
countries, dissuade the use of force and encourage a return to the observance of
the Geneva Agreement and the instrument of the Mixed Corrnnission. ,,75
Earlier, in 1966, the government of Trinidad had actually inaugurated a Connnittee on the
Guyana- Venezuela controversy:
"As a result of a letter dated January, 1966, from the Ambassador for Venezuela
advising that the Venezuelan Government was preparing several missions to visit
shortly hemispheric countries in order to put forward Venezuela's positive claim
in the boundary dispute with British Guiana in the hope of winning the maximum
support from these countries, and that Trinidad and Tobago would be visited by
one of such missions, Cabinet on the recommendation of the Ministry of External
73 Telegram 198, King, Georgetown to State Department, 26 February 1970, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
74 Telegram 170, Symington, Port-of-Spain to State Department, 7 March 1970, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
75 File EA (68) Bi. 56, 18 July 1968, inPOL No. 114111,Vol.llI, Ministry of External Affairs, Trinidad and
Tobago.
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Affairs agreed to set up a Committee on the 'Boundary Dispute between
Venezuela and British Guiana"'.76
It can be argued that such a major step is indicative of the recognized importance of the
controversy to Trinidad and Tobago, given its geopolitical interests in not having a
Marxist government in Guyana and in proximity/relation to Venezuela. The government
in Caracas was also aware of these factors, elaborating further:
"La situacion geografica y la creciente presencia venezolana en esta isla, han
forzado a1 Primer Ministro Eric Williams a mantener una objetiva e imparcial
posici6n ante las presiones guyanesas encaminadas a hacerla variar. Atin no se
conocen signos que puedan predecir una ruptura de esta posici6n equilibrada por
parte de Trinidad y Tobago. Sin embargo, su identificaci6n por razones
hist6ricas, geograficas y mas recientemente por econ6micas (CARIFT A) con
Guyana, deben obligar a esa Cancillerfa a ser extremadamente cuidadosa en la
conducci6n de los negocios politico-econ6micos trinito-venezolanos. ,,77
Inaddition, it should be noted that the governments of Trinidad and Venezuela had begun
a period of good relations since 1965, when the latter removed a surtax on the former's
imports which had been a source of dispute between the two states. The relationship
underwent a turnaround to the extent that Caracas had sponsored Trinidad's entry into the
OAS in 1967, while Port-of-Spain sponsored the Venezuelan candidate for Secretary-
General of that organization. 78 All of these recent factors had put Trinidad and in
particular Williams, in a strategic position to intervene between Caracas and Georgetown.
He was to preside over the initial talks at official level followed by the negotiations at
ministerial level that ultimately led to signing of the Protocol." Given the involvement
76 LEG:213/2 in ibid.
77 MRE (1968), p.25
78 Gill inManigat (1976b), p.472.
79 Telegrams 118 and 1108 from the US embassies inGeorgetown and Port-of-Spain of 23 February 1970
and 9 March 1970 respectively, give details of Guyana and Venezuela's proposals. The former favoured a
30-year moratorium while the latter favoured 2-4 years. See also telegram 1268 (19 March 1970) from the
US embassy, Caracas; and telegrams 258 (14 March 1970); 324 (6 April 1970), 390 (16 April 1970), 526
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of Washington and Williams' own motivations in brokering the Protocol, which we have
established, the following conclusion made by Glasgow lacks some validity: "To all
appearances, the solution to his problem was regionally induced particularly as the
United States had 'washed her hands of it' in an attempt to avoid alienating two of her
hemispheric allies. ,,80
Although amounting to a moratorium, the Protocol did not officially provide a
solution to the controversy, as indicated by Article V(2): "The signing and the
continuance of this Protocol shall not be interpreted in any way as a renunciation or
diminution of any rights which any of the parties may have on the date on which the
Protocol is signed or as a recognition of any situation, practice or claim existing at that
date. ,,81 Despite this Article, the Protocol was not well received by the political
opposition in both Guyana and Venezuela In the former, the PPP which had regarded
the Geneva Agreement as a "sell-out" and "part of the Anglo-American conspiracy",
subsequently viewed the Protocol as "... the second act of betrayal by the PNC
government. ..and another step in the same direction [of Anglo-American conspiracy]". 82
The general secretary of the PPP, Donald Ramotar, has elaborated further on his party's
historical position on the Protocol, which has been to locate it within the cold war
conspiracy framework that it has viewed the territorial controversy:
"We said that all that [the Protocol] was doing was not solving any problem, what
it was doing was postponing the problem: we were carrying the line at the time
that it was quite probably an American position to put in cold storage to be used
again."
(20 May 1970) from the American Embassy, Georgetown on the discussions during the negotiations, Pol
32-1, op.cit.
80 Glasgow inDavis (1975), p.I90.
81 See Appendix 6 for full text of the Protocol.
82 Nagamootoo (1981), p.17. See also Sunday Graphic, 21 June 1970, p.l.
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It is noteworthy that with the PPP in government, since 1992 to the time of writing, the
party's position has altered regarding the conspiracy theory. As Ramotar concedes:
"I am not sure if that was a correct analysis; whether the Americans were that
involved at that period of time because at that period of time they were getting a
little bit discontented with the PNC ... ,,83
This new contention has merit because 1970 was the year that the Burnham-led
government declared Guyana a "cooperative socialist republic"; a factor that was not
likely to be well-received in Washington. However, as we have seen, Washington and
Port-of-Spain still favoured Burnham, given that the alternative was the Marxist, Cheddi
Jagan. Ramotar now admits that even though postponement did not offer a solution, it
had advantages: "I suppose in the practical politics of the time, probably it was not a bad
decision to put it on hold so that you can focus on other things. ,,84 The freezing of the
controversy did provide the PNC government with the opportunity to pursue its
"socialist" and third world foreign policy. 85
Opposition to the Protocol was strong in the Venezuelan congress which had not
been informed by the Caldera government prior to its signatory and which did ratify it.86
This resulted in the Protocol being "... valid only as an executive agreement and tends to
suspend Guyana/Venezuelan relations in limbo.,,81 In reality, the Protocol did have de
facto governmental recognition in both Caracas and Georgetown and significantly for
both, the Venezuelan government did have the backing of the country's armed forces."
83 Interview with Donald Ramotar, 13 May 2000.
S4lbid.
85 For instance, diplomatic relations were established with Havana in 1972, and Guyana applied for 'formal
association' with COMECON in 1977, IISS (1973) and (1978) respectively.
86 Guyana Graphic, 20 June 1970, p.l. AirgramA-532, 5 October 1970, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
87 Airgram, A-532, 5 October 1970, Pol 32-, op.cit.
88 Guyana Graphic, 28 June, p.1, and 11 July 1970, p.l.
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The signing of the Protocol led to a marked improvement in relations between
Guyana and Venezuela, as a newspaper records:
"The Protocol of Port of Spain was intended to establish a climate of friendship
and understanding between Guyana and Venezuela and had succeeded in the ftrst
few years of its existence to produce dramatic improvements in the relations
between the two countries according to Cheryl Miles of the Foreign Ministry. ,,89
It is worth exploring the developments in the relationships between Georgetown and
Caracas at this time.
The joint communique issued at the end of the signing of the Protocol referred to
the agreement to establish a Joint Connnittee between Guyana and Venezuela, the key
task of which was to facilitate a reduction in problems between the two states.90 Several
enquiries by this writer, including interviews with senior diplomats in Georgetown and
Caracas have, however, failed to shed any light on the existence of this Connnittee.
Although the Protocol set the stage for a plateau in friendly relations between the
governments in Caracas and Georgetown, there were periods of uncertainty in the
relations between the two. For instance, in 1972, a US telegram noted, "Ramphal, in
particular, distressed at [the] exclusion [of] Guyana from [the] Law of Sea Conference
called by Venezuela ... He has discussed [the] matter with [the] Venezuelan FONMIN
[foreign minister] Calvani but received no satisfactory explanation [for] Venezuela's
actions.,,91 Guyana's exclusion, may not have been the result of a deliberate attempt by
Venezuela to shun it, as this telegram indicates:
89 Guyana Chronicle, 28 November 1981, p.12.
90 "Communique issued at Conclusion of Meeting in Port-of-Spain between the Honourable S.S.
Ramphal ... and Dr. Aristides Calvani, Foreign Minister of Venezuela 00 18th June, 1970", pp.20-21, MEA
(1970a).
91 Telegram 1567, Georgetown to State Department, 6 November 1971, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
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"Official GOV reason for not inviting Guyana is that geographically [the] latter
appears to be [an] Atlantic, not [a] Caribbean state. Though there is some
sophistry in this position, privately FONMINISTRY source has indicated basic
reason for not inviting Guyana is [the] troublesome 1968 Leoni Decree pertaining
to [the] territorial sea off [the] area in dispute. ,,92
The problem over this Conference served as an indication that although the territorial
controversy had effectively been put on hold, existing problematic areas were resolved.
Indeed, Guyana had never relaxed totally in relation to Venezuela.93 Nevertheless, the
Protocol was to usher in the period of a number of governmental visits on both sides and
"functional co-operation" in a number of areas.94 Such interaction Jackson has argued,
"... can sometimes be seen as not solving the problem but creating the framework for
solving the problem ,,95
The expression of good relations between Guyana and Venezuela was
demonstrated on a practical level by the first visit of a Venezuelan minister to Guyana.
As the following telegraph despatch notes, "As a gesture [of] friendship and follow-up to
[the] Protocol of Port of Spain, GOY headed by Development Minister Haydee Castillo
de Lopez Acosta arrived [in] Guyana March 5 [1971]. ,,96 The purpose of the visit was to
discuss technical cooperation between the two countries." The Venezuelan ministerial
team's trip was followed shortly afterwards by a reciprocal visit headed by Guyana's
92 Ibid.
93 Interview with Rudy Collins, 9 September 1999.
94 Functional cooperation is defined as ncn-political ties between states e.g. economic or social cooperation.
These links are expected to facilitate understanding and peaceful relations between states. See Braveboy-
Wagner (1984), pp.181-182, for further details en the theories of the functionalist and neo-functionalist
schools.
95 Interview with Rashleigh Jackson, 30 August 1999.
96 Telegram 318, 8 March 1971, Devine, Georgetown to State Department, Pol 32-, op.cit.
'T1 Ibid.
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deputy prime minister, Ptolemy Reid. This was the first by a Guyanese minister to
Caracas since independence," and it was to have had positive effects:
"It appears that the April 21 to 26 [1971] visit of Guyanese ... Ptolemy Reid and
his high-level mission to Venezuela accomplished what both sides had hoped for,
in that a general atmosphere of cordiality and mutual respect was noteworthy on
both sides. Substantive discussions of possible economic cooperation in a number
of fields were the central feature of the visit, but apparently no defmite
agreements were reached. ,,99
Although no firm agreements were signed, the visit represented a positive step since the
two governments were now engaging in discussions outside of their territorial
controversy. Venezuela, for instance, participated in CARIFEST A, hosted in
Georgetown in 1972.100 Moreover, the initial ministerial trip paved the way for further
such exchanges between Caracas and Georgetown during which the discussions centred
on economic, political and cultural cooperation. These included the visit of the Guyanese
foreign minister, Ramphal in June 1974; Guyana's Minister of Economic Development,
Desmond Hoyte, in April 1975; the Venezuelan foreign minister in the Carlos Andres
Perez administration, Ram6n Escovar Salom, in June 1975; and Fred Wills - Ramphal's
successor as foreign minister - inNovember 1977.101
By far the most significant visits during this period, both in terms of political level
and in making progress in a resolution of the territorial controversy, were those of
Burnham to Caracas in September 1975 and that of Carlos Andres Perez to Georgetown
in October 1978. Although not officially publicised, it has become widely known that
98 Telegram 441, 31 March 1971, King, Georgetown to State Department, Pol 7 Guyana, RG 59.
99 AirgrarnA-194, 3 May 1971, Caracas to State Department, Pol 32-1, op.cit.
100 Ferguson (1999), p.263.
101 MRE (1975), p.241. See also MRE (1998), pp.353-365, for the various Aide Memoire and official
correspondence that accompanied the ministerial visits. There were further discussions between Guyanese
and Venezuelan foreign ministers at the UN. See for instance, document no.23, ibid., p.353, for Aide
Memoire following me such meeting between Ramphal and Escovar Salomin 1975.
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during the latter visit Burnham and Andres Perez advanced the discussions on a solution
to the controversy.l'" It is here that we return to the theme of the land/sea concession
first mooted during the negotiations that led to the Protocol to the Geneva Agreement.
This centred on Venezuela reducing its claim significantly in exchange for an outlet to
the Atlantic which would involve Guyana ceding a relatively small amount of territory
adjacent to the sea.103 Guyana would in turn have received development assistance from
Venezuela.l?' The outlet to the Atlantic is part of Venezuela's Atlantic vision of power
on the high seas and in particular its attempt to project itself beyond the Caribbean to
places further afield, such as Africa One Venezuelan diplomat offered the following
metaphoric description:
"Venezuela has got access to the [Caribbean] sea, but it is a closed sea to a lake.
Look at the borders of all the neighbours here [northern South America], one next
to the other, then, you have a passage, small islands ... [i.e. the Caribbean states].
We don't have access to the Atlantic, we have a swimming pool in our backyard,
not in our front yard. ,,105
The Atlantic is also regarded in terms of strategic access to the Orinoco which in turn
links with the Amazon and thus into the heart of South America.l'" Ewell has also
suggested its importance vis-a-vis the country's petroleum movements and its imports.
"The maintenance of open and peaceful sea lanes both through Lakes Maracaibo and
through the Orinoco River to the Atlantic is necessary to the movement of Venezuelan
petroleum and the large volume of imports. ,,107
102 See for instance, Giacalone de Romero's thesis (1984), p.5.
103 See for instance, Braveboy-Wagner (1984), p.185 and Gill (1997). This discussion between the two





107 Ewell in Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (1982), p.306.
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One Venezuelan diplomat has argued that it was the Protocol which served as the
hindrance to Burnham and Andres Perez putting their discussions into fruition: "The
Protocol froze negotiations [on the territorial controversy]. Had the Protocol not existed,
both countries would have been very happy now. They could have solved the problem
and they could have enjoyed twenty years of love [to date]."I08 Despite this Venezuelan
diplomat's interpretation of the impediment posed by the Protocol, it is doubtful whether
the implementation of an agreement along the lines of the discussions held in 1978 would
have been any simpler if the Protocol had not existed, given that both governments still
had to gain popular support from their respective populace. This is a point made by
former Guyanese foreign minister Ramphal: "I certainly felt that the Carlos Andres Perez
period provided the most propitious time we had had to try to put the message to rest and
I had personal contacts with [him] which to me justified that. But Burnham and Carlos
Andres Perez had constituencies and so each was hampered to some extent."I09 On the
other hand, it is the perception of the Venezuelan foreign minister at the time, Ram6n
Escovar Salom that Burnham was not serious in his discussions on achieving such a
compromise solution:
"... 1 don't think that in Guyana there was any feeling to find a solution with
Venezuela. But they were interested in money and in cooperation on
hydroelectric power, bauxite etc. The only idea Burnham had in mind was to ask
for money from Venezuela; he was not seriously in my mind looking for a
solution with Venezuela." 110
If this perception is correct then the Guyanese prime minister was merely manipulating
the Venezuelan government's desire for an outlet to the sea in order to receive some of
108 Ibid.
109 Interview with Shridath Ramphal, 23 March 2001.
110 Interview with Ramon Escovar Salam, 8 March 2000.
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the benefits from the latter's oil wealth. The Trinidadian Express reported, however, that
Burnham and Carlos Andres Perez failed to achieve what is termed this "symbolic
cession" since the two leaders disagreed on the amount of territory to be ceded. III
The Andres Perez administration also saw a period of hitherto relatively intense
cooperation between Guyana and Venezuela. This period, it should be noted, was one of
high oil prices following OPEC action and Venezuelan nationalization of its oil industry,
the latter taking place on 1 January 1976. During his 1978 visit to Guyana, the
Venezuelan president also expressed his support for the hydroelectric project located in
the Upper Mazaruni area - within the territory being claimed by Venezuela - which the
Guyanese government was proposing:
"Con relaci6n a la posibilidad de la compra por parte de Venezuela de energfa, el
Presidente indic6 la disposici6n de su pais de fmanciar el estudio para la
interconexi6n. Se consider6 que se debfa establecer un comite para estudiar el
asunto de la posible participaci6n de Venezuela en el proyecto hidroelectrico." 112
The supply of electricity from Guyana to Venezuela, if the project and the Perez
government's interest became realities, would have represented a level of cooperation
which only ten years previous, would have been unthinkable.
For this reason, we should explore some aspects of the functional cooperation
between Guyana and Venezuela, which helped to foster a greater degree of interaction
between the peoples of the two states and by defmition furthered their understanding of
each other. In the medical field, Venezuela provided treatment to some Guyanese
patients in its more advanced teaching hospitals in Caracas with the collaboration of the
111 Express, 22 June 1982, p.17.
112 Document no. 30, "Memoranda presentada par los Gobiemos de Guyana y Venezuela con motivo de la
visita official efectuada por el Presidente de Venezuela, Carlos Andres Perez a la Republica Cooperativo de
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Ministry of Health and Social Security in Georgetown. 113 At the cultural level, the
Venezuelan government opened a cultural centre in Georgetown, named after the famous
Venezuelan writer, R6mulo Gallegos, in May 1972. An agreement on cultural, education
and scientific cooperation was later signed in June 1974. Scholarships were also
provided to Guyanese students to study Spanish in Venezuelan universities, thereby
advancing the level of understanding between Guyana and Venezuela.i'"
In July 1975, discussions between Guyanese and Venezuelan officials took place
centring on possible economic, technical and cultural cooperation between Caracas and
Georgetown. This included the extension of a line of credit from the Andres Perez
government to its Guyanese counterpart for trade between the two states.115 Indicative of
the level of cooperation between the two states at this time, Guyana was able to join the
IDB with the support of the Venezuelan government in April 1974. This was a
significant development given that it was Venezuela's action in 1964 that had led to the
Act of Washington prohibiting Guyana's entry to the OAS because of the territorial
controversy. While the ban remained, the separation of the criteria for membership of the
economic wing from the main body meant that with Venezuela's support, Guyana was
able to access much needed fmance. In the words of Ramphal, this represented "una
demostraci6n tangible en el nuevo ambiente de las relaciones Iarinoamericenas."!" In
addition, Guyana was a net beneficiary in its trading relations with Venezuela during this
period. The trade, which centred on Venezuela's import of Guyana's bauxite, amounted
Guyana, y en el eual se trataroo posibles compromises en material de cooperaei6n bilateral. Georgetown,
Guyana, 18-20 de octubre de 1978", MRE (1998), pp.360-361.
113 See for instance, MRE (1975 and 1978), pp.241, 483 respectively.
114 MRE (1998), p.419.
lIS Details in document no.27, ibid., pp.357-358.
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to $7 million of the product in 1980.117 The gathering of Venezuelan troops in
1975/1976 on the Guyanese border following reports of Cuban troops in Guyana
represented only a temporary glitch in Andres Perez-Burnham relations.
Aside from the growth in bilateral relations, there was also interaction between
Georgetown and Caracas at the multilateral level, especially as the former began to
broaden its participation in regional organizations. These included Sistema Econ6mico
de Latino America which Guyana joined in 1975; the Treaty of Amazonian Cooperation
created in 1978; and Organizacion Latinoamericano de Energia in 1979.118
The International Approaches of the Government of Guyana
It is fair to argue, given the evidence from speeches made during a randomly
selected year of good relations between Georgetown and Caracas that the territorial
controversy was not the focal point of the government's international activities. Rather,
the Burnham administration used the opportunity provided in such fora to vent its support
for liberation movements, calls for a new international economic order, Namibian
independence, economic cooperation amongst developing countries and other third world
issues. It is in this context that the argument proffered by some writers about the foreign
policy of the Burnham era being about securing domestic legitimacy through acclaimed
international action rings through. Nevertheless, it is the contention here that even with
this being the case, the international contacts made during such forays were vital when
116 Quoted in "Nota de Antonio Jose, Embajador Extraordinario y Plenipotenciario de Venezuela en
Guyana para Efrain Schacht Aristeguieta, MRE ... 3 de mayo de 1974", ibid., p.352.
117 Braveboy-Wagner (1984), p.186.
118 Ibid., p.190; and Bond in Ferris and Lincoln (1981), p.158.
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conflict escalated. This contingency in relations was recognized by the Commonwealth
study Group which looked at small states. "By giving support to one geographical group
on an issue with which it may not be directly concerned, a small state can win reciprocal
backing on an issue that is of present national interest. ,,119
The Burnham government reduced the "virulence" of its international campaign
against Venezuela in view of the improvement in relations between Georgetown and
Caracas. One has the distinct impression that this administration continued to be
distrustful of their Caracas counterparts despite the improvement in relations. Hence the
PNC government continued to monitor Venezuelan action on the international stage, with
a view to mounting its own campaign if required. This is made clear by Jackson who
notes:
"Territorial integrity still remained a number one priority [during the life of the
Protocol]. The amount of energy you had to expend was, however, reduced. As I
have said, you can never get fatigued of your own interest. You would look for
any opportunity that presented itself or if Venezuela thought they could indulge in
one-upmanship. You had to be vigilant. ,,120
So while tensions had eased, the Guyanese administration was never quite relaxed in its
relations with Venezuela Indeed, the Burnham government utilized international issues
of some relevance to draw direct attention to the state's position on the Guyana-
Venezuela controversy. A perusal of governmental speeches indicates that the PNC
government sought to draw international awareness to Venezuela's claims to Essequibo
by utilizing every available forum 121 Even during high profile visits to Guyana not
directly related to the territorial controversy, the principle of territorial integrity was
119 Commonwealth Study Group (1985), p.69.
120 Interview with Rashleigh Jackson, 11 April 2000.
121 See, for instance, ministerial speeches in Jackson (1984), especially, pp.26, 37.
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included on the agenda of discussions and/or speeches. 122 Similarly, in the government's
active support made for African liberation struggles, much was made of South Africa's
violation of Namibian territory. 123
The very high-profile support for those liberation struggles can also be construed
as a concomitant building of support amongst African countries for Guyana in the
territorial controversy. Jackson has made explicit the link between Guyana's support for
liberation struggles in Africa and Guyana's territorial problem in his speech at the
International Forum on Southern Africa 124 As Gill argues:
"... the government's activism in relation to these two matters [African liberation
movements and South Africa] has been part of a broader policy in courting
African Governments not only because of their importance in the non-aligned
movement but crucially in order to be guaranteed of their diplomatic support if
Venezuela were to re-activate the border issue.,,125
A significant factor in the PNC's administrative drive to win the support of African
government was the OAU's stance of respecting boundaries inherited from colonial
times. The territorial controversy with Venezuela was, therefore, an integral part of the
positioning that the Burnham government chose to take on certain issues. One foreign
minister during the Burnham years, Jackson, has given an insight into the strategic
positioning of his country on international issues where parallels could be drawn with
Guyana's own territorial problems:
"One always sought to make a connection between our territorial circumstances
with Venezuela with other issues of struggles for self-determination, for territorial
integrity...there are certain principles [which were] important like sanctity of
122 See for instance, MEA (1969), p.68, on the visit of Dr Anton Vartusa, Deputy Foreign Minister of
Yugoslavia.
123 See for instance, (1980), pp.20, 25.
124 Jackson (1981b), p.16.
125 Gill in Manigat (1977b), p.373.
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treaties, non-acquisition of territories by force and therefore any issue before the
UN that involved those principles attracted our support ... ,,126
In this regard, support for East Timor, Western Sahara, Belize, and Israeli withdrawal of
the occupied territories, was an integral part of the Burnham government's international
strategies. As Jackson explains, "All those issues we supported fully because of their
relevance ... to our own situation and ... because if you can cast your mind forward when
you might have part of Guyana occupied, we'll need the support of the United
Nations. ,,127 So, what may appear as adventurism, in terms of the PNC government's
seeming determination to stand out as a radical third world government - which
undoubtedly was an image it sought to project - was also part of that government's
strategy of winning friends vis-a-vis the territorial integrity. The fact that the GOG could
potentially derive support from particular states because of its own positioning on certain
issues is indicative of the multifaceted characteristics of foreign policy which can be
utilized for drawing international support on an issue affecting a state.
The signing of the Protocol of Port-of-Spain in June 1970 brought in a period of
good relations, but while the Burnham-led government did not have grievances to draw to
the attention of the UN General Assembly, it kept up an advocacy in UN fora on
territorial integrity and related issues. For instance, the country continued to be active in
the UN Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression a month after the
Protocol had been signed. 128 Another example can be gleaned from a speech made by
126 Interview with Rashleigh Jackson, 9 December 1999. See also "The Right to Live within Mutually
Recognised Boundaries" under Guyana's support for a number of territorial related causes such as support
for the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict is listed in Jackson (1978), pp.44-45.
127 Jackson (1999, mimeo.).
128 Details en Guyana's activities in this Special Committee which met 00 13-14 July 1970 in MEA
(1970a), pp.74-75.
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foreign minister, Jackson, to the UN on the Question of Disarmament where the
opportunity to include the issue of territorial integrity did not go amiss: "In more specific
terms, there needs to be greater respect for certain fundamental principles ...Included
among those principles .. .is the question of territorial integrity. ,,129 The Guyanese
government's advocacy, albeit in a more subtle way, continued in the UN even during the
validity of the Protocol.
Jackson has emphasised his government's international approach of continually
lobbying members of the UN. There the strategy was on emphasising Guyana's
"... strong legal and moral case". A perusal of his speeches at international organizations
in 1979 - a year of relatively good relations between Georgetown and Caracas - reveals
the territorial controversy not being a subject for discussion.P'' This does not mean that
the GOG during such periods of cooperation did not conduct informal lobbying with
delegates at the UN. As Jackson further explains, "We [the Guyanese government] were
never afraid to explain our position with a view to winning friends in the event that you
need their votes at the right time to support you when your case came before the
[Security] Council. ,,131
Guyana continued to be represented at meetings of the Connnonwealth
throughout the 1970s. As the country pursued closer relations with Venezuela, this
grouping of Britain and its former colonies did not express any views on the controversy
129 Jackson (1978) p.22.
130 Jackson (1979), speeches delivered at the Coordinating Bureau of the NAM; the 4th Ministerial Meeting
of the Group of 77; UNCf AD V; and the General Debate of the UN.
131 Jackson's speech (1999), mimeo.
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in the communiques issued between 1971 and 1979.132 This does not mean that the
government did not continue to keep this organization aware of developments in the
controversy. The point is that at a time of good relations there was not need to have the
Corrnnonwealth publicly endorsing Guyana's position on Essequibo.
On the issue of universal membership of the OAS in the region, the
Corrnnonwealth Caribbean countries were not ambiguous. Even before the formation of
CARICOM in 1973, Eric Williams, whose country Trinidad and Tobago was the first
English-speaking Caribbean country to be admitted to the GAS in 1967, had used the
opportunity which membership presented to lobby initially for a separation of the
membership criteria of the organization from the enjoyment of its economic bodies. 133
Still in the early years of his state's entry into the OAS, Williams, was astute in calling for
some change in the regional organization without seeming to suggest total overhaul in the
charter provisions. It was not long before that the relevant changes were made, thereby
facilitating Guyana (and other states joining) as an Observer in February 1972. 134 In 1974
the country gained access to the financial arm of the OAS, the IDB.135
The GOG continued to strengthen its ties with Brasilia, even though the Guyana-
Venezuela territorial controversy had ceased to be a major problem during this period.
132 Commonwealth Secretariat (1987), pp.151-220.
133 "Address by the Minister of External Affairs Mr. Francis Prevatt to the First Special Session of the
General Assembly of the OAS, Washingt<n, June 30, 1970" in Ministry of External Affairs, Trinidad and
Tobago (1971), p.12; and "Speech at Opening of Inter-American Economic and Social Council Meeting in
Caracas, 3 February 1970", in Sutten (1981), pp.397-399.
134 See Airgram A-310, New Delhi to State Department, 12 January 1973, Pol 17 Guyana-India, RG59; and
Bryan in Ince (1979), p.63.
135 Telegram 9773, McClintock, Caracas to State Department, Pol 17 Guyana-Venezuela, RG59. Guyana
later joined the lOB in 1976 - Wilson in Millett and Will (1979), p.266-284. Interview with Byron Blake, 1
May 2000. Braveboy-Wagner (1989), p.I44; Wilsen op.cit. and Caribbean Contact, January 1981, p.2.
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There were visits of leading medical specialists from Brazil. 136 The Brazilian
government also extended various lines of credit to the Burnham government since 1971,
some used possibly for military purposes. 137
The value which the Burnham government placed on its relations with Brazil as a
counter-weight to Caracas was evident in 1976 when it embarked on measures to win
back the support of Brasilia. This need had arisen following the Brazilian government's
stationing of troops on its border with Guyana as a result of reports about Cuban military
personnel in Guyana Jackson, who became the Guyanese foreign minister not long after
this incident, has given an indication of his government's mobilization of its diplomatic
machinery to win back the friendship of the Brazilian government:
"Once a report like that comes out [about Guyana being the base for the export of
the Cuban revolution] you must be concerned and then your diplomacy is to
convince the friendly countries that the report is baseless. And in this case, our
prime strategy was to convince Brazil, so that if you convince Brazil then
Venezuela is left on its own. Presumably too, Brazil, through its own channels
would do its own checking and tell Venezuela it is not true. ,,138
The Burnham government clearly felt that convincing Brazil in the first instance was of
more importance, before doing the same with Caracas. A key part of the strategy that
Jackson described above, was the despatch of Guyana's then foreign minister, Fred Wills,
who had succeeded Ramphal briefly, to Brasilia to offer reassurances to its government.
This strategy worked, as is indicated by the following statement:
"[The governments of Guyana and Brazil] stressed the principles relating to the
sovereignty and security of States, self-determination of peoples, non-intervention
in the internal affairs of other States interdiction of threats or use of force, the
136 MEA (1970a), p.96.
137 Braveboy-Wagner(1989), p.39.
138 Interview with Rashleigh Jackson, 9 December 1999.
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territorial integrity of States and the inviolability of their boundaries as legally
recognised by international treaties and agreements." 139
So not only had the Burnham government succeeded in winning back the friendship of its
counterpart in Brasilia, but in relation to the controversy, the statement, like the one
released earlier by Itamaraty in the wake of the Leoni decree of 1968, reiterated
pronouncements on boundaries and treaties which inferred support for Guyana vis-a-vis
Venezuela. From 1979, the Burnham government was able to strengthen its relationship
with Brasilia through its interaction in the Joint Guyana-Brazil Mixed Commission.P"
Summary
The Burnham years, have to date, represented the longest era of a single
government in the post-independence state of Guyana The period covered in this
chapter, 1969-1980, was one of contrast, both in the evolvement of the territorial
controversy and the trajectory of Guyana's international affairs. The contentious
relationship with Venezuela, which characterized the coalition years of government in
Georgetown, was to continue for the first year of the Burnham-only administration.
Declassifted records of the State Department and the Foreign and Cormnonwealth Office
have revealed continued behind-the-scenes involvement of the US and HMG with the
task of ensuring that Venezuelan action did not adversely affect Burnham's grip on
power. That the Guyanese prime minister was key to the cold war concerns within which
the Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy became embroiled is evident not just from
139 Extract from communique in Jackson (1981a), p.37.
140 Kirton in Jeffrey and Menke (1991), pp.218-219 and Manigat inHeine and Manigat (1988), pp.262-
274, provide discussions on Brazilian foreign policy and the motivations for that country's pursuit of closer
ties with Guyana and other countries in Latin America from the late 1970s.
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US and HMG efforts to intervene on his behalf, but also in Caracas and Port-of-Spain's
actions. The Venezuelan government was cognizant of the US's view on Burnham and
how this impacted on Venezuela. At the same time, Caracas expressed concern about
what it perceived to be a lack of assistance for its cause. Williams' motivation for
intervening in the controversy was guided by his own fears about Cheddi Jagan's
corrnnunism.
The Protocol of Port-of-Spain provided the opportunity for an improvement in
relations. It also facilitated the expansion of Guyana's foreign policy and international
activities as the state's diplomatic machinery was relieved significantly of the burdens
relating to the controversy. These factors have led some critics to charge that Burnham's
foreign policy was Machiavellian in character and about securing legitimacy. It would be
foolhardy not to recognize that in seeking and winning regional/international support for
its territorial controversy, both at times of conflict and cooperation, the Burnham-led
PNC administration was not also gaining prestige from its forceful and astute arguments
on the international stage. The impressions created there would certainly have had
benefits on the home front given the GOG's diminishing credibility there. It was during
the negotiations for the Protocol that the idea of a reduced claim was first mooted. This
was later elaborated on by the Carlos Andres Perez administration as a cession of land by
Guyana in order to facilitate Venezuela's access to the Atlantic Ocean. Although nothing
was conceded, this issue signalled a recognition by Caracas that it may not be able to gain
the whole of Essequibo, even though the "reclamacfon" remained official policy.
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Chapter 5:
The Burnham Years 1981-1985: from Conflict to Limited
Cooperation
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Part I: Guyana's Relations with Venezuela: the end of the Protocol
The focal point of part one of the present chapter will be an examination of the
return of tensions between Georgetown and Caracas from 1981-1983, following the
latter's signal of its intention not to renew the Protocol. This marked a recommencement
of the GOG's full-blown international approaches which I will examine. The second part
of this chapter looks at the search for a mechanism within which to approach the
controversy following the expiration of the Protocol of Port-of-Spain.
Ramphal's optimism in 1970 that" ... the Protocol is so framed that the emphasis
is upon the renewal of this every twelve years" 1 was not to be realised. The Venezuelan
government of COPEl's Luis Herrera Campfns, which had taken power in March 1979,
implemented substantial changes in the relationship between Guyana and Venezuela,
altering the cooperative path which had existed for much of the seventies. In the first
instance, as Payne contends, the new government" ... set about the conduct of Venezuelan
foreign policy in a distinctly more conservative, less flamboyant style than that of its
predecessor. ,,2 This change at the governmental level and in the foreign policy direction,
especially regarding Venezuela's approach to the territorial controversy, impacted
negatively on relations between Georgetown and Caracas. The clear indication that the
Protocol would not be renewed ushered in a return to a period of heightened tensions in
Guyana, the likes of which had not been witnessed since the 1960s. Several factors
contributed to the sense of fear in Georgetown, resulting in the government's full-scale
diplomatic onslaught against Venezuela in international institutions, groupings and
1 "Statement by the Honourable S.S. Ramphal ... in the National Assembly, on 22nd June 1970", MEA
(1970a), p.16.
2 Payne (1984), p.119.
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individual states. Before examining those initiatives on the world stage, I will explore the
factors, real or perceived, which created an atmosphere of alarm and unease in Guyana.
There were early signs that the Herrera Campfns administration was not as
amenable to cooperation with its counterpart as had been the case during the Carlos
Andres Perez government. One such indicator was the new government's attitude to its
Guyanese counterpart's proposed hydroelectric project in Upper Mazaruni, which is
located in Essequibo. The Venezuelan foreign minister in the Herrera Campfns
government, Alberto Zambrano Velasco, expressed reservations about this project to his
Guyanese counterpart while at the UN in 1980.3 Later, in June 1981, the Venezuelan
government wrote to the World Bank, from which Guyana was seeking funding for the
Upper Mazaruni hydroelectric project, to register its objections. These were based on
Venezuela's claims to Essequibo and that the project would alter the physical
environment of that territory." The GOG also accused Caracas of lobbying the European
Economic Community against participation in Essequibo's development.' It should be
noted that objections were also raised by international environmentalists concerned about
the effects on some of Guyana's Amerindian population." The Venezuelan protest
marked a signal change in the relations between Caracas and Georgetown, since, as will
be recalled, the Andres Perez administration not only supported this project, but had also
3 Summary from Venezuelan classified records in MRE (1998), p.421.
4 Document no.42, "Carta de Jose Alberto Zambrano Velasco, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores para el
Presidente del Banco Internacional de Reconstrucci6n y Fomento, sobre la posici6n del Gobierno de
Venezuela ante la solicitud de prestamo hecha por el Gobiemo de Guyana para el Proyecto de la Represa
del Alto Mazaruni. Caracas, 8 de junio de 1981 It, MRE (1998), pp.376-377. See Hoyte (1981) for
Guyana's letter from its Minister of Economic Planning and Finance, Desmond Hoyte, to the World Bank,
in response to the Venezuelan letter.
S "Speech made by Guyana's Prime Minister ... Ptolemy Reid to the 36th Session of the United Nations
General Assembly", 24 September 1981, reprinted in Guyana Chronicle, 16 October 1981, p.l.
6 Braveboy-Wagner (1984), p.198.
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discussed the possibility of electricity supply from it to Venezuela. The following year,
Guyana was excluded from the terms of the San Jose Agreement signed in 1980 under
which Venezuela, along with Mexico, agreed to supply oil at preferential rates, to poorer
countries in the region, including the issuing of credits for the purchase of that oil.7
It was after an official visit by Burnham from 2-3 April 1981 that the Venezuelan
government first signalled its intention not to renew the Protocol. During the visit,
discussions centred on a range of regional and international issues of interest to both
Guyana and Venezuela 8 Despite expressions of cordiality during the visit, immediately
afterwards, on 4 April 1981, a communique issued from the Miraflores governmental
palace in Caracas stated that Venezuela would not be renewing the Protocol when its 12-
year period expired the following year and that the government did not support Guyana's
hydroelectric project. Not only was Caracas not willing to extend the life of the Protocol,
it also sought to frame its perspective on Essequibo as a colonial wrong which it intended
to right:
"EI Presidente Herrera Campfns, en consecuencia, reiter6 el rechazo de Venezuela
a cualquier compromiso incompatible con la reclamaci6n venezolana y con la
aspiracion nacional de obtener la reparaci6n de la grave injusticia cometida contra
nuestro pais por la voracidad de los imperios coloniales ... En tal sentido, el
Presidente Herrera Campfns reiter6 el rechazo venezolano al proyecto
hidroelectrico del Alto Mazaruni. ,,9
Guyana's foreign minister Rashleigh Jackson indicated that the Venezuelan decision
about the Protocol was not a surprise, but his government would have welcomed an
extension. "We knew before we left that Venezuela was not going to renew the Protocol
7 Braveboy-Wagner (1984), pp.I90, 231-232; and Giacalone de Romero (1984), mimeo., p.6.
8 See documents nos. 34 and 35 inMRE (1998), pp. 364-370; and OP (1981), pp.9-16.
9 Document no. 36, MRE (1998), p.370.
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of Port-of-Spain. They were not inclined to do so. If they were, we would not have
objected. ,,10
Burnham did not waste time m seizing the opportunity provided by Herrera
Campfns' emotive statement on the controversy to add a new challenge into the dialectic
between Georgetown and Caracas. His response to journalists in Caracas had already
added a new dimension in the territorial controversy between the two states. In a
statement displaying his legal skills Burnham contended:
"Even if both the [1899] Award and the boundary laid down pursuant thereto are
invalid, the land claimed by Venezuela does not automatically go to her ... In such
a situation, whatever settlement procedure is adopted, account will have to be
taken of all the claims of both sides, including in particular- (1) claims by Guyana
to the Amakura, Barima and Cuyuni areas, which we lost to Venezuela as a result
of the Award; and (ii) claims by Guyana based upon her possession and
occupation right up to comparatively recent times when Venezuela first formally
rejected the validity of the 1899 award. ,,11
This served as notice that the Venezuelan rejection of the 1899 Award would not only
mean Caracas' claim to Essequibo, but that if the Guyanese accepted the Venezuelan
argument about the award, this would result in a return to the claims of either side, as
they were prior to the arbitration award. An obvious deduction, but one which had not
featured in the Venezuelan approach. The decision of the Herrera Campins government
not to renew the Protocol was connnunicated formally to the Burnham government in
writing on 11 December 1981, six months before the expiration of the Protocol, as
required in Article V of the said document. 12
10 Interview with Rashleigh Jackson, 9 December 1999.
11 Press statement, 8 April 1981, OTP (1981), pp.16-17. See also, Caribbean Contact, May 1981, p.l8.
12 Guyana Chronicle, 12 December 1982, p.I; and MRE (1982), pp.144-145. See Appendix 6 on the
Protocol.
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So why was the Protocol not renewed by Herrera Campfns? Braveboy-Wagner
has argued that a number of factors may have influenced this decision. Firstly, the
COPEI government faced serious economic problems, mismanagement and corruption
accusations, and denunciation of a secret pact worked out with Colombia over its border
dispute with that country. Against the backdrop of innninent elections, a tough stance on
Guyana could, in such circumstances, serve as the diversion the party needed if its next
presidential candidate was to be elected. Secondly, concerns over Cuban influence in
Guyana including support in the territorial controversy in 1981, is cited as another
important reason. The incumbent Venezuelan government had moved closer to the US
position on Cuba and hence was not receptive to interaction between Cuba and Guyana.
Thirdly, Guyana increased its efforts at development of Essequibo, including seeking
funds to build the hydroelectricity project and issuing concessions for oil and other
mineral explorations. Fourthly, the government of Guyana was in a vulnerable position
as a result of its economic problems and political mismanagement. Fifthly, the precedent
provided by recent Belizean concessions to Guatemala in the longstanding dispute
between those two countries.13
Each of the aforementioned factors offers a sound thesis to explain the rationale
for the Venezuelan's government decision not to renew the Protocol. It is worth us
exploring further the Colombian angle since this may have more resonance than that
indicated by Braveboy-Wagner. The Colombia-Venezuela dispute centres on the
delimitation of waters in the Gulf of Venezuela. During 1980, the two countries'
governments, which had been enjoying closer relations, engaged in secret discussions
13 Braveboy-Wagner (1984), pp.228-231; and Braveboy-Wagnerin Hopkins (1983), pp.229-231.
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aimed at delimitation. At the end of the ta1ks, an announcement was made that a draft
agreement had been reached." The Venezuelan ambassador to Guyana at the time of the
non-renewal of the Protocol, Garavini di Turno, has emphasised that the severe criticism
of the Venezuelan foreign minister over action taken on Colombia was a very important
factor influencing his government's hard-line action on Guyana:
"... even during my years [as ambassador] you could not understand the position
of foreign minister [Jose] Zambrano if you don't remember that it nearly burned
his hands politically on the Colombia affair .... the reaction against him was so
strong that from that moment on, he saved his job just for little; and from that
moment on, he became extremely hard on the Guyana side. I would say that [the
Colombia issue] was a very important factor in the psychological attitude of the
government because the government felt very weak on the situation with
Colombia and the hardliners felt they were strong, the press was mobilised and
the government felt that the safest way of calming down the situation was on the
Guyanese side." 15
Myers' report corroborates and elaborates on Garavini di Tumo's story regarding the
effect of the revelations on the Venezuelan foreign minister:
"Because of the military's concern with defence of the frontiers, Foreign Minister
Jose Zambrano Velasco scheduled a meeting. During his presentation the
younger officers reacted with extreme hostility upon being briefed as to the terms
of the agreement. Senior officers indicated in private that they would recommend
to the Senate that the proposed treaty not be approved. Within several days the
civilian left was echoing the military's line that Herrera had made a bad bargain.
So emotional and widespread was the opposition that the President instructed his
foreign minister not to fmalize the draft agreement." 16
A similar point was made in a Caribbean-wide monthly newspaper article at the time:
"The Herrera government was unable to deliver to the people a promised
settlement of a border dispute on the Colombian front. It therefore seeks a
triumph, if not a victory, on the Guyana front which it can give to the frustrated
14Myers (1985), pp.17-18.
1S Interview with Sadio Garavini di Tumo, 28 February 2000. See also Ewell, op.cit., p. 310, for details of
the actions of the political group, "Nueva Generacicn", "Academia de Ciencias Polfticas y Sociales" and
other domestic Venezuelan groups against the negotiations with Colombia in 1980.
16 Myers (1985), pp.17-18.
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Venezuelans as evidence that as a mature nation, Venezuela has exercised its
sovereignty to restore the national honour ."17
Although Myers does not take his argument logically forward to link it with Guyana,
Garavini di Turno's argument appears highly plausible as an important factor influencing
the Herrera Campins-Zambrano Velasco action on Guyana In an interview with Herrera
Campfns, he stated that there was no link between what happened with Colombia and his
action over Guyana. IS
Whatever the hierarchy of factors influencing the Venezuelan government's
decision not to renew the Protocol, its coincidence or not with the move by Caracas to
strengthen its military arsenal and with another territorial conflict in the region resulting
in war, created a precipitous rise in the sense of alarm in Georgetown. In November
1981, for instance, newspaper reports in Guyana carried stories that the Venezuelan
government was reactivating two jungle brigades to strengthen its military presence on
the border with Guyana.l" This was only one month before Venezuela was required to
serve notice of its intentions, as required by Article V(3) of the Protocol. 20 Let us recall
that it was in April 1981 that Caracas signalled unofficially, its decision about the
Protocol. In April 1982, two months before the official expiry of the Protocol, there were
reports that influential Venezuelans were urging an armed solution to the territorial
controversy. 21 The Venezuelan ambassador in Georgetown was later reported as denying
knowledge of a build-up of troops along his country's border with Guyana, but one
member of the foreign ministry in Caracas was reported in the same article as confirming
17 Caribbean Contact, March 1982, p.lO.
18 Interview with Luis Herrera Campins, 8 March 2000.
19 Sunday Chronicle, 29 November 1981, p.l. A similar report filed from the regional news agency,
CANA, and Reuters, was carried in Barbados's Advocate News of the same date, p.l.
20 See Appendix 6 for the Protocol. The GOV notified its Guyanese counterpart of its formal decision not
to renew the Protocol on 11 December 1982, Guyana Chronicle, 12 December 1981, p.l.
21 See for instance, Guyana Chronicle, 17 and 27 April 1981, pp.1 and 12, respectively.
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the movement of troops on "internal security initiatives. ,,22Moreover, the commander of
the Venezuelan navy, vice-admiral, Rafael Bertorelli, stated in a press conference,
"Venezuela will exhaust all efforts in a search for a peaceful solution to the border
dispute but that does not mean it rules out the use of the military road. ,,23
Other reports tallied the number of Guyanese air space violations by the
Venezuelan air force as being eighty-three in 1981 and twenty-five for the following year
to April.24 On another level, there were allegations of the Venezuelan government trying
to induce Guyanese citizens in the border area, reminiscent of the Kabakaburi Conference
incident, discussed in chapter 3.25 The sense of mounting pressure from Venezuela was
accompanied by rumblings from Suriname; Guyana's eastern neighbour with which it has
border disputes over the source of a Corentyne river, the boundary along parts of that
river and an area of overlap in the Atlantic." Although Guyana and Suriname's
economic and military might are more comparable than Guyana's with Venezuela's, the
decision by Paramaribo's military leader, lieutenant colonel D. Bouterse, to voice his
anger about incidents relating to the disputed area at this time meant that the government
in Guyana was almost in a state of siege." The timing of such a stance from Paramaribo
was perhaps no coincidence, since as Gill notes, Suriname and Venezuela have often laid
on the pressure over their respective territorial claims in tandem 28
22 Ibid., 28 April 1982, p.l.
23 Sunday Chronicle, 18 July 1982. p.l.
24 Guyana Chronicle, 29 April 1982, p.1. The Venezuelan ambassador in Georgetown was later reported as
conceding that there may have been violations of Guyana's airspace, but argued that they may have been
done by small civilian aircraft, ibid., 24 JW1e, 1982, p.12.
2S Guyana Chronicle, 6 May 1982, p.l.
26 Pollard in Manigat (1977), pp.217-252, provides an histcrical analysis of the Guyana-Suriname dispute.
'IT See, for instance, Mirror, 20 December 1981, p.I, which reports Bouterse's television address in
Paramaribo in which he threatened to strike back at Guyana against perceived injustices.
28 Gill (1981), mimeo., p.8.
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Compounding the fear in Georgetown was the Venezuelan government's
acquisition of sophisticated weaponry at this time which enhanced further its
considerable military superiority over Guyana. A Guyanese newspaper detailed the
Venezuelan purchase of Italian frigates and F-16 jets from the US. It should be noted,
however, another publication argued that the sale of these jets to Venezuela was a direct
response by the US government to show its support for Venezuela vis-a-vis Cuba, rather
than Guyana:
"The overt sale of the F-16 planes to Venezuela was intended by the USA as a
gesture, not to Guyana's regime, but to the government of Cuba, of a readiness of
the USA to support Venezuela, uneasy at the thought of a 'third party' taking an
interest in the controversy with Guyana ,,29
This followed Cuba's issuing of a joint communique with Guyana in 1981 which
suggested Havana's entrance into the controversy in support of Guyana 30
All of the aforementioned factors created a worrying time in Georgetown. More
so, when it is considered that the expiration of the Protocol occurred in the wake of the
Fa1klandslMalvinaswar. Indeed, Venezuela announced its support for Argentina in that
war, while citing its own territorial controversy with Guyana 31 The Venezuelan position,
as expressed in a foreign ministry presentation to Congress, was as follows: ''La posici6n
asurnida por el pais y por el Gobiemo Nacional fue de absoluta solidaridad con la
herrnana Republica de Argentina ..32 Such a stand was conceived in terms of the anti-
colonial framework of Venezuela, as Herrera Campfns explains:
29 Caribbean Contact, March 1982, p.l0. See Table 1 fer further details of Venezuela's acquisition of F-16
fighter jets.
30 See Catholic Standard, 27 January 1985, p.4, for a report on Cuba's declarations in support of Guyana.
31 Report inExpress, as reproduced in Guyana Chronicle, 5 May 1982, p.8.
32 MRE (1983), Intrcxluction.
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"El problema podriamos decir nuestro, no es con Guyana; el problema es con
Inglaterra y ya 10 vimos cuando el ano vino la Guerra Las Malvinas, nosotros
dentro la concepcion anticolonialista Latinoamericana nos pusimos, al lado de
Argentina... "33
From the perspective of the Venezuelan government, the FalklandslMalvinas is
intricately linked with colonialism. It was reported too, "The Argentine military takeover
of the Falkland Islands prompted nationalists in Venezuela this week to suggest similar
action against Guyana. 1134 Similar stories were carried in British newspapers on the
likelihood of a Venezuelan military invasion of the Essequibo.P The Guardian, for
instance, stated that support for armed invasion increased not just in relation to Argentine
action in the Falklands, but also after news of oil discoveries in the Bssequibor'" In April
1982, the Canadian Home Oil Company announced its discovery of oil in the North
Rupununi area of Essequibo, following an exploration concession issued by the
government of Guyana." This would have increased the stakes in Venezuela over
Essequibo, not necessarily from a monetary perspective, but in terms of preventing
exploitation of what the Venezuelans consider to be their soil.
Despite these signs, Garavini di Turno stresses that while there may have been
elements in Venezuelan society favouring an invasion, it was not official government
policy. He notes, however, "I am sure there were many in the more radical [civilian and
military] in Venezuela, thinking 'oh well, if they did it, we should do the same'. [But
33 Interview with Luis Herrera Campfns, 10 March 2000.
34 Trinidad Guardian, 17 April 1981, p.l. It should be noted that the calls for military invasion were not
confined to the 1982 period, but is a recurrent theme amongst certain civilian and military elements in
Venezuela. This author interviewed one former Venezuelan army colonel, Pompeyo Torrealba, m 10
March 2000, who was still very much in favour of a military solution.
3S The British newspapers included the Daily Telegraph and Glasgow Herald, extracts from which were
eublished in Guyana Chronicle, 19 May, 1982, p.16.
6 The Guardian, 23 April 1982.
37 Catholic Standard, 25 April 1982, p.l.
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that] was not the government's plan.,,38 As Venezuelan ambassador to Guyana at the
time, Garavini di Turno was amongst those Venezuelan diplomats issuing statements to
the press that it was not its government's intention to invade Guyana.P Myers, whose
report acknowledges that the light crude discovered in the Essequibo in April 1982 would
be viewed in Caracas as a welcomed bonus to the country's own less marketable heavy
crude, has argued that an invasion by Venezuela was unlikely:
"Use of the military option to force Guyana to the bargaining table, especially in
light of the positions taken by Great Britain and the United States during the
Falklands Islands conflict, was unrealistic. Consequently, with most diplomatic
options exhausted, Venezuelan efforts to recover any of the Essequibo remained
at an impasse for the remainder of the Herrera government. ,,40
As such, the Herrera Campins administration may have boxed itself into a comer that no
longer seemed an attractive one.
The International Approaches of the Government of Guyana
The GOG continued to use international fora and strategic states to counter the
actual and perceived threats faced from Caracas during this period of heightened
tensions. Two factors, in particular, facilitated an extension of Guyana's internationalising
strategies. They include: systemic changes resulting from detente which was conducive
to the rise of third world movements and hence widened the international fora which
Georgetown could access; and the transformation of CARIFT A into CARICOM, whose
treaty provided for foreign policy coordination of member states. Braveboy-Wagner's
description of the foreign policy strategies of this period is apt, " ... international visibility
38 Interview with Garavini di Tumo, 28 February 2000.
39 See for instance, Trinidad Guardian, 28 April 1982, p.5; and Express, 12 May 1982, p.21.
40 Myers (1985), p.16.
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as a strategy to win friends and raise the costs to Venezuela of continuing to press its
claim... ,,41
The year 1981 saw a return to a more direct advocacy by the Burnham
government in the UN on the Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy after Venezuela
signalled its intention not to renew the Protocol. As Jackson stated in a speech of the
same year, "Faced as we are today with a serious threat to our territorial integrity and
with other external pressures to alter our strategy for economic development, the Party is
particularly pre-occupied at this moment with the task of formulating foreign policy."
Moreover, Jackson went on to record the significance of the UN as a form of security for
countries such as Guyana in all aspects of the problems they face:
"For small states like Guyana, the United Nations is part of our security system,
for in it, we can with a mobilised public opinion seek to expose and condemn
discriminatory practices and seek to promote progrannnes and policies designed
to benefit the majority of mankind The United Nations must remain first for the
small and weak, a repository of hope working for a world where the harsher
excesses of power can be contained, even as we strive for a just and equitable
international system".42
This importance attached to the UN by the Burnham government was pertinent when in
addition to Jackson, the country's new prime minister, Ptolemy Reid, turned to the
General Assembly for international support, in a speech reminiscent of those delivered
prior to the Protocol.43 Once again, the General Assembly was used to draw the world
community's attention to Venezuelan actions. That is, namely the decision not to renew
the Protocol as well as other issues such as the objection to the Upper Mazaruni
hydroelectric project and other attempts to stymie economic development of Essequibo
41 Braveboy-Wagner (1989), p.44.
42 Jackson, (1981a), pp. 13-14. See also p.5.
43 Under a change in the constitution in 1980, Burnham became executive president.
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under Guyanese sovereignty. Reid also demonstrated the new insecurities of his
government in relation to Venezuela, especially in view of the recent acquisition by that
state of a sophisticated arsenal:
"... the history of Venezuela's behaviour on the question of the frontier with
Guyana gives us little cause of optimism What causes further concern are other
policies being pursued by the present government of Venezuela in this regard.
This allied with the desire of that government to acquire new and sophisticated
weapons of war, including F16 fighter aircraft, are increasingly clamant calls
within Venezuela for a military solution to the controversy."
The Burnham government clearly felt under threat from Venezuela in 1981, no doubt
exaggerated by its precarious domestic position, as discussed in the introduction of this
thesis.
During the speech to the UN, the tried and tested technique of widening the
context of the threat faced by Guyana to demonstrate its relevance to other states, in a bid
to win their support, was used. Reid declared, "The implications of the Venezuelan claim
are serious as much for the future relations between Guyana and Venezuela as they are
for the future of several states in Latin America and indeed beyond our region in Africa
and in Europe." The speech concluded with a call on the UN to persuade Venezuela to
abandon its policy on Essequibo:
"We bring it back [the territorial controversy] to this organisation in 1981 to help
us maintain our independence and to have our territorial integrity respected ... we
however now appeal to the organisation and each and every member of it to
prevail upon Venezuela to abandon the ill-conceived course of action on which
she has for too long embarked. ,,44
44 Ptolemy Reid's speech to the 36th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 24
1981, Guyana Chronicle 16 October 1981.
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Quite unsurprisingly, the Venezuelan government, at whom Guyana's international
advocacy in the UN was targeted, reportedly viewed the contents of Reid's speech as a
"propagandistic manoeuvre" on the part of the Burnham government. 45
A year later in 1982 - the year when the Protocol officially expired - the General
Assembly was once more the major international arena at which the Burnham
government drew international attention to its plight in the territorial controversy. This
time, the address was made by the foreign minister, Jackson, who once again drew on the
economic and military actions of the Venezuelan government against Guyana He also
gave his government's opinion on Venezuela's claim to the Essequibo. "We are
convinced that the Venezuelan territorial claim is an unjustified attempt to satiate a thirst
for the land and resources of others." Of particular significance, the General Assembly
was used during Jackson's speech to announce to Venezuela the international
organizations it deemed suitable for the next stage in negotiations between the two states,
as required under the terms of the Geneva Agreement at the end of the Protocol. Those
organizations being: the ICJ, the Security Council and the General Assembly." Given
that the Guyanese government was cognizant of Venezuela's preference for bilateral
negotiations as the next stage in negotiations, this call before the world community. can
only be viewed as a deliberate attempt to embarrass that state into opting for an
international mechanism
45 Sunday Chronicle, 29 November 1981, p.l, reporting on a document sent by the Venezuelan foreign
ministry to the UN secretary-general.
46 "Statement by Comrade Rashleigh E. Jackson Minister of Foreign Affairs of Guyana on Monday 11
October, 1982 at the XXXVIIth Session of the United Nations General Assembly", Jackson (1982), pp.26-
34.
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During 1982 the GOG was fortunate to have held one of the non-permanent seats
on the UN's Security Council. This feat (its second, the first being in 1975/1976) as
Ferguson notes, was not a result of sheer coincidence:
".. .it was more than fortuitous that Guyana acceded to membership of the UN
Security Council on 1 January 1982. This was merely the result of thoughtful
diplomatic planning, since the ending of the life of the Protocol of Port-of-Spain
in 1982 was one of the main factors in Guyana's earlier decision to stand for
membership of the Council. ,,47
Being on the Security Council at a time of escalated threats to Guyana's territorial
integrity effectively placed the Burnham government in a strong position in that
international body at a time when its support was most needed. The Guyanese
government, through its permanent representative to the UN, Noel Sinclair, wasted little
time in taking advantage of Guyana's strategic positioning on the Security Council.
Although, as in earlier times, not opting to call for a Security Council resolution, that
body's president, along with the UN secretary-general, were nevertheless notified of
developments between Caracas and Georgetown." Such notifications occurred
especially in relation to reports of an imminent invasion of Guyana by Venezuela and
reported incursions by Venezuelan military personnel into Guyanese territory."
At another UN forum in 1982, Jackson also expressed his satisfaction at the
provisions made in the Law of the Sea Convention, in what was an unambiguous
reference to Venezuela and its claims to Essequibo:
47 Ferguson (1999), p.382.
48 A letter from Guyana's permanent representative to the president of the Security Council and the
response from the Venezuelan counterpart, both in 1982, are reprinted in Braveboy-Wagner in Hopkins
(1983), pp.341-343. See also, Guyana Chronicle 29 April 1982, pp.l, 12; Trinidad Guardian 13 May
1982, p.2 and 15 May, p.z; and Sunday Chronicle, 16 May 1982, p.l.
49 See, for instance, Trinidad Guardian, 13 May 1982, p.2, en the PNC administratioa's complaint to the
Security Council about the troop incursions into its territory.
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"Yet we must be on guard lest there are attempts to insinuate into bilateral
relations under the guise of maritime delimitation, disputes and controversies
which owe their inspiration to ambitions rooted in territorial aggrandisement. The
Convention elaborates a regime for the peaceful use of the seas. In this sense
Guyana notes with keen interest the provisions dealing with the peaceful
settlement of disputes through compulsory procedures. Furthermore Guyana is
particularly attracted to article 301 under which states 'in exercising their rights
and performing their duties under the convention' are enjoined to 'refrain from any
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state .. .'.,,50
Once again, the Burnham government had found parallels to draw on in an international
issue.
In 1975, Guyana's former minister of foreign affairs, Shridath Ramphal, became
the secretary-general of the Commonwealth, Ferguson has opined, "That elevation was
in itself as much a tribute to Ramphal's undeniable diplomatic prowess as to the
recognition of the tremendous standing of Guyana in the councils of world diplomacy
that he himself had contributed to build. ,,51 With Ramphal at the helm, Commonwealth
support for Guyana was strongly expressed at the 1981 CHOGM, after the Herrera
Campfns government in Venezuela had signalled its refusal to renew the Protocol of Port-
of-Spain.
"Heads of Government expressed their deep concern at the threat to the territorial
integrity of Guyana arising from the resuscitation by Venezuela of a claim to
more than two-thirds of the territory of Guyana and the steps taken by Venezuela
in pursuit of the claim Noting that the existing boundary was laid down by an
International Arbitral Award in 1899 and accepted by all concerned as a final
settlement, they expressed support for Guyana and called for the peaceful
settlement of the controversy in accordance with established procedures and with
full respect for the sanctity of treaties. ,,52
50 "Statement by Comrade Rashleigh E. Jackson ... at the Third United NatiClls Conference on the Law of
the Sea Final Session, Montego Bay, Jamaica ... 8 December 1982", Jackson (1982), pp.36-38.
51 Fergusm (1999), p.245.
52 "Final Communique", CHOGM, Melbourne, 30 September-7 October 1981, Melbourne",
Conunonwealth Secretariat (1987), p.228.
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This extract from the Commonwealth statement points to the fact that the Burnham
government had received the unambiguous support of that body's members when it
needed that backing in the territorial controversy with Venezuela. It should also be
observed that the acquisition of support from this group would also have fed into the
United Nations where the Commonwealth represents a bloc. As this newspaper report in
1982 indicates, "Commonwealth Caribbean Ambassadors at the United Nations have
asked to be kept fully informed of developments on Venezuela's campaign of aggression
against Guyana And they are ready 'to place their diplomacy at Guyana's disposal'. ,,53
As such, even before approaching the UN, the Burnham government was assured of the
Commonwealth's support.
Lewis has argued that the developing world was crucial m the Burnham
government's lobbying against the Venezuelan claim:
"An important aspect of Guyana's activities in international forums on this matter
concerned its attempt to seek to neutralize any attempt by Venezuela to achieve
legitimacy for her claim; particularly among the newly independent Third World
States. A major objective, then of Guyana's diplomacy of non-alignment was
directed at ensuring firm knowledge of its case among Third World countries in a
context of limited previous knowledge of the country and its problems, seeking
sympathy for its case and at least then neutrality in the case especially of
historical friends of Venezuela'f"
Searwar writes specifically on the utilization of the NAM in Guyana's bid to win the
support of the developing world. "The threats to the territorial integrity of Guyana and
Belize evoked, as one major response, the utilization of the Non-Aligned Movement ... as
a 'security shield' in the context of which could be mobilised the diplomatic support of the
53 Guyana Graphic, 21 May 1982, pp.l, 16, based on. a briefing given to that newspaper by Guyana's
~ent representative to the UN, Noel Sinclair.
Lewis in Bryan, et al. (1990), pp.285-286.
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Afro-Asian states. ,,55 Like the United Nations, the NAM, which Guyana joined in 1969,
emerged as a crucial international organ through which its government brought pressure
to bear on Venezuela
The NAM's aims include, "to maintain solidarity and give mutual support,
particularly in situations threatening the independence and territorial integrity of the Non-
Aligned Countries. ,,56 It is worth us listing the five principles of the NAM in order to
gauge the significance of the Movement to the government of Guyana in its territorial
controversy with Venezuela:
"(i) the right of all peoples to freedom, self-determination and independence; (ii)
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states; (iii) the right of all
states to equality and active participation in international affairs; (iv) the right of
all nations to determine in full freedom the paths of their internal political,
economic, social and cultural development; (v) the right of all peoples to the
benefits of economic development and the fruits of the scientific and
technological revolution; and (vi) the peaceful settlement of disputes with the
consequent need to refrain the threat or use of force. ,,57
On these bases, the NAM was tailor-made for the GOG to counter Venezuela's claims to
Essequibo.
The former foreign minister, Ramphal, has given an insight into the significance
of the NAM: "Non-alignment was the natural tendency of Guyana's foreign policy even if
we didn't have this issue, but having this issue made it terribly important that we had the
alliance of the Non-aligned Movement on our side and we worked very hard at it. ,,58 As
one former Guyanese diplomat also opines, "Guyana saw non-alignment serving a
number of purposes: i.t was making friends who were very important in terms of its own
55 Searwar in ibid., p.17.
56 "The Georgetown Declaration" in MEA (1973), pp. 58-60.
57 Reprinted in MFA (1984d), pp.16-17. .
58 Interview with Shridath Ramphal, 23 March 2001.
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problems with Venezuela, at least the African support.t''" In this regard, the support
given by Georgetown to African liberation movements was significant in winning the
solidarity of states from the same continent to Guyana's territorial problems. An example
of the support from one such state is that received from Zambia which was also
prominent in the NAM. As one Guyanese newspaper reported during this period of
renewed tensions between Guyana and Venezuela in 1982, "The Zambian President Dr.
Kenneth Kaunda has come out firmly on the side of Guyana in the territorial issue. ,,60
Irrespective of the motivating factors behind the Burnham government's advocacy for
African liberation struggles, there emerged linkages in terms of the backing the
government received from African states for its territorial controversy. The support
given to such movements may be viewed from one perspective as Guyana's adventurism
on the international stage in order to gain the legitimacy it lacked at home. At the same
time, it served as an important corollary to the general policy of seeking international
backing for Guyana's territorial integrity.
Danns is critical of the Guyanese government's policy of non-alignment. It is
worth us examining his arguments in full:
"The government's pursuit of a policy of nonalignment, of being in neither East
nor West blocs may be important for a sense of national integrity for a small,
underdeveloped nation-state, but it may also be at variance with the realities of
international power politics and can be viewed as either conceit or courage on the
part of the regime and its leadership. What is clear is that Guyana's nonalignment
puts it in the inevitable position of having no dependable friends and several
reliable enemies. ,,61
59 Interview with Peter Denny, 9 May 2000.
60 Guyana Chronicle, 31 March 1982, p.l. See also Jackson (1979).
61 Danns in Young and Phillips (1986), pp.125-126.
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It may be argued that as an international organ the NAM represented an important source
of advocacy for Guyana on its own and in terms of its linkages in other international
organizations, namely the UN. The NAM actually institutionalised coordinated activities
amongst its members, as this extract from Jaipal notes:
"According to a decision of the Algiers Summit, there was to be a Bureau to
prepare for the next sununit and for meetings of Foreign Ministers in between to
coordinate the policies and actions of members at the UN, to oversee the
implementation of decisions etc. This came to be known as the Coordinating
Bureau which met as and when necessary at Ministers' level, and met more often
at New York at the level of Ambassadors to discuss issues before the UN or any
crisis that may arise. ,,62
Conceded that in an era of bloc politics and with superpowers able to entice small states
into their respective folds, the policy of non-alignment, especially in weak countries,
represented more of an ideal rather than an achievable reality. Given the military and
economic standing of the majority of NAM members, they were unlikely also to provide
an effective combatant force in the event of a Venezuelan invasion of Essequibo. These
factors, while valid, ignore the significance of the NAM as a lobbying force in the key
multilateral institution, the UN. It also fails to take into account the impact of such
pressure on the Venezuelan government which regarded itself as a champion of third
world causes and as such, desired NAM membership. Let us explore how the GOG used
the NAM as part of its international approach to the Guyana-Venezuela controversy in
order to gauge my arguments further.
The importance of the Coordinating Bureau becomes apparent when one
considers the following argument proffered by Rajan. "Nonaligned conferences ... have
consistently upheld the primacy of the United Nations as the most representative forum
62 Jaipal (1987), p.l05.
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and effective instrument for the conduct of international relations within the conununity
of nations...63 Securing the support of NAM members would have been of significant
benefit to the GOG in terms of the minimum support it could receive in the wider UN.
The PNC government's active role in the Coordinating Bureau of the NAM, as well as
Burnham's attendance at NAM Surrunits, would clearly have placed Guyana in an
advantageous position vis-a-vis Venezuela in that organization." This is especially
when it is considered that Venezuela was not even a full member, but only had observer
status.
The NAM's oft-repeated declarations on the principles of respect for territorial
integrity and the peaceful settlement of disputes would have been interpreted by the GOG
as implicit support for its approach in the territorial controversy with Venezuela. It was
not, however, until 1982 - just prior to the formal expiration of the Protocol - that a
communique of the Coordinating Bureau pointed to an expressed solidarity with Guyana:
"Having heard the statement of the Foreign Minister of Guyana, the Ministers
expressed concern over certain developments in respect of Venezuela's territorial
claim against Guyana which have caused deep apprehensions in Guyana, a
member of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries ... They reaffmned that use
or threat of use of force in the settlement of disputes is inadmissible; that the
sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of countries should be
respected, that no State should try to interfere or intervene in the internal affairs of
other States and that all differences or claims which may exist between States
should be settled by peaceful means in order that peaceful relations should prevail
among States ...They called for a peaceful and just solution to the controversy on
the basis of the above-mentioned principles and in strict conformity with the
Geneva Agreement of 1966.,,65
63 Rajan inRajan et al. (1987), p.305.
64 See for instance, Jackson's addresses to the Coordinating Bureau of the NAM in New York and Managua
in Jackson (1983), pp.76-79, and (1983), pp.5-12, respectively.
65 Communique of the "Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of Non-Aligned Countries",
Havana, May 31-JWle 5, 1982, NAM (1983), pp.557-587.
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There could not have been a more clear-cut declaration of support for Guyana than this
one. It should be noted that an earlier NAM foreign ministers' meeting in September
1981 would have presented the first opportunity to lobby for support in the wake of
Burnham's visit to Caracas in April of the same year, when it was disclosed that the
Venezuelan government did not intend to renew the Protocol. The timing of that foreign
ministers' meeting, which was held in New York, occurred just prior to Guyana's renewed
campaign in the General Assembly. This would suggest that the Burnham government
had not been effective enough within the NAM to ensure reference to the territorial
controversy in the communique of the foreign ministers' meeting. 66 One year later in
October 1982, the result of the government of Guyana's lobbying at the NAM foreign
ministers' meeting was evident:
"Noting that the Protocol of Port of Spain had expired in June 1982, the [NAM]
Meeting called for a just and peaceful solution to the controversy relating to
Venezuela's territorial claim against Guyana on the basis of the principles set out
in paragraphs 134 and 135 of the communique of the Havana Meeting, in
particular the inadmissibility of the use of force in the settlement of disputes, and
in accordance with the Geneva Agreement of 1966. ,,67
Ironically, it should be observed, this was also a time when that organization was voicing
its support for The Argentine in the FalklandslMalvinas conflict, counter to Guyana's
position of supporting Britain. 68 The Burnham government scored another significant
coup in relation to the Herrera Campfns government at the 1982 meeting of the
Coordinating Bureau. During this gathering, the Venezuelan government submitted an
66 "Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegations of Non-Aligned Countries", New
York, September 25 and 28, 1981, ibid., pp.541-549. This factor was not observed by Ferguson (1999),
fP·385-388, who details Guyana's lobbying of the NAM in this period.
"Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegations of Non-Aligned Countries", New
York, October 4-9,1982, NAM (1983), pp.595-608.
68 It should be noted that according to Garavini di Turno (1988), p.136, the Burnham government had
previously voiced its support for The Argentine in a 1975 NAM declaraticn.
225
application for formal membership of the NAM. Guyanese foreign minister, Jackson's
response was to express his concerns about Venezuela's application not just in relation to
the territorial controversy but, skilfully, he also drew reference to that state's counter
position on other NAM issues, such as the recent UN resolution - Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Affairs of States." Moreover, as
Ferguson notes of the Burnham's government tactical diplomacy on this issue:
"What in essence Guyana did at the time was not to oppose outright Venezuela's
membership. Rather, more astutely, it forced it to have to publicly address its
disposition with regard to such principles as the non-use of force in international
behaviour. ,,70
His government had also used the opportunity of Venezuela's membership application to
get that country to cancel its objections to the Upper Mazaruni hydroelectric project."
The GOG's tactics were successful, resulting in Venezuela's withdrawal of its application
for membership on 14 February 1983, just prior to the 1983 summit of the NAM.72 This
was evidently a tactical move to stave off further embarrassment, as the Trinidad
Guardian opined:
"The Venezuelan withdrawal is seen as a move to avoid further humiliation at
next month's summit of the non-aligned movement in India Cancellation of the
Venezuelan application represents a defeat for the Caracas Government of
President Luis Herrera Campins, which had hoped to use the Delhi Summit to
mobilise further support for its Essequibo claim ,,73
69 See "Statement by ...Rashleigh E. Jackson Minister of Foreign Affairs on Venezuela's Application for
Full Membership of the Non-Aligned Movement. .. October 8 1982, New York", Jackson (1982), pp.23-25.
70 Ferguson (1999), p.385.
71 MFA (1982), p.27.
72Ibid.,(1983), p.29.
73 Trinidad Guardian, 17 February 1983, p.13.
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As would be expected, this climb down by Venezuela was viewed as a triumph for the
GOG. One Caribbean-wide newspaper noted:
"Although the Caracas Administration of President Luis Herrera Campfns said
that it had postponed, for a later date, its application in an effort to preserve unity
among Latin American and Caribbean countries with which 'we have excellent
relations' the Venezuelan move is viewed in Georgetown as a diplomatic triumph
for the Government of President Forbes Burnham. ,,74
It is important to observe that what appears as merely the Venezuelan government's
attempt to explain away the suspension of its application, was an indication of the in-
roads Caracas was making amongst states with which Guyana has had traditionally close
relations. Indeed, Garavini di Turno has argued that the outcome at the 1983 conference
of NAM foreign ministers in Havana was the result of the principle of consensus within
the NAM, rather than an outright support for Guyana's position on Venezuela:
"La tradicional regla del consenso, en el NOAL, convertfa la decidida negativa de
Guyana en un virtual veto ... el ejercicio del veto le cost6 a Guyana un
significativo desgaste de su capital politico en el NOAL, ya que fue utilizado en
contra de la opini6n de la abrumadora mayoria del Movimiento, incluyendo sus
miembros mas influyentes, e.g. Yugoslavia, India y Cuba. Para algunos
observadores, hubiera sido mas favourable a los intereses guyaneses, en terminos
de la ecuaci6n costo-beneficio, haber dado la bienvenida a Venezuela en el
NOAL y despues haber aprovechado su influencia en el Movimiento para
presionarla. ,,75
Such an argument suggests that what may appear to be a victory for the Burnham
government was not as clear-cut when the underlying story is examined.
The appearance, at least, of continued support for Guyana within the NAM was
demonstrated once again at the 1983 Summit in New Delhi. The meeting, which noted
the government of Guyana's attempts to preserve its territorial integrity, called for a
74 Caribbean Contact, March 1983, p.7.
7S Garavini di Tumo (1988), p.137.
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peaceful settlement in accordance with NAM principles and the Geneva Agreement. 76
Ferguson has argued about the important role of the interplay of personalities, namely
that of Burnham and Gandhi, in securing such support from the NAM.77 This argument
conflicts that of Garavini di Turno who, as noted earlier, suggested that Guyana's
lobbying against Venezuelan membership was counter to the preference of NAM states,
such as India.
Earlier developments within CARIFT A led to the creation of certain institutional
mechanisms which could be utilized by the Burnham government in its bid to ensure the
continued support of the English-speaking Caribbean against Venezuela's claims to
Essequibo. Firstly, CARIFT A's Seventh Conference of Heads of Government of the
Connnonwealth Caribbean Countries meeting in Trinidad in October 1972 had decided to
establish a Standing Committee of Foreign Ministers (SCMFA).78 Secondly, the Treaty
of Chaguaramas, which facilitated the converting of CARFIT A into CARICOM, made
explicit provisions for foreign policy coordination amongst member states through the
SCMF A. Article 17 of the treaty of Chaguaramas declares:
"1. To the end that Member States aim at the fullest possible coordination of their
foreign policies within their respective competences and seek to adopt as far as
possible connnon positions in major international issues, there is hereby
established a Standing Conunittee of Ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs. ,,79
That article institutionalised foreign policy coordination within CARICOM through the
SCMFA.
76 "Extract 2: Political Declaration - 7th Conference of Heads of State cr Government of Non-Aligned
Countries, New Delhi - March 7 to 11, 1983", Appendix 2, Burnham (1983).
n Ferguson (1999), p.386.
78 Searwar in The CARICOM Bulletin (1983), p.30.
79 CARICOM (1973), p.23.
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It should be noted that while the English-speaking Caribbean countries have
scored some successes in foreign policy coordination over the years, there has been some
criticisms levelled at that coordination. The areas of successes have included the joint
decision by the four independent countries at the time - Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and
Trinidad and Tobago - to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba, even against the
background of objections from the USA.80 Unity amongst Caribbean states was also
instrumental in bringing about the African, Caribbean and Pacific countries' unity and
negotiations that ultimately led to the Lome Convention in 1975.81 Despite such
achievements, Payne has levelled criticisms at the foreign policy coordination aspect of
CARICOM. As early as 1980, he noted, "... a consensus of opinion is now emerging in
the region that the area of foreign policy co-ordination is one of the Caribbean
Community's main weaknesses. ,,82 Griffith has argued that differences in politics,
ideology and national interests affected coordination. 83 Moreover, as Braveboy-Wagner
has contended, CARICOM "... are not in any way bound as a group to a common
position. ,,84 That this is the case is implicit in the Treaty of Chaguaramas under which
foreign policy coordination is an aim, rather than mandatory. Criticisms have also been
levelled against CARICOM and its predecessor, CARFIFf A, for not having conflict
resolution, military or security mechanisms. 85
80 Ramphal (1985), p.14 and Payne (1980), p.21l. Gill inManigat (l977b), pp.365-368, notes that the
Burnham government had taken the lead in respect of this decision.
81 Ramphal (1975b) and Dyett (1989).
82 Payne (1980), p.222. See also Payne (1984), p.139 in which he notes that the SCMFA met only four
times in the first six years (1973-1979) of its existence.
83 Griffith in Braveboy- Wagner (1993), p.113.
84 Braveboy-Wagner (1989), p.148.
8S Ibid.; Collart in Preiswerk (1969), pp.170-188; and Danns in YOWlg and Philipps (1986).
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In spite of its drawbacks, CARICOM, continued to be regarded as a major source
of support for Guyana in the territorial controversy with Venezuela. As Searwar has
contended, "In the case of Guyana, co-ordinated foreign policy action has ... provided an
important security resource in the controversy which has developed as a result of the
Venezuelan c1aim.,,86 That support had extra-regional significance since, like the NAM,
CARICOM members also attempted to coordinate their foreign policy in New York at
the annual General Assembly sessions.V This is not to say, however, that that support
was automatic or always forthcoming. We turn our attention now to the successes and
difficulties the Burnham government encountered in its strategy of mobilising Caribbean
support. In doing so, I will consider two aspects - the extent to which CARICOM was
mobilised and that body's advocacy on behalf of Guyana
It should be noted when considering the GOG's lobbying of CARICOM that the
regional body, which was officially formed on 1May 1974, had encountered a period of
stagnation between 1976 and 1981 when no Heads of Government Meetings took place. 88
The Meetings of the SCMFA fared slightly better, as mentioned earlier, with four
gatherings within the first six years of CARICOM. Luckily for the Burnham
government, this stagnation within the movement took place at a time of relatively good
relations between Caracas and Georgetown.
The signal from Herrera Campfns in April 1981 that his government would not be
renewing the Protocol of Port-of-Spain resulted in the PNC government going into
86 Searwar in The CAR/COM Bulletin (1983), p.32.
87 Ibid., p.33. See also news release 911980, "CARICOM Overseas Missions to Foster Closer Co-operation
following Foreign Ministers Meeting in Saint Lucia", Caribbean Community Secretariat, 15 February 1980.
88 See Boodhoo (1986), p.105, who has argued that Eric Williams" ... was largely responsible ... " no
meetings being convened during that time, for more details.
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overdrive to target CARICOM member states for support. The diplomatic operation
launched in this regard has been described by the foreign ministry in Georgetown as
follows:
"In response to Venezuelan pressure over the Guyana/Venezuelan controversy,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs launched a highly successful diplomatic initiative
to win support from Caricom countries. A high-powered diplomatic mission
headed by High Commissioner Sahadeo personally met and explained to each
Head of Government the history and ramifications of Venezuela's expansionist
and colonialist plans not only for Guyana but for the Caribbean as a whole."s9
This lobbying was successful in its desired effect, as demonstrated by the publicly
declared and unequivocal support received from the SCMF A meeting, which stated:
"Reaffirming the support for the territorial integrity of Guyana, the Ministers
noted that the action of the Government of Venezuela against that CARICOM
Member State did not accord with the fundamental principles governing
international relations as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, in
particular, the sovereign equality of States, respect for the territorial integrity and
political independence of States, and the peaceful settlement of all international
issues. The Ministers called upon the Government of Venezuela to settle this
matter by peaceful means. The Foreign Ministers declared that CARICOM States
cannot accept that any State has the right to take action to frustrate the economic
development of any other State. They expressed full support for Guyana's efforts
to develop hydro-power in the Upper Mazaruni as an alternative energy system
and agreed to give every moral and political support to this end. ,,90
While the Burnham government's lobbying of CARICOM reaped great dividends
in 1981, the following year a different scenario emerged. This is despite evidence of that
government's continued lobbying of Caribbean states. The MFA stated, "The Caribbean
countries remain Guyana's closest associates in her international relations and the focus
89 MFA (1981a), p.22.
90 News Release 46/1981, "Sixth Meeting of the Standing Committee of Ministers of CARICOM
Responsible for Foreign Affairs", Caribbean Community Secretariat, 3 July 1981.
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of much diplomatic artention."?' To the contrary, the 1982 statement made by the Heads
of Government Meeting indicates that support from CARICOM was not as emphatically
stated, as at the 1981 foreign ministers' meeting:
"Recalling its concern for the sanctity of treaties and for defmed and demarcated
boundaries, the Conference noted the grave effect that this controversy is having
on the relations between CARICOM States and Venezuela and took note of the
unqualified undertaking given by the Venezuelan Government to eschew the use
of force as a means of settling the controversy. The Conference also called upon
Venezuela to desist from further action or threats of action likely to affect the
economic development of Guyana The Conference urged Guyana and Venezuela
to continue their pursuit of a peaceful settlement of the controversy in accordance
with the terms of the Geneva Agreement of 1966 so as to arrive at a final decision
as promptly as possible. ,,92
When taken as a whole, the 1982 CARICOM heads' declaration appears to proffer broad
support for Guyana in the territorial controversy. A more careful examination -
particularly of the latter half of the first sentence - indicates a shift from the concern for
the effect on Guyana, per se, to that of the relationship between CARICOM states and
Venezuela Nevertheless, the Burnham government was quick to interpret the contents of
this CARICOM heads' statement as unwavering support for Guyana:
"Meanwhile, she [Venezuela] seeks friends within Caricom by offering financial
and economic assistance. This tactic however, was recognised for what it was,
when at the recent Caricom Summit in Ocho Rios, Jamaica, there was full support
for the present geographic configuration of Guyana, and Venezuela was warned
that her continued claim and acts of economic aggression could jeopardise her
relations with other Caricom states. This was a stem rebuff to those who have
taken on the mantle of the Spanish conquistadors of yesteryear. ,,93
91 MFA (1982), p. 31. The same report (p.2.) also lists the other Caribbean heads of states who either
visited Burnham or whom were visited by him See also a report in the Guyana Chronicle of 21 May 1982,
pp.l, 16, which points to the lobbying of Caribbean states conducted by Guyana's permanent mission at the
UN in New York.
92 News release nO.5211981 mimeo. "Communique", (Ocho Rios, Jamaica, 15-18 November 1982),
Caribbean Community Secretariat, 22 November 1982.
93 Burnham (1982), pp.ID-II.
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The Guyanese leader had, at best, offered a spin-doctored interpretation. Ferguson also
took up the same line of reasoning as the Burnham government, without questioning the
facts, when he stated that at the Ocho Rios Summit, " ... Venezuela found itself coming in
for strong criticism as a result of its recent actions against Guyana. ,,94 Even allowing for
generous interpretation, however, the regional leaders' statement suggests a compromise
within the CARICOM, reconciling its historical support for Guyana with the relatively
recent developed friendship with Venezuela The Guyanese foreign minister, Rashleigh
Jackson, has admitted that the wording of the communique was the result of "a
compromise" between Burnham and his Jamaican counterpart, Edward Seaga The latter
is said to have been the only CARICOM leader that was "lukewarm in his support of
Guyana", at the a time when the Jamaican government was developing bilateral relations
with Venezuela. 95 This is a tacit admission that in 1982 there was not as strong a
CARICOM condemnation of Venezuela as witnessed the previous year.
Not surprisingly, the Venezuelan government welcomed the stand taken by the
CARICOM heads in 1982. Quoting Venezuela's Information minister, Guido Dfaz Pen,
one newspaper reported:
'''Guyana's efforts to get its regional partners to issue a strong condenmation of
Venezuela at the three-day meeting failed. The Caricom meeting constituted a
demonstration that Venezuela has drawn close to Caribbean countries. Not that it
is now trying to draw close, but that there was a closeness that has been
developing in recent years,.,,96
Moreover, the Venezuelan foreign minister at the time, Zambrano Velasco, was quick to
interpret the heads' declaration as being the result of Venezuela's Caribbean policy. He
94 Ferguson (1999), p.388.
9S Interview with Rashleigh Jackson, 11 April 2002.
96 Express, 28 November 1981, p18. See also Ely (1997) mimeo., p.41.
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states, "Nuestra politica de acercamiento a los paises del Caribe ha neutralizado en alguna
medida la natural solidaridad con que las circunstancias de una cormin tradici6n, lengua y
origen, tienen a manifestarse como expresion de vfnculos entre los pueblos. ,,97 The
hyperbole of this speech aside, it has to be recognized that the 1982 CARICOM
statement amounted to a significant coup for Venezuela, given the Conunonwealth
Caribbean's historical support for Guyana in the territorial controversy.
Garavini di Turno notes that Guyana had actually been forced to back-track on its
invitation to have the 1982 Heads of Government Meeting hosted in Georgetown after a
lukewarm response to its diplomatic lobbying on this front:
"... una intensa movilizaci6n de la diplomacia Guyanese para lograr que esa
importante 'cumbre' [of CARICOM] se realizara en Guyana. En un primer
momento, apareci6 que el objetivo guyanes habia sido logrado, se conocfo
parcialmente hasta el programa official de la conferencia cuya apertura estaba
prevista para la primera semana de Julio de 1982, en Georgetown. Segtin los
planes del gobiemo guyanes, la reunion se habria transformado en un gran acto de
solidaridad para Guyana, en su enfrentamiento con Venezuela Como un
significativo sfmbolo de solidaridad y apoyo, una de las reuniones importantes de
la conferencia habrfa tendio como sede, una localidad de la Guayana Esequiba.
Finalmente, Guyana no logro obtener la sede de la conferencia, en buena parte y
entre otras cosas, porque lfdres como Adams, Seaga, Compton y Charles no
querian transformar la reuni6n en una manifestaci6n de propaganda
antivenezolana. ,,98
There were ideological differences between Burnham and some of his Caribbean
97 "Discurso pronunciado por el doctor Jose Alberto Zambrano Velasco ... en La Cmvenci6n de
Gobernadores (Region Guayana)", MRE (1983), p.883.
9& Garavini di Tumo (1988), p.138.
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counterparts, such as Eugenia Charles.?' The pro-US hardliners were clearly responding
negatively to the Burnham era socialist ideology. It should also be recognized that this
government had lost prestige in the region as a result of, inter alia, its human rights
abuses, rigging of elections, militarization and falling standards of living in Guyana
It is unlikely that Guyana encountered difficulties in having the meeting hosted in
Georgetown as a result of Venezuelan influence amongst CARICOM countries as the
extract from the Libro Amarillo cited suggests or as is argued by Garavini di Tumo.'?"
Granted that Venezuela, beginning with the Caldera government and especially during
the Andres Perez administration had embarked on a Caribbean policy geared towards
winning influence in the region. Such a policy was accompanied by generous aid and
donations to CARICOM governments, made possible by Venezuela's growing wealth
resulting from the petro-dollars acquired as a result of OPEC action in the 1970s.101 So
widespread was Venezuela's encroachment amongst CARICOM states in the 1970s that
the country was subjected to a series of verbal attacks in 1975 by Trinidad and Tobago's
prime minister Eric Williams, who charged the country's leadership with a new form of
imperialism 102 Payne has argued that Venezuelan largesse to Caribbean states and the
human rights record under Burnham were the two factors influencing the 1982
99 See News Release 811980 "CARICOM Ministers Review Regional and International Issues at Saint
Lucia Meeting", Caribbean Community Secretariat, 11 February 1980, on the need for recognition of
ideological plurality within CARICOM. See also Livingston (1990).
100 Interview with Garavini di Tumo, 28 February 2000. See also Garavini di Turno (1988), pp.139-140.
101 See for instance, MRE (1980), on various high-level visits of CARICOM governments to Caracas in
search of aid. See also Boersner inManigat (1976), pp.435-464; Burggraaf inMillett and Will (1979),
pp.193-203; and Payne (1984), especially pp.113-136. Caribbean Contact, September 1981, p.14, details
Venezuela's extensive investments in St Lucia alone.
102 See Williams' speech to his PNM party conferences, "The Threat to the Caribbean Community", 15 June
1975", Sutton (1981), pp.352-360.
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declaration. 103 I would contend that the ideological differences between Burnham and
other CARICOM leaders, which were to become even more pronounced after Grenada,
were of more significance than Venezuela's economic generosity, though this would have
been a contributory factor. Indeed, the PNC administration was aware of Venezuela's
growing influence among its traditional supporters in the Caribbean and sought to caution
them against compromising their principles on issues such as territorial integrity in
1981.104
CARICOM's advocacy pressurized the OAS into rethinking the issue of Guyana
and Belize's exclusion based on the 1964 Act of Washington, which was incorporated as
Article 8 of the OAS charter. lOS This can be evidenced by the following decision:
"The Juridical and Political Connnittee of the Organisation of American
States ... tonight agreed to appoint a Working Group to study Article Eight of the
Organisation's Charter which bars countries with territorial disputes against
member states from joining the Organisation. The decision came following a 90-
minute debate by the Connnittee on a resolution proposed by the eight English-
speaking members of the 29-nation Organisation during the 11th General
Assembly of the OAS in session here. ,,106
The English-speaking Caribbean group continued to pressurize the OAS for the
appropriate change to its charter.107 This suggests that CARICOM members were able to
separate their problems with the Burnham government from that of a principle they
believed in: universal membership of the OAS. Lobbying on the issue was to eventually
prove successful, as will be discussed in chapter 6.
103 Payne (1984), pp.149-150.
104 Jackson (1981b), pp.28-33. Caribbean delegations were present for this speech.
lOS See, for instance, Caribbean Contact, January 1981, p.12.
106 Caribbean Contact, January 1982, p.11.
107 "Communique", Perspective Supplement: Fifth Meeting of Heads of the Caribbean Community,
Conference: Nassau, Bahamas, 4-7 July 1984.
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The GOG's relationship with Brazil took on an enhanced mode at this time of
heightened tensions between Georgetown and Caracas. Garavini di Tumo has suggested
signs of the Guyanese government seeking military cooperation with Brazil in 1981, i.e.
around the time that the Venezuelan government gave informal notice of its
unwillingness to renew the Protocol. "... el Jefe del Estado Mayor de las Fuerzas
Armadas guyanesas, Brigadier Norman McLean viaj6, en visita official a Brasil, donde
manifesto su interes en adquirir aviones de reconocimiento, camiones y otros equipos
militares." 108 Further evidence of this allegation was reported in a Guyanese newspaper
at the time sighting an interview given by Burnham to the BBC's Latin American service.
He is reported to have said that purchases would be made of reconnaissance and
armoured aircraft during his visit to Brazil in 1982. The newspaper added further that
Burnham's statement" ... supported other reliable reports that a (US)$lO million line of
credit from Brazil, .. " was to be used for the purchase of Brazilian-made Embraer
aircraft.l'" Such was the extensive development in Guyana-Brazil relations during this
period that Caracas became concerned. As the Trinidad Guardian reported in April
1981, "Caracas Press reports published here last week said a senior Venezuelan diplomat
had warned that increased co-operation between Guyana and Brazil could seriously harm
Venezuelan-Brazilian relations. ,,110 If those reports reflected the views expressed in the
Miraflores palace, then from the perspective of the Burnham government, its foreign
policy strategy of courting relations with Brazil to counter Venezuelan claims to its
territory, had the desired effect in Caracas.
108 Garavini eli Tumo (1988), p.135.
109 The Catholic Standard, 10 October 1982, p.4.
110 Trinidad Guardian, 22 April 1981, p.5.
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Any fears harboured by the Venezuelan government about its two neighbours'
relations would have been increased in 1982 - the year of the official expiry of the
Protocol of Port-of-Spain - since this year witnessed the strengthening of ties between
Brasilia and Georgetown. That year started off with the visit of the Brazilian foreign
minister to Guyana, Saraiva Guerreiro from 27-29 January 1982.111 This was evidently
part of the Burnham government's calculated strategy of demonstrating to Caracas its
close ties with Brazil. 112 Once again, various cooperative agreements of the types
described earlier were signed. The visit from Itamaraty, was followed by that of Guyana's
Minister of Energy to Brazil in June, where the discussions centred on cooperation in
alternative sources of energy. 113
Indicative of the extent of the Guyanese government's bid to have its more
powerful neighbour as an ally - was Burnham's visit to Brazil from 30 September to 5
October 1982. The timing of this trip was crucial, coming as it did three months after the
Protocol to the Geneva Agreement had expired. Indeed, the Guyanese foreign ministry
has described it as: "The visit was the culmination of long and patient work to develop
strong and friendly relations between Guyana and Brazil, and to promote Guyana among
the Latin American family of nations. ,,114 This was clearly a calculated move designed to
demonstrate Brazil's support, as Kirton has observed.U''
111 MFA (1982), pp.117-119.
112 See "Statement by ...Rashleigh E. Jackson ... at the Commencement of Discussions with ... Ranmiro
Saraiva Guerreiro, Minister of External Relaticns of Brazil. .. 27 January, 1982 in Jackson (1981), pp.5-7,
where Jackson refers to Brazil's observance of the principles of the UN charter and the pursuit of a good
neighbour policy.
113 MFA (1982), pp.117-119.
114 Ibid., pp.117-119.
115 Kirton in Jeffrey and Menke (1991), p.19.
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Apart from the usual trade and other forms of cooperation agreements signed, two
factors were of significance in relation to the Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy
during Burnham's visit. Firstly, he briefed the Brazilian president, Joao Baptista
Figueiredo, on the Venezuelan claim, securing the previously strong Brazilian statement
about, inter alia, the sanctity of treaties. 116 It is interesting to observe that the Brazilian
government supported The Argentine's claim to the FalklandslMalvinas islands, but it
was neutral on that country's use of force. As such, "The [Guyanese] Embassy [in
Brasilia] was at pains to sensitize the Brazilian government to the implications which this
conflict in the South Atlantic had for the GuyanalVenezuela controversy. ,,117 The second
issue of significance during Burnham's visit is the discussions surrounding his
government's purchase of reconnaissance planes and personnel carriers, clearly in
response to perceived threats from Venezuela's position on the controversy in 1982.118
Other cases of Brasilia's military cooperation with Guyana in the same year included the
former's extension of a line of credit of $17 million to the latter for military purchases
and the continuation of a training programme for GDF officers at the Brazilian Military
116 See Caribbean Contact, November 1982, p.6.
117 MFA (1982), p.21.
118 Caribbean Contact, November 1982, p.6.
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Academy. 119 These military forms of cooperation suggest that for the Burnham
government, its relationship with Brasilia went beyond receipt of a symbolic
demonstration of support.
It is evident that as relations with Caracas deteriorated, the government of Guyana
strengthened its ties with Brasilia. This points, once again, to Brazil's strategic
significance to Guyana in its controversy with Venezuela Progrannnes of cooperation in
a number of fields, including trade, health, training, transportation and technical expertise
were later devised and implemented in 1981. Official visits also took place between
Brazil and Guyana in the same year in order to follow up cooperation agreements. These
included that of the Guyanese minister of health, and a team led by the permanent
secretary of the Ministry of Trade to Brazil, while the governor of Roraima state which
borders Guyana, made an official visit to Georgetown, shortly after Burnham's ill-fated
trip to Caracas in April 1981.120 Amongst the areas of cooperation agreed on, were the
following: construction of a bridge between Guyana and Brazil on the Takutu border
river; the establishment of free port facilities for Brazil in Georgetown and the
construction of a road from the Guyanese town of Lethem 121 The latter is particularly
significant not just in terms of the renewed vigour in Guyana-Brazil relations, but also as
the area of Lethem - a part of the Rupununi where the 1969 rebellion took place - is
located in Essequibo. The Brazilian government, whether through calculated strategy or
fortuitous action was sending out a message to the government of Venezuela about its
119 Braveboy-Wagner(1989), p.39; and MFA (1982), p.23.
120 MFA (1981 a), pp.15-16.
121 Ibid., pp.37-38.
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willingness to be involved m the development of that county under Guyanese
sovereignty.
Colombia emerged during the Burnham years as a country of new diplomatic
strategic significance in the Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy. The importance
of this state to Guyana stems from the border problem that it also has with Venezuela.
Colombia's border dispute with Venezuela centres on the oil-rich Gulf of Venezuela, as
was discussed earlier. Although as early as January 1971 the governments in Bogota and
Georgetown had confirmed that they would be establishing diplomatic relations with
each other, it was not until the period surrounding Venezuela's decision not to renew the
Protocol that evidence exists of the Burnham government actively courting the friendship
of Bogota 122 Given that the same period was also a trying time in Colombia-Venezuela
relations after the secret negotiations between the two states had resulted in a public
outcry in the latter, the time was ripe for the development of a mutually supportive
relationship between Colombia and Guyana in relation to Caracas.
Guyana's foreign minister at the time, Jackson, has argued that both governments
in Bogota and Georgetown were influenced by their border problems with Venezuela to
form closer ties. "I think [the territorial controversy] defmitely influenced us .. .1 think
Colombia was influenced [by its territorial dispute] in having relations with us too."
Jackson further recalls the impact that the relations between the two countries had in
Caracas.
"When I went to Colombia, for instance, you find that Zambrano [Venezuela's
foreign minister] was saying, 'what is he going to Colombia for?' The fact is that
122 AirgramA-3 to State Department, 5 January 1971, Pol 32-1 Guyana-Venezuela, op.cit.
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Venezuela got worried that we were getting close to Colombia and that was to our
advantage because it meant they had another thorn in their flesh. ,,123
The Venezuelan reaction is understandable given that the unison between eastern and
western neighbours on the international stage could portray the government in Caracas
negatively on the issue of territorial aggrandisement.
Significantly, the relationship that the Burnham government courted with its
counterpart in Colombia was envisaged as a counter-balance to that developed between
Venezuela and Suriname - the latter also having a border dispute with Guyana. As
Jackson has explained:
"In our analysis, when you look at the operation of Venezuela and Suriname, they
always seem to be emphasising their claims at the same time. They synchronise
it, but even if they don't synchronise it, once one does it, the other [follows]. But
usually, Venezuela does it first then you would begin to expect to see what
Suriname would do. So we then developed a counter strategy of ... developing
towards such a relationship with Colombia ,,124
Evidence of the Burnham government specifically targeting a relationship with Colombia
was referred to in a party speech made by Jackson in 1981 during which he declared, "At
the bilateral level within the region, Guyana has sought more recently to develop and
strengthen our links with Colombia .... ,,125 From 2-3 June of the same year, the Guyanese
foreign minister, headed a delegation visiting Colombia Bogota's foreign minister,
Carlos Lemos Simmonds, later made an official ministerial visit to Georgetown from 19-
20 August 1981. That visit had represented the first official one from Colombia to
Guyana
123 Interview with Rashleigh Jackson, 11April 2000.
124 Ibid., 9 December 1999.
125 Jackson (1981a), p.20. Gill (1981) mimeo., also looks at Venezuela-Suriname coordination in relation
to Guyana.
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Jackson used the opportunity of his speech welcoming the Colombian foreign
minister to launch what was clearly an attack on Venezuela:
"There is revolving in the region a situation where notwithstanding the universally
accepted principles governing international relations to which they purport to
subscribe, certain states seem bent on adopting policies of political coercion and
of economic aggression against others. "
He lauded the Colombia government for its "...principles and correct position ... " at the
World Bank when another state tried to block the development of another; an
unambiguous reference to the Venezuelan government's position on Guyana's
hydroelectric project. Pointing to a unity of interest between Bogota and Georgetown,
Jackson noted, "... 1 believe that we are united in our determination to promote the
interests and rights of our peoples and that we shall do so in accordance with time
honoured and universal principles including those of sovereignty and mutual benefit.,,126
Agreements were also signed to strengthen economic, scientific, cultural and Amazonian
cooperation between Colombia and Guyana.F' The visit of Jackson to Venezuela's
western neighbour and the later visit of the Colombian foreign minister to Guyana in
1981, both followed on the heels of Burnham's ill-fated visit in April of the same year to
Caracas, thereby representing a concerted effort to woo Colombia at a time of impending
crisis in Guyana-Venezuela relations.
Importantly for Georgetown, in 1982 the Colombian government was amongst the
few Latin American governments not to back The Argentine's invasion of the
Falklands/Malvinas.V" As such, Guyana and Colombia found themselves united in
126 "Speech of the occasion of the official visit to Guyana of the foreign minister of Colombia ... Carlos
Lemos Simmonds, August 18,1981" in Jackson (1981b), pp.31-33.
127 MFA (1981a), p.24.
128 Andersen (1984), p.112; and Caribbean Contact, September 1982, p.8.
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opposition to an action vociferously supported by their mutual neighbouring state. The
same year also witnessed an intensification in relations between Bogota and Georgetown.
At the formal level, both countries upgraded their diplomatic relations to that of
ambassadorial level, with the first Colombian ambassador to Guyana being a resident
one, while the first Guyanese ambassador to Colombia was non-resident. 129Indicative of
the close collaboration between the foreign ministries in the two states was the visit to
Georgetown of the secretary-general of Colombia's ministry of foreign affairs from 18-19
February 1983. As a report noted:
"Apart from an exchange of views on the territorial claims faced by the two
countries, and on other international events, the Secretary-General also handed
over for Guyana's consideration two draft Agreements - one on Amazonian
Cooperation and the other on Economic, Scientific and Technical
Cooperation. ,,130
The visit provided both foreign ministries with a two-fold opportunity to strengthen their
ties, that is, on the border problems with Venezuela, and functional cooperation between
themselves. The growing Colombia-Guyana relationship was also of significance in
another area related to the Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy. That is, the
Colombian government had become an active lobbyist for Guyana's admission to the
~AS. This was evident in 1983, for instance, when the Colombian foreign minister
called for Guyana's admission to that hemispheric body.131As will be discussed in
chapter 6, Colombia's continued importance in respect of Guyana's admission to the OAS
was to become further evident towards the end of 1985.
129 MFA (1982), p.33.
130 Ibid.
131 Latin American Weekly Report, 25 February, 1983, p.11.
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So the Burnham government found a strategic ally with which to counter
Venezuela. Colombia was all the more significant because it had a contentious border
with Venezuela and even more because it was a country with historical and cultural ties
more akin to Venezuela than Guyana. In a sense, Guyana had usurped what may be
deemed a natural ally of Venezuela An indication of the perception in Caracas of
Guyana's growing friendship with Colombia is given in the words of Garavini di Tumo
who although writing in his capacity as an academic rather than a diplomat, nevertheless
vented his opinion on the relationship Guyana developed with Colombia in relation to
Caracas:
"Esta 'special relationship' Colombo-guyanesa, en funci6n antivenezolana, podrfa
parecer, a los ojos de mas de un latinoamericano, como hist6rico, cultural e
ideol6gicamente 'contra natura', a este respecto, quizas serfa interesante recordar
que el Congreso de Colombia, en 1966, aprob6 un Acuerdo en apoyo de la
reclamaci6n venezolana de la Guyana Esequiba ,,132
If Garavini di Tumo's opinion is indicative of the reaction in Caracas, the growing
Bogota-Georgetown ties represented not only the Burnham government's acquisition of
another Latin American ally, but significantly, one which, according to Garavini di Tumo
and Braveboy-Wagner, had earlier been supportive of Venezuela's reclamation policy on
Essequibo.V'
It should be observed that the GOG did not project Cuba in the forefront of its
strategy of winning regional or international support. Yet, Havana was unambiguous in
its support for Georgetown in the territorial controversy. As one newspaper has reported
at the time of heightened tensions in Guyana-Venezuela relations in 1982, "Cuba has
agreed to back Guyana in its territorial dispute with neighbouring Venezuela according to
132 Garavini di Tumo (1988), p.136.
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a Memorandum of Co-operation between Havana and Georgetown ... ,,134 Such support
would have been crucial in multilateral settings such as the UN and NAM, in roth of
which Cuba was a member. Not targeting Cuba as a bilateral ally has to be understood
against the realpolitik of geopolitics of which Burnham had long demonstrated
awareness. Moreover, Washington's neutrality was likely to be preferable to its
opposition to Guyana as a result of Cuban involvement. Child sums up the adverse
reaction in Caracas and Brasilia to the Cuban pronouncement in favour of Guyana:
"... the possible Cuban connection to the Venezuelan-Guyanese dispute has
caused concern among geopolitical writers in roth Venezuela and Brazil. The
Cuban link motivated one Venezuelan geopolitican (in a pre-October 1983
reference to Grenada) to argue that there exists a threat from 'a geopolitical arc in
the Eastern Caribbean'. ,,135
Earlier, during the coalition government in 1967, Burnham had addressed the national
assembly on his government's recognition that Russia was unlikely to go to Guyana's
rescue in the event of a Venezuelan invasion, judging from events surrounding the Cuban
missile crisis in 1962Y6 The same argument had no doubt informed the Burnham
government's position on not openly seeking to engage Cuba on a bilateral basis in the
controversy.
Part II: The Search for a new Mechanism
Under the terms of Article 3 of the Protocol of Port-of-Spain, its termination
signalled a return to Article IV of the Geneva Agreement.P? The latter, in effect, gave
133 Braveboy-Wagner (1984), p.212.
134 Trinidad Guardian, 30 June 1982, p.1.
135 Child (1985), pp.162-163.
136 See address in Guyana Graphic, 22 March 1967, p.l.
137 See Appendix 6 for the full text of the Protocol.
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the Guyanese and Venezuelan governments three months to agree on "... one of the
means of settlement provided in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations ... ,,138
Formal discussions were commenced on 1 July 1982 with the Venezuelan government
proposing bilateral negotiations with Guyana 139 This suggestion has represented a
continued theme in Caracas' agenda That is, to engage Guyana in direct talks to the
exclusion of other parties. The significance is evident given Guyana's weaknesses vis-a-
vis Venezuela and this is a factor of which the Burnham-led government was cognizant.
Hence it rejected the proposal, expressing a preference instead for referral to the ICJ.140
This was in turn rejected by Caracas':", as was Guyana's later proposal of a choice of
three international bodies - the ICJ, the Security Council and the UN's General
Assembly. 142
With three months passing and neither side able to agree on a mutually
acceptable mechanism, the two parties reverted back to the provisions in Article IV (2) of
the Geneva Agreement. That is, Guyana and Venezuela "... shall refer the decision as to
the means of settlement to an appropriate international organ upon which they both agree
or, failing agreement on this point, to the secretary-general of the United Nations.,,143
Accordingly, on 19 September 1982, the Venezuelan government proposed the secretary-
138 See Appendix 5 for the full text of the Geneva Agreement. Article 33 of the UN Charter states, "The
parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace
and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration,
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, cr other peaceful means of their own
choice", http://www.un.org
139 See Catholic Standard, 4 July 1982, p.4.
140 Document no. 50, "Nota de Rashleigh Jackson, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Guyana para Jose
Alberto Zambrano Velasco, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Venezuela ... 2 de agosto de 1982", MRE
(1998), pp.393-394.
141 Document OM 185, MRE (1983), pp.899-890.
142 "Statement by Comrade Rashleigh E. Jackson, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Guyana on ... October 11,
1982 at the XXXVIIth Session of the United Nations General Assembly", Jackson (1982), p.31.
143 Geneva Agreement, Appendix 5.
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general of the UN, Javier Perez de Cuellar, and this was accepted by the Guyanese
government on 28 March 1983}44 A month earlier, the Venezuelan ambassador to
Guyana, Sadio Garavini di Turno and his wife were shot during an armed robbery at their
house in Georgetown. 145 Apart from the embarrassment for the GOG, this incident did
not mar relations between the two states. Indeed, the year 1983 began on an upbeat note
with the shipment of bauxite from Guyana to Venezuela, following a million-dollar
agreement whereby Guyana would supply its western neighbour with the metal grade
bauxite it required by Inter Alwnina Company of Venezuela. 146 The UN secretary-
general accepted the new responsibility on 23 May 1983 and, in the process, designated
under-secretary for political affairs, Diego C6rdovez, as his personal representative in
discussions between Guyana and Venezuela on finding a new means.147
Following the change of government in Venezuela in early 1984, the discussions
involving C6rdovez were advanced between the new Caracas administration of Jaime
Lusinchi and Burnham. Both governments proceeded to engage in negotiations with the
UN secretary-general's personal representative and, in addition, a process of direct, secret
and informal negotiations, was initiated between the governments concurrently. This
writer was given an off-the-record briefing into the secret diplomacy channels which
connnenced on 6 July 1984. Those discussions were held mainly in London between
Guyana's former foreign minister and secretary-general of the Conunonwealth at the
time, Shridath Ramphal, and Emilio Figueredo, as the Venezuelan foreign minister's
representative. Some degree of disagreement ensued between Diego C6rdovez and the
144 Document OM 210, MRE (1983), pp.904-905.
145 The ambassador lost an eye in the incident, Catholic Standard, 26 February 1983, p.l.
146 Catholic Standard, 30 January 1983, p.l.
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two countries' representatives over the mechanism to be chosen for resolving the
controversy. The former is said to have wanted to build up a new means of pacific
settlement that included a combination of mediation and conciliation. This is reportedly
premised on the latter wanting "... to make his mark" and having "... his own ideas that he
wanted to put in action". A newspaper report in 1985 does refer to the UN secretary-
general Javier Perez de Cuellar presenting IIseveral ideas II to the Guyanese and
Venezuelan governments - a reference which probably refers to the initiatives devised by
Cordovez.I'" Nevertheless, Figueredo and Ramphal managed to convince C6rdovez that
his solution would result in both parties going "...back to their juridical positions ".149
The outcome of these discussions will be looked at in chapter 6 since the new
developments took place during the era of president Desmond Hoyte in Guyana For
now, it should be registered that the secret channel of communication was revealed in the
Venezuelan press, causing much negative reaction. As Garavini di Tumo notes:
"La filtraci6n en la prensa venezolana de su existencia provoc6 fuertes crfticas
entre personalidades influyentes tanto en el partido de gobiemo como en la
oposici6n, quienes consideraban que debfan haber sido consultadas al respecto.
Estas reacciones provocaron el aborto del 'canal' y, en buena medida,
contribuyeron a la salida del mismo canciller, Morales Paul del gabinete."150
Although witnessing the initial expression of concern about Guyana's economic
147 MRE (1999) and MRE (1998), p423.
148 Guyana Chronicle, 21 December 1985, p.l.
149 Anonymous interview.
150 Garavini di Tumo (1988), p.155.
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development of the Essequibo region, 151 the advent of the Lusinchi government in
Venezuela in March 1984 marked a return to cordial relations between Georgetown and
Caracas. This was demonstrated by the visit of the Venezuelan foreign minister to
Georgetown from 6-9 February 1985 when several areas of possible cooperation between
the states - inter alia, agriculture, bauxite, dredging, fishing and public health - were
discussed. 152 It was in fact recorded that face to face contact between Morales Paul and
Guyana's foreign minister Rashleigh Jackson at the UN four months prior to the former's
visit to Guyana represented the first person to person meeting between foreign ministers
of Guyana and Venezuela in three years153 - an indication of how seriously relations had
deteriorated between Caracas and Georgetown during the Herrera Campfns
administration. Relations with the Lusinchi government had assumed the cordiality of
the first Andres Perez administration. Reminiscent of the discussions during that period,
Burnham was reported as saying, "Guyana is ready to discuss a water for land deal to
solve its century-old Essequibo border dispute with Venezuela ... ,,154 The extent to which
this suggestion was serious is, however, unknown.
lSI Document no.54, "Nota de Isidro Morales Paul, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Venezuela para
Rashleigh Jackson, Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de la Republica Cooperativa de Guyana ... , 20 de
s~tiernbre de 1984", MRE (1997), pp. 397-398.
IS See for instance, document no. 55, "Discursos de Rashleigh E. Jackson, Ministro de Relaciones
Exterirres de Guyana, y de Isidro Morales Paul, Ministro de Relaciones Extericres de
Venezuela ... referidos al desarrollo de las relaciones diplomaticas de ambos proses en el marco de una
nueva clirna de cooperaci6n y de una pronto solucion ala controversia del Esequibo .... , 8 de febrereo de
1985", ibid., pp.398-400. For the communique issued at the end of the visit, see document 56, ibid., p.40l.
Full details 00 the areas of cooperation are produced inMRE (1986), pp.l075-1078
153 Ibid.
154 Express, 5 April 1985.
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The International Approaches of the Government of Guyana
By the time of the General Assembly session connnencing in 1983 Guyana and
Venezuela had progressed in their negotiations under the terms of the Geneva
Agreement, nevertheless, Jackson vented the usual general calls for respect for territorial
integrity and the peaceful settlement of disputes and controversies at this forum The
territorial controversy was also addressed directly, during which Jackson notes inter alia:
"The struggle to preserve my country's territorial integrity never ceases to engage
the energies and the attention of the Government and people of Guyana because
of the untenable claim which Venezuela has been actively pursuing to over two-
thirds of my country. We desire most ardently to free ourselves from this burden
which we have borne even before our independence and to remove this canker
from the relations between ourselves and our western neighbour. We wish to rid
ourselves and our region of the potential for conflict which inheres in the
Venezuelan claim and the manner in which it has oft-times been pursued." 155
In a reference to the inter-American system, Jackson also drew attention to Guyana's
continued exclusion from the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the OAS.156 It should be noted
that during the 1983 session of the General Assembly, Guyana served as vice-president _
a position for which the MFA's annual report stated Guyana did not seek nomination
for.157 The inference being that the country was nominated into the position based on its
standing in that world body.
During the 39th session of the General Assembly in 1984, Jackson again drew
attention to territorial controversy with Venezuela, indicating his government's desire for
the issue to be resolved. He also used the opportunity of his speech to call on that world
body, once again to "... strengthen the capacity of this organisation for increasing the
155 "Statement by Cde. Rashleigh E. Jackson .... October 5, 1983 in the General Debate of the XXXVIIIth
Session of the United Nations General Assembly", Jackson (1983), pp.25-32.
156 Ibid.
157 MFA (1983), p.2.
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security of small states.,,158 The vitriolic attack on Venezuela in the UN began to wane,
however, as Guyana-Venezuela relations improved under the Jaime Lusinchi
administration in Caracas.
The Connnonwealth recorded the progress being made between Guyana and
Venezuela in 1983. That organization's support for Guyana was again evident publicly in
1983, this time reflecting the progress that had been made between that state and
Venezuela:
"In reaffirming their position adopted at Melbourne with regard to the controversy
between Guyana and Venezuela ... Heads of Government noted that the
Governments of these countries had referred the choice of a means of settlement
to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions
of the 1966 Geneva Agreement."
Although not registering the "deep concern" of earlier years, the Connnonwealth
nevertheless made a declaration that demonstrated its implicit support for Guyana:
"They welcomed the unqualified undertaking given by the Venezuelan
Government to eschew the use of force as a means of settling the controversy.
Stressing the importance of the sanctity of treaties and respect for defmed and
demarcated boundaries, Heads of Government expressed the hope that the
controversy would be quickly and peacefully resolved. ,,159
The Guyanese government's active participation in the NAM continued for the
rest of the Burnham years, but as renewed cooperative relations developed between
Caracas and Georgetown overt lobbying against Venezuela in the NAM was curtailed. 160
The statement issued at the 1983 CARICOM Heads of Government Meeting suggests
that Venezuela had, at a minimum, secured the neutrality it desired in CARICOM.161
IS8 "Statement by ... Rashleigh E. Jackson ... at the 39th Session of the United Nations General Assembly on
3 October 1984 New York", Jackson (1984), pp.23-27.
159 "Final Communique", CHOGM, New Delhi, 23-29 November 1983, ibid., p.2S4.
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The SCMFA's communique in 1983 merely recorded the situation between Georgetown
and Caracas, but refrained from expressing an opinion about either side.162 This is
despite the PNC government's continued lobbying of that group.l'" It should be noted in
this regard that same year witnessed enhanced divisions between Burnham and his
counterparts in the region over the sanctioning of US military action in Grenada. 164
In some respects, the communique issued at the end of the CARICOM Heads of
Government meeting in 1984 at which Jackson had continued to stress respect for the
principle of territorial integrity, was a matter of fact recording of developments between
Guyana and Venezuela. 165 The 1984 meeting was also one which witnessed the growing
polarisation between Burnham and some of his CARICOM colleagues. This was evident
in the attempt by some heads, including Dominica's Eugenia Charles and Jamaica's
Edward Seaga, to change the rules of membership in order to exclude Guyana. 166
Luckily for the administration in Georgetown, tensions with Venezuela subsided, as it
began to engage with Caracas in the search for an alternative to the Protocol.
160 See MFA (1984a) and (1985), pp.60, and pp.62-64 respectively, for details of Guyana's activities in the
NAM in those years.
161 News Release 3011983, "Communique", Caribbean Community Secretariat, 15 July 1983.
162 News Release 18/1983, "Ninth Meeting of the Standing Committee of Ministers Responsible for
Foreign Affairs", Caribbean Community Secretariat, 6 June 1983. NB. The next page of this news release
was missing in the library at CARICOM headquarters.
163 MFA (1983), p.33.
164 The Burnham government conderrmed the US invasion that was sancticned by some CARlCOM
ft0vernments, ibid.
65 "Communique" in Perspective Supplement: Fifth Meeting of Conference of Heads of Government of the
Caribbean Community, Conference: Nassau, Bahamas, 4-7 July 1984. See also, "Reply by ... Rashleigh
Jackson at the Tenth Meeting of the Standing Committee of Ministers Responsible for Foreign
Affairs ", in Jackson (1984), pp.11-15.
166 Baber and Jeffrey (1986), p.175. The SCMFA was also matter of fact in its recording of developments
between Guyana and Venezuela in its 1985 communique, News Release 3311985, "Communique of
CARICOM Foreign Ministers' Meeting", Caribbean Community Secretariat, Georgetown, 16 May 1985.
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The Community's advocacy in one area relating to the Guyana-Venezuela
territorial controversy did not waiver. That is, on the exclusionary clause which barred
Guyana and Belize from membership of the GAS because of territorial problems with
existing members, Venezuela and Guatemala, respectively. Interaction between Guyana
and Brazil in the form of cooperative relations continued for the rest of the Burnham era,
but on a lower political scale as the furore over Venezuela's decision not to renew the
Protocol had abated in Georgetown. Economic problems confronted by the two states
affected the extent of their coopererion.l'" Fortuitously for the Burnham government in
terms of its territorial controversy at such a time, negotiations had been resumed with
Venezuela both informally and via the UN secretary-general's representative.
Summary
The period 1981-1982 witnessed the return to a relationship of conflict between
Guyana and Venezuela, for the first time since the signing of the Protocol to the Geneva
Agreement. It was signalled by the Herrera Campfns government's decision in April
1981not to renew that Agreement. The perception of fear in Georgetown was intensified
by Caracas' vociferous support for The Argentine in the Fa1klandslMalvinas war in April
1982, just two months prior to the Protocol's expiry, and the related calls by certain
elements in Venezuela for that state to adopt similar action regarding its claim to
Essequibo. This resulted in the GOG's diplomatic onslaught against Venezuela through
addresses at the UN General Assembly and other international fora.
167 See MFA (1983) and (1984a), pp. 17, 19-22; and 15-18 respectively.
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In accordance with Guyana's wider foreign policy berth, Colombia, and the
NAM, were targeted for the first time for support in the Guyana-Venezuela territorial
controversy. The relationship with the regional CARICOM was not smooth in the latter
part of Burnham's rule. The GOG had also encountered difficulties with Brazil in the
mid-1970s regarding Georgetown's relationship with Havana. In spite of these tensions,
the PNC administration was able to ensure that support from CARICOM states and
Brazil were not lost altogether. As the relationship between Georgetown and Caracas
became tense, Brazil's role emerged once again, as part of the GOG's counter-strategy to
Venezuela as it had been during the difficult period in the late 196Os. Even allowing for
differences between Guyana and CARICOM states, the organization also continued its
advocacy within the OAS for the admission of Guyana and Belize.
The GOG successfully resisted Caracas' attempts to persuade it to engage
bilaterally over the controversy, agreeing instead to the involvement of the UN secretary-
general. Georgetown was clearly aware of the dangers it faced as the weaker party, if it
removed the territorial controversy from the international sphere. By the end of this
period, the territorial controversy had not been solved, but neither had Guyana lost any
land, been invaded or ended up in a war with Venezuela, factors which point in part to
the successful lobbying by the Burnham government on the international stage. Signs of
an improvement in relations between Caracas and Georgetown were evident following
the ascension to power of the Jaime Lusinchi government.
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Chapter 6:
The Boyte Years 1985-1992: the Move from a "Confrontation
Dynamic" to a "Cooperation Dynamic"
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Guyana's Relations with Venezuela
It is my contention that this period of unprecedented cooperation between
Georgetown and Caracas was the result of new regimes in both states which facilitated a
new approach in relations. InVenezuela, the change of government paved the way for an
end to the conflictual approach of the Herrera Carnpfns era. The mere change in
leadership (even if not of party) in Guyana nineteen years after independence was the
single most important factor engendering a receptiveness to the positive signals
emanating from Caracas. This has been acknowledged by Hoyte: "I was a new boy on
the block. Burnham had been perceived as being a person who took a very hard and
inflexible line on the border issue. III Facilitating the change was the increased role of
personal diplomacy between Hoyte and his Venezuelan counterparts, Jaime Lusinchi and
later Carlos Andres Perez. Barston has argued that personal diplomacy or direct contact
between heads of government has become an important aspect of modem international
relations, allowing leaders to improve bilateral relations.' There was certainly a meeting
of minds between Hoyte and Lusinchi and later Hoyte and Andres Perez. As Hoyte notes
of Herrera-Campfns' immediate successor to the presidency:
"I think Lusinchi accepted there is no easy solution to this problem and that if
every country went back two or three hundred years, arguing what its border was
at that time, there would be chaos and he agreed that the thing to do was to lower
the tension and forge better relationships at all levels between the two countries;
relationships between professional people, business people, farmers, educational
people. 113
Indeed when Hoyte took office, he acknowledged the cordial relations that had recently
been re-developed with his counterpart in Caracas:
1 Interview with Desmond Hoyte, 16 May 2000.
2 Barston (1997), p.l06.
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"With the advent of the Accion Democratica Government in Venezuela under
President Jaime Lusinchi, there has been a welcome lowering of tension between
our countries and a positive response to building bridges of co-operation between
our peoples. ,,4
A similar conclusion was reached in a report for the American Air Force which stated:
"The incumbent Lusinchi administration, while committed to recovering the
Essequibo territory benignly neglected the issue during its first months in office.
President Lusinchi's approach was a marked contrast to that of his predecessor,
Luis Herrera Campins. Herrera Campins made recovery of the Essequibo a point
of national honor. ,,5
Jaime Lusinchi's administration adopted a less belligerent approach than its predecessor.
The relationship that ensued with Georgetown differed from that predicted by Braveboy-
Wagner: " ... Lusinchi, who has been running ahead in the polls, has been militant on the
question of Guyanese development of the Essequibo and has warned about Cuban
development in Guyana. An AD victory could mean less manoeuvrability in Guyana." 6
Lusinchi's presidency did not signal the continuity of bad relations between Caracas and
Georgetown, thereby indicating that Braveboy- Wagner's foresight was misconceived.
Instead, the governments in Caracas and Georgetown were to carry on pursuing their
fruitful interaction when Hoyte took office. As one newspaper reported, "Venezuela's
border conflict with Guyana is 'very much on the back burner', says the South American
country's Ambassador to the English-speaking Caribbean"." Cooperative relations were,
moreover, to continue under Lusinchi's successor, Carlos Andres Perez.
3 Ibid.
4 "The economy: the diplomatic effort: Address at the opening of the Heads of Mission Conference at the
Sophia Auditorium, Georgetown, on 11 July 1986", Hoyte (1997), p.23.
SMyers (1985), p.116.
6 Braveboy-Wagner in Hopkins (1983), p.236.
7 Trinidad Guardian, 27 February 1987, p.5.
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Other factors were conducive to the change in modus operandi between the two
states. Hoyte's emphasis on neighbouring countries being the inner core of the concentric
circles of foreign policy is vital to understanding the country's relations with Venezuela.
In this regard, it is apposite to note that the first visit of the Guyanese leadership during
this period to Caracas was expressed as a manifestation of the declared foreign policy
perspective of the administration in Georgetown. Hoyte declared:
"Last year, you will recall, I likened our foreign relations to three concentric
circles. The inner circle, I explained, represents the core of those relations and
embraces our neighbours, that is, contiguous countries and of course, our sister
CARICOM States. I would stress again the importance of this inner core of
relationships to our development prospects. My visit to Venezuela last March, on
an invitation from President Jaime Lusinchi, was an important expression of that
aspect of our foreign policy in action. ,,8
This focus would have sent a clear signal to Caracas of Georgetown's wish for a
paradigm shift in their relations from one centred on the controversy to one concerned
with development.
The Hoyte administration offered the added benefit of pursuing more pragmatic
policies than its predecessor. Crucially, these had the backing of the Reagan
administration in Washington; most likely a significant factor in the policy direction
which Caracas took towards Georgetown. This point has been elaborated on by Hoyte,
who states:
"When this sort of cold war [between Guyana and western countries] came to an
end and our policies changed so that the grouses that the US and other countries
have were no longer valid and we were pursuing an open economy and things like
that, we got tremendous help in our efforts to restore the economy. So it was that
kind of situation where a lot of people seem to be warming toward Guyana,
encouraging the country to pursue the path it had taken, complete the reforms
being undertaken and so on. I think the Venezuelans at that time were having
8 "Economic independence and self-reliance: Address at the opening of the Heads of Mission Conference at
the Sophia Auditorium, Georgetown, on 17 July 1987", Hoyte (1997), p.55.
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their own internal problems and also they realised that Guyana was not as isolated
within the western powers as it might have appeared to be years ago. ,,9
The fact that Washington was openly supporting and aiding the Hoyte regime would have
been evident to Caracas and therefore likely to influence policy direction towards
Georgetown. It is too early, of course, to tell from the records of the State Department
whether the US did seek to galvanize the Venezuelan government into cooperative
relations with Guyana Given past activity from Washington, however, such a premise is
not improbable.
The leader of the UF in Georgetown, Manzoor Nadir, has argued that Venezuela's
desire for closer interaction with CARICOM was a factor of influence in Caracas'
courting of good relations with Georgetown. He states:
"Venezuelan presidents at that time [during the Hoyte administration] somehow
were seeking to win a lot of CARICOM support for Venezuela and, as such. they
couldn't isolate Guyana and they had to have an acconnnodating policy. So
Venezuela's designs with respect to CARICOM influenced the soft position
during the Hoyte administration. ,,10
There is some merit in this argument given the desire on the part of both Venezuela and
CARICOM to foster closer relations among each other, leading to tangible policy
responses in this direction, as will be seen below.
The Guyanese foreign minister at the time, Rasbleigh Jackson, has argued -
perhaps unsurprisingly - that the effects of his country's international lobbying was a
factor which caused Venezuela to opt for friendly relations with Guyana He states:
"... Venezuela recognized that it was loosing [the battle to win support]
internationally. The [Venezuelan] foreign minister at the time, Consalvf, told me
that whenever their emissaries went to talk about Guyana people would ask them:
9 Interview with Desmond Hoyte, 16 May 2000.
10 Interview with Manzoor Nadir, 29 April 2000.
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'why are you bothering little Guyana?' So I think. that helped to say to [the
Venezuelans], 'look we have to change our tactics."!!
A state's image on the international stage is, of course, of much importance. So it is not
inconceivable that the international lobbying carried out during the Burnham era - which
had managed to portray Venezuela in a negative light - would have resulted in the
perception that there would be need for a change of approach. Progress in other
territorial disputes in the region were likely to have had influenced the trajectory of the
Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy. For instance, a treaty was signed between
Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago in 1990 settling the two states' maritime dispute.V
The result of all these factors was the curtailment of the GOG's international campaign
against Venezuela to focus on developing ties between the two states. Georgetown's
international action did not disappear altogether, but was expressed in more subtle ways.
The Hoyte-Lusinchi Fonnula of Cooperative Relations 1986-1988
The first evidence of the emergent pattern of relations which characterised the
Hoyte-Lusinchi era occurred in February 1986 at a time when Guyana faced a massive
fuel crisis resulting from its foreign exchange shortage. The government of Trinidad and
Tobago, which supplied the country with oil, halted the credit given for these supplies
when the Guyanese administration's debt to Port-of-Spain reached TT$550 million.P A
fuel-rationing progrannne was introduced in Guyana on 2 February, causing queues at
petrol stations. There were also long periods of electricity black outs, and water supply
11 Interview with Rashleigh Jackson, 11 April 2000.
12 Commonwealth Advisory Group (1997), p.l04.
13 Catholic Standard, 27 April 1986, p.3.
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problems as the Guyanese government attempted to conserve fuel. 14 The opposition
parties, most of which were united in the umbrella Patriotic Coalition for Democracy,
began to organize protests against the fuel rationing." As the crisis enveloped the Hoyte
administration, the Lusinchi government went to its rescue, in response to the approach
made on behalf of Georgetown." An agreement was signed on 24 April 1986 between
the two governments which lasted until December 1987, resulting in Guyana's fuel needs
being met by Venezuela The terms of the agreement were the result of discussions
undertaken from 14-16 April 1986 when a Venezuelan economic mission headed by
ambassador Pedro Sorensen visited Guyana.l" The agreement has been summarised as
follows:
"Basically, the package contains a counter trade element by which Venezuela will
supply principally petroleum products to Guyana and Guyana will export
principally bauxite products to Venezuela. But also included in the package are
agreements to expand trade in other products, investments and joint ventures to be
undertaken in Guyana and credit facilities to be provided to facilitate the
increased trade. ,,18
The deal represented, essentially, an oil-for-bauxite arrangement with avenues for other
areas of cooperation in trade and investments. It included a line of credit of up to US$15
million from the Venezuelan investment bank, FINEXPO, for purchases from that
country. 19
There were further ties between the two countries in 1986. It is worth looking at
some of the ways in which cooperation between Georgetown and Caracas was manifested
14 Caribbean Contact, April 1986, p.9.
15 Ibid.
16 Catholic Standard, 13 April 1986, p.1.
17 The agreements were signed in Caracas when the Guyanese vice-president Haslyn Parris visited, MRE
(1987a), pp.167 -168.
18 Catholic Standard, 27 April 1986, p.l. See also ibid., 7 June 1986, p.3, for the specifics of the
agreement.
262
that year in order to gauge the extent of the increased cooperation between the Guyanese
and Venezuelan governments. From the perspective of Hoyte's economic diplomacy
focus, the visit of a trade mission from the Asociaci6n Venezolana de Exportadores
(AVEX) of 1-5 June 1986 was significant in terms of what it represented. The group met
with the private sector, including Hoyte's advisory committee, the Chamber of Commerce
and the Association of Manufacturers. The same month had also witnessed the Lusinchi
government's donation of twelve tons of cooking salt to Guyana. The visit from AVEX
was reciprocated by that of an economic mission of the Guyanese public and private
sectors to Caracas from 28 July-4 August. In the academic field, the visit of the vice-
rector of Venezuela's Universidad de los Andes to Georgetown from 24-30 October
resulted in the signing of the second academic cooperation agreement with the University
of Guyana since 1979. This visit was preceded by one of the University of Guyana from
13-20 July. From 3-6 November, Guyana's vice-president, Haslyn Parris, headed an
official visit to Caracas during which a technical and scientific programme between the
two states was signed. Other areas of cooperation included the fight against malaria and
rubella, as well as sporting exchanges. 20
Against such a backdrop of intensified activities between the two states,
Venezuela's MRE declared:
"Con Guyana, el Acuerdo suscrito por medio del cual se garantiza a ese pais el
suministro de petr61eo con facilidades financieras y las garantfas de compra de
bauxita por parte de Venezuela, han dado inicio a una nueva etapa en las
relaciones entre los dos pafses. Por otra parte, la amplicaci6n de nuestra
cooperacion con este pais en otras areas ha significado la reapertura de un dialogo
19 Ibid., 7 June 1986, p.3.
20 MRE (1986), pp.167 -171. See also docwnent no. 57: "Nota de Hugo Alvarez Pifano ... para Simrn
Alberto Consalvi ... sobre la visita a Guyana de Julian Aguirre, Vice-Rector Academico de la Universidad
de los Andes ... 29 de octubre de 1986", MRE (1998), p.402; and MFA (1986), pp.25-28.
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sincero y promisor. ,021
Similar expressions were made by the Guyanese foreign ministry which declared,
"Clearly identifiable in 1986, were the significant changes in Guyana-Venezuela
relations. These new initiatives were enhancing previous efforts in promoting economic,
cultural and educational activities between the two states.,,22 The trajectory of relations
was undergoing a fundamental transformation from that of the Burnham-Herrera
Campins era.
The exchange of presidential visits between the governments of Venezuela and
Guyana to each other's capitals opened new paths of cooperation and set the stage for a
joint approach that was to yield major developments. Hoyte's visit took place from 24-28
March 1987 and was reciprocated by Lusinchi's on 16-18 November 1987. The opinion
expressed by the Guyanese president to his party cadres about his visit gives an indication
of the extent of its fruitfulness: "I would like at the outset to record my opinion that the
visit was good for both sides." In relation to the territorial controversy, Hoyte recorded:
"The discussions which took place between President Lusinchi and myself and the
agreements which were concluded during the visit evidenced, I believe, a
consensus that the existing controversy between our countries ought not to be a
barrier to the furtherance of co-operation in the economic, cultural and other
fields. Indeed, it would seem that such co-operation might well enhance the
existing circumstances for the resolution of this problem ,,23
The latter point was also elaborated in a statement released in Caracas during Hoyte's
visit:
"Los dos Jefes de Estado examinaron la cuesti6n de la controversia entre los dos
parses y senalaron que el clima de amistad y entendimiento que existe entre
21MRE (1987), p.I44.
22 MFA (1986), p.3.
23 Hoyte (1987), pp.5, 13-14.
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Guyana y Venezuela es proPICIO para tartar ese aspecto fundamental de las
relaciones bilaterales con flexibilidad y buena voluntad. ,,24
The president of Guyana's speech is significant in pointing to an acknowledgement by
both Caracas and Georgetown that the territorial controversy should not form an obstacle
to constructive relations between the two states. It signalled the recognition, especially
on the part of the Guyanese government, that such a modus operandi may, ultimately,
facilitate a resolution to the bone of contention between Guyana and Venezuela.
It is interesting to observe that even the foreign minister at the heart of much of
the international lobbying since the 1970s and who continued in office for much of the
Hoyte administration, viewed positively the move from confrontation to cooperation.
Jackson states:
"Let me say that the visit provided, if I may plagiarise a phrase, 'Windows of
opportunities'. I think it represents a shift from what I might call a confrontation
dynamic to a co-operation dynamic. The visit manifests that there is today in
Venezuela a fund of goodwill and a determination to build a strong lasting
relationship of understanding and friendship with us. ,,25
Jackson's observation about the IOOve away from "a confrontation dynamic" should be
understood both in terms of Guyana and Venezuela's relations with each other and in the
Guyanese government's international approaches. As will become evident below, there
was a shift in the international lobbying which characterised earlier periods of the
government of Guyana.
The understanding reached by the two presidents following their meeting in each
other's capitals resulted in three important developments relating to the territorial
24 Document no.58: "Cormmicado Conjnto de los Gobiemos de Guyana y Venezuela con motivo de la
visita efectuada a Venezuela pee Hugh Desmond Hoyte, Presidente de la Republica Cooperativa de Guyana
durante los dfas 24 al28 de marzo de 1987 ... Caracas, 27 de marzo de 1987", MRE (1998) p.403.
25 Jackson (1987).
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controversy. In the first instance, the two counterparts agreed on the establishment of a
Guyana-Venezuela Joint Commission; letters for which were exchanged by the countries'
foreign ministers on 27 March 1987, i.e. during Hoyte's visit to Caracas" According to
the MFA, the Joint Commission is a "... mechanism that would provide coordination,
consultation and evaluation of bilateral cooperation between the two states. ,,27 Hoyte
explains the strategy which was envisaged in forming this body: "The idea being that if
we got those relationships really going, we got interests being developed, that over time
people would not want their vested interests to be disturbed by arguing about the
border.,,2s
The second facet to have emerged out of the Hoyte-Lusinchi dialogue and which
was important in sensitising Venezuelan interest groups was Lusinchi's moves to
familiarise his Guyanese counterpart with these bodies. As Hoyte elucidates:
"... Lusinchi arranged for me to meet a wide cross-section of the society about his
policy. His policy of attempting to create these cross border vested interests
[involved] a lot of military people because he said to me that he had national
support for this and indeed he had national support for this, including the military
and the main political parties. "
There was also a strategic political introduction in an attempt to pave the way for the
continuation of the Hoyte-Lusinchi era of cooperation. Hoyte notes further:
"Specifically, I met Carlos Andres Perez who it was well known was going to be
the next AD candidate at the elections and was most likely to win. I met the
business connnunity and so on and all of them said to me that they were solidly
behind president Lusinchi and his policy. It was one of lowering tensions,
creating goodwill and forging strong links between these interests on both sides of
the border. ,,29
26 MFA (1999), p.2.
1:1 MFA (1987), p.28. See also Hoyte (1987), p.16.
28 Interview with Desmond Hoyte, 16 May 2000.
29 Ibid. The joint communique issued during the Guyanese president's visit to Caracas also bears testimony
to Hoyte's meeting with the future Venezuelan incumbent, "Communicado Conjunto", MRE (1998), p.403.
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It may be argued that the extent to which the Lusinchi government familiarized key
domestic groups to Hoyte is an indication of the seriousness to which that government
had viewed the development of productive relations with its counterpart in Georgetown.
It is also indicative that Lusinchi perceived his policy approach as long-term, This was
evidenced by the decision to introduce the Guyanese leader to the next likely president of
Venezuela, Carlos Andres Perez, someone who it will be recalled, had established good
relations with Burnham during their earlier presidencies.
The third major development during this period was the clandestine meetings on
the Guyana-Venezuela border between Hoyte and Lusinchi. These rendezvous were very
important in cementing ties between Georgetown and Caracas, especially as they allowed
the two heads of state to discuss ideas without the glare of or accountability to their
domestic constituencies. The first indication that such meetings would be held can be
deduced from the following newspaper report which states: "At the end of a four-day
visit here [Caracas], Hoyte told a news conference he and President Jaime Lusinchi
agreed to increase direct contacts to resolve the controversy over the mineral-rich
Essequibo region which Venezuela claims. ,,30 The report did not allude to the fact that
the links envisaged would be conducted without much publicity. As Hoyte explains,
however, this was to be the nature of the meetings, at least from the GOG's perspective:
"The other thing that facilitated the good relations is something that is not well
known, even in Guyana, and it is this: that we, Lusinchi and I, used to meet on the
Guyana- Venezuela border privately without any bureaucrats. We would just have
our foreign ministers, maybe some other persons and with no agenda. That was
not to solve the border issue, but to talk generally. You got to know each other
30 Trinidad Guardian, 29 March 1987, p.15.
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and you developed mutual trust and we talked about ways and means of
promoting good productive relationships between the countries. ,,31
The exclusion of their respective bureaucrats from these meetings was likely to remove
constraints on the interaction of the two incumbents. As such, it can be seen as a
deliberate move to create an atmosphere for full and frank discussions. While it is not
clear what the exact substance of these talks were, it is fair to say that they must have
been an important element in advancing the good relations being encountered between
the governments of Guyana and Venezuela. Evidence of at least one of the clandestine
meetings is contained in a document obtained from MRE which records the two
presidents getting together in the border area of Kavanayen located in Bolivar State,
Venezuela, on 19August 1988_32
The success of the Hoyte-Lusinchi formula can be judged by the variety of
arrangements entered into. These agreements are too numerous to be discussed in-depth
here, nevertheless, it is worth highlighting their diversity. In the financial area, the visit
ofHoyte to Caracas in 1987 resulted in an agreement signed by the two countries' foreign
ministers to extend the line of credit from FINEXPO, first issued on 24 April 1986, to 31
December 1987.33 Another agreement between the Venezuelan Investment Fund and the
Bank of Guyana was signed on 16December 1988.34 Oil supply continued on the agenda
when Lusinchi's visit to Georgetown in 1987 led to the decision to continue the
agreement between Petr6leos de Venezuela and the Guyana National Energy Authority
31 Ibid.
32 MRE (1999a), p.3. It is interesting to note that while this meeting may not have been publicised in
Guyana, it was recorded in the annual report of the Venezuelan foreign ministry, MRE (1988), p.326.
33 MRE (1987a), p.580.
34 MFA (1999), p.4.
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regarding the supply and fmance of oil.35 Cooperation diversified into non-traditional
areas, for instance, the Venezuelan president offered to construct a gynmasium and create
a civic park in Georgetown. The seriousness with which this proposal was made is
evident in the rapid deployment of a team from Venezuela's housing authority and a
construction company - Instituto Nacional de la Vivienda-INAVI and Construcci6n de
MINDUR respectively - to Georgetown within a week of Lusinchi's visit of the 16-18
November 1987.36 The construction projects were begun and completed during the
government of Lusinchi's successor, Carlos Andres Perez.
Hailed by Guyana's president as "one ofthe successful stories", was an agreement
to control the spread of malaria on the border area between the two countries.V Jackson
has argued about the significance of the malaria control initiative vis-a-vis the territorial
controversy: "I remember one time I had advanced the thesis [to the Venezuelans] that
the mosquitoes don't respect the boundary, so why don't we agree on a common
programme to eliminate the mosqUitO?,,38 This was, therefore, both symbolic and
practical for the trajectory of relations in the area of the controversy.
The Hoyte-Lusinchi period witnessed unprecedented cooperation amongst the
Guyanese and Venezuelan military. For instance, there was the visit of senior Guyanese
army personnel headed by the chief of staff, major general Norman McLean, from 21-28
June 1987. This represented one of the most significant developments in Guyana-
35 Ibid., p.204.
36 Document no.60: "Nota de Hugo Alvarez Pifano ... para Simfu Coosalvi, Ministro de Relaciones
Exteriores de Venezuela, sabre la visita efectuada a Guyana pee Cesar Quintana Romero, Ministro de
Desarrollo Urbano. Georgetown, Guyana, 25 de noviembre de 1987", MRE (1998), p.408.
37 Interview with Desmond Hoyte, 16 May 2000. The exchange of letters took place on 1 December 1988,
MFA (1999), p.4.
38 Interview with Rashleigh Jackson, 9 December 1999.
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Venezuela relations given that the two states' armies have had a relationship of conflict in
the border region since the 196Os. It will also be recalled from chapter 5 that certain
elements within the Venezuelan armed forces openly called for a military solution to the
controversy at a time when The Argentine had invaded the FalklandslMalvinas. Yet, five
years later, the Guyanese and Venezuelan armies came together in a spirit of cooperation.
The purpose of this tour, made at the invitation of the Venezuelan Ministry of Defence,
was to implement an agreement signed during Hoyte's earlier trip "for the prevention and
control of illegal trafficking in narcotic and psychotropic substances. ,,39 Such interaction
during the Hoyte years paved the way for further cooperation between the two states'
anned forces, leading the chief of staff of the GDF, Joe Singh, to declare, "Our
engagements with the Venezuelan military are of mutual respect." Further, he
emphasises the importance of collaboration:
"We [the army] don't create wars, but we have to carry out the orders of
government. We work towards rapprochement; we are not permanently hostile.
We work towards confidence building and try to forge relationships, emphasising
the professional as well as the personal. That relationship is important in the
event of maverick incidents by individual soldiers. ,,40
Singh's point about the military not creating wars, but acting in response to declarations
at the governmental level points to the important role which civilian leadership can play
in fostering good relationships between their anned forces. A similar point is made by
another senior GDF officer, Fairbain Liverpool, who argues of the Hoyte era: "I think,
generally speaking, that level of cooperation resulted from political cooperation." He
notes further, "... until the political powers declare the war, I think it is in the military's
39 MFA (1987), pp.29, 30. See also MRE (1987a), p.580; and MRE (l987b). The latter provides the texts
of agreements signed with the Hoyte government in 1987.
40 Interview with Joe Singh, 10 December 1999.
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interest to have some level of cooperation. ,,41 So while armies may not create wars on
their own, interaction at the level of government is important in fostering an atmosphere
of peace between military forces. The Hoyte-Lusinchi formula has been a poignant case
to advance this argument. It is interesting to observe, however, that despite the
significantly improved relations between the two states, Guyanese emigrants to
Venezuela, many of whom are illegal, received preferential treatment if they were born in
the region claimed by Venezuela 42 This suggests that Venezuela's claim to Essequibo
had not been completely removed from the agenda in relations between Georgetown and
Caracas.
The Hoyte-Andres Perez Fonnula of Cooperative Relations 1989-1992
The inauguration of the Carlos Andres Perez government in February 1989 led to
an intensification of the increased collaboration with Guyana which had been developed
by Lusinchi. The two administrations, Hoyte's and Andres Perez's, built on the good
relations already established and were to take the level of cooperation to new heights.
Memoranda of understanding were signed with regards to cooperation in energy, air
services between the two states, and the health sectors in April and July 1989, and August
1990, respectively.f An agreement aimed at promoting an increase in trade between the
two countries was signed by the respective agencies - the Foreign Trade Institute of
Venezuela and the Guyana Export Promotion Council- in December 1989.44
41 Interview with Fairbain Liverpool, 12 May 2000.
42 MFA (1987), p.34.
43 Ibid., pp.3-4. The air link was inaugurated en 24 March 1990.
44 MFA (1990a).
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At the crux of this new plateau in friendly relations between Georgetown and
Caracas laid the implementation of the Guyana-Venezuela Joint Connnission which
oversaw the areas of cooperation. During the fourth meeting of this body, for instance, it
was agreed that the Guyanese Institute of Science and Technology would provide
technical assistance in biogas systems for rural applications and in the area of glass
blowing." In the military field, an agreement was signed between the two countries'
armies "...for the establishment of a formal relationship in the areas of military training,
sports and cultural exchanges, technical and material assistance. ,,46 Amongst the issues
covered at the inaugural meeting in Venezuela in June 1991 were activities in the frontier
area, the movement of narcotics and intelligence exchange on issues of mutual interest.47
Interactions at the highest levels, notably between Andres Perez and Hoyte were
very significant in extending the capacity for cooperation between Georgetown and
Caracas. Both leaders had engaged in dialogue before the Venezuelan president's
inauguration and also met in a wider forum, CARICOM; but it was during a summit held
in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, from 8-11 November 1989 between the two presidents, that
major developments occurred. One, which will be discussed in the next sub-section,
related to the search for a mechanism to handle the territorial controversy. The Puerto
Ordaz talks also centred on electricity interconnection between the two states, specifically
between Venezuela's new hydroelectric facility - the Guri Dam - and Guyana's national
electricity grid. Discussions about electricity interconnection were first raised in August
4S Letter from Barton Scotland, head, Department of International Economic Cooperatim, to President
Hoyte, 9 December 1991.
46 MFA (1999), p.5.
47 MFA (1991), p.22.
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1988 by presidents Hoyte and Lusinchi when it was agreed to examine jointly the
feasibility of linking Venezuela's Electrificaci6n del Carom with the National Electricity
Grid of Guyana." It was after the Hoyte-Andres Perez meeting that the proposal was
advanced, since three months later, Venezuela's foreign minister, Reinaldo Figueredo
Planchart made an official visit to Georgetown, from 10-11 February 1990, during which
a Protocol of Intent on electricity interconnection was signed with his counterpart,
Rashleigh Jackson.49 It is of note that the Venezuelan government was prepared to put in
a funding request for the project to the IDB.50 The discussions about the electricity
scheme were also conducted during Jackson's subsequent official visit to Venezuela,
which was made from 13-16 June 1990.51
Guyana-Venezuela relations continued to intensify during 1990, a year in which
Andres Perez made an official visit to Guyana from 16-17 August. As the joint
communique issued after the visit noted, ''The visit of the President of Venezuela took
place in the context of continuing efforts by the two countries to further strengthen the
already existing network of friendly relations between Guyana and Venezuela,,52 This
statement has certainly been demonstrated by the issues which were raised during the
trip. In the first instance, this was symbolised by the heads of state of Guyana and
Venezuela decorating each other with their highest national awards: "Order of
Excellence" and "Collar de la Orden del Libertador", respectively.53 The two presidents
examined the growing cooperation between their states in the health field, including
48 "Project - Guyana-Venezuela Power Transmission Link", Hydropower Unit, Guyana National Resources
Agency, 20 January 1993.
49 MRE (1990), pp.180-181; and MFA (1999), p.12.
so MFA (1990b), p.19.
SI MRE (1990), p. 181.
273
malaria eradication. Other areas of cooperation that already existed and were discussed
included the private sector; fishing and fish processing; environmental protection and
sustainable development; and the campaign against the drugs trade. Regarding the latter,
it was agreed to convene a specific Mixed Commission in September 1990 on this issue
in order to take forward initiatives. 54 In the oil sector, although it was claimed that
Venezuela's OPEC commitments prevented it from supplying oil to Guyana at below
market prices, an agreement was, nevertheless, reached whereby Venezuela would be
flexible on the terms and conditions of Guyana's repayments for those supplies. 55 On a
separate issue in the area of trade, the Guyanese and Venezuelan administrations had
been negotiating an agreement which would give certain Guyanese goods preferential
access to Venezuela's markets. It was noted that the presidents" ... felt that the Partial
Scope Agreement between the two countries could significantly facilitate the expansion
of trade between the two countries. ,,56 The agreement was signed eventually by Jackson
and Figueredo on 27 October 1990.57 It is interesting to note that a secret memo from the
permanent secretary of the MFA to president Hoyte warned "... this arrangement is in
danger of serious erosion and possibly, of collapse." At the root of the problems were the
difficulties in utilizing the facilities on offer. Miles' memo notes further:
"We have not been able to take proper advantage of the essence of the
arrangement, namely, the utilization of the deposits made by the Investment Fund
of Venezuela for the funding of joint venture projects in Guyana. The one
exception is the collaboration between Dayco and Guymine and this has been in
52 MFA (1990).
53 Ibid., p.l.
54 MRE (1990b), pp.3-6. The first meeting did not take place, however, lUltil26-30 June 1991, MRE
(1992), p.44l.
55 MRE (l990b), p.5.
56 Ibid., p.5.
51 "Address by the Foreign Minister, Reinaldo Figueredo, at his office upon the signing of the Partial
Agreement between Venezuela and Guyana, October 27, 1990."
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dire trouble from the beginning - trouble which seems to persist despite regular
discussion at the technical and political levels. ,,58
In spite of the administrative and other incapacities in Guyana which inhibited such
ventures bearing fruition, the mere factor of the agreement being entered into represented
a significant advancement in Guyanese-Venezuelan relations.
Discussions continued on electricity interconnection, noting specifically that the
technical work of the pre-feasibility study was fmished:
"They [the Guyanese and Venezuelan presidents] observed that the work done by
the technical teams from both countries had brought the electricity link one step
closer to its fmal fulfilment, and decided that the next step should be to formalise
the request by both countries to the IDB for financing this Project. ,,59
'This scheme never materialised in the end, due to a combination of technical and
economic factors, as Hoyte has argued:
"... that project became a 'cropper' because the smallest facility you could have
established was between 750 and 1000 megawatts, which is a lot of power for
Guyana, and therefore, you had to have an intensive user of power at the end of
the line. What we had in mind was a bauxite smelter, so the whole project was
linked to the establishment of the smelter. Then just around that time, we had the
recession in the world economy and nobody was interested in bauxite; the steel
industry was another industry in trouble and the automobile industry and so on.
So the project then faded away. ,,60
A further attempt to reinvigorate the move towards electricity interconnection also failed,
this time due to changes in the domestic position in both Guyana and Venezuela:
"What was proposed by president Perez was that we linked Guri with Upper
Mazaruni [Guyana's earlier aborted hydroelectric power scheme] and with the
power generation of these joint facilities, we could supply the whole of Guyana
including the bauxite industry. We would have power to supply Suriname, if they
were interested in buying because for years Suriname has been attempting to
develop a hydropower facility, in a place called Kabelebo and also, most
important of all, is that we would supply the northern states of Brazil with power.
58 Memo from ambassador, Cheryl Miles, to President Hoyte, 13 December 1990, MFA.
59 MRE (l990b), p.4.
60 Interview with Desmond Hoyte, 16 May 2000.
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That was very exciting, it was very attractive to us and we asked the Inter-
American Development Bank when they were developing medium and long-term
study for the power sector in Guyana to include that linkage and they were very
keen on it, so that was done. However, shortly after, we lost the elections and the
new government was not keen on this Iinkage.t''"
The Andres Perez government also had its own internal difficulties to contend with at this
time. An internal MFA document describes the Venezuelan president as being
"completely immobilised", following an abortive coup in Caracas in February 1992,
thereby inhibiting the continued development of relations with Guyana 62 Electricity
interconnection was, clearly, a ImII1IIl.Oth undertaking in terms of funding. Of much
IIDre significance was what the mere discussion of the project represented: Guyanese-
Venezuelan relations had developed to such a high level of cooperation and trust that not
only was Caracas willing to link its electricity system to that of Guyana, but more so, the
Hoyte administration was happy to participate. This is despite the long-term security
risk: although relations were good at the time, a new Venezuelan president may well
decide literally to pull the plug on Guyana's electricity supply, thereby plunging the
country into crisis. The fact that the project even got to the stage it did is indicative of the
success of bilateral relations between the Andres Perez and Hoyte administrations.
On a more practical level, there was the completion of the construction of a
gymnasium in Georgetown and a medical faculty building at the University of Guyana,
two projects deriving from Lusinchi's visit to Guyana in 1987.63 A visit by the
Venezuelan ministers of foreign affairs and urban development was made to Guyana for
61 Ibid.
62 Draft briefing document: "Prospects for Guyana/Venezuela Bilateral Relations", p.4.
63 MFA (l99Oc), p.3. See MRE (1990), p.182. It should be noted that in discussions which took place
following Lusinchi's visit, Guyana opted to have the medical faculty building constructed rather than a
civic park. See document no.60, (MRE 1998), op. cit.
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the corrnnissioning of these construction projects which have been described as being
"completed by the Government of Venezuela as a gift to the people and Government of
Guyana ,,64 Of particular importance was the fact Hoyte had unofficial meetings with his
new counterpart in the border area of the two countries. Two such meetings, at which
bilateral relations were discussed in an informal setting, is recorded as taking place, once
again, in Kavanayen, on 19 August 1988 and 14 June 1991.65 Elsewhere, signs that
continuity occurred in the areas of cooperation initiated during the Lusinchi government
in Caracas are demonstrated by the meetings of the Joint Commission being continued,
starting with the second meeting which took place in December 1989.66
The Search for a New Mechanism
By the end of the Burnham presidency, the ideas devised by the UN secretary-
general's representative, Diego C6rdovez, had proved unpopular, as was discussed in
chapter 5. The government of Venezuela's special envoy, Emilio Figueredo Planchart,
made his own proposal for a mechanism to carry forward the Guyana-Venezuela
territorial controversy at a meeting held in New York from 24-26 September 1985
between the Guyanese and Venezuelan foreign ministers, Rasbleigh Jackson and Sim6n
Alberto Consalvt This proposal envisaged the role of a third party's Good Offices in the
64 MFA (1991), p.21.
6S MRE (1991), p.170; and MRE (1999a), p.3.
66 The Guyana-Venezuela Joint Commission met annually, with the exception of 1992 when a meeting was
not held. In the period 1991-1992, the areas for collaboration under review included: mining, science and
technology, tourism, the environment, health, culture, hydrology, economic and commercial issues and
planning - MFA (1991), p.21; and (1992), p.13. See also MRE (1991), p.170, for details of the fourth
meeting of the Joint COmmission which took place from 20-23 November 1991.
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search for a solution to the controversy. 67 The suggestion was met with resistance by
Cordovez, resulting in continued discussions of the under-secretary general's proposals in
September and November 1985.68 As Figueredo Planchart recalls:
"I introduced the idea of the Good Office. But there was a lot of pressure from
Diego Cordovez who travelled to Guyana and elsewhere in order to get his ideas
into action. Eventually, the idea of a Good Office was convinced by my
government and Ramphal [Guyana's special envoy in the discussions]. Ramphal
and I felt that if we went into juridical mode, it would not be a solution. ,,69
The idea of the Good Offices began to take shape in February 1987 when the
Venezuelan ambassador was instructed to inform the Guyanese administration of a
flexible formula for that process:
"Se instruyo a1 Embajador Pedro Sorensen para plantear mas alto nivel guyanes
una f6rmula de los Buenos Oficios que fuera 10 mas flexible, sencilla, menos
elaborada y menos especffica: un procedimiento en el cual todo fluya de manera
natural y permit a a las partes abordar el problema sin estar obJigados a adoptar
posiciones formales. ,,70
This proposal for flexible meetings to take place in an atmosphere where ideas can be
floated without being corrnnitted was acceptable to Jackson when he met his Venezuelan
counterpart in Georgetown from 10-11 March 1987. As an official document of the
MREnotes:
"Reiterandose los planteamientos del Embajador Pedro Sorensen, El Ministro
Jackson expres6: que estaban preparados para ser flexibles, sugiriendo comunicar
al Secretario General de la ONU que los pafses estaban discutiendo el asunto para
precisar los terminus de una nueva propuesta. Exigiendo que se le presentaran los
detalles y modalidades de los Buenos Oficios."?'
67MRE (1999a), p.2.
68 Interview with Emilio Figueredo Planchert, 1 Marcll2000.





The acceptance of the Good Offices proposal by both parties was communicated
to the UN secretary-general on 6 April 1987. As the MRE has recorded:
"Los Embajadores de Venezuela y Guyana ante la ONU participan al Secretario
General la disposici6n de ambos pafses de aceptar el metodo de los Buenos
Oficios. El Secretario General comunic6 que en atenci6n a la petici6n,
seleccionarfa una personalidad que no serfa un mediador, dedicandose a esta labor
hasta que ambas partes lleguen a un acuerdo mutuamente acceptable.
Oportunarnente se metera a la consideraci6n de ambos gobiemos el nombre de esa
persona. ,,72
Figueredo has stated that once the Good Offices idea was accepted, Brazil was suggested
in the role of good officer; this idea was not, however, acceptable to Venezuela 73 It was
during the meeting between Andres Perez and Hoyte in Puerto Ordaz on 8 November
1989 that the two presidents agreed to the UN secretary-general's suggestion of Alister
McIntyre as his personal representative in the role of good officer; a position to which
McIntyre was designated on 11 November 1989.74 The Grenadian-born vice-chancellor
of the University of the West Indies and former secretary-general of CARICOM was not
announced formally in his new position of good officer until 1 February 1990.75
Cooperative relations between Guyana and Venezuela facilitated the emergence
of the Good Offices process. A motivating factor for both Georgetown and Caracas was
the desire to move the territorial issue off their inunediate agenda of strengthening
bilateral ties. As Hoyte states:
".. .it was in those circumstances [of good relations with Venezuela] that we
[Hoyte and Andres Perez] agreed to ask the Secretary General of the United
Nations to appoint his good officer. Moreover, the choice of such a process was
seen in terms of satisfying our respective populace that the border controversy
was still being dealt with. We thought it would be a good thing that you have
72 MRE (1999a), p.3; and MRE (2000a), p.5.
73 Interview with Emilio Figueredo Planchart, 1 March 2000.
74 MRE (2000a), p.5.
75 Guyana Chronicle, February 3,1990, p.I; and MRE (2000a), p.5.
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this. " because, as president Lusinchi pointed out, you need always to be
reassuring your opponents that you haven't swept this thing under the carpet. So
that if they asked, you can say, 'well, it is in the hands of the Secretary General;
you have the good officer who is talking to both sides'.,,76
Hoyte's premise suggests that the Good Offices process emerged out of a desire for him
and his counterpart to rid themselves of the controversy in a way that was acceptable to
their domestic constituencies, thereby freeing them to advance their cooperative relations.
It may be argued that from Guyana's perspective as a small state, the involvement of the
UN secretary-general's Good Offices carries an inherent benefit: that is, the involvement
of a third party, in particular an international one, in the discussions on the territorial
controversy.
Emilio Figueredo Planchart's brother, Reinaldo, as Venezuelan foreign minister,
established with his Guyanese counterpart the mechanism of facilitators in the Good
Offices process during a meeting on 28 April 1990. Guyana and Venezuela would have
one facilitator each to take forward the discussions and proposals in a process which
would allow for the non-cormnittal airing of ideas to resolve the controversy." On the
Venezuelan side, Emilio Figueredo Planchart, who had been Venezuela's special envoy in
the discussions with Ramphal prior to the adoption of the mechanism and who had
suggested the process, was named as that state's facilitator. Barton Scotland, who
continued in his job as Deputy Chairman of the Natural Resources Agency in Guyana,
assumed the role of Guyanese facilitator.
76 Ibid.
77 MRE (2000a), p.5.
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The contents of the facilitators' meetings - the first of which took place in New
York on 13 August 1990 - have not been made public." The Guyanese facilitator at this
time, Barton Scotland, provides a snapshot view of the nature and conduct of those
deliberations. But first, let us explore the role of the UN secretary-general and the
facilitators. According to Scotland:
"The secretary-general's remit is to fmd a means of settlement of the controversy
and the good officer's remit was that. In a sense we [the facilitators] were like the
foot soldiers. In a nutshell, the process involved [is]: the controversy is always
making its way back to the secretary-general as long as the controversy has not
been settled. We [Scotland and Figueredo Planchart] worked with that remit,
namely to work our way towards finding a means of settlement. " 79
The UN Good Offices process is arguably the most important development in the search
for a resolution to the Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy since the failed Mixed
Commission of 1966-1970. Scotland describes the modus operandi of the facilitators'
meetings:
"... the whole idea was that we [Scotland and Figueredo Planchart] would meet
and we would discuss issues pertaining to the controversy. The results of our
discussions would be transmitted by each of us to our respective foreign minister.
We would then take it on from there. The representative of the [UN] secretary-
general was appointed, so to speak, as the conductor in the orchestra, but he didn't
play an instrument, We played the instruments and that I found worked very
well."so
The imagery of the secretary-general as an orchestra's conductor points to an essential
feature: while the head of the UN is charged with responsibility for overseeing the search
for a resolution of the territorial controversy, he is not actually involved in the nuts and
78 Three other meetings which took place during the Hoyte administratioo were: the second meeting en 23
October 1990 in New York; the third meeting on 26 January 1991 in London; and the fourth meeting en 5
April 1991 in New York, MRE(1999), p.3. The meetings were held away from Caracas and Georgetown
in order to aid secrecy.
79 Interview with Bartoo Scotland, 7 December 1999.
80 Ibid.
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bolts of those discussions. Although his representative, the good officer, is more directly
included in the process, this is merely to ensure the dialogue between Guyana and
Venezuela continues. In effect, he oversees the functioning of the mechanism The
Good Offices process, involving as it does a third party, is what Princen has termed
"intermediary intervention". Within such a category, that writer's typology of the
"neutral mediator" serves as a useful framework for understanding this process. Prince
states, "If the intermediary has no interests whatsoever in the disputed issues - direct or
indirect - but simply wants to facilitate an agreement, it is a "neutral mediator.?" The
purpose of such a figure amongst parties engaged in discussion is essentially to keep the
channels of dialogue going. As Princen notes further, the neutral mediator" ...may be
able to open lines of communication, clarify for each side the other's perceptions and
intentions and even suggest steps towards meaningful, direct negotiations. ,,82
While the governments pursued friendly and extensive bilateral relations in
public, the facilitators' acted as the secret diplomacy channel through which a means of
settlement could be explored, away from the influence of pressure groups and the media
Maintaining the secrecy of their discussions has been an important element of the
process, as the following incident described by Scotland makes clear:
"On one occasion, the good officer did send someone and that person attempted to
take notes; I tell you, we [Scotland and Figueredo Planchart] were both quite put
off! The result is nothing was discussed of substance and this wasn't a big
agreement or anything, it was just simply that we could not do it because a pencil
poised there over a notebook made everyone not want to talk." 83
81 Princen (1992), p.20. Ramkarran (1999), mimeo., provides further details of the function of the Good
Offices of the UN secretary -general and its precedents elsewhere.
82 Ibid., p.22.
83 Interview with Bartoo Scotland, op. cit. It should be noted that the process also involved the foreign
ministers meeting with the good officer who sometimes flew to Georgetown and Caracas for discussions.
"Secret Brief: The McIntyre Process", MFA (no date given).
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The procedure was for the facilitators' to make their own notes after the meetings had
taken place. Those records were then forwarded to the respective foreign ministers who
used them as the basis for their own discussions.
Discussions on a Solution to the Guyana-Venezuela territorial
controversy
The discussions about a solution to the controversy have centred on Venezuela's
desire for access to the Atlantic Ocean - a topic that was likely to be included in the
facilitators' dialogue. This would involve the GOG ceding some territory in order to
facilitate its western neighbour's outlet to the high seas. Such a scenario has been at the
centre of secret discussions with Georgetown to secure a resolution to the controversy
since the 1970s, as noted in chapters 4 and 5. Officially, however, Caracas maintains its
claim to the whole of Essequibo. Even Burnham who has been described as "very
inflexible on the territorial issue" ,84 was reportedly willing to discuss certain aspects of
Venezuela's proposal for a settlement. This can be gleaned from the following
newspaper report which states:
"During the government of President Carlos Andres Perez, the interviewer [of
Venezuela's El Nacional newspaper] said, an exit to the Atlantic was spoken of as
an alternative to resolve the difference, and the Venezuelan Chancellor Morales
Paul had recently told them that "Venezuela has to have a portion of land and sea
in an eventual settlement with Guyana. ,,85
Burnham's response is reported to have been: "This can be discussed ... 'But having an
entrance in the Caribbean is quite different from being owner of the land which borders
84 Interview with David Granger, 9 December 1999.
8S Catholic Standard, April 21, 1985, p.I, quoting from El Nacional newspaper to which Burnham had
given an interview.
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this sea'. ,,86 Even such a minor concession of discussing certain aspects of Venezuela's
proposal had represented a major shift in terms of Burnham's traditional rigidity on the
question of making any concessions to Venezuela.
Less than a year into office, the approach of the Hoyte administration was one of
flexibility on the question of a settlement of the territorial controversy. Like the
Burnham interview quoted above, the expressed willingness of the Guyanese president to
look at a solution was intended for a Venezuelan audience. As the Catholic Standard in
Georgetown reported from an interview Hoyte gave to Venezuela's El Nacional on 23
June 1986:
"Reminded that the Guyana Government for a long time held that it would not
surrender even a millimetre of the territory, claimed by Venezuela, President
Hoyte said he was not 'as a practical politician' pleased to make such declarations,
which can shut doors. I am disposed to listen and study proposals, then say
whether they are reasonable or not. ,,87
Hoyte clearly felt more at liberty to speak his mind away from his domestic audience. It
is unclear whether such pronouncements were merely made to win the favour of the
Venezuelan government in an attempt to reap other financial rewards for the ailing
economy. A not unrelated argument is that given the pragmatism that Hoyte
demonstrated in his foreign policy and in pursuing cooperative relations with the
Venezuelan government, the declared flexibility on the question of a solution was part of
the Guyanese president's more pragmatic approach in foreign relations.
Lusinchi's successor, Carlos Andres Perez, also continued discussions about a
solution based on an outlet to the sea with some adjacent land. Hoyte has given a
snapshot of the nature of these discussions:
86 Ibid.
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"The Venezuelans have from time to time floated many ideas, but this has never
really been a formal proposal. There has always been, a few things. I remember
Carlos Andres Perez had paid a visit to Guyana and there was a meeting at the
then prime minister's residence ... and we were all ta1king about the issue. Carlos
Andres Perez kept harping on about 'symbolic cessions' until somebody said 'what
do you have in mind for this symbolic cession?' And he drew a line right across
Guyana which would have decapitated the whole of Guyana .. .it would have gone
right across Vreed-en-Hoop [a port opposite Georgetown on the western bank of
the Demerara river which is outside of Essequibo] and everything north of Vreed-
en-Hoop which would have been absolutely absurd. At which point, there was
complete silence; nobody picked up on this any longer. So it wasn't what I may
call a very serious kind of discussion; we were not contemplating anything. ,,88
Venezuelan discussions did not only centre on the land/sea outlet option. As Hoyte notes
further: "There were other ideas floated ... what they call 'territorial correction', where
you would cede a piece of land and be compensated by a piece of land ceded by them"
During his visit to Guyana in August 1990, Andres Perez was also reported to have raised
the issue of an "ideology of integration" during his speech at a state dinner. As the report
noted, this suggested joint development, if not cessation of territory.89 Whatever the
discussions, Hoyte has asserted that they were not concrete proposals. "But as I have said,
they were never formally put on the table; they were never formally discussed with us.
We never really entertained them ,,90 This argument has been backed up by Ferguson
who states of his time at the MFA inGeorgetown:
"We were always aware that that opens up a Pandora box that you can never
control - bearing in my mind the disparity incapabilities: size, territory and so on
etc. As with everything else these matters come to the table, you sit down and
you ta1k about it - that's part of the diplomatic process - and they [the
Venezuelans] from time to time came with those things [proposals]. In the time
that I was there they were not issues that were seriously considered. TIley were
discussed, but never seriously because we were conscious of the consequences,
~ Catholic Standard, 13July 1986, p.l.
88 Interview with Desmond Hoyte.
89 Mirror, 19 August 1990, p.l.
90 Interview with Desmond Hoyte, op.cit.
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the implications of such a process. To open up that route, opens up dangers,
unforeseeable dangers. ,,91
The administration in Georgetown was, therefore, cognizant of the implications of going
down the road of a negotiated settlement that involved the ceding of territory.
It is clear that the Venezuelans have kept up the land/sea option first proposed by
the Carlos Andres Perez presidency in the 1970s, as well other suggested solutions. The
fact that these proposals were not formally made, at least during the Hoyte
administration, suggests that the Venezuelans may have been fishing for Guyana's
reaction before putting their proposed solution to the domestic audience and the
government in Georgetown. This is with awareness, no doubt, that any cessation of
territory is a difficult issue for any government. Hoyte has been reported as saying, "We
must not close ourselves to or reject any proposal that would procure a realistic
solution. ,,92 Given that the Venezuelans did not put formally their proposals for a
solution to his administration suggests that such a statement was either an exercise in spin
doctoring and/or that the proposed solutions were not viewed as realistic by Georgetown.
Indeed, Jackson who did not rule out a solution being found when interviewed by
reporters, was not specific on the fonn(s) that solution might take. Speaking after a
meeting with his Venezuelan counterpart, he is reported to have said: '''I'm not going to
say that a solution will not be found before President Hoyte's mandate is over but we are
certainly going to try'. ,,93 While at one level this may be another case of spin doctoring,
at another, it is also indicative of the close relationship developed by Jackson with his
Venezuelan counterpart, Reinaldo Figueredo Planchart. Such ties are evident in a speech
91 Interview with Tyrone Ferguson, 19 May 2000.
92 Catholic Standard, 13 July 1986, p.l quoting from an interview given by Hoyte to El Nacional.
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given by the latter which demonstrates the informal nature with which the two could
meet:
"That is why I wanted to call attention to the presence of my friend Jackson in
Venezuela. I was about to go to Georgetown this Sunday since I feel we are now
accustomed to seeing each other without much protocol. If one wants to talk to
him as one talks to one's brother or friend, that is how we are talking. I will
welcome him here as often as he wants to come to discuss any matter of
importance to his country. 1194
It is this type of atmosphere that was likely to provide the environment within which the
means of a solution to the territorial controversy could be found. Yet the Hoyte
administration did not concede any territory.
The Hoyte Administration's Approach at the International Level
It is the argument here that the pursuit and achievement of closer ties with
Venezuela under the prioritised role designated to relations with neighbouring countries,
resulted in a reduced need for the Hoyte administration to concentrate its attention on
intemationalising the Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy in multilateral or other
strategic fora Such campaigning did not disappear altogether, but became subtle in its
manifestation. One PNC minister has argued that Hoyte and his foreign minister,
Jackson, "... took the view that a new and less overtly bellicose posture was needed both
from the changes in the world and the need to concentrate on the shattered economy ."95
Evidence to support my contention can be found in an examination of the Guyanese
addresses to certain international fora and/or the declarations of those organizations. It is
93 Stabroek News, 16 August 1990, p.l.
94 Comments made during "Address by the Foreign Minister, Reinaldo Figueredo at his office upon the
signing of the Partial Agreement between Venezuela and Guyana, October 27,1990", p.2.
95 Anonymous interview.
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recognized that the GOG's diplomatic machinery was engaged in behind the scenes
lobbying amongst the traditional groups/states from which it has derived support." At
the very least, this would be to ensure continued awareness of the controversy's existence,
irrespective of the period of good relations. It has been possible at times of conflict to
gauge the extent of the government's international approaches through an analysis of the
addresses/appeals to certain international organizations and states as well as in the
declarations released by these fora I suggest that an examination of these same sources
would serve as an important barometer of whether internationalising Guyana's territorial
controversy continued to be as important a strategy during the period of cooperative
relations under Hoyte and whether any changes can be discerned. It is to these analyses
that we now turn in order to gauge the argument I have made.
Relations between Georgetown and Caracas had already begun to show signs of
improvement in 1984 following the ascension to office of the Jaime Lusinchi
administration, as noted earlier. A perusal of the Hoyte administration's addresses to the
annual sessions of the UN General Assembly reveals a move away from lobbying
publicly on the Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy, but with continuity in the
emphasis on related themes. For instance, at the first session following Hoyte's accession
to power, the government's speech stressed:
"... respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity of states, the self-
determination of peoples, non-use or threat of use of force, non-interference in the
internal affairs of states, collective security and multilateral cooperation on an
equitable basis ...97
96 This factor was confirmed in an anonymous interview.
'11 Rashleigh Jackson's address to the 40th session of the UN General Assembly, 1 October 1985, Jackson
(1985), p.6. See also Jackson (1988a), p.7, on similar themes covered in Jackson's address to the UN Third
Special Session CIl Disarmament in June 1988; and Jackson's address to the 42nd and 43rd sessions of the
General Assembly, Jackson (1987), especially pp.37 and 22, respectively.
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This suggests that Hoyte's government still perceived it important, from the perspective
of its national interest, to ensure continued international emphasis on themes relating to
the preservation of states. Conscious of the hiatus it was enjoying with Venezuela,
Georgetown became subtle in how it addressed the territorial controversy on the world
stage.
The importance of the Commonwealth continued to be stressed, despite this body
seemingly falling in the outer-most of the government's concentric circles of foreign
policy. A MFA report in 1987 declared: "Guyana remains fully conunitted to the
principle and aspiration of the Commonwealth and continues to enjoy a high profile
within that body. ,,98 As well as attendance at CHOGMs, Georgetown continued to be
active in other Commonwealth activities, for instance, participation in the
Commonwealth Committee of Foreign Ministers on Southern Africa, the mandate of
which had been renewed in 1989.99
The October 1985 CHOGM in Nassau was the first such summit to be convened
after Hoyte had asswned the presidency. It is evident that Guyana continued to keep the
members of this organization informed of developments with Venezuela This aspect of
maintaining a level of international visibility on the controversy was different from the
earlier pressure brought to bear on Venezuela by the GOG at this forum The 1985
CHOGM merely recorded the progress being made between Guyana and Venezuela:
"Heads of Government welcomed the constructive efforts under way to resolve
the controversy arising from Venezuela's territorial claim to more than two-thirds
of Guyana's territory. They noted that the governments of both countries had
referred the choice of means of settlement to the Secretary General of the United
98MF 'A (1987), p.60.
99 MFA (1989), p.64.
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Nations in accordance with the 1966 Geneva Agreement, and had pledged every
assistance for his efforts. They were encouraged by the expressed determination
of the two governments to reach agreements and their hopes for a peaceful
settlement." 100
The next CHOGM at Vancouver in 1987 also noted the growing interaction between the
two states and efforts to resolve the territorial problem 101 TIlls suggests that the
administration did not abandon CHOGM as an international forum for discussing the
Guyana-Venezuela controversy. At the same time, it is evident that there was a
dichotomous shift away from Burnham-era lobbying against Venezuela to one of
presenting the positive developments between the two states.
As friendly and cooperative relations intensified between Guyana and Venezuela
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the territorial controversy disappeared from the public
declaration of the CHOGMs held during such times. In this regard, it interesting to note
that statements regarding Belize's territorial dispute with Guatemala continued to be
included in the communiques of the same period, suggesting that this issue continued to
be troublesome. Moreover, and indicative of extent to which cooperative relations with
Venezuela allowed the GOG to engage in other topical areas, was Hoyte's environmental
proposal to the Commonwealth at the 1989 CHOGM:
"Heads of Government noted with appreciation the generous offer from the
President of Guyana to set aside part of Guyana's Amazonian tropical forest for a
pilot project under Commonwealth auspices to study utilisation of the forest on a
sustainable basis and the conservation of species. They asked the Secretary-
General to organise a high level exploratory mission to pursue the offer with the
Guyanese authorities." 102
100 Commonwealth Secretariat (1987), p.274.
101 Conunonwealth Secretariat (1997), p.17.
102 Ibid., p.69. Hoyte's offer to the commonwealth came to fruitioo when it was launched on Wcrld
Envirooment Day,5 June 1990, as the Iwokrama International Centre for Rain Forest Conservation and
Development,MFA (1990b), pp. 43-44.
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It is interesting to observe that the forestry area on offer falls within Essequibo, i.e. the
county of Guyana claimed by Venezuela At a time of good relations between the two
states and the wider international concerns with the environment and forests, Hoyte's
offer to the corrnnonwealth did not incur the wrath of the government in Caracas. 103
If we examine the Hoyte government's speeches to the NAM we observe the
continued emphasis on the principles of the movement. These include "respect for
sovereignty and territorial integrity and the peaceful settlement of disputes". 104 These
factors are, of course, of relevance to Georgetown in the Guyana-Venezuela territorial
controversy. As at the UN, what is absent from the Guyanese administration's addresses
under Hoyte is the overt reference to the controversy and/or condemnation of Venezuela's
claim to Essequibo. In this regard, it is noteworthy that when the issues of nuclear non-
proliferation and the related Latin America Treaty of Tlatelolco from which Guyana was
barred as a result of the Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy were addressed by the
Hoyte administration, there was not a tirade against Venezuela Instead, the Guyanese
foreign minister, Rasbleigh Jackson, merely referred in passing to " ... the imperfections
of one of its provisions which debars some of us from participating in it. "lOS This is a
mere glossing over of an issue which previously - as we have seen in chapters 4 and 5 -
the GOG had campaigned against. It can only be deduced that once again, improved
Guyanese-Venezuelan relations tamed the Hoyte administration's overt lobbying on the
issue and its related effects. The NAM's statements on the Guyana-Venezuela
103 This was confirmed by Professor Bishnodat Persaud, in answer to a question asked by the author of this
thesis at a symposium, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 19 September 2001. Professor Persaud is a
former director at the Commonwealth Secretariat and now a member of the board of trustees of the
Iwokrama International Centre for Rain Forest Conservation and Development.
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controversy also reflect the mood of conciliation between Georgetown and Caracas. This
is especially noted in contrast to the organization's statements on Belize-Guatemala
dispute. For instance, while the 1986 sunnnit merely" ... noted the efforts being made by
the Government of Guyana to consolidate its independence and sovereignty ... ", the same
meeting recorded its" ... unconditional support ... " for Belize's territorial integrity.l'" This
is not say that behind the scenes campaigning did not continue. It may be argued that the
Guyanese government's hosting of the NAM in 1987, at a time when the administration
was grappling with an economic crisis and a thallium scare, was just one of the
diplomatic manoeuvres to ensure continued support for Guyana in the event of the
controversy becoming problematic again.
Politically symbolic of the advances made during the Andres Perez and Hoyte
administrations was the GOG's sponsorship of Venezuela's successful application for
membership of the NAM at its 1989 sunnnit in Yugoslavia It will be recalled that the
Guyanese administration's lobbying at that organization in 1983 had caused Venezuela to
withdraw its application. 107
The Hoyte administration's move away from utilizing the technique of
inflammatory speeches against Venezuela at international/regional gatherings did not
deviate in relation to CARlCOM.108 Yet this organization continued its vigil in support
of Guyana in the territorial controversy. CARICOM exercised important roles in
Guyana-Venezuela relations in three respects: recording its continued support for
104 Jackson's statement to the NAM Coordinating Bureau in Jackson (1987), pp.7-11. See also Jackson
(1988b), pp.12-16.
lOS Jackson's address to the Coordinating Bureau of the NAM inJackson (1987), p.15.
106 NAM (1986), pp.142, 144.
107 Griffith (1993b), p.30.
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Guyana's territorial integrity; welcoming the improvement in relations between the two
countries; and continuing to lobby for Guyana (and Belize's) admission to the OAS. This
suggests that the GOG continued to lobby CARICOM behind the scenes in order to
maintain the momentum of support within that organization. Such a premise can be
understood against the background of Venezuela's continued strengthened relations with
CARICOM. The Hoyte administration was supportive of Venezuela in this regard, but is
likely to have been concerned about maintaining its own standing within the organization
vis-a-vis Venezuela. A behind the scenes campaign to maintain CARICOM's support for
Guyana in the controversy was one neans to effect this. Also, it is to be noted that this
was a time of regional initiatives to solve regional problems e.g. the Contadora Process in
Central America It is, therefore, likely that the GOG's cognisance of this international
shift to regional conflict resolution envisaged a role for CARICOM. The Hoyte
administration's inclusion of CARICOM within the innermost sanctum of its concentric
circles of foreign policy is informative in this regard
After Hoyte's appointment to the presidency, the first CARICOM heads summit
was held in Georgetown from 1-4 July 1986, thereby indicating that the problems
developed between Burnham and other CARICOM leaders during the early 1980s had
been overcome. The statement issued after this summit stated: "Heads of Government
adhered to their previously stated position on the controversy which had arisen as a result
of the territorial claim advanced by Venezuela against Guyana" The CARICOM leaders
were also careful to recognize the cooperation between Guyana and Venezuela on the
issue:
108 See, for instance, Jackson's address to the SCMFA in Jackson (1987), pp.19-25 and (l988b), pp.5-11.
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"They noted the attempts being made by the two countries to resolve the issues
and encouraged their continuing search for a peaceful solution. They commended
the parties for cooperating fully with the Secretary-General of the United Nations
in the discharge of the mandate given under the terms of the Geneva Agreement
of 1966, to choose a means of settlement. Heads of Government welcomed the
recent improvement in GuyanaIV enezuela relations and expressed the hope that
this would lead to increased friendship and cooperation between them ,,109
The SCMFA's communique of the same year expressed a similar viewpoint.l'" The
improved relations between Georgetown and Caracas and their cooperation with the UN
secretary-general in the search for a solution was to be continually recorded m
subsequent communiques issued after the heads' and SCMFA conferences. III
The CARICOM leaders' welcoming of the improved relations between Guyana
and Venezuela underlies the fact that such ties removed an obstacle to the development of
the further strengthening of relations between the regional body and Caracas. Certainly,
there was an expressed desire from CARICOM to deepen its ties with Latin America, as
expressed by the ninth heads' summit held in Antigua and Barbuda in 1988: "The Heads
of Government reviewed the Community's relations with Latin America during the past
year, and reaffirmed their desire to strengthen those relations, particularly in the areas of
trade and economic cooperation. ,,112 This statement was in accordance with Hoyte's
earlier declarations at the CARICOM leaders' conference held in Georgetown in 1986, in
109 Caribbean Community Press Release 39/1986, 3 July 1986, p.lS.
110 Press release .31/1986, "Twelfth Foreign Ministers Meeting Ends", 18 June 1986, p.3.
111 See CARlCOM Perspective Special Supplement, July-December 1987, July 1988 and December 1990
which contain the communiques of the eighth, ninth and eleventh heads' conferences; "Opening Addresses
and Communique: Tenth Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean
Community, Grand Anse", 3-7 July 1989; CAR/COM Perspective: Communique and Addresses, July-
December 1991; and CAR/COM Perspective - Communique 1992, en the twelfth and thirteenth
conferences. See also press releases 3211987, 3711988, 33/1990, 4111991 and 8411992 which contain the
communiques of the SCMF A meetings.
112 CAR/COM Perspective: Supplement, July 1988, pp.lS-16.
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which he recognized that the strengthening of relations with the regional Spanish-
speaking states was of benefit to both Guyana and the wider CARICOM:
"As we address the problems of the structures internal to the Connnunity, it
appears to me that it would also be necessary for us to reweave the pattern of our
external economic relations. We are, in geo-strategic terms, part of the Americas.
Yet, our economic ties with Latin America have been minimal, largely because of
historical reasons. I believe that our efforts to reorganise and revitalise the
Connnunity's economy can be enhanced by developing a carefully structured
relationship with our hemispheric neighbours including Connnunity negotiated
arrangements. Such a course would enlarge the horizon of regional development
and correct the distortions of old colonial patterns. ,,113
The removal of conflict between Guyana and Venezuela facilitated this desire for the
development of increased links between CARICOM and Latin America, since the two
linguistic regions would not have been pitted against each other in their support for
respective sides in the territorial controversy.
The improved relations between Georgetown and Caracas also facilitated the
latter's strengthening of ties with CARICOM. This observation has been made by Serbfn
in relation to the Lusinchi government which continued Venezuela's pursuit of a
Caribbean policy. He states:
"The thrust of Venezuelan Caribbean policy has finally been helped by the
improvement of relations with Guyana consequent upon the involvement of the
United Nations Secretary-General in the resolution of the territorial claim. This
fact, along with the cultural policy and the privileged situation of Venezuela as
the principal Latin American connnercial presence in the non-Hispanic
Caribbean, has helped gradually to modify Caribbean views concerning
Venezuela's role in the region. ,,114
Indeed, Lusinchi became the first Latin American head of state of a non-CARICOM
country to visit the regional body's secretariat in Georgetown in 1987. During the
Venezuelan president's visit, the CARICOM secretary-general, Roderick Rainford,
113 Hoyte (1986), p.7.
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pointed to CARICOM's attempts to reach out to Latin America. Such ties between
Venezuela and CARICOM were not new, since they had begun to emerge during the
1970s when Venezuela's Caribbean policy was developed. Like that earlier period, but
even more so now, Venezuela's relations with the English-speaking Caribbean flourished
at a time of good relations between Caracas and Georgetown. In January 1990 there was
an announcement that mechanisms for "increased cooperation between the Caribbean and
Latin America" would be the subject of a meeting between a working group of officials
from CARICOM, Venezuela and other Latin American countries. 115
The most significant development between Guyana and Venezuela in relation to
CARICOM was Georgetown's sponsorship of Caracas' application for observer status in
the regional organization. This would have been an unthinkable occurrence in the early
1980s, but it became a reality a decade later. This factor more than any other
demonstrates how far Guyana-Venezuela relations had advanced and the level of trust
developed between the two states. Equally important in this regard was Venezuela's
sponsorship of Guyana's application to join the ~AS. It will be recalled that Caracas was
behind the 1964 Act of Washington (incorporated as Article 8 of the OAS treaty) which
barred Guyana from joining the organization because of the territorial controversy.
Indeed, CARICOM had played an important role in effecting a change to Article 8 of the
charter. An assistant secretary-general of CARICOM has given details of his
114 Serbin in Suttoo (1991), p.2IO.
115 Press Release 211990: "Mechanism to Foster CARICOM-Latin American Cooperatioo", 8 January 1990,
pp.I-2. The formatioo of the working group had earlier been proposed by Andr~ PcSrezduring a meeting
with the heads of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica St Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago,
ibid.
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organization's role in campaigning for an amendment to the charter of the inter-American
system:
"It manifested itself in many forms. In the first instance, in the OAS itself,
CARICOM countries consistently made statements supportive of these countries
[Guyana and Belize] ...Then it also manifested itself in terms of communiques and
statements which they issued at various meetings in terms of the rights of these
countries and support for the rights of these countries. [There was] absolute
consensus from the very beginning - that's one on which I can't remember that
there was ever a deferral. That is one of the areas on which they have had full and
total consensus from the very beginning. ,,116
A change to article 8 of the OAS charter was eventually introduced in December 1985 at
the organization's fourteenth special session in Colombia The amendment, which
became known as the Protocol of Cartagena, removed the impediment to countries like
Guyana joining the organization, subject to ratification of two-thirds of member states.
Mirroring the aforementioned connnents made by Blake, Francis argues that
CARICOM's campaigning was instrumental in ensuring change:
"The unified, clear-cut position of the Commonwealth Caribbean in opposing the
maintenance of Article 8 of the Charter of the Organization, resulted in
meaningful reform in this provision when the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias of
Article 8 was made a transitory disposition, valid until December 10, 1990, and a
new article specifying the states or territories that will eventually be entitled to
apply for membership in the future replaced it.,,1l7
After December 1985, CARICOM continued its campaign, this time aimed at getting the
necessary two-thirds of OAS member-states to ratify the Cartegena Protocol. This is
evident, for instance, in the statement made by CARICOM at the 1988 heads of
government summit:
"They noted that all CARICOM States Members of the Organization of American
States had ratified the Protocol of Cartagena which is designed to permit the entry
116 Interview with Byron Blake, 1 May 2000. See also Thomas (1997), especially p.2S, where the points
made by Blake had hitherto been enunciated.
117 Francis in Bryan (1986), p.48.
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of Belize and Guyana in the ~AS. The Heads urged those OAS Member States
which have not yet done so, to ratify the Protocol at the earliest opportunity.v'P
The SCMFA had earlier made a similar statement.I'" As part of their lobbying for
ratification, the CARICOM foreign ministers made it clear that the continued exclusion
of Guyana and Belize from the OAS would impact negatively on CaribbeanlLatin
America relations within that organization. This is evident, for instance, in the statement
made at one of the foreign ministers' meetings. 120
The desired result became a reality on 11 December 1990 which was the time
specified in the Protocol of Cartagena for the change to be introduced, and by which date,
the appropriate ratification by two-thirds of member-states had taken place. 121
Significantly, it was Venezuela which successfully sponsored Guyana's application for
membership.F! Guyana was admitted formally to the OAS at a special session of that
organization's General Assembly on 8 January 1991.123 That the Guyanese and
Venezuelan foreign ministers consented to entry to what may be deemed each other's
respective spheres of influence is indicative of the extent to which relations between the
two states had advanced during the second Carlos Andres Perez and Hoyte
presidencies.V'' As a result of its entry as a full member into the OAS, the government in
118 CARICOM Perspective Supplement, July 1988: "Ninth Meeting of the Ccnference of Heads of
Government of the Caribbean Community, Deep Bay, Antigua and Barbuda, 4-8 July 1988", p.lS.
119 Press release no: 3111986, "Twelfth Foreign Ministers Meeting Ends", 18 June 1986, p.S. See also
43/1990: "Communique - Meeting of CARICOM Ministers Responsible for Foreign Affairs, Guyana 16
May 1990", p.1l.
120 Press release no. 3211987: "Thirteenth Meeting of the Standing Committee of Ministers Responsible for
Foreign Affairs, Guyana 7-8 May 1987", p.8.
121 MFA (1990b), pp.39-40. See also Mutloz in Vaky and MUiloz (1993), especially p.91, on the entry of
Guyana, as well as Belize into the OAS in the early 199Os.
122 Griffith (1993b), p.30; and Serbin inJournal of Inter american Studies and World Affairs (1991), p.58.
123 Ibid.
124 Serbin, op.cit., p.58, asserts that Venezuela supported the entry of both Guyana and Belize into the ~AS.
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Georgetown was able to benefit from the technical assistance and funding programmes of
the organization. 125
The positive influence on CARICOM of the new Guyana-Venezuela relations
was further evident when Andres Perez announced the introduction of a one-way free
trade access for CARICOM goods to his country's markets in 1991. It may be argued
that the improved relations with Guyana was equally beneficial to Venezuela since it put
on the back-burner an impediment to the Venezuelan government's intensified
development of its Caribbean policy. As Andres Perez stated:
"Venezuela wants to be present among its first promoters in the Caribbean waters.
To make this possible and to give a first boost to regional trade, Venezuela has
decided to eliminate tariff duties for products requiring reciprocity. TIle
establishment of the non-reciprocal free trade agreement between the countries of
the Caribbean and Venezuela aims to open the way to trade flows in our Region,
with the dual purpose of promoting trade between us and making way in our
integration purpose. ,,126
In the same speech, reference was made to "TIle Caribbean destiny of Venezuela ... "
which is said to extend "... beyond its 2,800kms coastline on the Caribbean sea, our
history and the conunon interest and fate awaiting us". 127 TIle Venezuelan president also
noted the investment which his country had put over the years into the Caribbean through
agencies such as the Venezuelan Investment Fund and announced his intention to move
from observer to full member of CARICOM.I28 So, the emergent pattern of relations
between Guyana and Venezuela led to dramatic developments between the two states and
CARICOM.
125 For full details, see MFA (1992a), pp.26-27.
126 "Communique and Addresses: Twelfth Meeting of Cooference of Heads of Governmentof the




The focus of Guyana's relations with Brazil and Colombia - two states with which
the Burnham government had cultivated relations mainly as part of its international
strategy against Venezuela - was redefmed within the context of Hoyte's concentric
circles of Hoyte's foreign policy and the emphasis on the economy. The already existing
links, even if cultivated originally in view of the Guyana-Venezuela territorial
controversy, facilitated the increased interaction between Georgetown and these states.
Hence, for instance, the year 1986 being described as the "catalyst for Guyana/Colombia
relations", by the MFA.129 TIlls came in the wake of Prime Minister Hamilton Green's
visit to Colombia for the inauguration of president Virgilio Barco during which the
opportunity was taken to pursue a number of avenues to increase economic ties between
Georgetown and Bogota. These links were expected to advance with the exchange of
Instruments in 1987 between the MFA and the Colombian embassy "with regard to the
entry into force of the Economic, Scientific and Technical Co-operation Agreement, and
the Amazonian Co-operation Agreement." 130 The strengthening of ties with Brazil also
continued as the following statement by the MFA makes clear: "In 1987 the rhythm of
our relations with Brazil was maintained as the Ministry sought to promote greater
bilateral cooperation in areas of trade and economic development, and consular
relations. ,,131 Subsequently, the exchange of presidential visits between Hoyte and the
129MFA (1986), p.38. See also MFA (1985, 1989, 1990b, 1991, and 1992a) for details of Guyana-
Colombia relations during the Hoyte government.
130 For further details, see ibid. The former agreement was ratified by the two countries 00 13 July 1987,
MFA (1987), p.47.
131 Ibid., p.44. See also other MFA (1986, 1988, 1989, 1990b, 1991 and 1992a) during the Hoyte
administration for details of Guyana-Brazil cooperation.
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Brazilian leader, Jose Sarney, to each other's capitals, as well as a range of trade and
economic activities served to defme the new focus of the relationship with Brazil. 132
It is fair to say that the cooperation pursued with Brazil and Colombia was for the
first time not linked specifically to the Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy, but
rather to Georgetown's economic recovery progrannne. What the Hoyte administration
merely did was to switch the emphasis on those ties and deepened them further. The
government also began to pursue contacts with other South American countries, such as
Argentina and Peru, as part of its new focus and emphasis in foreign policy.133 The key
point however, is that it is no longer necessary to analyse relations with Brazil and
Colombia in the context of the foreign policy strategies used to counter Venezuela's claim
to the Essequibo.
Summary
The Hoyte administration witnessed a hiatus in Guyana's relations with
Venezuela, for which the pragmatism of Hoyte's foreign policy with its focus on the
economy and ties with neighbouring states, must be credited with facilitating. This period
was one which saw the introduction of the UN Good Offices mechanism as a means of
searching for a solution in the territorial controversy. The agreement to take this route is
indicative of the atmosphere of improved relations which also centred on a strengthening
of bilateral cooperation. Significantly in terms of the international approaches of the
government of Guyana to the territorial controversy was the shift in modus operandi from
campaigning against Venezuela on the world stage to the more subtle expression of
132 MFA (1989), pp.36-37. See also Kirtcn in Jeffrey and Menke (1991), pp.220-224, fer details of
Guyana-Brazil cooperaticn during the Hoyte administration.
133 See MFA (1990) for details on such bilateral links.
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certain international principles of relevance in Guyana to the controversy. This has
suggested that the Hoyte administration remained conscious of the importance of
international action in relation to the issue but at the same time had to modify its lobbying
in view of the improved relations between Georgetown and Caracas. By all appearances,
it struck an effective balance between the pursuit of extensive bilateral relations while
maintaining some international focus.
It is apposite to observe one unavoidable exception in our analysis of Guyana's
relations with Venezuela during the Hoyte era: that is, the absence of the insights
provided by State Department records since they have not yet been declassified for the
period under study. Those records may be of importance in view of the fact that a
significant part of Hoyte's foreign policy involved rebuilding relations with the USA
which had earlier been damaged during parts of the Burnham years. Moreover, those
records may reveal to what extent, if any, Washington influenced the Lusinchi and
Andres Perez governments' positive response to Hoyte's new refocused foreign policy.
Of course, those administrations in Caracas may merely have been responding to the
more pragmatic foreign policy of the Hoyte administration, but until the State
Department's records become available, this will probably not be confirmed. For now,
speculation about the likelihood of Washington being involved will have to be confmed
not only to historical precedent, but also to the other indication of the US's involvement




The Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy has represented a significant threat
to Guyana's national security because of the size of the claim and Venezuela's
occasionally active pursuit of its "zona en reclamaci6n" policy. The nineteenth century
Anglo-Venezuelan dispute was re-opened on the eve of the discussions surrounding
British Guiana's independence. From the 1950s, the domestic political scene had become
entangled with US cold war concerns as the British Guianese premier prior to
independence espoused Marxism openly. The available evidence does not confirm the
US's involvement in Venezuela's decision to re-open the claim in 1962. At the same
time, it is evident that Washington did not dissuade Caracas from pursuing its claim at a
time of grave concern over the trajectory of politics in British Guiana Faced with the
threat from a militarily and economically more powerful neighbour and in the absence of
a defence agreement with a major power from 1966 to 1992, the government of Guyana
utilized multilateral diplomacy and other diplomatic initiatives as its only means of
defending the state's territorial integrity.
Burnham's role in the trajectory of Venezuela's renewed claim to Essequibo was
significant from the discussions and signing of the 1966 Geneva Agreement, which led to
the claim being designated "a controversy"; his signature being the price he was willing
to pay for leading Guyana at independence. Burnham's confidence of winning the
support of the Afro-Asian bloc on the world stage was also significant in the decision to
internationalise the controversy. From the available evidence, it is clear that while the
US and Britain did not openly support Guyana in the controversy, both Washington and
London favoured Burnham and so operated clandestinely to ensure that Venezuelan
action in the 1960s did not affect his hold on power. The governments of Brazil and
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Trinidad and Tobago also became involved, with the motivating factor being, as with
Britain and the US, to keep Jagan out of power. It has not been possible to ascertain from
the available documents whether there was a shift in the policies of these states towards
Burnham as he became increasingly leftist in the 1970s. It is known, however, that
Burnham's relationship with the US did come under strain. The rapprochement with
Washington under the Hoyte administration coincided with a strengthening of ties
between Caracas and Georgetown, raising the issue of whether the US played a part in
this trajectory.
The United Nations General Assembly became the key international forum where
the government of Guyana sought to win international support against Venezuela's claim
from 1966 to 1992. Burnham's prediction about support from the Afro-Asian bloc was
important in that organization, where that grouping comprises the majority of its
members. Other important international fora included the NAM, the Conunonwealth and
the regional Caribbean Community, all of which fed into the support received at the UN.
Relations with Brazil and Colombia were cultivated because of their strategic value vis-a-
vis Venezuela: the former because of its military strength and emphasis on the sanctity of
treaties/maintenance of borders so defined, and the latter because of its own border
dispute with Venezuela In essence Guyana could utilize instances of conunonality with
Brazil and Colombia against Venezuela's claim to Essequibo.
Britain and the US were informed of developments in the Guyana-Venezuela
territorial controversy by the Guyanese government. TIley were not, however, overtly
part of the PNC government's international campaign against Venezuela. This is because
Georgetown recognized Britain's withdrawal from the issue after independence - a
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withdrawal implicit in the absence of a defence agreement. It has become evident that
the US also had signalled to Burnham its reluctance to get involved publicly. This was a
result of the delicate balancing act between Washington's economic interests in Caracas
and the support given to Burnham against Cheddi Jagan of the PPP. Nevertheless, both
Britain and the US were involved in behind the scenes advocacy, most notably, in
persuading Brazilian action in 1968 following the decree issued by the Venezuelan
president, Raul Leoni. The declassified documents of the Department of State and the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the future may yet reveal more instances of
clandestine British and US involvement in the territorial controversy to aid Burnham.
While aware of the limitations of the US's open support, the government of Guyana was
cognizant of the need not to antagonize Washington when it came to soliciting
international support in the controversy. Hence, Georgetown was careful not to court the
support of the socialist bloc bilaterally, in spite of the friendly development of other
aspects of relations with those states. It is in this regard that Cuba's public support for
Guyana during the period of heightened tensions between Georgetown and Caracas in the
early 1980s was not encouraged openly as a bilateral strategy. The support of Havana
would have been of significance and less troublesome in the multilateral setting of the
NAM, of which it was a member. The government of Guyana conducted its lobbying in
the General Assembly rather than the Security Council of the UN precisely because it
was aware of the embarrassment an abstention by the US (or other member) in the
Security Council would cause.
As a small and weak state faced with the significant threat to its national security
in the form of the claim to Essequibo from the militarily, economically and territorially
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larger Venezuelan state, Guyana's defence took the form of diplomatic initiatives. The
Burnham government's active involvement on the international stage in general from
1970 to 1985 led to criticisms that foreign policy became the means by which his
administration sought to legitimise its rule on the domestic stage, some seeing the foreign
policy as a "Machiavellian" search for legitimacy. It is naturally possible to establish
some link between the domestic economic problems and the question over the legitimacy
of rule confronting the PNC government on the one hand and, on the other, its active role
on the world stage. However, to dismiss all of the government's foreign policy on this
basis alone is simplistic, and it ignores the very real threat to the state's territorial
integrity as a result of the Venezuelan claim to Essequibo. It is here that some
conceptualisation of foreign policy as a multifaceted field is important. The territorial
controversy was the most salient foreign policy issue during periods of tension with
Venezuela, while at other times goals such as prestige enhancement and economic
development came to the fore. Even when relations with Venezuela had improved, the
links which the GOG established with the Afro-Asian bloc through support, for instance,
of African liberation struggles, were valuable when Guyana's relations with Venezuela
deteriorated. To dismiss the foreign policy as serving either one goal or the other is to
miss the complex and fluid characteristics of the policy field.
The international approaches of the Hoyte administration from 1985 to 1992
provided a contrast to earlier strategies. There was greater bilateral engagement between
Georgetown and Caracas, influenced by the personalities of Hoyte and his Venezuelan
counterparts, Jaime Lusinchi and Carlos Andres Perez, in facilitating the development of
closer bilateral relations. These interactions were significant in leading to the most
307
important development in the controversy since the Protocol to the Geneva Agreement in
1970: the UN Good Offices process in 1990 under which the personal representative of
the UN's secretary-general oversees the talks conducted by Guyana and Venezuela's
facilitators. That process may well hold the key to a solution to the controversy in the
future, providing a forum for secret discussions. Whether this transpires or not is
dependent on the political motivation in both Georgetown and Caracas, as well as the
capacity of the weaker state to avoid manipulation. If a solution is not found within the
Good Offices process, its purpose would have been beneficial in terms of providing a
mechanism within which the channels of communication between Guyana and Venezuela
are kept open.
In both the 1970 and 1990 agreements, secret diplomacy played a significant part
in the achievement of the Protocol to the Geneva Agreement and the Good Offices
process. The thesis has provided an insight into the behind-the-scenes negotiations that
took place between Guyana and Venezuela in order to effect agreements away from
public scrutiny. Ultimately, this points to a major difficulty inherent in achieving a
resolution to the controversy: as Garavini di Tumo (1999) has observed, even if the
political will exists in both Guyana and Venezuela, governments will have to convince
their populaces of the merits of compromise over what each side hitherto has regarded as
its own rightful patrimony.
Although Venezuela has maintained its claim to Essequibo at the official level,
the recurrent theme, which has emerged since the Carlos Andres Perez administration in
the mid-1970s, is securing an outlet to the Atlantic through Guyana's cession to
Venezuela of a strip of land adjacent to the outlet. The recurrence of this proposal
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suggests Venezuela's recognition of the fact that Guyana is unlikely to cede the whole of
Essequibo. On the one hand, this option can be conceived as a face-saving exercise for
both states since it allows Guyana to retain sovereignty over the majority of Essequibo. It
would also facilitate Venezuela's maritime ambitions on the high seas. As one former
Venezuelan president has stated, the Atlantic is important to his country "... porque el
Atlantico es la salida al mundo". This is as opposed to the Caribbean sea which has been
perceived as a closed lake: "EI Caribe esta como encerrado. EI Caribe es un lago de
Panama, America Central, el Caribe ... ,,1
While the relinquishing of a small portion of territory to facilitate Venezuela's
access to the Atlantic might appear as a gesture of compromise for both sides, it carries
an inherent danger. Like the Geneva Agreement, which some have perceived as
legitimising Venezuelan claims to Essequibo, a cessation of territory by the government
of Guyana could later be viewed as implying recognition of Venezuela's entire claim to
Essequibo. This explains why the government of Guyana has not ceded any territory to
Venezuela At the same time, as Ewell's geopolitical analysis of Venezuela has
indicated, "No major political figure can afford to advocate abandoning the Guyana
claims or ceding territory to Colombia ... ,,2 Ewell's prediction has held up to and beyond
the l00th anniversary of the 1899 Arbitration Award on 3 October 1999. TIle resolution
to the Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy is a difficult issue that is likely to remain
unresolved for some time to come.
A close working relationship like that achieved by Hoyte and Carlos Andres
Perez/I aime Lusinchi or the mutual and coincidental convenience to both states at any
1 Interview with Luis Herrera Campfns, 10 March 2000.
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time may bury tensions temporarily either on a de facto basis or through an agreement
such as the Protocol to the Geneva Agreement. In such a scenario, as at times of a
conflicting relationship, international lobbying remains the best option for the small state
of Guyana vis-a-vis the large and more powerful neighbour. Whether that lobbying is
aggressive, as during the Burnham era, or more subtle, as during the Hoyte period, will
depend on the relationship between Georgetown and Caracas, as well as the political uses
to which foreign policy may be deployed. To engage with Caracas on a purely bilateral
basis is risky for Guyana as the weaker state; a factor which the post-1992 government
discovered to its cost. More recently, there are signs that the post-1992 administration
has become cognizant of the need to internationalise the controversy. This was
demonstrated in 2000 when the government of Guyana successfully sought the action of
the Commonwealth in the face of renewed activity from Venezuela towards its claim to
Bssequibo.'
This case study of the government of Guyana's international response from 1966
to 1992 to the Guyana-Venezuela territorial controversy has demonstrated the importance
of diplomatic action for the national interests of small states faced with threats, especially
if the adversary is a militarily or economically powerful state. Guyana is, by no ~ans,
unique as a small state facing a threat to its territorial integrity. Examples in the Latin
America/Caribbean region include Guatemala's claim to the smaller Belize and the
Ecuador-Peru dispute. The small state can utilize multilateral fora to gain international
visibility on the problems faced. While international institutions such as the NAM have
2 Ewell in Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (1982), p.309
3 The Commonwealth has set up a Ministerial Group on the territorial controversy with the implicit purpose
being to support Guyana See MFA (2000).
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lost influence, the continued existence of the UN and regional organizations continue to
provide adequate fora for small states to take action.
A well-thought out strategy is important in winning the support of the
international community. The government of Guyana found it effective, for instance, to
draw parallels with the implications for other states if Venezuela was allowed to renege
on an agreement it had made. Here an emphasis on the sanctity of treaties, sovereignty
and territorial integrity was significant in drawing the attention of the international
connnunity to the very principles by which it claims to operates, with the hope of
winning international support. The utilization of such techniques requires diplomatic
ability. As Linton has observed, small size is not necessarily a barrier to ability, even if
small a population and resources places the diplomatic machinery of small states at a
disadvantage." Indeed, the utilization of multilateral diplomacy is a key element in small
states overcoming the disadvantages of small size. As this case study has shown,
multilateral fora can provide for an economy of scale which is to the advantage of small
states.
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Treaty of Arbitration signed at Washington on 2nd February,
1897 between Great Britain and the U.S.V. and the Award of
the Tribunal of Arbitration constituted under Article I of the
Treaty, dated 3rd October, 1899.
WHEREAS, on the 2nd day of February, 1897, a Treaty of Arbitration was concluded
between Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland
and the United States of Venezuela in the terms following-
"Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the
United States of Venezuela, being desirous to provide for an amicable settlement of
the question which has arisen between their respective Governments concerning the
boundary between the Colony of British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela,
have resolved to submit to arbitration the question involved, and to the end of
concluding a Treaty for that purpose have appointed as their respective
Plenipotentiaries:
"Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, the
Right Honourable Sir Julian Pauncefote, a Member of Her Majesty's Most
Honourable Privy Council. Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable Order of the
Bath, and of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, and Her
Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States:
"And the President of the United States of Venezuela, Senor Jose Andrade, Envoy
Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Venezuela to the United States of
America:
"Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, which were
found to be in due and proper form, have agreed to and concluded the following
Articles -
"ARTICLE I
"An Arbitral Tribunal shall be inunediately appointed to determine the boundary-line
between the Colony of British Guiana and the United States of Venezuela.
"ARTICLE II
"The Tribunal shall consist of five jurists: two on the part of Great Britain, nominated
by the members of the Judicial Committee of Her Majesty's Privy Council, namely,
the Right Honourable Baron Herschell, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Honourable
Order of the Bath, and the Honourable Sir Richard Henn Collins, Knight, one of the
Justices of Her Britannic Majesty's Supreme Court of Judicature; two on the part of
Venezuela, nominated, one by the President of the United States of Venezuela,
namely, the Honourable Melville Weston Fuller, Chief Justice of the United States of
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America, and one nominated by the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States of America, namely, the Honourable David Josiah Brewer, a Justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States of America; and of a fifth jurist to be selected by
the four persons so nominated, or in the event of their failure to agree within three
months from the date of the exchange of ratifications of the present Treaty, to be
selected by His Majesty the King of Sweden and Norway. The jurist so selected shall
be President of the Tribunal.
"In case of the death, absence, or incapacity to serve of any of the four Arbitrators
above named, or in the event of any such Arbitrator omitting or declining or ceasing
to act as such, another jurist of repute shall be forthwith substituted in his place. If
such vacancy shall occur among those nominated on the part of Great Britain, the
substitute shall be appointed by the members for the time being of the Judicial
Conunittee of Her Majesty's Privy Council, acting by a majority and if among those
nominated on the part of Venezuela, he shall be appointed by the Justices of the
Supreme Court of the United States, acting by a majority. If such vacancy shall occur
in the case of the fifth Arbitrator, a substitute shall be selected in the manner herein
provided for with regard to the original appointment.
"ARTICLE III.
"TIle Tribunal shall investigate and ascertain the extent of the territories belonging to,
or that might lawfully be claimed by the United Netherlands or by the Kingdom of
Spain respectively at the time of the acquisition by Great Britain of the Colony of
British Guiana, and shall determine the boundary-line between the Colony of British
Guiana and the United States of Venezuela
"ARTICLE IV.
"In deciding the matters submitted, the Arbitrators shall ascertain all facts which they
deem necessary to a decision of the controversy, and shall be governed by the
following Rules, which are agreed upon by the High Contracting Parties as Rules to
be taken as applicable to the case, and by such principles of international law not
inconsistent therewith as the Arbitrators shall determine to be applicable to the case-
"Rules.
" (a) Adverse holding or prescription during a period of fifty years shall make a good
title. The Arbitrators may deem exclusive political control of a district, as well as
actual settlement thereof, sufficient to constitute adverse holding or to make title by
prescription.
" (b) The Arbitrators may recognise and give effect to rights and claims resting on any
other ground whatever valid according to international law, and on any principles of
inter- national law which the Arbitrators may deem to be applicable to the case, and
which are not in contravention of the foregoing role.
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.. (c) In determining the boundary-line, if territory of one Party be found by the
Tribunal to have been at the date of this Treaty in the occupation of the subjects or
citizens of the other Party, such effect shall be given to such occupation as reason,
justice, the principles of international law, and the equities of the case shall, in the
opinion of the Tribunal, require.
"ARTICLEV.
"TIle Arbitrators shall meet at Paris, within sixty days after the delivery of the printed
arguments mentioned in Article VTII, and shall proceed impartially and carefully to
examine and decide the questions that have been, or shall be, laid before them, as
herein provided, on the part of the Governments of Her Britannic Majesty and the
United States of Venezuela respectively.
"Provided always that the Arbitrators may, if they shall think fit, hold their meetings,
or any of them, at any other place which they may determine.
"All questions considered by the Tribunal, including the final decision, shall be
determined by a majority of all the Arbitrators.
"Each of the High Contracting Parties shall name one person as its Agent to attend the
Tribunal, and to represent it generally in allmatters connected with the Tribunal.
" ARTICLE VI.
"TIle printed Case of each of the two Parties accompanied by the documents, the
official correspondence, and other evidence on which each relies, shall be delivered in
duplicate to each of the Arbitrators and to the Agent of the other Party as soon as may
be after the appointment of the members of the Tribunal, but within a period not
exceeding eight months from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this
Treaty.
" ARTICLE VTI.
"Within four months after the delivery on both sides of the printed Case, either Party
may in like manner deliver in duplicate to each of the said Arbitrators, and to the
Agent of the other Party, a Counter-Case, and additional documents, correspondence,
and evidence, in reply to the Case, documents, correspondence and evidence so
presented by the other Party.
"If in the Case submitted to the Arbitrators either Party shall have specified or alluded
to any report or document in its own exclusive possession, without annexing a copy,
such Party shall be bound, if the other Party thinks proper to apply for it, to furnish
that Party with a copy thereof, and either Party may call upon the other, through the
Arbitrators, to produce the originals or certified copies of any papers adduced as
evidence, giving in each instance notice thereof within thirty days after delivery of the
353
Case, and the original or copy so requested shall be delivered as soon as may be, and
within a period not exceeding forty days after receipt of notice.
"ARTICLE VIII.
"It shall be the duty of the Agent of each Party, within three months after the
expiration of the time limited for the delivery of the Counter-Case on both sides, to
deliver in duplicate to each of the said Arbitrators, and to the Agent of the other Party,
a printed argument showing the points, and referring to the evidence upon which his
Government relies, and either Party may also support the same before the Arbitrators
by oral argument of Counsel; and the Arbitrators may, if they desire further
elucidation with regard to any point, require a written or printed statement or
argument. or oral argument by Counsel upon it; but in such case the other Party shall
be entitled to reply either orally or in writing, as the case may be.
"ARTICLE IX.
"TIle Arbitrators may, for any cause deemed by them sufficient, enlarge either of the
periods fixed by Articles VI, VII and VIII by the allowance of thirty days additional.
"ARTICLEX.
"TIle decision of the Tribunal shall, if possible, be made within three months from the
close of the argument on both sides.
"It shall be made in writing and dated, and shall be signed by the Arbitrators who may
assent to it.
"TIle decision shall be in duplicate, one copy whereof shall be delivered to the Agent
of Great Britain for his Government, and the other copy shall be delivered to the
Agent of the United States of Venezuela for his Government.
"ARTICLE XI.
"TIle Arbitrators shall keep an accurate record of their proceedings, and may employ
the necessary officers to assist them
"ARTICLE XII.
"Each Government shall pay its own Agent and provide for the proper remuneration
of the Counsel employed by it, and of the Arbitrators appointed by it or in its behalf,
and for the expense of preparing and submitting its Case to the Tribunal. All other




"The High Contracting Parties engage to consider the result of the proceeds of the
Tribunal of Arbitration as a full, perfect, and final settlement of all the questions
referred to the Arbitrators.
"ARTICLE XIV.
"The present Treaty shall be duly ratified by Her Britannic Majesty and by the
President of the United States of Venezuela, by and with the approval of the Congress
thereof, and the ratifications sball be exchanged in London or in Washington, within
six months from the date hereof.
"In faith whereof we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed treaty and have
hereunto affixed our seals.
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Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, in consultation with the Government of British Guiana, and the
Government of Venezuela, Geneva, 17th February, 1966.
The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in
consultation with the government of British Guiana, and the Government of
Venezuela;
Taking into account the forthcoming independence of British Guiana;
Recognising that closer co-operation between British Guiana and Venezuela could
bring benefit to both countries; Convinced that any outstanding controversy between
the United Kingdom and British Guiana on the one hand and Venezuela on the other
would prejudice the furtherance of such co-operation and should therefore be
amicably resolved in a manner acceptable to both parties;
In conformity with the agenda that was agreed for the governmental conversations
concerning the controversy between Venezuela and the United Kingdom over the
frontier with British Guiana, in accordance with the joint communique of 7
November, 1963, have reached the following agreement to resolve the present
controversy:-
ARTICLE I
A Mixed Connnission shall be established with the task of seeking satisfactory
solutions for the practical settlement of the controversy between Venezuela and the
United Kingdom which has arisen as the result of the Venezuelan contention that the
Arbitral Award of 1899 about the frontier between British Guiana and Venezuela is
null and void.
ARTCLE II
(1) Within two months of the entry into force of this Agreement, two representatives
shall be appointed to the Mixed Connnission by the Government of British
Guiana and two by the Government of Venezuela.
(2) The Government appointing a representative may at any time replace him, and
shall do so immediately should one or both of its representatives be unable to act
through illness or death or any other cause.
(3) The Mixed Connnission may by agreement between the representatives appoint
experts to assist the Mixed Connnission, either generally or in relation to any
individual matter under consideration by the Mixed Connnission.
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ARTICLE III
The Mixed Commission shall present interim reports at intervals of six months from
the date of its first meeting.
ARTICLE IV
(1) If, within a period of four years from the date of this Agreement, the Mixed
Connnission should not have arrived at a full agreement for the solution of the
controversy it shall, in its fmal report, refer to the Government of Guyana and the
Government of Venezuela any outstanding questions.
Those Governments shall without delay choose one of the means of peaceful
settlement provided in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.
(2) If, within three months of receiving the fmal report, the Government of Guyana
and the Government of Venezuela should not have reached agreement regarding the
choice of one of the means of settlement provided in Article 33 of the Charter of the
United Nations, they shall refer the decision as to the means of settlement to an
appropriate international organ upon which they both agree or, failing agreement on
this point, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. If the means so chosen do
not lead to a solution of the controversy, the said organ or, as the case may be, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall choose another of the means stipulated
in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, and so on until the controversy has
been resolved or until all the means of peaceful settlement there contemplated have
been exhausted.
ARTICLE V
In order to facilitate the greatest possible measure of cooperation and mutual
understanding, nothing contained in this Agreement shall be interpreted as a
renunciation or diminution by the United Kingdom, British Guiana or Venezuela of
any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in the territories of Venezuela or British
Guiana, or of any previously asserted rights of or claims to such territorial
sovereignty, or as prejudicing their position as regards their recognition or non-
recognition of a right of, claim or basis of claim by any of them to such territorial
sovereignty.
(2) No acts or activities taking place while this Agreement is in force shall constitute a
basis for asserting, or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in the territories of
Venezuela or British Guiana or create any rights of sovereignty in those territories,
except in so far as such acts or activities result from any agreement reached by the
Mixed Commission and accepted in writing by the Government of Guyana and the
Government of Venezuela No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to
territorial sovereignty in those territories shall be asserted while this Agreement is in
force, nor shall any claim whatsoever be asserted other-wise than in the in the Mixed
Commission while that Connnission is in being.
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ARTICLE VI
The Mixed Commission shall hold its first meeting at a date and place to be agreed
between the Governments of
British Guiana and Venezuela. This meeting shall take place as soon as possible after
its members have been appointed. Thereafter the Mixed Commission shall meet as
and when agreed between the representatives.
This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature.
Upon the attainment of independence by British Guiana, the Government of Guyana
shall thereafter be a party to this Agreement, in addition to the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of
Venezuela.
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by their respective
Governments, have signed this Agreement.
Done in duplicate at Geneva this 17th day of February, 1966, in the English and
Spanish languages, both texts being
equally authoritative.
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
MICHAEL STEWART
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
L.F.S.BURNHAM
Prime Minister of British Guiana
For the Government of Venezuela:
IGNACIO IRIBARREN BORGES




The Protocol to the Geneva Agreement (Protocol of Port-of-Spain)
The Government of Guyana, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of Venezuela,
Having received on this date the Final Report dated June, 1970 of the Mixed
Commission established by the Agreement between the Government of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in consultation with the Government
of British Guiana, and the Government of Venezuela, signed at Geneva on 17th
February, 1966, hereinafter referred to as the Geneva Agreement;
Convinced that the promotion of mutual confidence and positive and friendly
intercourse between Guyana and Venezuela will lead to an improvement in their
relations befitting neighbouring and peace-loving nations, have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
So long as this Protocol remains in force and subject to the following
provisions the Government of Guyana and the Government of Venezuela shall
explore all possibilities of better understanding between them and between their
peoples and in particular shall undertake periodical reviews, through normal
diplomatic channels, of their relations with a view to promoting their improvement
and with the aim of producing a constructive advancement of the same.
ARTICLE II
(I) So long as this Protocol remains in force no claim whatever arising out of
the contention referred to in Article I of the Geneva Agreement shall be asserted by
Venezuela to territorial sovereignty in the territories of Guyana or by Guyana to
territorial sovereignty in the territories of Venezuela.
(2) In this Article, the references to the territories of Guyana and the territories
of Venezuela shall have the same meaning as the references to the territories of
British Guiana and the territories of Venezuela respectively in the Geneva Agreement.
ARTICLE III
So long as this Protocol remains in force the operation of Article IV of the
Geneva Agreement shall be suspended. On the date when this Protocol ceases to be in
force the functioning of that Article shall be resumed at the point at which it has been
suspended, that is to say, as if the Final Report of the Mixed Connnission had been
submitted on that date, unless the Government of Guyana and the Government of
Venezuela have first jointly declared in writing that they have reached full agreement
for the solution of the controversy referred to in the Geneva Agreement or that they
have agreed upon one of the means of peaceful settlement provided for in Article 33
of the Charter of the United Nations.
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ARTICLE IV
(1) So long as this Protocol remains in force Article V of the Geneva
Agreement (without prejudice to its further operation after this Protocol ceases to be
in force) shall have effect in relation to this Protocol as it has effect in relation to that
Agreement, subject to the substitution for the words "British Guiana" wherever they
occur in that Article of the word "Guyana ", and subject to the deletion from
paragraph (2) of that Article of the following phrases:
(a) ", except insofar as such acts or activities result from any agreement
reached by the Mixed Commission and accepted in writing by the Government
of Guyana and the Government of Venezuela"; and
(b) ", nor shall any claim whatsoever be asserted otherwise than in the
Mixed Commission while that
Conunission is in being".
(2) The signing and the continuance of this Protocol shall not be interpreted in
any way as a renunciation or
diminution of any rights which any of the parties may have on the date on which this
Protocol is signed or as a recognition of any situation, practice or claim existing at
that date.
ARTICLE V
(1) This Protocol shall remain in force for an initial period of twelve years,
renewable thereafter, subject to the provisions of this Article, for successive periods
of twelve years each
(2) Before the expiration either of the initial period or of any period of renewal
the Government of Guyana and the Government of Venezuela may by agreement in
writing decide that with effect from the end of any such period this Protocol shall
continue in force for successive periods of renewal each less than twelve years but not
less than five years.
(3) This Protocol may be terminated at the expiration of the initial period or of
any period of renewal if, at least six months before the date on which it may be
terminated, either the Government of Guyana or the Government of Venezuela gives
to the other Governments parties to this Protocol a notice in writing to that effect.
(4) Unless terminated in accordance with paragraph (3) of this Article, this
Protocol shall be deemed to have been renewed at the end of the initial period or at
the end of any period of renewal, as the case may be, in accordance with the
provisions of this Article.
ARTICLE VI
This Protocol to the Geneva Agreement shall be referred to as the Protocol of
Port-of-Spain and shall come into force on the date of its signature.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by
their respective Governments, have signed this Protocol.
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Done in triplicate at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, this 18th day of
June, 1970, in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally
authoritative.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF GUYANA
(sgd. SHRIDA TIl S. RAMPHAL, Minister of State
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN
AND NORTHERN IRELAND
(sgd.) R C. C. HUNTE, High Commissioner for the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ncr-them Ireland in Trinidad and Tobago.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF VENEZUELA
(sgd.) ARlSTIDES CAL VANI, Minister of External Relations.
Source: MFA (1984).
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